Combat support risk analysis method and system

Abstract

The invention discloses a combat support risk analysis method and system, belongs to the technical field of risk analysis, and can solve the problem that risk analysis is difficult to visualize and quantify at the same time in the prior art. The method comprises the following steps: S1, determining a top event and a hazard source of an analysis object; s2, drawing a bow-tie diagram of the analysis object according to the top event and the hazard source; s3, determining a risk matrix of each consequence element in the bow tie diagram; and S4, obtaining a risk analysis result of the analysis object according to the bow-tie diagram and the risk matrix. The method is used for combat support risk analysis.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of risk analysis, and in particular relates to a combat support risk analysis method and system. Background Art

[0002] Risk analysis is an important part of joint combat command and support. In a complex and ever-changing battlefield environment, accurate risk analysis can provide important decision-making support for risk management, avoid possible risk factors, and thus ensure the safety of combat personnel and the effective performance of weapons and equipment.

[0003] The bowtie diagram, also known as the Bowtie diagram, is a method of risk analysis and management with significant advantages and wide application, and its application in the military has great potential. However, as far as the current status of theoretical research on bowtie diagram risk analysis is concerned, the bowtie diagram cannot fully meet the needs of military risk analysis and management. The traditional bowtie diagram focuses on qualitative analysis, and the quantitative analysis involved is limited to vague descriptive words such as "more" and "less", making it difficult to visualize and quantify risk analysis. Summary of the invention

[0004] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a combat support risk analysis method and system that can visualize and quantify risk analysis.

[0005] The content of the present invention includes:

[0006] In one aspect, the present invention provides a method for analyzing operational support risks, the method comprising:

[0007] S1. Determine the top events and hazards of the analysis object;

[0008] S2. Draw a bowtie diagram of the analysis object according to the top event and the danger source;

[0009] S3, determining a risk matrix for each consequence element in the bowtie diagram;

[0010] S4. Obtain risk analysis results of the analysis object according to the bowtie diagram and the risk matrix.

[0011] Optionally, the S3 specifically includes:

[0012] S31, obtaining the risk occurrence probability and consequence severity of each consequence element in the bowtie diagram at different analysis angles;

[0013] S32. Determine the severity level of the corresponding consequence element at the corresponding analysis angle according to the risk occurrence probability and the consequence severity;

[0014] S33. Generate a risk matrix of corresponding consequence elements according to the consequence severity level.

[0015] Optionally, the analysis perspectives include personnel, material, society and environment.

[0016] Optionally, the S2 specifically includes:

[0017] S21, determining the consequence elements caused by the top event and the threat elements that cause the top event to get out of control;

[0018] S22. Identify the barriers for each consequence element and each threat element;

[0019] S23. Draw a bowtie diagram of the analysis object based on the top event, the hazard source, the consequence element, the threat element and the barrier.

[0020] Optionally, after S22, S2 further includes:

[0021] S24. Determine the degradation factors and degradation control measures for each barrier;

[0022] Correspondingly, the S23 is specifically:

[0023] A bowtie diagram of the analysis object is drawn based on the overhead event, the hazard source, the consequence element, the threat element, the barrier and its degradation factors and degradation control measures.

[0024] Optionally, the S22 is specifically:

[0025] Identify the prevention barriers for each consequence element and the mitigation barriers for each threat element;

[0026] Correspondingly, the S24 is specifically as follows:

[0027] Identify the degradation factors and degradation control measures for each prevention-type barrier and the degradation factors and degradation control measures for each mitigation-type barrier;

[0028] The S23 is specifically:

[0029] A bowtie diagram of the analysis object is drawn based on the top event, the hazard source, the consequence element, the threat element, the prevention barrier and its degradation factors and degradation control measures, and the mitigation barrier and its degradation factors and degradation control measures.

[0030] Optionally, the threat elements include combat personnel, command decisions, weapons and equipment, logistics support and intelligence information.

[0031] Optionally, the consequence elements include causing casualties, causing property damage and causing negative social impact.

[0032] In another aspect, the present invention provides a combat support risk analysis system, the system comprising:

[0033] The first determination module is used to determine the top events and danger sources of the analysis object;

[0034] A drawing module, used for drawing a bowtie diagram of the analysis object according to the top event and the danger source;

[0035] A second determination module is used to determine a risk matrix for each consequence element in the bowtie diagram;

[0036] The result analysis module obtains the risk analysis result of the analysis object according to the bowtie diagram and the risk matrix.

[0037] Optionally, the second determining module specifically includes:

[0038] An acquisition unit, used for acquiring the risk occurrence probability and consequence severity of each consequence element in the bowtie diagram at different analysis angles;

[0039] A determination unit, configured to determine the severity level of a consequence of a corresponding consequence element at a corresponding analysis angle according to the risk occurrence probability and the severity level of the consequence;

[0040] A generating unit generates a risk matrix of corresponding consequence elements according to the consequence severity level.

[0041] Beneficial effects of the present invention:

[0042] The combat support risk analysis method provided by the present invention analyzes the constituent elements of the bowtie graph model, namely, top events, sources of danger, threats, consequences, barriers, barrier degradation factors and degradation control measures, etc., in the context of joint combat command support tasks, and analyzes risks from four aspects, namely, combat personnel, weapons and equipment, society and battlefield environment. From these four aspects, the impact of risks can be analyzed more comprehensively. On this basis, the present invention uses the risk matrix to unify the severity of the consequences of risks and the probability of risk events, and makes a semi-quantitative assessment of the severity of combat support risks from these two dimensions, thereby providing decision-making support for improving the emergency response level of troops. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0043] Figure 1 A flow chart of a combat support risk analysis method provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0044] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a risk matrix provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0045] Figure 3 A risk matrix diagram of a consequence element 1 provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0046] Figure 4 A risk matrix diagram of consequence element 2 provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0047] Figure 5 A risk matrix diagram of consequence element three provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0048] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of a bowtie diagram and a risk matrix provided in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0049] The present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with embodiments, but the present invention is not limited to these embodiments.

[0050] Violent terrorist incidents occur frequently around the world, and combating terrorists and maintaining social stability is an important challenge faced by governments of all countries. As the means by which terrorists carry out terrorist activities become more and more diverse, the risk sources faced by our military's mobile forces in carrying out emergency response and stability maintenance operations from enemy situations, battlefield environments, command decisions, weapons and equipment, etc. are more complex and changeable. The present invention uses the bow tie chart as a risk analysis tool, starting from the emergency response and stability maintenance tasks of the mobile forces, and makes an in-depth analysis of the emergency response and stability maintenance risks, providing decision-making support for improving the emergency response level of the troops.

[0051] Emergency response and stabilization operations are a type of non-war military operations with the following main characteristics: terrorist incidents occur suddenly and quickly, without any signs beforehand, and are not easy to detect. Therefore, emergency response and stabilization teams must grasp all kinds of intelligence information and situation of emergencies in a very short period of time and respond quickly; the tasks of quelling riots are relatively scattered, and the battlefield environment for quelling riots is very complex and unpredictable, making it difficult to control the entire situation; emergency response and stabilization operations are highly concealed, uncertain and unpredictable, intelligence information is complex and difficult to discern, and information security requirements are very high.

[0052] Mobile force emergency response and stabilization operations face great uncertainty, and the timeliness of the operations is extremely high. Therefore, before implementing emergency response and stabilization risk analysis, we must first have a clear understanding of the definition of emergency response and stabilization risk, the characteristics of risk analysis, etc.

[0053] The risk of mobile force emergency response and stabilization operations refers to the possibility that, during the process of mobile force carrying out emergency response and stabilization operations, the proposed riot control action plan may not be able to quell the riots effectively due to the suddenness, uncertainty, complexity and variability of the riots, resulting in adverse consequences such as casualties, economic losses, obstruction of operations, adverse social impacts, and making it difficult to achieve the expected goals of the action plan.

[0054] The embodiment of the present invention provides a method for analyzing operational support risks. Figure 1 As shown, the method includes:

[0055] S1. Determine the top events and hazards of the analysis object.

[0056] The main steps of drawing a bowtie diagram are: first, analyze the possible risks and determine the top events and hazards; second, find out all possible causes of top events and the possible consequences after the top events occur based on the contents of the top events and hazards; third, analyze each preventive barrier that may reduce the impact of the threat and the mitigation barrier that may reduce the impact of the consequences; finally, analyze the possible barrier degradation factors and degradation control measures for each barrier.

[0057] According to the definition of top events, that is, top events occur when the source of danger is out of control or fails and releases the potential for harm, top events in emergency response and stabilization operations can be defined as "failure of emergency response and stabilization operations when violent terrorist actions occur". After a violent terrorist incident occurs, the mobile force must first mobilize its personnel, weapons and equipment to rush to the scene of the incident for disposal as soon as possible according to the tasks it undertakes. In this process, due to the great uncertainty faced by personnel, weapons and equipment, information and intelligence, it is possible that the emergency response and stabilization operations cannot play a good role, thus causing the operation to fail. However, after the failure of the emergency response and stabilization operations, the mobile force still has the opportunity to take other measures to reduce its impact. Therefore, although the failure of the emergency response and stabilization operations of the mobile force may bring adverse effects when violent terrorist actions occur, there is still a possibility of remedy. Therefore, in the risk analysis of emergency response and stabilization operations, the top event can be defined as "failure of emergency response and stabilization operations when violent terrorist actions occur".

[0058] In the bowtie diagram analysis theory, the hazard source is a factor that may cause harm, including various operations, activities or substances. Obviously, emergency response and stabilization operations are an activity that needs to be taken in an emergency. In this activity, there are many uncertain factors that may lead to the occurrence of top events. Therefore, in the risk analysis of emergency response and stabilization operations, the hazard source can be defined as "emergency response and stabilization operations."

[0059] S2. Draw a bowtie diagram of the analysis object based on top events and hazards.

[0060] S2 specifically includes:

[0061] S21. Determine the consequence elements caused by the top incident and the threat elements that cause the top incident to get out of control;

[0062] S22. Identify the barriers for each consequence element and each threat element;

[0063] S23. Draw a bowtie diagram of the analysis object based on top events, hazard sources, consequence elements, threat elements and barriers.

[0064] Preferably, after S22, S2 further includes:

[0065] S24. Determine the degradation factors and degradation control measures for each barrier;

[0066] Correspondingly, S23 is specifically as follows: based on the top events, hazard sources, consequence elements, threat elements, barriers and their degradation factors and degradation control measures, draw a bowtie diagram of the analysis object.

[0067] Further, S22 specifically includes: determining a prevention barrier corresponding to each consequence element and a mitigation barrier corresponding to each threat element;

[0068] Correspondingly, S24 specifically includes: determining the degradation factors and degradation control measures of each prevention-type barrier, and the degradation factors and degradation control measures of each mitigation-type barrier;

[0069] S23 is specifically as follows: based on top events, hazard sources, consequence elements, threat elements, prevention barriers and their degradation factors and degradation control measures, mitigation barriers and their degradation factors and degradation control measures, draw a bowtie diagram of the analysis object.

[0070] In the bowtie diagram risk analysis theory, a threat is a potential cause that can cause an overhead event to lose control. In the present invention, there are multiple aspects of threat elements that can cause an overhead event to occur, including combat personnel, command decisions, weapons and equipment, logistics support, and intelligence information.

[0071] Threat element one: combatants. People are the decisive factor in determining the outcome of a war, and this is no exception in emergency response and stabilization operations. The quality of combatants has an important impact on the effectiveness of emergency response and stabilization operations. Their professional and technical quality, combat experience, task execution ability, and psychological quality all play a decisive role in the success or failure of emergency response and stabilization operations. The higher the professional quality, the richer the combat experience, the stronger the task execution ability, and the stronger the psychological quality of the combatants participating in emergency response and stabilization operations, the more conducive it is to the success of emergency response and stabilization operations. Based on this, the present invention defines "insufficient quality of combatants" as the first threat.

[0072] Threat element 2: Command decision-making. Command decision-making plays an important role and has far-reaching impact in military operations, directly affecting the success or failure of military operations. At present, the problems of command decision-making in emergency response and stability maintenance operations are prominently manifested in: emergency command decision-making agencies are still unable to fully play their expected role, the scientific nature of instructions needs to be improved, the command decision-making system is not smooth, and the authority of the command decision-making agency is unclear.

[0073] Threat element three: weapons and equipment. The reliability of weapons and equipment plays an important role in modern warfare and non-war military operations. Reliability, maintainability and security play a vital role in the development and use of weapons and equipment. Therefore, problems such as insufficiently advanced equipment, low reliability and poor environmental adaptability will greatly restrict the combat effectiveness of the troops and cause the operation to fail. Therefore, "low reliability of weapons and equipment" is another threat in the risk analysis of emergency response and stability maintenance operations.

[0074] Threat element 4: logistics support. The logistics support of emergency response and stability maintenance operations needs to face many special situations. For example, due to the sudden occurrence of terrorist attacks, logistics support is required to mobilize all materials in a very short time. The logistics preparation time is hasty. Emergency response and stability maintenance operations and logistics support are often carried out at the same time. Logistics support mainly includes vehicles, fuel, combat readiness materials, medicines and other professional equipment. Whether it can be successfully guaranteed is the key to determining the success or failure of the mission. Therefore, "ineffective logistics support" is an important threat factor in the risk analysis of emergency response and stability maintenance operations.

[0075] Threat element 5: Intelligence information. Unlike other military operations, the characteristics of intelligence information in emergency response and stabilization operations are reflected in the diversity, strangeness and particularity of the enemy's means and locations of violence. Based on the important impact of intelligence information on emergency response and stabilization operations, a non-war military operation, "lack of intelligence information" can be used as an important threat factor in the risk analysis of emergency response and stabilization operations.

[0076] After defining the top event, the next step is to determine the consequences. In the bowtie diagram, the threat on the left and the consequence on the right jointly determine the shape of the bowtie diagram. If no effective measures are taken to deal with the top event defined in the present invention, "failure of emergency response and stability maintenance actions when terrorist acts occur", it will cause serious adverse effects. The present invention summarizes the possible consequences as follows.

[0077] Consequence element 1: Causing casualties. After a terrorist incident occurs, it often poses a huge threat to people's lives and property, which is mainly reflected in two aspects. First, the most typical manifestation of a terrorist incident is the wanton harm to innocent civilians without a bottom line, resulting in a large number of casualties among ordinary people and causing social panic. When a terrorist incident occurs, the thugs often mingle among ordinary people and have a strong disguise. At the time of the incident, the thugs broke out at different locations in the same city at the same time, causing chaos. Second, the handling of terrorist incidents will also cause many casualties among soldiers and armed police officers. Since most of the thugs are desperate, when they have a head-on conflict with the mobile force, the lives and safety of the mobile force's combatants will be put in great threat.

[0078] Consequence element 2: causing property losses. Violent terrorist incidents often result in huge property losses. Thugs often gather to cause trouble, smash and loot at pre-arranged times and locations, and carry out violent terrorist activities such as explosions and arson in important places such as squares, shopping malls, neighborhoods, stations, and airports, causing significant losses.

[0079] Consequence element three: Negative social impact. The occurrence of violent terrorist incidents has many negative impacts on society. First, after the occurrence of violent terrorist incidents, through the fermentation of communication media such as the Internet, it will cause great panic among the masses and seriously affect the normal production and life of residents. Secondly, the occurrence of violent terrorist incidents will greatly damage the image of the city, cause serious damage to the tourism industry, and damage the image of the government.

[0080] Based on the above description of threat elements and consequence elements in the risk analysis of emergency response and stability maintenance operations, all prevention barriers and mitigation barriers are analyzed below.

[0081] The emergency response and stability maintenance operations against terrorist incidents require the participation of various forces, and the personnel composition is complex, making command and coordination difficult. Therefore, the preventive barriers that can be taken against the threat element of "combatants" are:

[0082] (1) Select personnel with certain practical experience and the ability to deal with emergencies to participate, thereby reducing the impact of personnel inexperience;

[0083] (2) Strengthen ideological education and psychological counseling for subordinates, so as to eliminate the influence of psychological pressure and other factors on them;

[0084] (3) Calling on professional troops to participate in emergency response tasks to improve the combat effectiveness of personnel;

[0085] (4) Clarify the relationship of responsibilities and the scope of authority to prevent mutual buck-passing.

[0086] Mitigation barriers that can be applied to command decision elements include:

[0087] (1) We must improve the scientific level of decision-making procedures and mechanisms, carefully examine the rationality and scientific nature of decision-making procedures, and make timely adjustments in response to specific terrorist incidents;

[0088] (2) Establish a good coordination and communication mechanism to ensure that each emergency team performs its duties and completes the scheduled tasks together;

[0089] (3) Improve the reliability and completeness of the command information system for emergency response and stability maintenance operations, and promptly adopt various new information technologies and equipment.

[0090] Modern warfare is a battle based on the confrontation of informationized equipment and systems, and non-war military operations are no exception. In order to reasonably and effectively use riot control equipment in emergency response and stability maintenance operations, control the situation and situation of violent terrorist incidents, and achieve the established goals, the following preventive barriers can be taken:

[0091] (1) Improve the informationization of weapons and equipment. On the one hand, under the influence of foreign hostile forces, the informationization of the violent equipment used by terrorists is increasing. On the other hand, high-reliability weapons and equipment play an important role in improving the combat effectiveness of troops. In this regard, our military mobile forces must also vigorously improve the informationization of weapons and equipment.

[0092] (2) Improve the reliability of equipment. Try to reduce the possibility of poor performance, poor use, or even equipment damage due to external factors or mechanical failure.

[0093] In response to the threats faced in logistics support, the following barriers can be taken: formulate in advance the logistics support model for specific terrorist incidents and their riot control operations, optimize the deployment plan of the support force, and make timely dynamic adjustments based on the progress of the operation.

[0094] The preventive barriers that can be taken against intelligence information threat elements are:

[0095] Understand the nature of terrorist incidents. The emergency response and stability maintenance action plan must be formulated according to the nature and characteristics of the specific terrorist incidents. Different natures of incidents will lead to very different action plans;

[0096] Understand the political background and intentions of violent gangs. Find out if there are powerful supporters behind them.

[0097] Understand the technological content and information level of the enemy's tools or weapons of violence, and provide decision-making support for our army to formulate combat plans.

[0098] After the top incident occurs, mitigation measures can be taken to reduce its impact. First, we can strengthen the guidance of public opinion on violent terrorist incidents to reduce the negative impact of violent terrorist incidents on public opinion; second, violent terrorist incidents may cause a large number of casualties, so we must improve medical security capabilities and establish emergency plans.

[0099] The degradation factors and degradation control measures of barriers are mainly reflected in the human factors in the risk management process. Not all barriers have barrier degradation factors. Among all the barrier elements listed in this invention, the most dependent on the relevant personnel is the operational standardization of weapons and equipment. Skilled equipment and equipment operation standards are the guarantee for the success of the action plan. The unfamiliarity of combatants with weapons and equipment may lead to the inability of weapons and equipment to perform their due effectiveness. The equipment operation process can be standardized and training efforts can be increased.

[0100] S3. Determine the risk matrix for each consequence element in the bowtie diagram.

[0101] Specifically include:

[0102] S31. Obtain the risk occurrence probability and consequence severity of each consequence element in the bowtie diagram at different analysis angles;

[0103] S32. Determine the severity level of the corresponding consequence element at the corresponding analysis angle based on the probability of risk occurrence and the severity of the consequence;

[0104] S33. Generate a risk matrix of corresponding consequence elements according to the severity level of the consequence.

[0105] The analysis angles may include personnel, material, society and environment. The present invention uses the risk matrix method to make an effective assessment of risks from the above four angles, which can provide support for subsequent risk management decisions.

[0106] After completing the modeling of the bowtie diagram, it is necessary to conduct a risk assessment on the possible consequences of the events at the top of the bowtie diagram, so as to understand the severity of different consequences and further take targeted measures for key areas and key links that may bring risks.

[0107] When establishing a risk analysis matrix, we first use qualitative methods to conduct a systematic analysis based on the needs of the subject, identify all factors that may cause risks, analyze, predict and estimate the risk level of each factor, analyze the direct and indirect causes of risks layer by layer, and analyze the possibility of risk events, estimate the probability of occurrence, and the probability level and its reference basis are shown in Table 1.

[0108] Table 1 Description of the risk probability classification

[0109]

[0110] In the above table, risks are divided into 5 levels according to the probability of occurrence, represented by symbols A, B, C, D, and E respectively. The probability of occurrence of risks of each level corresponds to the second column in the table. Among them, the probability of occurrence of A-level risks is less than 0.2, which is very unlikely to occur; the corresponding probability of occurrence of B-level risks is between 0.2 and 0.4, and the risks within this probability range are unlikely to occur; the probability of occurrence of C-level risks is 0.4 to 0.6, which may occur in the project; the probability of occurrence of D-level risks is 0.6 to 0.8, which is a relatively likely risk; the probability of occurrence of E-level risks is greater than 0.8, which is very likely to occur in actual projects.

[0111] After determining the probability of risk occurrence, the severity of the consequences after the risk occurs must be evaluated. Specifically, the risk is evaluated into 5 levels: negligible, minor, general, severe and critical in order of impact from small to large. In order to more accurately reflect the severity of the risk impact, the present invention divides the severity of risk consequences into 6 levels, represented by numbers 0-5, as shown in Table 2.

[0112] Table 2 Definition of consequence severity levels

[0113]

[0114] After determining the probability of risk occurrence and the severity of the consequences after it occurs, a risk matrix can be established. Based on the above classification of risk probability levels (5 levels) and consequence severity (6 levels), a matrix with 6 rows and 5 columns can be established. Figure 2 shown.

[0115] The column where each element of the risk matrix is ​​located represents the possibility of the risk corresponding to the element (i.e., the probability of risk occurrence), from left to right, they are A, B, C, D, and E, corresponding to the five levels of possibility. The row where each element is located represents the severity of the consequences of the risk corresponding to the element (i.e., the severity of the consequences), which are represented by numbers 0-5. The larger the number, the more serious the corresponding impact.

[0116] There are 4 levels of severity of risk consequences, represented by 4 different colors. The darker the color, the higher the severity of the risk consequences. Among them, C5, D4, D5, E3, E4, E5 are the highest levels, indicating that the probability of occurrence of such risks is extremely high, the consequences are extremely serious, and the occurrence of risks is unacceptable, represented by black; A5, B4, B5, C3, C4, D2, D3, E2 are strictly controlled risks, the probability of occurrence of such risks is high, the consequences are relatively serious, and they must be strictly controlled continuously to prevent such risks from occurring, represented by dark gray; A1, A2, A3, A4, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2, D1, E1 are reasonably controlled (or acceptable) risks, the probability of occurrence of such risks is low, the consequences are relatively light, and the overall impact on the project is controllable, represented by gray; A0, B0, C0, D0, E0 are negligible risks, and such risks have no impact on the overall project, represented by light gray.

[0117] In the bowtie chart risk analysis, the "consequences" in the bowtie chart are analyzed by matrix analysis, and different levels of risk are represented by different grayscales. This can intuitively reflect the severity of the risk and provide more basis for risk analysis decision makers.

[0118] Specifically, for the first consequence element causing casualties, the risk analysis results are shown in the following table. When casualties occur, because casualties are involved, it can be characterized as very serious harm. In addition, it will affect public opinion and cause social panic, and the severity of the harm is rated as "serious harm". Because the first consequence directly corresponds to casualties, the probability of its occurrence is the highest probability "very likely".

[0119] Table 3 Risk assessment of consequence element 1

[0120]

[0121] The risk matrix of consequence element one is as follows Figure 3 As shown, the consequence severity levels are E5 and D4.

[0122] The second consequence element, property damage, is also a serious damage, but compared with casualties, the severity of property damage is slightly lower, so the severity of the material loss and property damage caused by the second consequence is determined as a greater harm. Similarly, the second consequence directly corresponds to material loss and property damage, so its probability of occurrence is the highest probability "very likely".

[0123] Table 4 Risk assessment of consequence element 2

[0124]

[0125] The risk matrix of consequence element 2 is as follows Figure 4 As shown, the consequence severity levels are E2 and E3.

[0126] The third element of consequence is the negative impact on society, including causing social panic and negative impact on public opinion. Since the third element of consequence does not make any evaluation in terms of personnel, materials and environment, the negative impact brought about by the terrorist incident is relatively large and far-reaching, so the severity of the third element of consequence is determined as "great harm" and the possibility of occurrence is "possible".

[0127] Table 5 Risk assessment of consequence element three

[0128]

[0129] The risk matrix of consequence element three is as follows Figure 5 As shown, the severity level of the consequences is D3.

[0130] S4. According to the bowtie diagram and risk matrix, the risk analysis results of the analysis object are obtained.

[0131] Based on the above analysis, we can draw a bow tie diagram as follows Figure 6 shown.

[0132] Among them, there are one top event and one hazard source, five threat elements, three consequence elements, 13 prevention barriers, three mitigation barriers, and one barrier degradation factor and one degradation control measure.

[0133] The risk analysis report on emergency response and stability maintenance operations is as follows:

[0134] The bowtie diagram consists of overhead events, hazards, threats, consequences, barriers, barrier degradation factors and degradation control measures. The overhead event occurs when the hazard source loses control or fails and releases the potential for harm. Even if the overhead event has occurred, barriers (especially mitigation barriers) may still play a role in preventing or mitigating its consequences. Hazard sources are factors that may cause harm, including various operations, activities or substances. Consequences are adverse results caused by overhead events, which can cause losses and harm. Consequences are adverse results caused by overhead events, which can cause losses and harm. Threats are potential causes that can cause the loss of control of overhead events. For each overhead event, there are usually multiple threats corresponding to it on the left side of the bowtie diagram. Barriers can be divided into two categories: prevention barriers and mitigation barriers. Prevention barriers act on threats and can reduce the adverse effects of threats. Mitigation barriers act on consequences and can reduce the adverse effects of consequences. Degradation factors and degradation control measures are drawn below their corresponding barriers in the bowtie diagram. Control measures on the degradation path are called degradation control measures. Degradation factors are conditions that can reduce the effectiveness of their corresponding barriers. Degradation factors do not directly cause the top events or consequences to occur, but they degrade the main path barriers, so the likelihood of adverse consequences is higher. At the same time, degradation control measures can reduce the adverse effects of degradation factors, thereby reducing the likelihood of adverse consequences.

[0135] The details of the bow tie diagram are shown in the following table:

[0136] Table 6 Risk analysis of bow tie diagram for emergency response and stability maintenance operations

[0137]

[0138] The basic idea of ​​the risk matrix is ​​that the main factors affecting the severity of a risk are the probability of the risk occurring and the magnitude of the harm caused by the risk. The greater the probability of the risk occurring and the greater the harm caused by the risk, the greater the severity of the risk, and the more attention the manager should pay. Therefore, as long as the probability of the risk occurring and the impact of the risk after the risk occurs are clearly described, the ranking of the severity of the risk can be obtained.

[0139] Table 7 Risk assessment results

[0140]

[0141] Through the study of the bowtie diagram and risk matrix analysis results, combined with the actual situation of mobile forces in dealing with emergencies and maintaining stability, we can provide the following suggestions for the risk control strategy of dealing with emergencies and maintaining stability:

[0142] (1) Personnel. People are always the decisive factor in the outcome of a war. First, according to the bowtie diagram analysis, among all the consequences, "causing casualties" is the most serious one, and its risk assessment results are "E5" and "E4" respectively, which are relatively serious levels. However, there is only one mitigation barrier corresponding to it, namely "promptly mobilizing medical forces for rescue", which is obviously not enough to effectively curb the adverse effects. Therefore, more effective measures can be considered in this regard to minimize possible casualties. Secondly, the barrier degradation factor in the bowtie diagram risk analysis is mainly related to people. Improper operation of weapons and equipment by relevant combatants and non-standardized processes will greatly hinder the performance of weapons and equipment. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the combat quality of combatants, especially the ability to skillfully use and operate weapons and equipment.

[0143] (2) Intelligence analysis. According to the bow tie diagram, an important weak link in the current emergency response and stability maintenance operations is that intelligence information must be well-informed during the war preparation period, so as to cut off the economic and material support given to the rioters by foreign forces as much as possible. Use advanced technology and means to obtain scientific and accurate intelligence in a timely manner, and pay attention to distinguishing the true from the false, and do a good job in intelligence collection.

[0144] (3) Weapons and equipment. According to the bowtie diagram, weapons and equipment, as an important threat factor, have a significant impact on the occurrence of top incidents, but there are not many preventive barrier measures that can be taken, and its reliability is a weak link. First, we must strengthen the maintenance of equipment to ensure that it can work normally and play its due combat effectiveness; second, we must keep up with combat needs and update relevant weapons and equipment in a timely manner to ensure their advancement and reliability; finally, while strengthening the training of relevant personnel, we should moderately introduce equipment and equipment that is simple to operate and has better destructive effectiveness.

[0145] Another embodiment of the present invention provides a combat support risk analysis system, the system comprising:

[0146] The first determination module is used to determine the top events and danger sources of the analysis object;

[0147] A drawing module is used to draw a bowtie diagram of the analysis object based on the top events and hazard sources;

[0148] A second determination module is used to determine the risk matrix of each consequence element in the bowtie diagram;

[0149] The result analysis module obtains the risk analysis results of the analysis object based on the bowtie diagram and risk matrix.

[0150] Furthermore, the second determination module specifically includes:

[0151] An acquisition unit is used to acquire the risk occurrence probability and consequence severity of each consequence element in the bowtie diagram at different analysis angles;

[0152] A determination unit, used to determine the severity level of the corresponding consequence element at the corresponding analysis angle according to the probability of risk occurrence and the severity of the consequence;

[0153] The generating unit generates a risk matrix of corresponding consequence elements according to the severity level of the consequence.

[0154] The specific description of each module in the above analysis system can refer to the description of each step in the analysis method, which will not be repeated here. The above analysis system can achieve the same function as the analysis method.

[0155] The combat support risk analysis system provided by the present invention analyzes the constituent elements of the bowtie graph model, namely, top events, danger sources, threats, consequences, barriers, barrier degradation factors and degradation control measures, etc., in the context of joint combat command support tasks, and analyzes risks from four aspects, namely, combat personnel, weapons and equipment, society and battlefield environment. From these four aspects, the impact of risks can be analyzed more comprehensively. On this basis, the present invention uses the risk matrix to unify the severity of the consequences of risks and the probability of risk events, and makes a semi-quantitative assessment of the severity of combat support risks from these two dimensions, thereby providing decision-making support for improving the emergency response level of the troops.

[0156] A person skilled in the art should understand that the discussion of any of the above embodiments is merely illustrative and is not intended to imply that the scope of protection of the present application is limited to these examples. In line with the concept of the present application, the technical features in the above embodiments or different embodiments may be combined, the steps may be implemented in any order, and there are many other variations of different aspects of one or more embodiments of the present application as described above, which are not provided in detail for the sake of simplicity.

[0157] One or more embodiments of the present application are intended to cover all such substitutions, modifications and variations that fall within the broad scope of the present application. Therefore, any omissions, modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of one or more embodiments of the present application should be included in the protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A combat support risk analysis method, characterized in that: The method comprises: S1. Determine the top events and hazards of the analysis object; S2. Draw a bowtie diagram of the analysis object according to the top event and the danger source; S3, determining a risk matrix for each consequence element in the bowtie diagram; S4. Obtain risk analysis results of the analysis object according to the bowtie diagram and the risk matrix.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The S3 specifically includes: S31, obtaining the risk occurrence probability and consequence severity of each consequence element in the bowtie diagram at different analysis angles; S32. Determine the severity level of the corresponding consequence element at the corresponding analysis angle according to the risk occurrence probability and the consequence severity; S33. Generate a risk matrix of corresponding consequence elements according to the consequence severity level.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The analysis perspectives include human, material, social and environmental.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The S2 specifically includes: S21, determining the consequence elements caused by the top event and the threat elements that cause the top event to get out of control; S22. Identify the barriers for each consequence element and each threat element; S23. Draw a bowtie diagram of the analysis object based on the top event, the hazard source, the consequence element, the threat element and the barrier.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that After S22, S2 further includes: S24. Determine the degradation factors and degradation control measures for each barrier; Correspondingly, the S23 is specifically: A bowtie diagram of the analysis object is drawn based on the overhead event, the hazard source, the consequence element, the threat element, the barrier and its degradation factors and degradation control measures.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The S22 is specifically: Identify the prevention barriers for each consequence element and the mitigation barriers for each threat element; Correspondingly, the S24 is specifically as follows: Identify the degradation factors and degradation control measures for each prevention-type barrier and the degradation factors and degradation control measures for each mitigation-type barrier; The S23 is specifically: A bowtie diagram of the analysis object is drawn based on the top event, the hazard source, the consequence element, the threat element, the prevention barrier and its degradation factors and degradation control measures, and the mitigation barrier and its degradation factors and degradation control measures.

7. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The threat elements include combat personnel, command decisions, weapons and equipment, logistics support and intelligence information.

8. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The consequence elements include causing casualties, property damage and negative social impact.

9. A combat support risk analysis system, characterized in that: The system comprises: The first determination module is used to determine the top events and danger sources of the analysis object; A drawing module, used for drawing a bowtie diagram of the analysis object according to the top event and the danger source; A second determination module is used to determine a risk matrix for each consequence element in the bowtie diagram; The result analysis module obtains the risk analysis result of the analysis object according to the bowtie diagram and the risk matrix.

10. The system according to claim 9, characterized in that The second determination module specifically includes: An acquisition unit, used for acquiring the risk occurrence probability and consequence severity of each consequence element in the bowtie diagram at different analysis angles; A determination unit, configured to determine the severity level of a consequence of a corresponding consequence element at a corresponding analysis angle according to the risk occurrence probability and the severity level of the consequence; A generating unit generates a risk matrix of corresponding consequence elements according to the consequence severity level.

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