Quantitative FMECA-based weapon station six-property integrated design method

Abstract

The invention discloses a quantitative FMECA-based six-property integrated design method for a weapon station. The method comprises the following steps: step 1, carrying out system definition on the weapon station; step 2, fault mode analysis; step 3, fault reason analysis; step 4, fault influence and severity analysis; step 5, a fault detection method; step 6, design improvement and use compensation measure analysis; step 7, analyzing harmfulness; determining the scope of reliability design according to the step 7; determining the scope of maintainability design according to the steps 2 to 4; determining the scope of the supportability design according to the steps 5-6; determining the category of testability design according to the step 5; determining a security design category according to the step 2 and the step 5; and determining the scope of the environmental adaptability design according to the step 2. According to the method, quantitative FMECA analysis is firstly carried out on the weapon station, design is improved and optimized based on the quantitative FMECA analysis result, and performance and six properties are integrally and synchronously carried out.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This method belongs to the field of six-property design analysis, and particularly relates to a six-property integrated design method for weapon stations based on quantitative FMECA. Background Art

[0002] If a weapon station that is "easy to use, effective, durable and practical" is developed, the formation and maintenance of effective combat effectiveness of the weapon station and the comprehensive improvement of the ability to prepare for war are the problems that need to be solved urgently in the design process of the weapon station. Meeting the performance requirements of the weapon station is the basis and premise of the design, and improving the six-property design capabilities of the weapon station is the key to solving the above problems.

[0003] FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis) is an important work in the six-character design analysis of weapon stations. It is not only indispensable for improving and ensuring reliability, but also has important value for ensuring other general quality characteristics because it can directly or indirectly provide information or data. However, the current application of FMECA technology in the field of weapon stations is still mainly based on passive response to military requirements. The FMECA that has been carried out is only treated as a design archive file, and most of it is qualitative analysis. Quantitative analysis has not yet started, and the FMECA analysis results have not been incorporated into the forward design, and the effect of FMECA application has not been achieved. Summary of the invention

[0004] The present invention provides a six-property integrated design method for a weapon station based on quantitative FMECA. The present invention first performs a quantitative FMECA analysis on the weapon station, and based on the quantitative FMECA analysis results, improves and optimizes the design to achieve simultaneous integration of performance and six properties.

[0005] The technical solutions to the above problems are as follows:

[0006] The six-property integrated design method of weapon station based on quantitative FMECA includes the following steps:

[0007] Step 1, define the weapon station system;

[0008] Step 2: Failure mode analysis: find out all possible functional or hardware failure modes from the functional description or hardware characteristics of the analyzed product and the requirements of the failure criteria;

[0009] Step 3: Failure cause analysis: analyze all possible causes of each failure mode;

[0010] Step 4, failure impact and severity analysis, find out the impact of each possible failure mode of the product and analyze its severity, where the impact of each failure mode is divided into local impact, higher-level impact and final impact, and the severity category of the weapon station is classified;

[0011] Step 5, fault detection method;

[0012] Step 6: Design improvements and use of compensation measures analysis;

[0013] Step 7, criticality analysis, classifies the severity of each failure mode of the product and the comprehensive impact of its probability of occurrence, so as to comprehensively evaluate the impact of all possible failure modes in the product;

[0014] Determine the scope of reliability design according to step 7; determine the scope of maintainability design according to steps 2 to 4; determine the scope of assurance design according to steps 5 to 6; determine the scope of testability design according to step 5; determine the scope of safety design according to steps 2 and 5; determine the scope of environmental adaptability design according to step 2.

[0015] The present invention performs functional analysis on the weapon station and draws a functional block diagram and a task reliability block diagram; uses a variety of failure mode acquisition methods to obtain all possible functional failure modes of the weapon station; analyzes all possible causes of each failure mode for all possible functional failure modes of the weapon station; finds out the impact of each possible failure mode of the weapon station and analyzes its severity; determines the fault detection method for each failure mode; analyzes design improvements and uses compensation measures; and quantitatively analyzes the comprehensive impact of the severity of each failure mode of the weapon station and the probability of its occurrence, and uses the determined quantitative analysis results as input to perform reliability design, maintainability design, supportability design, testability design, safety design and environmental adaptability optimization design to achieve simultaneous integration of performance and six properties. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0016] Figure 1 This is a diagram of the composition of the high-voltage power supply box of a weapon station's power management subsystem.

[0017] Figure 2 This is the corresponding diagram of the functional level and structural level of the high-voltage power box of a weapon station power management subsystem.

[0018] Figure 3 This is the mission reliability block diagram of the high-voltage power supply box of a weapon station power management subsystem.

[0019] Figure 4 A hazard matrix diagram. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0020] The present invention will be further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0021] The six-property integrated design method of a weapon station based on quantitative FMECA of the present invention includes reliability, maintainability, testability, security, safety, and environmental adaptability. The steps for implementing the above method are as follows:

[0022] Step 1, define the weapon station system, including:

[0023] ① Perform functional analysis on the weapon station. After describing the mission of the weapon station, analyze its main functions, working modes (such as continuous work, intermittent work) and working time under different mission profiles, and give full consideration to the analysis of the product interface;

[0024] ② Draw the functional block diagram and task reliability block diagram:

[0025] a) Draw a functional block diagram. A functional block diagram is a functional model used to represent the tasks or relationships between the functions of each component of the product, as well as the functional logical sequence, data (information) flow, and interface between each agreed level of the product.

[0026] b) Draw a task reliability block diagram. The reliability block diagram describes the relationship between the overall reliability of the product and the reliability of its components. It only represents the logical relationship of the impact of failures. If the product has multiple tasks or multiple working modes, corresponding task reliability block diagrams should be established separately.

[0027] Step 2, failure mode analysis, find out all possible functional or hardware failure modes from the functional description or hardware characteristics of the analyzed product and the requirements of the failure criteria. The main contents are:

[0028] ① Failure mode analysis of different FMECA methods:

[0029] a) When performing functional FMECA, determine all possible functional failure modes based on the functional description and failure criteria in step 1, and then analyze each functional failure mode.

[0030] b) When performing hardware FMECA, determine all possible hardware failure modes based on the hardware characteristics of the product in step 1, and then analyze each hardware failure mode.

[0031] ② Method of obtaining failure mode:

[0032] a) For existing products, the failure modes that occurred in the past use of the product are used as the basis, and then the failure modes of the product are obtained by analysis and correction according to the similarities and differences in the environmental conditions of the product.

[0033] b) For new products, the functional principles and structural characteristics of the new products can be used for analysis and prediction to obtain the failure mode of the product, or the failure mode of the product can be analyzed and determined based on the failure mode of products with similar functions and structures.

[0034] c) For imported shelf products, we should ask the foreign merchants for their failure modes, or analyze and determine their failure modes based on the failure modes that occur in products with similar functions and similar structures.

[0035] d) When the methods in b) and c) cannot obtain the failure mode, the possible failure mode of the analyzed product can be determined by referring to the typical failure modes in the relevant standards.

[0036] Step 3, failure cause analysis, analyze all possible causes of each failure mode, including:

[0037] ① Direct causes of product design defects, manufacturing defects, etc. that lead to product functional failure or potential failure.

[0038] ② Indirect causes of product failure caused by external factors (such as failure of other products, test equipment, usage, environment and human factors, etc.).

[0039] Step 4, failure impact and severity analysis, find out the impact of each possible failure mode of the product and analyze its severity. The impact of each failure mode is divided into local impact, higher-level impact and final impact. The severity category of the weapon station is divided into Class I (catastrophic), Class II (fatal), Class III (moderate) and Class IV (mild).

[0040] Step 5, fault detection method. The main contents of the fault detection method generally include: visual inspection, on-site detection, off-site detection, etc. Its means include built-in test (BIT), automatic sensing device, sensing instrument, sound alarm device, display alarm device and telemetry, etc.

[0041] Step 6, design improvement and use of compensation measures analysis, including:

[0042] ① Design improvement measures: When a product fails, consider whether there are redundant devices that can continue to work; safety or insurance devices (such as monitoring and alarm devices); alternative working methods (such as backup or auxiliary equipment); design improvements that can eliminate or reduce the impact of the failure (such as preferred components, thermal design, derating design, etc.).

[0043] ② Use compensatory measures: In order to avoid or prevent the occurrence of failures as much as possible, the use and maintenance measures specified in the use and maintenance regulations, once a failure occurs, the operator should take the most appropriate remedial measures, etc.

[0044] Step 7, criticality analysis, classifies the severity of each failure mode of the product and the comprehensive impact of its probability of occurrence, so as to comprehensively evaluate the impact of all possible failure modes in the product. Common methods include:

[0045] ① The risk priority number method is to prioritize the RPN value of each failure mode of the product and take appropriate measures to make the RPN value reach the minimum acceptable level.

[0046] ② Criticality matrix analysis method, which compares the criticality of each product and its failure mode, and provides a basis for determining the order of product improvement measures, including:

[0047] a) When product failure data is not available, select the qualitative criticality matrix analysis method.

[0048] b) When more accurate product failure data is available, the quantitative criticality matrix analysis method is selected.

[0049] Steps 8 to 10 fall under the category of reliability design.

[0050] Step 8, determine the list of reliability-critical products. Based on the RPN value or hazard matrix determined in step 7, determine that the products with an RPN value greater than a certain specified value or falling within a certain specified area in the hazard matrix are reliability-critical products. Develop a list of reliability-critical products and control them during design, production, and use.

[0051] Step 9, determine the list of serious failure modes. Based on the list of key reliability products determined in step 8 and combined with the failure modes of severity I and II determined in step 4, determine the list of serious failure modes, list them separately and control them.

[0052] Step 10, determine the list of single-point failure modes. According to the failure mode with failure impact probability β=1 determined in step 7, determine the list of single-point failure modes and indicate the severity of the failure impact. Failure modes that are both in the serious failure list and in the single-point failure list should be especially controlled.

[0053] Steps 11 to 13 fall under the category of maintainability design.

[0054] Step 11. Using the failure mode list determined in step 2 as the basic input, conduct maintainability design for the weapon station from the aspects of reducing maintenance downtime, reducing maintenance costs, reducing maintenance complexity, reducing maintenance personnel requirements, and reducing maintenance errors. The main design criteria include quick and easy detection and diagnosis, accessibility design, error prevention and labeling, and maintenance safety.

[0055] Step 12, arrange a maintenance plan, according to the cause of the fault determined in step 3, the severity category determined in step 4, the fault detection method determined in step 5, and taking into account the maintenance cost and maintenance time. For the faults with high severity level determined in step 4 but no detection method, arrange some regular inspections.

[0056] Step 13, arrange the maintainability verification test. If the failures occurring during the test cannot meet the failure sample size requirement for the test, perform failure simulation and sampling test according to the severity and probability of each failure determined by the hazard analysis in step 7.

[0057] Step 14 falls under the category of safeguard design.

[0058] Step 14, reasonably arrange spare parts and maintenance personnel. According to the fault detection method determined in step 5 and the use compensation measures determined in step 6, scientifically and reasonably arrange the spare parts required for equipment maintenance, and determine whether it will be implemented by operators or maintenance personnel.

[0059] Step 15 falls under the category of testability design.

[0060] Step 15: Arrange testability design and other tasks reasonably based on the product failure rate and the fault detection method determined in step 5.

[0061] Step 16-Step 17 belongs to the category of security design.

[0062] Step 16, based on the failure modes determined in step 2, group the failure modes according to their impact on specific-level products, so as to check whether the fault tree analysis (FTA) covers various failure modes.

[0063] Step 17, review the failure mode determined in step 2 from a safety perspective, and avoid undetectable failures as much as possible during product design in accordance with safety regulations or safety design requirements of specific equipment.

[0064] Step 18 falls under the category of environmental adaptability design.

[0065] Step 18, based on the failure mode determined in step 2 and the corresponding failure detection method determined in step 5, the functional performance and working status of the test product of the environmental adaptability test are detected or monitored, and the completeness of such detection or monitoring is evaluated.

[0066] Combine the following Figures 1 to 4 The method involved in the present invention is further described as follows for a high voltage power supply box of a power management subsystem of a weapon station:

[0067] Step 1: System definition of the high voltage power supply box, including:

[0068] ①Perform functional analysis on the high voltage power supply box.

[0069] a) The function of the high-voltage power supply box of a certain weapon station power management subsystem is to complete the high-voltage DC power distribution function to the weapon station. It is composed of a high-voltage control board, a high-voltage DC distribution board, a three-phase AC rectifier board, a three-phase Hall sampling board, a circuit breaker 1QF3, a fuse 1FU1, a contactor 1KM1, a rectifier module 1N1 and a push button switch 1SB1.

[0070] b) Agreement level: The initial agreement level is a weapon station; the division of the agreement level and the minimum agreement level is shown in Figure 1 .

[0071] c) Definition of severity categories: Based on the characteristics of the weapon station, the definition of severity categories is shown in Table 1, and the recommended values ​​of the failure impact probability β are shown in Table 2.

[0072] Table 1 Definition of severity categories of weapon stations

[0073]

[0074] Table 2 Recommended values ​​of failure impact probability β

[0075]

[0076] ② Draw the functional block diagram and task reliability block diagram:

[0077] a) Draw a functional block diagram. The functional level and structural level correspondence diagram of the high-voltage power supply box of a certain weapon station power management subsystem is shown in Figure 2 .

[0078] b) Draw a mission reliability block diagram. The mission reliability block diagram of the high-voltage power supply box of a certain weapon station power management subsystem is shown in Figure 3 .

[0079] According to the failure mode analysis in step 2, the failure cause analysis in step 3, the failure impact and severity analysis in step 4, the failure detection method in step 5, the design improvement and compensation measures analysis in step 6, and the criticality analysis in step 7, the hardware FMECA analysis of the high-voltage power supply box is carried out. The results are shown in Table 3. The hardware FMECA table of the high-voltage power supply box of the power management subsystem of a certain type of weapon station and Figure 4 Hazard matrix diagram.

[0080] The relevant matters regarding Table 3 are as follows:

[0081] Initial engagement level: Weapon Station

[0082] Task: High voltage power distribution control

[0083] Audit: XXX

[0084] Agreement level: High voltage power box

[0085] Analyst: XXX

[0086] approve: XXX

[0087] Date of filling: XXX

[0088] Table 3 is the hardware FMECA table of the high-voltage power supply box of a certain type of weapon station power management subsystem. The following is the specific content of Table 3.

[0089]

[0090]

[0091]

[0092] Steps 8 to 10 fall under the category of reliability design.

[0093] Step 8, determine the list of key reliability products. According to the hazard matrix obtained in step 7, determine the products falling in the upper right corner area of ​​the hazard matrix as key reliability products, and formulate a list of key reliability products to control them during design, production, and use. The list of key reliability products for the high-voltage power supply box of a certain type of weapon station power management subsystem is shown in Table 4.

[0094] Table 4 Reliability key product list

[0095]

[0096] Step 9, determine the list of serious failure modes. According to Table 3, determine the list of failure modes with severity of Class I and Class II, list them separately and control them. The severity of the high-voltage power supply box of a certain type of weapon station power management subsystem is Class I and Class II, and the list of failure modes is shown in Table 5.

[0097] Table 5 List of failure modes for severity Ⅰ and Ⅱ

[0098]

[0099]

[0100] Step 10, determine the single point failure mode list. According to the failure mode with failure impact probability β=1 determined in step 7, determine the single point failure mode list and indicate the severity of the failure impact. The single point failure mode list of the high voltage power supply box of a certain weapon station power management subsystem is shown in Table 6. Combining Tables 5 and 6, it is determined that the two failure modes of "the control panel of the high voltage control panel does not work" and "the lifting servo box of the high voltage DC distribution panel has no high voltage" are both in the serious failure list and in the single point failure list, and should be controlled in particular.

[0101] Table 6 List of single point failure modes

[0102]

[0103] Steps 11 to 13 fall under the category of maintainability design.

[0104] Step 11, using the failure mode list and compensation measures determined in Table 3 as basic input, perform the following maintainability design on the high voltage power supply box:

[0105] 1) Designed as easy-to-plug and quickly replaceable modules and circuit boards: The high-voltage control board, high-voltage DC distribution board, three-phase AC rectifier board, and three-phase Hall sampling board of the high-voltage power supply box are designed to be pluggable and can be directly replaced; the circuit breaker, fuse, contactor, rectifier module, and push button switch of the high-voltage power supply box can be directly disassembled and replaced.

[0106] 2) The fuse of the high-voltage power supply box is set on the front panel for easy replacement.

[0107] 3) The high-voltage AC power supply, high-voltage DC power supply and low-voltage power supply in the high-voltage control box use wires of different colors, so different power supplies can be quickly distinguished during maintenance.

[0108] 4) Rationally configure and combine the detection signals of the fault diagnosis built-in test (BIT) to improve the accuracy of fault location and enhance maintainability.

[0109] Step 12, based on the list of failure modes, causes of failure, severity categories, fault detection methods and compensation measures determined in Table 3, taking into account the maintenance cost and maintenance time, and combining routine and preventive maintenance task analysis, arrange a maintenance plan. Among them, for the failures with high severity levels determined in Table 3 but no detection methods, arrange some regular inspections. The maintenance arrangement of the high-voltage power supply box of the power management subsystem of a certain type of weapon station includes routine inspection in Table 7, preventive maintenance in Table 8, and corrective maintenance in Table 9.

[0110] Table 7 Routine inspection requirements for the high voltage power supply box of a certain type of weapon station power management subsystem

[0111]

[0112]

[0113] Table 8 Summary of preventive maintenance work for the high-voltage power supply box of a certain type of weapon station power management subsystem

[0114]

[0115] Table 9 Summary of corrective maintenance work for the high voltage power supply box of a certain type of weapon station power management subsystem

[0116]

[0117] Step 13, arrange the maintainability verification test. If the faults occurring during the test cannot meet the fault sample size requirement for the test, perform fault simulation and sampling test on the high-voltage control board and circuit breaker 1QF3 according to the list of key reliability products determined in Table 4. Use the faulty parts of the high-voltage control board and the faulty parts of the circuit breaker 1QF3 to replace the normal parts, generate simulated faults, and conduct the maintainability verification test.

[0118] Step 14 falls under the category of safeguard design.

[0119] Step 14, reasonably arrange spare parts and maintenance personnel. According to the fault detection method and compensation measures determined in Table 3, scientifically and reasonably arrange the spare parts required for equipment maintenance, and determine whether it is implemented by operators or maintenance personnel. The support arrangement of the high-voltage power supply box of a certain type of weapon station power management subsystem includes the maintenance personnel quantity and professional and technical level requirement list in Table 10, the maintenance spare parts requirement list in Table 11, and the technical data requirement list in Table 12.

[0120] Table 10 List of maintenance personnel quantity and professional and technical level requirements

[0121] Maintenance level quantity major Technical Level Battlefield Level 1 electrician primary Base Level 1 electrician primary

[0122] Table 11 Maintenance spare parts requirements list

[0123]

[0124] Table 12 Technical data requirements list

[0125] Serial number Technical data name quantity Maintenance level 1 Operation and maintenance instructions for a certain weapon station power management subsystem 1 Battlefield Level

[0126] Step 15 falls under the category of testability design.

[0127] Step 15, according to the fault detection method determined in Table 3, the high voltage power supply box is designed for testing as follows:

[0128] 1) The high-voltage power supply box is designed as a plug-in circuit board and device board;

[0129] 2) Leave enough space between the components in the high-voltage power supply box to use test clips or test probes;

[0130] 3) The high-voltage AC power supply, high-voltage DC power supply and low-voltage power supply in the high-voltage power supply box use wires of different colors;

[0131] 4) The high-voltage power supply box is equipped with a CAN bus dedicated connector for access to the weapon station CAN bus, providing a dedicated test input signal and data path to detect and isolate internal faults of the high-voltage power supply box;

[0132] 5) The high-voltage power supply box is provided with a small door that can be opened and closed. A test point is set inside the small door, and the working parameters can be tested using detection equipment.

[0133] Step 16-Step 17 belongs to the category of security design.

[0134] Step 16, based on the failure modes determined in Table 3, check whether various failure modes are covered by the fault tree analysis (FTA) of the high-voltage power supply box, and add and supplement the failure modes identified in Table 3 but missing in the FTA analysis to ensure the integrity of the FTA.

[0135] Step 17, according to the failure mode determined in Table 3, review it from the perspective of safety, and avoid undetectable failures as much as possible during product design in accordance with the requirements of safety regulations or the safety design requirements of specific equipment. The following safety design is performed on the high-voltage power supply box:

[0136] 1) The high-voltage AC power supply, high-voltage DC power supply and low-voltage power supply in the electrical box use wires of different colors to intuitively distinguish different power supplies and improve maintenance safety;

[0137] 2) The main power circuit and different power supply and distribution circuits are respectively provided with corresponding insurance devices to protect the safety of the previous stage devices, equipment and personnel in case of overload of the latter stage;

[0138] 3) Both the high voltage power supply and the low voltage power supply are designed with over-current and over-voltage and under-voltage protection functions.

[0139] Step 18 falls under the category of environmental adaptability design.

[0140] Step 18, according to the fault modes and corresponding fault detection methods determined in Table 3, during the environmental adaptability test, the functions of the components and parts of the high-voltage power supply box are tested or monitored by comparing the product names and functions in Table 3, and the completeness of the environmental adaptability test is evaluated based on such testing or monitoring.

Claims

1. The six-property integrated design method of weapon station based on quantitative FMECA is characterized by: The following steps are involved: Step 1, define the weapon station system; Step 2: Failure mode analysis: find out all possible functional or hardware failure modes from the functional description or hardware characteristics of the analyzed product and the requirements of the failure criteria; Step 3: Failure cause analysis: analyze all possible causes of each failure mode; Step 4, failure impact and severity analysis, find out the impact of each possible failure mode of the product and analyze its severity, where the impact of each failure mode is divided into local impact, higher-level impact and final impact, and the severity category of the weapon station is classified; Step 5, fault detection method; Step 6: Design improvements and use of compensation measures analysis; Step 7, criticality analysis, classify the severity of each failure mode of the product and the comprehensive impact of its probability of occurrence, so as to comprehensively evaluate the impact of all possible failure modes in the product; Determine the scope of reliability design according to step 7; determine the scope of maintainability design according to steps 2 to 4; determine the scope of assurance design according to steps 5 to 6; determine the scope of testability design according to step 5; determine the scope of safety design according to steps 2 and 5; determine the scope of environmental adaptability design according to step 2.

2. The six-property integrated design method of weapon station based on quantitative FMECA according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The process of system definition for the weapon station in step 1 is as follows: ① Conduct functional analysis on the weapon station. After describing the mission of the weapon station, analyze its main functions, working methods and working hours under different mission profiles, and give full consideration to the analysis of the product interface; ② Draw the functional block diagram and task reliability block diagram: a) Draw a functional block diagram, which is a functional model used to represent the tasks or relationships between the functions of each component of the product, as well as the functional logic sequence, data flow, and interface between each agreed level of the product; b) Draw a task reliability block diagram. The reliability block diagram describes the relationship between the overall reliability of the product and the reliability of its components. It only represents the logical relationship of the impact of failures. If the product has multiple tasks or multiple working modes, corresponding task reliability block diagrams should be established separately.

3. The six-property integrated design method of weapon station based on quantitative FMECA according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The main contents of the failure mode analysis in step 2 include: ① Failure mode analysis of different FMECA methods: a) When performing functional FMECA, determine all possible functional failure modes according to the functional description and failure criteria in step 1, and then analyze each functional failure mode; b) When performing hardware FMECA, determine all possible hardware failure modes based on the hardware characteristics of the product in step 1, and then analyze each hardware failure mode; ② Method for obtaining failure mode: a) For existing products, based on the failure modes that occurred in the past use of the product, analysis and correction are performed according to the similarities and differences in the environmental conditions of the product, and then the failure mode of the product is obtained; b) For new products, analysis and prediction can be conducted based on the functional principles and structural characteristics of the new products to obtain the failure mode of the product, or the failure mode of the product can be analyzed and determined based on the failure mode of products with similar functions and structures; c) For imported shelf products, the failure modes should be obtained from foreign merchants, or the failure modes of products with similar functions and structures should be analyzed and determined based on the failure modes; d) When the methods in b) and c) cannot obtain the failure mode, determine the possible failure mode of the analyzed product by referring to the typical failure modes in the relevant standards.

4. The six-property integrated design method of weapon station based on quantitative FMECA according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The design improvement and use of compensation measures analysis in step 6 include: ① Design improvement measures: When a product fails, consider whether there are redundant devices that can continue to work; safety or insurance devices; alternative working methods; design improvements that can eliminate or reduce the impact of the failure; ② Use compensatory measures: In order to avoid or prevent the occurrence of failures as much as possible, the use and maintenance measures specified in the use and maintenance regulations are the most appropriate remedial measures that the operator should take once a failure occurs.

5. The six-property integrated design method for weapon stations based on quantitative FMECA according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The methods for hazard analysis in step 7 are: ① The risk priority number method is to prioritize the RPN value of each failure mode of the product and take corresponding measures to make the RPN value reach the minimum acceptable level; ② Criticality matrix analysis method, which compares the criticality of each product and its failure mode, and provides a basis for determining the order of product improvement measures. a) When product failure data cannot be obtained, select the qualitative criticality matrix analysis method; b) When more accurate product failure data is available, the quantitative criticality matrix analysis method is selected.

6. The six-property integrated design method for weapon stations based on quantitative FMECA according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Determining the scope of reliability design according to step 7 includes the following steps: Step 8, determine the list of reliability-critical products, and according to the RPN value or hazard matrix determined in step 7, determine that the products whose RPN value is greater than a certain specified value or falls within a certain specified area in the hazard matrix are reliability-critical products; Step 9, determine the list of serious failure modes, based on the list of key reliability products determined in step 8 and the severity determined in step 4, and list and control them separately; Step 10, determine a list of single-point failure modes. According to the failure mode with a failure impact probability β=1 determined in step 7, determine a list of single-point failure modes and indicate the severity of the failure impact.

7. The six-property integrated design method for weapon stations based on quantitative FMECA according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Determining the scope of maintainability design according to steps 2 to 4 includes the following steps: Step 11, using the failure mode list determined in step 2 as the basic input, conduct maintainability design for the weapon station from the aspects of reducing maintenance downtime, reducing maintenance costs, reducing maintenance complexity, reducing maintenance personnel requirements, and reducing maintenance errors. The main design criteria include rapid and easy detection and diagnosis, accessibility design, error prevention and labeling, and maintenance safety; Step 12, arranging a maintenance plan, arranging a maintenance plan according to the fault cause determined in step 3, the severity category determined in step 4, the fault detection method determined in step 5, and taking into account the maintenance cost and maintenance time; Step 13, arrange the maintainability verification test. If the failures occurring during the test cannot meet the failure sample size requirement for the test, perform failure simulation and sampling test according to the severity and probability of each failure determined by the hazard analysis in step 7.

8. The six-property integrated design method for weapon stations based on quantitative FMECA according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Determining the scope of the safeguard design according to Steps 5 and 6 includes the following steps: Step 14, reasonably arrange spare parts and maintenance personnel. According to the fault detection method determined in step 5 and the use compensation measures determined in step 6, scientifically and reasonably arrange the spare parts required for equipment maintenance, and determine whether it will be implemented by operators or maintenance personnel.

9. The six-property integrated design method for weapon stations based on quantitative FMECA according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Determining the scope of the testability design according to step 5 includes the following steps: Step 15: Arrange the test design work reasonably according to the product failure rate and the fault detection method determined in step 5.

10. The six-property integrated design method for weapon stations based on quantitative FMECA according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Determining the scope of the safety design according to step 2 includes the following steps: Step 16, based on the failure modes determined in step 2, group the failure modes according to their impact on the specific level of products, so as to check whether the fault tree analysis covers various failure modes; Step 17: Review the failure mode determined in step 2 from a safety perspective, and avoid undetectable failures as much as possible during product design in accordance with safety regulations or safety design requirements of specific equipment; Determining the scope of environmental adaptability design according to step 2 and step 5 includes the following steps: Step 18, based on the failure mode determined in step 2 and the corresponding failure detection method determined in step 5, the functional performance and working status of the test product of the environmental adaptability test are detected or monitored, and the completeness of such detection or monitoring is evaluated.

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