Unmanned aerial vehicle cluster data secure transmission method supporting malicious node detection

Abstract

The invention discloses an unmanned aerial vehicle cluster data secure transmission method supporting malicious node detection. The problems that in the prior art, the number of relay nodes of a multi-hop unmanned aerial vehicle network is large, and authentication lacks are solved. The method comprises the following steps: initializing a key distribution center; registering and authenticating each unmanned aerial vehicle and a ground control center according to an initialization result, collecting transmission data by any first data unmanned aerial vehicle in the multi-hop unmanned aerial vehicle network, calculating a certificateless aggregation signature, and transmitting the data to an adjacent second data unmanned aerial vehicle; the second data unmanned aerial vehicle adds data carried by the second data unmanned aerial vehicle to the transmission data to obtain an aggregation message, and transmits the aggregation message to an aggregation unmanned aerial vehicle in the multi-hop unmanned aerial vehicle network; and the aggregation unmanned aerial vehicle verifies the aggregation message, and if the verification does not pass, malicious member detection is operated to obtain malicious members in the link. Otherwise, the aggregation unmanned aerial vehicle sends the message to the ground control center; according to the method, non-interactive rapid negotiation of the session key is realized, and high security in multi-hop transmission is guaranteed.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a method for securely transmitting data of a drone cluster that supports malicious node detection. Background Art

[0002] As drone terminal technology continues to mature, drones can perform more and more tasks, such as surveillance and reconnaissance, target strikes, and air warning. After accessing the network, drones play a vital role in disaster management, auxiliary network access, rapid search and rescue, and other scenarios. Since drones often work in harsh environments and have poor network quality, there may be infrastructure damage in emergency rescue scenarios such as disaster management. At the same time, some specific tasks, such as finding sporadic fire points in forest fires or large-scale earthquake search and rescue, require large-scale drones to form a cluster to participate in order to complete. Due to the characteristics of drone network communication such as high exposure of air interface channels and limited computing resources, the communication and data transmission process in drone networks is extremely vulnerable to attacks such as eavesdropping, replay, middlemen, and counterfeiting, resulting in privacy information leakage, denial of service, and other security issues. Considering that drone multi-hop networks are often used in emergency scenarios involving public safety such as rapid search and rescue and disaster management, once potential security threats are exploited by adversaries, they are likely to cause major public safety accidents and even threaten the safety of public life and property. In addition, in large-scale drone networks, data and instructions are often transmitted through multiple hops in the network. However, once malicious nodes participate in relay transmission, it will lead to a waste of limited communication resources.

[0003] At the same time, data transmission in drone multi-hop networks in emergency scenarios will also lead to a variety of security issues. First, since drone networks are air interface networks and are in highly open channels, entities in the network are extremely vulnerable to a variety of attacks, such as replay attacks, forgery attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, etc., and even entities in the network are easily physically captured by attackers; secondly, due to the large scale and large number of hops of drone multi-hop networks, the communication delay of data communication and command issuance in drone multi-hop networks will be larger than that of other networks, and entities at the edge of the network may even be unreachable, resulting in delayed or failed command execution. Therefore, a mobile command center is generally introduced to replace the ground center to issue commands at the edge of the network; thirdly, after the introduction of the mobile command center, it is necessary to issue command authority to it and authenticate the identity of the mobile command center. If the disaster area is large, multiple mobile command centers may be required for coordinated management and control. The communication overhead of issuing command authority is large, and the command authority may contain sensitive information of the mobile command center, resulting in message leakage and mission failure; finally, due to the characteristics of drones such as short flight time and limited computing resources, it is difficult to use cryptographic technologies with high computational complexity, which will make the network more vulnerable and more vulnerable to attacks. Summary of the invention

[0004] The present invention provides a method for secure transmission of drone cluster data that supports malicious node detection, thereby solving the problems in the prior art of a large number of drone multi-hop network relay nodes, air interface communication, lack of authentication and key negotiation, etc. in emergency rescue scenarios, and realizes non-interactive rapid negotiation of session keys, thereby ensuring high security in multi-hop transmission.

[0005] The present invention provides a method for secure transmission of drone cluster data supporting malicious node detection, the method comprising:

[0006] Initializing the key distribution center, obtaining a key distribution center initialization result, and making the initialization result public;

[0007] According to the initialization result of the key distribution center, each drone is registered and authenticated, and the ground control center is registered and authenticated;

[0008] Any first data drone DUAV in a multi-hop drone network i Collect and transmit data, the first data drone DUAV i Digitally sign the transmission data using a certificateless aggregate signature technique, and then transmit the data signature and the transmission data to an adjacent second data drone DUAV. i+1 ;

[0009] The second data drone DUAV i+1 The data carried by the drone is added to the transmission data to obtain an aggregate message, and the aggregate message is transmitted to the aggregate drone AUAV in the multi-hop drone network. M middle;

[0010] The Converged UAV M The aggregate message is verified. If the verification fails, the aggregated UAV M Run the malicious node detection algorithm to obtain the malicious data drone identity in the transmission link, and remove the malicious data in the aggregate message and send it to the ground control center; if the verification is successful, the aggregate drone AUAV M The aggregated message is processed and sent to the ground control center.

[0011] In a possible implementation manner, initializing the key distribution center includes:

[0012] The key distribution center selects a cyclic group G and determines a syndrome generator matrix S with a biorthogonal code; wherein the order of the cyclic group G is represented by q and the generator is P;

[0013] Determine the Galois Field GF(2 h ) and the extended syndrome generator matrix Σ, where the Galois field GF(2 h ) is α;

[0014] According to the Galois Field GF(2 h ) and the syndrome generation matrix S, determine the first matrix Ξ and the second matrix Γ; wherein the shape of the first matrix Ξ is (l+1)×n, and the shape of the second matrix Γ is (2 l+1 -1)×n;

[0015] The key distribution center determines the system master private key s pri , and according to the master private key s pri Calculate the corresponding system public key P pub ;

[0016] The key distribution center is based on the cyclic group G and the Galois field GF(2 h ) generates multiple secure hash functions to complete the initialization.

[0017] In a possible implementation, completing registration and authentication for each drone according to the initialization result of the key distribution center includes:

[0018] First Data UAV DUAV i Determine the first random number x i , determine the first random number x i First data drone DUAV i The first part of the private key x i , and according to the first part of the private key x i The first data drone DUAV is calculated by using the parameters of the cyclic group G in the initialization result i The first part of the public key X i , the first information (X i ,ID i ) is sent to the key distribution center, where ID i Indicates the first data drone DUAV i ID;

[0019] The key distribution center determines a second random number r i , according to the second random number r i , the system master private key s pri and the first secure hash function in the initialization result to calculate the first data drone DUAV i Corresponding pseudonym PID i ;

[0020] The key distribution center determines a third random number z i , according to the third random number z i The first data drone DUAV is calculated i The second part of the public key Y i , and according to the second part of the public key Y i The first data drone DUAV is calculated i The second part of the private key y i , using the second part of the private key y i Calculate the second part of the obfuscated private key y i ′;

[0021] The key distribution center sends a second message (PID i ,y i ′,Y i ) to the first data drone DUAV i ;

[0022] The first data drone DUAV i The second message (PID i ,y′ i ,Y i ) for verification, if the verification is successful, the first data drone DUAV i Calculate the second part of the private key y i , accept the pseudonymous PID i As the first data drone DUAV i The alias of the first part of the private key x i and the second part of the private key y i As a certificateless private key pair, the first part of the public key X i and the second part of the public key Y i As a certificateless public key pair.

[0023] In a possible implementation, the first verification formula is expressed as:

[0024]

[0025] Among them, z i represents the third random number; P represents the generator of the cyclic group G; s pri Indicates the system master private key; H2 indicates the second secure hash function; PID i UAV i Corresponding pseudonym: X i Indicates the first data drone DUAV i The first part of the public key; Y i Indicates the first data drone DUAVi The second part of the public key; H3 represents the third secure hash function; P pub Indicates the system public key; x i Represents the first random number.

[0026] In a possible implementation, completing registration and authentication of the ground control center includes:

[0027] The ground control center GCC determines the fourth random number x GCC , determine the fourth random number x GCC The first part of the private key x of the ground control center GCC GCC , and according to the first part of the private key x of the ground control center GCC GCC The first part of the public key X of the ground control center GCC is calculated using the parameters of the cyclic group G in the initialization result GCC , the third information (X GCC ,ID GCC ) is sent to the key distribution center;

[0028] The key distribution center determines five random numbers z GCC The second part of the public key Y of the ground control center GCC is calculated by the parameters of the cyclic group G in the initialization result GCC , and according to the second part of the public key Y of the ground control center GCC GCC Calculate the second part of the private key y of the ground control center GCC GCC , using the second part of the private key y of the ground control center GCC GCC Calculate the second part of the obfuscated private key y′ of the ground control center GCC GCC ;

[0029] The key distribution center sends a fourth message (y′ GCC ,Y GCC ) to the ground control center GCC;

[0030] The ground control center GCC verifies the fourth message (y′) by a second verification formula GCC ,Y GCC ) is verified, and if the verification is successful, the ground control center GCC calculates the second part of the private key y of the ground control center GCC GCC , the first part of the private key x of the ground control center GCC GCC and the second part of the private key y of the ground control center GCC GCC As a certificateless private key pair, the first part of the public key X of the ground control center GCC GCC and the second part of the public key Y of the ground control center GCCGCC As a certificateless public key pair.

[0031] In a possible implementation, the second verification formula is expressed as:

[0032]

[0033] Among them, z GCC represents five random numbers; P represents the generator of the cyclic group G; s pri Indicates the system master private key; H2 indicates the second secure hash function; ID GCC Indicates the identity of the ground control center; X GCC Indicates the first part of the public key of the ground control center GCC; Y GCC represents the second part of the public key of the ground control center GCC; H3 represents the third secure hash function; P pub Indicates the system public key; x GCC Represents the first part of the private key of the ground control center GCC.

[0034] In a possible implementation, any first data drone DUAV in the multi-hop drone network i Collect and transmit data, the first data drone DUAV i The transmission data is transmitted to a neighboring second data drone DUAV via a certificateless aggregate signature i+1 ,include:

[0035] The first data drone DUAV i Determine the sixth random number b i , and according to the sixth random number b i The first calculation result U is obtained by calculating the parameters of the cyclic group G in the initialization result i ;

[0036] The first data drone DUAV i Utilizing the Aggregate UAV M Aggregate drone public key X M , calculate the first data UAV DUAV i Corresponding temporary pseudonym PID i ′;

[0037] The first data drone DUAV i Calculate the encryption key k i , and using the encryption key k i For the message m to be encrypted i Encrypt and get the ciphertext C i ;

[0038] The first data drone DUAVi Calculate the first data of DUAV i The corresponding signature s i , and the second calculation result T is calculated by using the syndrome generation matrix S with dual orthogonal codes in the initialization result, the first matrix Ξ, the first calculation formula and the second calculation formula i,1 And the third calculation result T i,2 ;

[0039] The first data drone DUAV i Send transmission data (PID ' i ,C i ,U i ,…,PID′0,C0,U0,T i,1 ,T i,2 ) to the second data drone DUAV i+1 .

[0040] In a possible implementation, the first calculation formula is expressed as:

[0041] T i,1 =(0,…,0,s i ,0,…,0)S T +T i-1,1 ;

[0042] The second calculation formula is expressed as:

[0043]

[0044] Among them, s i Indicates the first data drone DUAV i The corresponding signature; S T represents the transpose of the syndrome generation matrix S; T i-1,1 Indicates any third-party data drone DUAV i-1 The first part of the generated aggregate message verification code with detection function; Indicates H8(s i P), where h is the Galois Field GF(2 h ), H8 represents the eighth secure hash function, and P represents the generator of the cyclic group G; T represents the transpose of the first matrix Ξ; T i-1,2 Indicates any third-party data drone DUAV i-1 The second part of the generated aggregated message verification code with detection function.

[0045] In a possible implementation, the aggregated UAV M Verifying the aggregate message includes:

[0046] The aggregation drone obtains the public key pair of each of the data drones according to the aggregation message;

[0047] The aggregate message is verified using the public key pair and the third verification formula to obtain a verification result value s to complete the verification, and it is determined whether the verification result value s is equal to 0. If so, the aggregate drone accepts the aggregate message; if not, the aggregate drone performs malicious node detection.

[0048] In a possible implementation, the aggregated drone performs malicious node detection, including:

[0049] A first vector σ is obtained by calculating the syndrome generation matrix S with dual orthogonal codes in the initialization result, the verification result value s, and the extended syndrome generation matrix Σ in the initialization result, and each row in the first vector σ is judged according to the first judgment condition and the second judgment condition, and the matrix elements that do not meet the first judgment condition and the second judgment condition are deleted to obtain a sixth matrix σ';

[0050] An error correction vector is calculated according to the first matrix Ξ and the second matrix Γ in the initialization result, and a second vector γ is obtained according to the error correction vector;

[0051] Determine whether the elements in the sixth matrix σ' are equal to the elements at corresponding positions in the second vector γ, and if they are equal, determine the position of the malicious node according to the position of the elements in the matrix;

[0052] If the verification result is 1, the aggregated UAV M The aggregated message is sent to the next hop drone.

[0053] One or more technical solutions provided in the present invention have at least the following technical effects or advantages:

[0054] (1) Aiming at the problems of a large number of relay nodes in the multi-hop network of drones, air interface communication, lack of authentication and key negotiation, etc. in emergency rescue scenarios, the present invention designs a method and system for secure transmission of drone cluster data that supports malicious node detection, which can quickly detect malicious nodes and ensure the authenticity and non-repudiation of valid nodes. After completing the registration process, the drone can use the public-private key pair with the command center to achieve non-interactive and rapid negotiation of the session key, ensuring high security in multi-hop transmission;

[0055] (2) The present invention combines the aggregated message verification code with the detection function and moves the verification function forward to the aggregated drone, which effectively reduces the spread of malicious data in the communication network and reduces the communication and computing overhead of the scheme;

[0056] (3) The present invention generates an anonymous identifier for each drone participating in data transmission. When there are malicious communication nodes, the present invention has low communication and computing overhead and is suitable for resource-constrained drone communication scenarios. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0057] Figure 1 A flowchart of the steps of a method for secure transmission of drone cluster data supporting malicious node detection provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0058] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the registration process of the drone, key distribution center and ground control center provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0059] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of multi-hop UAV data transmission provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0060] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of aggregated drone data transmission and data verification provided in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0061] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be described clearly and completely below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0062] The present invention provides a method for secure transmission of drone cluster data supporting malicious node detection, such as Figure 1 As shown, the method includes the following steps S101 to S105.

[0063] S101, initializing the key distribution center, obtaining the key distribution center initialization result, and making the initialization result public;

[0064] Specifically, in step S101, the key distribution center is initialized, including the following steps S1011 to S1015.

[0065] S1011, the key distribution center selects a cyclic group G and determines a syndrome generator matrix S; wherein the order of the cyclic group G is represented by q and the generator is P;

[0066] S1012, determine the Galois field GH (2 h ), where the Galois Field GH(2 h ) The original element is α;

[0067] S1013, according to Galois Field GH (2 h ) and the syndrome generation matrix S, determine the first matrix Ξ and the second matrix Γ;

[0068] S1014, the key distribution center determines the system master private key s pri , and according to the master private key s pri Calculate the corresponding system public key P pub ;

[0069] S1015, the key distribution center uses the cyclic group G and the Galois field GF (2 h ) generates multiple secure hash functions to complete the initialization.

[0070] Exemplarily, before the system is started, the key distribution center must first be initialized, and the specific steps are as follows.

[0071] (1) The key distribution center selects a cyclic group G with order q and generator P;

[0072] (2) Let S i =(S i,1 ,…,S i,n )∈{0,1} n , S T =[S1,…,S i ,…,S n ], where i = [1, l + 1], l ≥ 4 and h ≥ 256;

[0073] (3) Randomly select the Galois field GH(2 h ), whose primitive element is α;

[0074] (4) Order i =(Ξ i,1 ,…,Ξ i,n )=(α 0 S i,1 ,…,α n-1 S i,n ), T =[Ξ1,…,Ξ l+1 ];

[0075] (5) Let Γ = matrix (2 l+1 -1,n), that is, Γ is a shape of (2 l+1 -1,n) matrix;

[0076] (6) Selection of the Key Distribution Center Secret is the system master private key, and calculates the corresponding system public key P pub , P pub =s pri P;

[0077] (7) Generate a secure hash function. The specific secure hash function is expressed as:

[0078]

[0079] H4:G→{0,1} * ;

[0080] H5:G→{0,1} * ;

[0081]

[0082] H8:G→GH(2 h );

[0083] (8) The key distribution center publishes the initialization result and secretly stores the system master private key s pri , the initialization result is expressed as: (S,Ξ,Σ,Γ,GF(2 h ),q,P,G,P pub ,H1,H2$,$H3,H4,H5,H6,H7,H8).

[0084] S102, completing registration and authentication for each drone according to the initialization result of the key distribution center, and completing registration and authentication for the ground control center;

[0085] Specifically, Figure 2 As shown, in step S102, registration and authentication are completed for each drone according to the initialization result of the key distribution center, including:

[0086] (1) First Data UAV i Determine the first random number Determine the first random number x i First Data UAV i The first part of the private key x i , and according to the first part of the private key x i The parameters of the cyclic group G in the initialization result are calculated as the first data UAV i The first part of the public key X i , the first information (X i ,ID i ) is sent to the key distribution center; where ID i Indicates the first data drone DUAV i ID;

[0087] Here, the first part of the public key X i The calculation formula is: i =x i P;

[0088] (2) The key distribution center determines the second random number According to the second random number r i 、System master private key pri And the first secure hash function in the initialization result is calculated to obtain the first data drone UAV i Corresponding pseudonym PID i ;

[0089] Here, the pseudonym PID i The calculation formula is: Among them, ID i UAV i ID;

[0090] (3) The key distribution center determines the third random number According to the third random number z i Calculate the first data UAV i The second part of the public key Y i , and according to the second part of the public key Y i Calculate the first data UAV i The second part of the private key y i , using the second part of the private key y i Calculate the second part of the obfuscated private key y′ i ;

[0091] Here, the second part of the public key Y i The calculation formula is: i =z i P; the second part private key y i The calculation formula is: i =z i +s pri H2(PID i ,X i ,Y i ); The second part is the obfuscated private key y′ i The calculation formula for y′ is: i =y i +H3(PID i ,s pri X i );

[0092] (4) The key distribution center sends a second message (PID i ,y′ i ,Y i ) to First Data UAV i ;

[0093] (5) First Data UAV iThe second message (PID i ,y′ i ,Y i ) for verification. If the verification is successful, the UAV i Calculate the second part of the private key y i ,y i =y′ i -H3(ID i ,x i P pub ), accept pseudonymous PID i As UAV i The alias of the first part of the private key x i and the second part private key y i As a certificateless private key pair, the first part of the public key X i and the second part of the public key Y i As a certificateless public key pair.

[0094] Here, the first verification formula is expressed as:

[0095]

[0096] Among them, z i represents the third random number; P represents the generator of the cyclic group G; s pri Indicates the system master private key; H2 indicates the second secure hash function; PID i UAV i Corresponding pseudonym: X i Indicates the first data drone DUAV i The first part of the public key; Y i Indicates the first data drone DUAV i The second part of the public key; H3 represents the third secure hash function; P pub Indicates the system public key; x i Represents the first random number.

[0097] Specifically, in step S102, the ground control center is registered and authenticated, including:

[0098] (1) The ground control center GCC determines the fourth random number Determine the fourth random number x GCC The first part of the private key x of the ground control center GCC GCC , and according to the first part of the private key x of the ground control center GCC GCC The first part of the public key X of the ground control center GCC is calculated by using the parameters of the cyclic group G in the initialization result GCC , the third information (X GCC ,ID GCC) is sent to the key distribution center;

[0099] Here, the first part of the public key X of the ground control center GCC GCC The calculation formula is: GCC =x GCC P;

[0100] (2) The key distribution center determines five random numbers The second part of the public key Y of the ground control center GCC is calculated by the parameters of the cyclic group G in the initialization result GCC , and according to the second part of the public key Y of the ground control center GCC GCC Calculate the second part of the private key y of the ground control center GCC GCC , using the second part of the private key y of the ground control center GCC GCC Calculate the second part of the obfuscated private key y′ of the ground control center GCC GCC ;

[0101] Here, the second part of the public key Y of the ground control center GCC GCC The calculation formula is: GCC =z GCC P; the second part of the private key y of the ground control center GCC GCC The calculation formula is: GCC =z GCC +s pri H2(ID GCC ,X GCC ,Y GCC ); The second part of the obfuscated private key y′ of the ground control center GCC GCC The calculation formula for y′ is: GCC =y GCC +H3(ID GCC ,s pri X GCC );

[0102] (3) The key distribution center sends the fourth message (y′ GCC ,Y GCC ) to the Ground Control Center GCC;

[0103] (4) The ground control center GCC verifies the fourth message (y′) through the second verification formula GCC ,Y GCC ) for verification. If the verification is successful, the ground control center GCC calculates the second part of the private key y of the ground control center GCC GCC ,y GCC =y′ GCC -H3(ID GCC ,x GCC Ppub ), the first part of the private key x of the ground control center GCC GCC and the second part of the private key y of the ground control center GCC GCC As a certificateless private key pair, the first part of the public key X of the ground control center GCC GCC and the second part of the public key Y of the ground control center GCC GCC As a certificateless public key pair.

[0104] Here, the second verification formula is expressed as:

[0105]

[0106] Among them, z GCC represents five random numbers; P represents the generator of the syndrome generation matrix S; s pri Indicates the system master private key; H2 indicates the second secure hash function; ID GCC Indicates; X GCC Indicates the first part of the public key of the ground control center GCC; Y GCC represents the second part of the public key of the ground control center GCC; H3 represents the third secure hash function; P pub Indicates the system public key; x GCC Represents the first part of the private key of the ground control center GCC.

[0107] S103, any first data drone DUAV in the multi-hop drone network i Collect and transmit data, the first data drone DUAV i Use certificateless aggregate signature technology to digitally sign the transmitted data, and then transmit the data signature and transmission data to the adjacent second data drone DUAV i+1 ;

[0108] At this stage, if Figure 3 As shown, any first data drone DUAV in the multi-hop drone network i Collect data and transmit it securely to the ground control center GCC. During the data secure transmission process, the first data drone DUAV i Append its data to the received data to reduce the communication overhead in the network through certificateless aggregate signature. Receive data from DUAV i-1 After the data, the first data UAV DUAV i The application appends its own data to the data from the DUAV i-1 The data is transmitted to the next hop second data drone DUAV i+1 .

[0109] Specifically, in step S103, any first data drone DUAV in the multi-hop drone network i Collect and transmit data, the first data drone DUAV i Transmitting data to an adjacent second data drone DUAV via certificateless aggregate signature i+1 , including the following steps S1031 to S1035.

[0110] S1031, the first data UAV i Determine the sixth random number And according to the sixth random number b i The first calculation result U is obtained by calculating the parameters of the cyclic group G in the initialization result i , U i =b i P;

[0111] S1032, the first data UAV i Leveraging AUAV M Aggregate drone public key X M , calculates the first data UAV DUAV i Corresponding temporary pseudonym

[0112] S1033, the first data UAV i Calculate the encryption key k i , and using the encryption key k i For the encrypted message m i Encrypt and get the ciphertext

[0113] Here, the encryption key k i The calculation formula is: i =x i (X GCC +Y GCC +H2(ID GCC ,X GCC ,Y GCC ) pub )

[0114] S1034, the first data UAV i Computing the first data drone DUAV i The corresponding signature s i ,s i =y i +x i H6(PID i ,X i ,Y i ,C i ,Ui ), and use the syndrome generation matrix S in the initialization result and the first matrix Ξ to calculate the second calculation result T i,1 And the third calculation result T i,2 ;

[0115] Here, the first data drone DUAV i Computing the first data drone DUAV i The corresponding signature s i , and use the syndrome generation matrix S in the initialization result and the first matrix Ξ to calculate the second calculation result T i,1 And the third calculation result T i,2 , including: using the first calculation formula and the second calculation formula to calculate a second calculation result T i,1 And the third calculation result T i,2 ;

[0116] The first calculation formula is expressed as:

[0117] T i,1 =(0,…,0,s i ,0,…,0)S T +T i-1,1 ;

[0118] The second calculation formula is expressed as:

[0119]

[0120] Among them, s i Indicates the first data drone DUAV i The corresponding signature; S T represents the transpose of the syndrome generation matrix S; T i-1,1 Indicates any third-party data drone DUAV i-1 The first part of the generated aggregate message verification code with detection function; Indicates H8(s i P), where h is the Galois Field GF(2 h ), H8 represents the eighth secure hash function, and P represents the generator of the cyclic group G; T represents the transpose of the first matrix Ξ; T i-1,2 Indicates any third-party data drone DUAV i-1 The second part of the generated aggregated message verification code with detection function.

[0121] S1035, the first data UAV i Send transmission data (PID ' i ,C i ,U i,…,PID′0,C0,U0,T i,1 ,T i,2 ) to the second data drone DUAV i+1 .

[0122] S104, the second data drone DUAV i+1 Add the data it carries to the transmitted data to obtain an aggregate message, and transmit the aggregate message to the aggregated drone AUAV in the multi-hop drone network M middle;

[0123] When UAVs converge M After receiving the message, the aggregation drone AUAV M The temporary pseudonym of the data drone will be removed first and verified. Figure 4 shown.

[0124] S105, AUAV M Verify the aggregated message. If the verification fails, the aggregated drone AUAV M Run the malicious node detection algorithm to obtain the identity of the malicious data drone in the transmission link, and remove the malicious data in the aggregated message and send it to the ground control center; if the verification is successful, the aggregated drone AUAV M After the aggregated message is processed, it is sent to the ground control center.

[0125] Specifically, in step S105, the aggregated drone verifies the aggregated message, including the following steps S1051 to S1052.

[0126] S1051, the aggregation drone obtains the public key pair (X) of each data drone according to the aggregation message. i ,Y i );

[0127] S1052, use the public key pair and the third verification formula to verify the aggregate message, obtain the verification result value s to complete the verification, and determine whether the verification result value s is equal to 0. If so, the aggregate drone accepts the aggregate message, if not, the aggregate drone performs malicious node detection.

[0128] For example, calculate t i =Y i +H2(PID i ,X i ,Y i ) pub +X i H6(PID i ,X i ,Y i ,C i ,U i), where i = [1, n]. Let t = (t1,…, t n ), verify (s = T i,1 P-t T )==0, if the equation holds, output 1, otherwise output 0.

[0129] Specifically, in step S1052, the aggregated drone performs malicious node detection, including:

[0130] A first vector σ is obtained by calculating the syndrome generation matrix S with dual orthogonal codes in the initialization result, the verification result value s, and the extended syndrome generation matrix Σ in the initialization result, and each row in the first vector σ is judged according to the first judgment condition and the second judgment condition, and the matrix elements that do not meet the first judgment condition and the second judgment condition are deleted to obtain a sixth matrix σ';

[0131] An error correction vector is calculated according to the first matrix Ξ and the second matrix Γ in the initialization result, and a second vector γ is obtained according to the error correction vector;

[0132] Determine whether the elements in the sixth matrix σ' are equal to the elements at the corresponding positions in the second vector γ. If they are equal, determine the position of the malicious node according to the position of the elements in the matrix;

[0133] If the verification result is 1, the AUAV is aggregated M Send the aggregated message to the next hop drone.

[0134] For example, if the algorithm outputs 0 in the previous step, there is a malicious transmission node in the system. M The following steps will be run to find malicious transmission nodes.

[0135] (1) Let D = {1, 2, ..., n}, L = {1, 2, ..., 2 l+1 -1};

[0136] (2) Calculation Where e satisfies s=eS T The error vector of

[0137] (3) If σ i ==0, then let L←L\{i}, where So that the i-th row of the σ matrix This condition, for i∈[1,2 l +1 -1] established;

[0138] (4) For a = [1, b], calculate t′ a =H8(ta )[-h]∈GH(2 h );

[0139] (5) Let t′ = (t′ a ,…,t′ b ), g=(g1,…,g l+1 )=T a,2 -t′Ξ T ,

[0140] (6) Let σ′ k =σ k [-h]∈GH(2 h ), D′={j|Σ a,j α j-1 σ′ a =γ a for a∈L,j∈D}, where k=[1,2 l+1 -1];

[0141] (7) Let J = [PID j ], where j∈D′. At this time, all elements in J are the IDs of malicious transmission nodes.

[0142] If the algorithm outputs 1 in the previous step, there is no malicious transmission node in the system. M The following steps are run to pass the message to the next hop.

[0143] (1) Let L M ={PID0,…,PID i}.

[0144] (2)AUAV M Generate a random number r M , and calculate U M =r M P,

[0145] (3)AUAV M Generate signatures M =y M +x M H7(PID M ,X M ,Y M ,L M ,C i ,…,C0)+r M .

[0146] (4)AUAV M Will be sent to the next hop (PID M ,L′ M ,Ci ,…,C0,s M ,U M ).

[0147] Finally, after the message is passed to GCC, GCC runs the following steps:

[0148] (1) For each M The message is that GCC calculates Thus, the pseudonyms and public keys of all data drones are obtained.

[0149] (2) GCC verifies the aggregate signature s by the following formula M If the verification fails, the message is discarded. Otherwise, GCC calculates k′ for each data drone. i =(x GCC +y GCC )X i , and decrypt the message

[0150]

[0151] In view of the problems of a large number of relay nodes in drone multi-hop networks, air interface communication, lack of authentication and key negotiation, etc. in emergency rescue scenarios, the present invention designs a drone cluster data security transmission method and system that supports malicious node detection, which can quickly detect malicious nodes and ensure the authenticity and non-repudiation of valid nodes. After completing the registration process, the drone can implement non-interactive rapid negotiation of session keys through the public-private key pair with the command center, ensuring high security in multi-hop transmission, and by combining an aggregated message verification code with a detection function and moving the verification function forward to the aggregated drone, the spread of malicious data in the communication network is effectively reduced, and the communication and computing overhead of the method is reduced; in order to protect the real identity information of the drone, the present invention generates an anonymous identifier for each drone participating in data transmission. When there are malicious communication nodes, the present invention has low communication and computing overhead, and is suitable for resource-constrained drone communication scenarios;

[0152] Safety analysis of the present invention:

[0153] (1) Key security: During entity registration, the entity sends part of the public key X to the key distribution center and receives the other part of the private key y and the public key Y through a secure channel. An attacker cannot obtain part of the entity's private key x and therefore cannot access the entity's complete private key pair.

[0154] (2) Anonymity: During entity registration, the key distribution center uses the master private key s pri Calculate the basic pseudonym PID for the entity. The entity uses the system public key P pubVerify and accept the PID. Since the attacker cannot obtain the system's master private key pri , so a valid PID cannot be generated. During secure data transmission, the UAV uses the AUAV's partial public key X M and a random number r i Encrypt the PID to generate a temporary pseudonym PID′. The attacker cannot obtain the partial private key x of AUAV. M or a random number r m , so it is impossible to decrypt PID′ to obtain PID.

[0155] (3) Mutual authentication: GCC can verify the private key pair y containing AUAV m and x m , related information and ciphertext H(PID M ,X M ,Y M ,L i ,C i ,…,C0) hash and random number r m Signatures M AUAV can verify the private key pair y by verifying the private key pair y of DUAV. i and x i , related information and data H(PID i ,X i ,Y i ,C i ,U i ) and the random number T i,1 and T i,2 To verify DUAV. Since this private key is held only by DUAV, AUAV can ensure the verification of DUAV.

[0156] (4) Data encryption: During secure data transmission, DUAV uses the GCC public key pair (x GCC ,y GCC ) and the partial private key x obtained by its own DH key exchange i Encrypt your own data and obtain the shared key k i The attacker cannot obtain the private key pair of GCC and the public key of DUAV, so he cannot calculate or obtain the corresponding k i , making it impossible to decrypt the ciphertext.

[0157] (5) Malicious user detection: In most secure data transmission schemes, if there is an anomaly in the data transmission, the entire data set will be discarded. However, the scheme in this paper is able to output a list of malicious members through an aggregate message authentication coding scheme with detection capabilities. If s≠0, it indicates that a malicious message exists. The receiver can then use a malicious member detection algorithm to detect and output a list of malicious identities, effectively helping the group to troubleshoot and enhance the robustness of the group. In schemes that do not use aggregate message authentication codes with detection capabilities, malicious users can usually only be identified through exhaustive search or binary search methods. Their time complexities are O(n) and O(nlog2n), respectively.

[0158] (6) Anti-replay attack: During secure data transmission, the drone entity uses random numbers to resist replay attacks. Even if an attacker replays previously transmitted data from a legitimate drone, the receiving entity can resist replay attacks by checking whether the random number has been received before and verifying the correctness of the signature.

[0159] (7) Defending against impersonation attacks: To carry out an impersonation attack, the adversary needs to forge a valid signature. However, during secure data transmission, the adversary cannot obtain the complete private key pair of any entity. Since mutual authentication is completed, the adversary cannot calculate the correct signature without the private key pair, and therefore cannot impersonate any entity to transmit data.

[0160] (8) Resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks: Similar to resistance to impersonation attacks, the attacker cannot obtain the complete private key pair of any entity and therefore cannot generate a correct signature. Therefore, the attacker cannot impersonate any entity or act as a middleman to communicate with two entities simultaneously to transmit data. Therefore, the present invention can resist man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0161] The present invention firstly utilizes an aggregated message verification code mechanism with a detection function, and designs a traceable aggregate signature method in combination with certificateless public key cryptography, so that malicious nodes can be quickly detected in large-scale nodes of drone multi-hop networks, and the authenticity and non-repudiation of valid nodes can be ensured. Secondly, the public-private key pair between the data drone and the command and control center is used to realize non-interactive rapid negotiation of session keys and secure transmission of multi-hop data. Thirdly, an anonymous identifier is designed for each drone node in secure transmission to protect the true identity of the entity. Finally, the detection of malicious nodes is placed on the aggregation node in the group.

[0162] Therefore, when there are malicious nodes, the present invention can realize verification at the front end of data transmission, timely discover and trace malicious entities in the network, and reduce the communication overhead in data transmission. In addition, the present invention has a wide range of application scenarios and is applicable to various types of drones and drones launched by different organizations. In terms of overhead, compared with the current methods, the present invention has lower computational overhead and communication overhead when there are malicious nodes in the group.

[0163] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, and the same or similar parts between the various embodiments can be referred to each other, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments. All or part of the present invention can be used in many general or special computer system environments or configurations. For example: personal computers, server computers, handheld devices or portable devices, tablet devices, mobile communication terminals, multi-processor systems, microprocessor-based systems, programmable electronic devices, network PCs, minicomputers, mainframe computers, distributed computing environments including any of the above systems or devices, etc.

[0164] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit the present invention. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, a person skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments may still be modified, or some or all of the technical features thereof may be replaced by equivalents. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the scope of the technical solutions of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for secure transmission of drone cluster data supporting malicious node detection, characterized in that: include: Initializing the key distribution center, obtaining a key distribution center initialization result, and making the initialization result public; According to the initialization result of the key distribution center, each drone is registered and authenticated, and the ground control center is registered and authenticated; Any first data drone DUAV in a multi-hop drone network i Collect and transmit data, the first data drone DUAV i Digitally sign the transmission data using a certificateless aggregate signature technique, and then transmit the data signature and the transmission data to an adjacent second data drone DUAV. i+1 ; The second data drone DUAV i+1 The data carried by the drone is added to the transmission data to obtain an aggregate message, and the aggregate message is transmitted to the aggregate drone AUAV in the multi-hop drone network. M middle; The Converged UAV M The aggregate message is verified. If the verification fails, the aggregated UAV M Run the malicious node detection algorithm to obtain the malicious data drone identity in the transmission link, and remove the malicious data in the aggregate message and send it to the ground control center; if the verification is successful, the aggregate drone AUAV M The aggregated message is processed and sent to the ground control center.

2. The method for secure transmission of drone cluster data supporting malicious node detection according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The initializing of the key distribution center includes: The key distribution center selects a cyclic group G and determines a syndrome generator matrix S with a biorthogonal code; wherein the order of the cyclic group G is represented by q and the generator is P; Determine the Galois Field GF(2 h ) and the extended syndrome generator matrix Σ, where the Galois field GF(2 h ) is α; According to the Galois Field GF(2 h ) and the syndrome generation matrix S, determine the first matrix Ξ and the second matrix Γ; wherein the shape of the first matrix Ξ is (l+1)×n, and the shape of the second matrix Γ is (2 l+1 -1)×n; The key distribution center determines the system master private key s pri , and according to the system master private key s pri Calculate the corresponding system public key P pub ; The key distribution center is based on the cyclic group G and the Galois field GF(2 h ) generates multiple secure hash functions to complete the initialization.

3. The method for secure transmission of drone cluster data supporting malicious node detection according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The registering and authenticating each drone according to the initialization result of the key distribution center includes: First Data UAV DUAV i Determine the first random number x i , determine the first random number x i First data drone DUAV i The first part of the private key x i , and according to the first part of the private key x i The first data drone DUAV is calculated by using the parameters of the cyclic group G in the initialization result i The first part of the public key X i , the first information (X i ,ID i ) is sent to the key distribution center, where ID i Indicates the first data drone DUAV i ID; The key distribution center determines a second random number r i , according to the second random number r i , the system master private key s pri and the first secure hash function in the initialization result to calculate the first data drone DUAV i Corresponding pseudonym PID i ; The key distribution center determines a third random number z i , according to the third random number z i The first data drone DUAV is calculated i The second part of the public key Y i , and according to the second part of the public key Y i The first data drone DUAV is calculated i The second part of the private key y i , using the second part of the private key y i Calculate the second part of the obfuscated private key y′ i ; The key distribution center sends a second message (PID i ,y′ i ,Y i ) to the first data drone DUAV i ; The first data drone DUAV i The second message (PID i ,y′ i ,Y i ) for verification, if the verification is successful, the first data drone DUAV i Calculate the second part of the private key y i , accept the pseudonymous PID i As the first data drone DUAV i The alias of the first part of the private key x i and the second part of the private key y i As a certificateless private key pair, the first part of the public key X i and the second part of the public key Y i As a certificateless public key pair.

4. The method for secure transmission of drone cluster data supporting malicious node detection according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The first verification formula is expressed as: Among them, z i represents the third random number; P represents the generator of the cyclic group G; s pri Indicates the system master private key; H2 indicates the second secure hash function; PID i UAV i Corresponding pseudonym: X i Indicates the first data drone DUAV i The first part of the public key; Y i Indicates the first data drone DUAV i The second part of the public key; H3 represents the third secure hash function; P pub Indicates the system public key; x i Represents the first random number.

5. The method for secure transmission of drone cluster data supporting malicious node detection according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The registration and certification of the ground control center includes: The ground control center GCC determines the fourth random number x GCC , determine the fourth random number x GCC The first part of the private key x of the ground control center GCC GCC , and according to the first part of the private key x of the ground control center GCC GCC The first part of the public key X of the ground control center GCC is calculated using the parameters of the cyclic group G in the initialization result GCC , the third information (X GCC ,ID GCC ) is sent to the key distribution center; The key distribution center determines five random numbers z GCC The second part of the public key Y of the ground control center GCC is calculated by the parameters of the cyclic group G in the initialization result GCC , and according to the second public key Y of the ground control center GCC Calculate the second part of the private key y of the ground control center GCC GCC , using the second part of the private key y of the ground control center GCC GCC Calculate the second part of the obfuscated private key y′ of the ground control center GCC GCC ; The key distribution center sends a fourth message (y′ GCC ,Y GCC ) to the ground control center GCC; The ground control center GCC verifies the fourth message (y′) by a second verification formula GCC ,Y GCC ) is verified, and if the verification is successful, the ground control center GCC calculates the second part of the private key y of the ground control center GCC GCC , the first part of the private key x of the ground control center GCC GCC and the second part of the private key y of the ground control center GCC GCC As a certificateless private key pair, the first part of the public key X of the ground control center GCC GCC and the second part of the public key Y of the ground control center GCC GCC As a certificateless public key pair.

6. The method for secure transmission of drone cluster data supporting malicious node detection according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The second verification formula is expressed as: Among them, z GCC represents five random numbers; P represents the generator of the cyclic group G; s pri Indicates the system master private key; H2 indicates the second secure hash function; ID GCC Indicates the identity of the ground control center; X GCC Indicates the first part of the public key of the ground control center GCC; Y GCC represents the second part of the public key of the ground control center GCC; H3 represents the third secure hash function; P pub Indicates the system public key; x GCC Represents the first part of the private key of the ground control center GCC.

7. The method for secure transmission of drone cluster data supporting malicious node detection according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Any first data drone DUAV in the multi-hop drone network i Collect and transmit data, the first data drone DUAV i The transmission data is transmitted to a neighboring second data drone DUAV via a certificateless aggregate signature i+1 ,include: The first data drone DUAV i Determine the sixth random number b i , and according to the sixth random number b i The first calculation result U is obtained by calculating the parameters of the cyclic group G in the initialization result i ; The first data drone DUAV i Utilizing the Aggregate UAV M Aggregate drone public key X M , calculate the first data UAV DUAV i The corresponding temporary pseudonym PID′ i ; The first data drone DUAV i Calculate the encryption key k i , and using the encryption key k i For the message m to be encrypted i Encrypt and get the ciphertext C i ; The first data drone DUAV i Calculate the first data of DUAV i The corresponding signature s i , and the second calculation result T is calculated by using the syndrome generation matrix S with dual orthogonal codes in the initialization result, the first matrix Ξ, the first calculation formula and the second calculation formula i,1 And the third calculation result T i,2 ; The first data drone DUAV i Send transmission data (PID ' i ,C i ,U i ,…,PID′0,C0,U0,T i,1 ,T i,2 ) to the second data drone DUAV i+1 .

8. The method for secure transmission of drone cluster data supporting malicious node detection according to claim 7 is characterized in that: The first calculation formula is expressed as: T i,1 =(0,…,0,s i ,0,…,0)S T +T i-1,1 ; The second calculation formula is expressed as: Among them, s i Indicates the first data drone DUAV i The corresponding signature; S T represents the transpose of the syndrome generation matrix S; T i-1,1 Indicates that any third-party data drone DUAV i-1 The first part of the generated aggregate message verification code with detection function; Indicates H8(s i P), where h is the Galois Field GF(2 h ), H8 represents the eighth secure hash function, and P represents the generator of the cyclic group G; T represents the transpose of the first matrix Ξ; T i-1,2 Indicates any third-party data drone DUAV i-1 The second part of the generated aggregated message verification code with detection function.

9. The method for secure transmission of drone cluster data supporting malicious node detection according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The Converged UAV M Verifying the aggregate message includes: The aggregation drone obtains the public key pair of each of the data drones according to the aggregation message; The aggregate message is verified using the public key pair and the third verification formula to obtain a verification result value s to complete the verification, and it is determined whether the verification result value s is equal to 0. If so, the aggregate drone accepts the aggregate message; if not, the aggregate drone performs malicious node detection.

10. The method for secure transmission of drone cluster data supporting malicious node detection according to claim 9 is characterized in that: The aggregate drone performs malicious node detection, including: A first vector σ is obtained by calculating the syndrome generation matrix S with dual orthogonal codes in the initialization result, the verification result value s, and the extended syndrome generation matrix Σ in the initialization result, and each row in the first vector σ is judged according to the first judgment condition and the second judgment condition, and the matrix elements that do not meet the first judgment condition and the second judgment condition are deleted to obtain a sixth matrix σ'; An error correction vector is calculated according to the first matrix Ξ and the second matrix Γ in the initialization result, and a second vector γ is obtained according to the error correction vector; Determine whether the elements in the sixth matrix σ' are equal to the elements at corresponding positions in the second vector γ, and if they are equal, determine the position of the malicious node according to the position of the elements in the matrix; If the verification result is 1, the aggregated UAV M The aggregated message is sent to the next hop drone.

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