Quantity purchase decision-making system and method based on bargaining

Abstract

The invention discloses a bargaining-based amount purchase decision-making system and method, belongs to the technical field of drug market purchase decision-making and supply chain management, and improves the decision-making accuracy of a pharmaceutical enterprise participating in amount purchase through specific data and scientific calculation. The method is helpful for an enterprise to accurately evaluate the influence on profits, marketing strategies and patient welfare and make a more intelligent choice. Meanwhile, reduction of medicine cost is promoted, medicine accessibility of the patient is improved, medicine can be purchased in batches due to quantity purchasing dominated by a purchasing unit or a medical institution, the burden of the patient is relieved, market competition is stimulated through quantity purchasing, and medicine quality improvement and industry technology innovation are promoted. According to the invention, an effective reference for making a medicine purchasing policy is provided for a purchasing unit and a medical institution, and the actual medicine market can be known through dynamic analysis of the market under different purchasing conditions.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of drug market procurement decision-making and supply chain management, and specifically relates to a bargaining-based volume procurement decision-making system and method. Background Art

[0002] In the modern pharmaceutical market, pharmaceutical companies face a variety of procurement models when selling their products, among which volume-based procurement is a method that is gaining more and more attention. Volume-based procurement is usually led by procurement units or large medical institutions, and aims to reduce drug costs and improve drug accessibility for patients through bulk purchases. This model has a significant impact on the profit structure and market strategy of pharmaceutical companies, and also affects consumer surplus (i.e., the degree of satisfaction that consumers get from purchases). In the context of volume-based procurement, pharmaceutical companies need to consider the pricing pressure of procurement units and the welfare of patients while ensuring their own profits. In addition, since volume-based procurement often involves the bulk purchase of a large number of drugs, this may lead to an overall decline in drug prices in the market, which in turn affects the dynamics of the non-volume-based procurement market. In order to make wise decisions in such an environment, pharmaceutical companies need to accurately evaluate the impact of volume-based procurement on their profits, marketing strategies, and patient welfare. Traditional decision-making models may not be able to fully capture the interaction of these complex factors, so a more refined decision support system is needed to help pharmaceutical companies optimize their strategies.

[0003] The aim is to provide a scientific decision-making framework for pharmaceutical companies by building a bargaining-based volume-based procurement decision system and method. The system takes into account market sales, corporate profits, and consumer surplus in both volume-based and non-volume-based procurement scenarios, and simulates the negotiation process between pharmaceutical companies and procurement platforms through the Nash bargaining model. This approach not only helps pharmaceutical companies evaluate the potential benefits of participating in volume-based procurement, but also provides procurement units and medical institutions with insights on how to formulate more effective drug procurement policies. To this end, we propose a bargaining-based volume-based procurement decision system and method to solve the above-mentioned problems. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a volume purchasing decision system and method based on bargaining to solve the problems raised in the above background technology.

[0005] To achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following technical solution: a bargaining-based volume purchasing decision-making system and method, characterized in that the method comprises the following steps:

[0006] a) Construct the drug market sales volume, pharmaceutical enterprise profit and consumer surplus model under the non-volume procurement situation, which are q1=a-p1+λe1, and

[0007] b) Construct the drug market sales volume, pharmaceutical enterprise profit and consumer surplus model under the volume-based procurement scenario, respectively: and

[0008] c) Constructing a Nash bargaining model between pharmaceutical companies and procurement platforms:

[0009] d) Using the reverse induction method, the optimal price and optimal marketing effort level of pharmaceutical companies in the case of non-volume procurement are:

[0010] e) Substituting the optimal price and optimal marketing effort level obtained in step d into the model in step a, the maximum enterprise profit and the maximum consumer surplus are obtained as follows:

[0011] f) Using the reverse induction method, the optimal price and optimal marketing effort level of pharmaceutical companies in the market for remaining drug usage under volume-based procurement are:

[0012] g) Substitute the optimal price and optimal marketing effort level obtained in step f into the model in step b to obtain the maximum total enterprise profit and maximum consumer surplus respectively. and

[0013] h) Find the maximum profit of the pharmaceutical company in the remaining drug market, that is, the negotiation breakdown point of the pharmaceutical company:

[0014] i) Substitute the relevant variables in steps e, g, and h into the model in step c, where the platform negotiation breakdown point The Nash bargaining model can be obtained:

[0015] j) Using the optimality condition, the optimal drug purchase price can be obtained as:

[0016] k) Substituting the optimal drug purchase price obtained in step j into step g, we can obtain the maximum total enterprise profit and maximum consumer surplus under volume-based procurement:

[0017]

[0018] l) The difference between the profits of the enterprise under the two situations is recorded as ΔΠ:

[0019]

[0020] Preferably, the Nash bargaining model in step c further comprises:

[0021] a) Determine the negotiation breakdown point between the two parties, that is, the retained profits of both parties if no agreement is reached;

[0022] b) For the volume purchasing platform led by the purchasing unit, its focus is on the patient's consumer surplus;

[0023] c) For pharmaceutical companies, if they fail to reach an agreement with the volume-based procurement platform, they can only seek to maximize profits in the remaining drug usage market;

[0024] d) Pharmaceutical companies and volume-based purchasing platforms negotiate on the price of drugs for the agreed purchase volume;

[0025] e) The bargaining power of pharmaceutical companies is r, and the bargaining power of volume-based procurement platforms is 1-r.

[0026] Preferably, the model construction in steps a and b further includes obtaining data such as the agreed purchase volume and demand volume of the volume-based purchasing platform, and estimating the company's marketing level based on data such as the company's marketing investment costs over the years, the company's net profit, and the marketing investment coefficient.

[0027] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0028] Improve the accuracy of pharmaceutical companies' decisions: This invention uses specific data and scientific calculation methods to calculate the profits of companies participating in volume-based procurement, thereby improving the accuracy of pharmaceutical companies' decisions. This enables pharmaceutical companies to more accurately assess the impact of volume-based procurement on their profits, marketing strategies, and patient benefits, thereby making more informed decisions.

[0029] Reduce drug costs and improve drug accessibility for patients: Volume-based procurement is usually led by purchasing units or large medical institutions, aiming to reduce drug costs and improve drug accessibility for patients through bulk purchases. The decision-making system provided by the present invention can help pharmaceutical companies better participate in volume-based procurement, thereby reducing drug prices and enabling more patients to afford the drugs they need.

[0030] Promoting market competition and improving drug quality: Under the volume-based procurement model, pharmaceutical companies need to compete with other competitors to obtain orders. This prompts pharmaceutical companies to continuously improve product quality to meet the needs of procurement platforms and patients. At the same time, since volume-based procurement involves the bulk purchase of a large number of drugs, it may lead to an overall decline in drug prices in the market, which in turn affects the dynamics of the non-volume-based procurement market. This competitive environment helps promote technological progress and innovation in the entire industry.

[0031] Providing insights for procurement units and medical institutions to formulate more effective drug procurement policies: The decision-making system provided by the present invention can provide procurement units and medical institutions with insights on how to formulate more effective drug procurement policies. By analyzing market sales, corporate profits and consumer surplus under volume-based procurement and non-volume-based procurement scenarios, procurement units and medical institutions can better understand the actual situation of the drug market and thus formulate more reasonable and effective drug procurement policies.

[0032] Helps to maximize the benefits of both parties: The present invention simulates the negotiation process between pharmaceutical companies and procurement platforms through the Nash bargaining model, which helps to maximize the benefits of both parties. During the negotiation process, pharmaceutical companies and volume-based procurement platforms negotiate on the price of drugs for the agreed procurement volume, and finally reach an agreement that is beneficial to both parties by weighing their respective negotiation breakdown points and bargaining power. This helps ensure that pharmaceutical companies can obtain reasonable profits when participating in volume-based procurement, while also protecting the patient's consumer surplus. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0033] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0034] Figure 1 The present invention is a flow chart of the method. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0035] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be described clearly and completely below in combination with the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0036] See also Figure 1 The present invention provides a volume purchasing decision-making system and method based on bargaining, characterized in that the method comprises the following steps:

[0037] a) Construct the drug market sales volume, pharmaceutical enterprise profit and consumer surplus model under the non-volume procurement situation, which are q1=a-p1+λe1, and

[0038] b) Construct the drug market sales volume, pharmaceutical enterprise profit and consumer surplus model under the volume-based procurement scenario, respectively: and

[0039] c) Constructing a Nash bargaining model between pharmaceutical companies and procurement platforms:

[0040] d) Using the reverse induction method, the optimal price and optimal marketing effort level of pharmaceutical companies in the case of non-volume procurement are:

[0041] e) Substituting the optimal price and optimal marketing effort level obtained in step d into the model in step a, the maximum enterprise profit and the maximum consumer surplus are obtained as follows:

[0042] f) Using the reverse induction method, the optimal price and optimal marketing effort level of pharmaceutical companies in the market for remaining drug usage under volume-based procurement are:

[0043] g) Substitute the optimal price and optimal marketing effort level obtained in step f into the model in step b to obtain the maximum total enterprise profit and maximum consumer surplus respectively. and

[0044] h) Find the maximum profit of the pharmaceutical company in the remaining drug market, that is, the negotiation breakdown point of the pharmaceutical company:

[0045] i) Substitute the relevant variables in steps e, g, and h into the model in step c, where the platform negotiation breakdown point The Nash bargaining model can be obtained:

[0046] j) Using the optimality condition, the optimal drug purchase price can be obtained as:

[0047] k) Substituting the optimal drug purchase price obtained in step j into step g, we can obtain the maximum total enterprise profit and maximum consumer surplus under volume-based procurement:

[0048]

[0049] l) The difference between the profits of the enterprise under the two situations is recorded as ΔΠ:

[0050]

[0051] Furthermore, a model of drug market sales, pharmaceutical company profits and consumer surplus under non-volume procurement is constructed: This step helps pharmaceutical companies understand the market demand for their products, corporate profitability and consumer satisfaction without volume procurement. With this information, companies can better evaluate the market performance of their products and services and formulate corresponding marketing strategies and pricing policies accordingly. In addition, this model can also help companies predict future market trends, thereby providing guidance for the long-term development of the company.

[0052] Constructing a model of drug market sales, pharmaceutical company profits and consumer surplus under volume-based procurement: This step enables pharmaceutical companies to evaluate the sales of their products in the market, the profitability of the company and the welfare level of consumers under the volume-based procurement model. This helps companies understand the actual impact of volume-based procurement on their business and provides a scientific basis for participating in volume-based procurement decisions. At the same time, this also helps procurement units and medical institutions understand the impact of volume-based procurement on the drug market, thereby formulating more reasonable drug procurement policies.

[0053] Constructing a Nash bargaining model between pharmaceutical companies and procurement platforms: This step helps maximize the benefits of both parties by simulating the behaviors and strategies of both parties during the negotiation process. During the negotiation process, pharmaceutical companies and volume-based procurement platforms negotiate the price of drugs for the agreed procurement volume, and finally reach an agreement that is beneficial to both parties by weighing their respective negotiation breakdown points and bargaining power. This helps ensure that pharmaceutical companies can obtain reasonable profits when participating in volume-based procurement, while also protecting the consumer surplus of patients.

[0054] Using the reverse induction method to solve the optimal price and marketing effort level of pharmaceutical companies in the case of non-volume procurement: This step helps pharmaceutical companies find product prices and marketing strategies that maximize their profits in the case of non-volume procurement. In this way, companies can increase their product market share and consumer satisfaction while ensuring their own interests.

[0055] Substitute the optimal price and optimal marketing effort level obtained in step d into the model in step a: This step can help pharmaceutical companies understand the maximum corporate profit and maximum consumer surplus that can be achieved by adopting the optimal price and marketing strategy under non-volume procurement. This helps companies evaluate their competitiveness in the market and provides a reference for future development plans.

[0056] Using the reverse induction method to solve the optimal price and marketing effort level of pharmaceutical companies in the market for residual drug usage under volume-based procurement: This step enables pharmaceutical companies to find product prices and marketing strategies that maximize their profits in the market for residual drug usage under the volume-based procurement model. This helps companies maintain a certain level of profitability when facing the pressure of volume-based procurement.

[0057] Substitute the optimal price and optimal marketing effort level obtained in step f into the model in step b: This step can help pharmaceutical companies understand the maximum total corporate profit and maximum consumer surplus that can be achieved by adopting the optimal price and marketing strategy under volume-based procurement. This helps companies better evaluate the impact of volume-based procurement on their business and provide a basis for decision-making on whether to participate in volume-based procurement.

[0058] Determine the maximum profit that pharmaceutical companies can achieve in the remaining drug market: This step enables pharmaceutical companies to understand the maximum profit that can be achieved in the remaining drug market without volume-based procurement. This helps companies adjust their business strategies to adapt to the changing market environment when faced with market changes.

[0059] Substitute the relevant variables in steps e, g, and h into the model in step c: This step helps pharmaceutical companies and volume-based procurement platforms to more accurately assess the position and strength of both parties in the negotiation by substituting data such as corporate profits and consumer surplus under different scenarios into the Nash bargaining model, thereby laying the foundation for reaching a fair and reasonable agreement.

[0060] The optimal drug purchase price can be obtained using the optimality conditions: This step calculates the optimal drug purchase price under certain conditions, which helps pharmaceutical companies and volume-based purchasing platforms find a price point acceptable to both parties during negotiations, thereby maximizing the benefits of both parties.

[0061] Substitute the optimal drug purchase price obtained in step j into step g: This step can help pharmaceutical companies understand the maximum total corporate profit and maximum consumer surplus that can be achieved by adopting the optimal drug purchase price under volume-based procurement. This helps companies better assess the impact of volume-based procurement on their business and provide a basis for decision-making on whether to participate in volume-based procurement.

[0062] The difference in corporate profits under the two scenarios is recorded as ΔΠ: This step helps pharmaceutical companies to more intuitively understand the impact of volume-based procurement on their profitability by comparing the difference in corporate profits under volume-based procurement and non-volume-based procurement scenarios. This helps companies make more informed decisions when facing market changes.

[0063] In this embodiment, the Nash bargaining model in step c further includes:

[0064] a) Determine the negotiation breakdown point between the two parties, that is, the retained profits of both parties if no agreement is reached;

[0065] b) For the volume purchasing platform led by the purchasing unit, its focus is on the patient's consumer surplus;

[0066] c) For pharmaceutical companies, if they fail to reach an agreement with the volume-based procurement platform, they can only seek to maximize profits in the remaining drug usage market;

[0067] d) Pharmaceutical companies and volume-based purchasing platforms negotiate on the price of drugs for the agreed purchase volume;

[0068] e) The bargaining power of pharmaceutical companies is r, and the bargaining power of volume-based procurement platforms is 1-r.

[0069] Furthermore, determine the negotiation breakdown point of both parties: This step is crucial to ensure the fairness and efficiency of the negotiation process. By clarifying the retained profits of pharmaceutical companies and volume-based procurement platforms when an agreement is not reached, both parties can have a clearer understanding of their positions and bottom lines. This helps to avoid excessive compromise during the negotiation process, thereby protecting their respective interests. In addition, this also provides a clear starting point for subsequent negotiations, allowing both parties to communicate and negotiate effectively within a mutually recognized framework.

[0070] For the volume-based purchasing platform led by the purchasing unit, the focus is on the patient's consumer surplus: this step emphasizes the non-profit nature of the volume-based purchasing platform and its focus on the well-being of patients. By taking the patient's consumer surplus as the key negotiation goal, the volume-based purchasing platform can ensure the rationality of drug prices, thereby reducing the economic burden on patients. This will not only help improve patients' access to drugs, but also promote social equity and overall improvement of public health. At the same time, this also provides pharmaceutical companies with a clear market orientation, prompting them to pay more attention to patient needs and social value in product development and pricing strategies.

[0071] For pharmaceutical companies, if they fail to reach an agreement with the volume-based procurement platform, they can only seek to maximize profits in the remaining volume market of drugs: This step reveals the potential risks and challenges faced by pharmaceutical companies when facing volume-based procurement decisions. If they fail to reach a cooperation agreement with the volume-based procurement platform, pharmaceutical companies will have to turn to the more competitive remaining volume market, which may lead to a reduction in their market share and a decline in profits. Therefore, this step actually encourages pharmaceutical companies to actively participate in volume-based procurement negotiations in order to obtain more stable market access and revenue sources. At the same time, this also encourages pharmaceutical companies to be more flexible and pragmatic in negotiations and to find mutually beneficial solutions with the volume-based procurement platform.

[0072] Pharmaceutical companies and volume-based procurement platforms negotiate on the price of drugs for the agreed purchase volume: This step is the core of the entire volume-based procurement decision-making system. Through negotiations, both parties can reach a consensus on key terms such as drug prices, supply volume, and quality assurance. This not only helps to ensure the stability and reliability of the drug supply chain, but also promotes pharmaceutical companies' R&D innovation and product quality improvement. At the same time, this also provides more options and bargaining space for volume-based procurement platforms, enabling them to provide patients with better quality drug services at a lower cost.

[0073] The bargaining power of pharmaceutical companies is r, and the bargaining power of volume-based procurement platforms is 1-r: This step introduces a quantitative indicator of bargaining power, making the negotiation process more transparent and predictable. By weighing their respective bargaining powers, both parties can more reasonably allocate negotiation gains and risks. This helps avoid unfair results caused by information asymmetry or unequal power, thereby maintaining the fairness and effectiveness of the entire negotiation mechanism. At the same time, this also provides pharmaceutical companies and volume-based procurement platforms with more strategic choices and adjustment space, enabling them to flexibly respond to negotiation challenges based on market changes and their own advantages.

[0074] In this embodiment, the model construction in steps a and b further includes obtaining data such as the agreed purchase volume and demand volume of the volume-based purchasing platform, and estimating the company's marketing level based on data such as the company's historical marketing investment costs, net profit, and marketing investment coefficient.

[0075] The working principle and use process of the present invention:

[0076] First, pharmaceutical companies need to build a model of drug market sales, pharmaceutical company profits and consumer surplus under non-volume procurement. This includes obtaining data such as marketing input costs, corporate net profits, and marketing input coefficients over the years, and inferring corporate marketing levels based on these data. With this information, pharmaceutical companies can predict market performance and profits under non-volume procurement. Next, pharmaceutical companies need to build a model of drug market sales, pharmaceutical company profits and consumer surplus under volume procurement. This also requires obtaining relevant data, such as agreed purchase volume and demand volume, in order to more accurately assess the impact of volume procurement on the market and companies. Then, pharmaceutical companies need to build a Nash bargaining model with the procurement platform. This model will simulate the behavior and strategies of both parties during the negotiation process. At this stage, pharmaceutical companies need to determine the negotiation breakdown point between the two parties, that is, the retained profits of both parties when the agreement is not reached. At the same time, it is also necessary to evaluate the goals of the volume procurement platform led by the procurement unit, which usually focuses on the patient's consumer surplus. In addition, if no agreement is reached with the volume-based procurement platform, pharmaceutical companies can only seek profit maximization in the remaining drug usage market. Once the Nash bargaining model is established, pharmaceutical companies and volume-based procurement platforms can negotiate the price of drugs for the agreed procurement volume. In this process, the bargaining power of pharmaceutical companies is r, while the bargaining power of volume-based procurement platforms is 1-r. By weighing their respective negotiation breakdown points and bargaining power, the two parties finally reached an agreement that is beneficial to both parties. Finally, the optimal drug procurement price can be obtained according to the optimality condition. Substituting this price into the previously established model, the maximum total corporate profit and maximum consumer surplus under the volume-based procurement scenario can be obtained. By comparing the difference in corporate profits under the two scenarios, pharmaceutical companies can make a decision on whether to participate in volume-based procurement.

[0077] The above shows and describes the basic principles, main features and advantages of the present invention. It should be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments. The above embodiments and descriptions are only for explaining the principles of the present invention. Without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, the present invention may have various changes and improvements, which fall within the scope of the present invention to be protected. The scope of protection of the present invention is defined by the attached claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A bargaining-based volume purchasing decision-making system and method, characterized in that: The method comprises the following steps: a) Construct the drug market sales volume, pharmaceutical enterprise profit and consumer surplus model under the non-volume procurement situation, which are q1=a-p1+λe1, and b) Construct the drug market sales volume, pharmaceutical enterprise profit and consumer surplus model under the volume-based procurement scenario, respectively: and c) Constructing a Nash bargaining model between pharmaceutical companies and procurement platforms: d) Using the reverse induction method, the optimal price and optimal marketing effort level of pharmaceutical companies in the case of non-volume procurement are: e) Substituting the optimal price and optimal marketing effort level obtained in step d into the model in step a, the maximum enterprise profit and the maximum consumer surplus are obtained as follows: f) Using the reverse induction method, the optimal price and optimal marketing effort level of pharmaceutical companies in the market for remaining drug usage under volume-based procurement are: g) Substitute the optimal price and optimal marketing effort level obtained in step f into the model in step b to obtain the maximum total enterprise profit and maximum consumer surplus respectively. and h) Find the maximum profit of the pharmaceutical company in the remaining drug market, that is, the negotiation breakdown point of the pharmaceutical company: i) Substitute the relevant variables in steps e, g, and h into the model in step c, where the platform negotiation breakdown point The Nash bargaining model can be obtained: j) Using the optimality condition, the optimal drug purchase price can be obtained as: k) Substituting the optimal drug purchase price obtained in step j into step g, we can obtain the maximum total enterprise profit and maximum consumer surplus under volume-based procurement: l) The difference between the profits of the enterprise under the two situations is recorded as ΔΠ:

2. A bargaining-based volume purchasing decision system and method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The Nash bargaining model in step c further includes: a) Determine the negotiation breakdown point between the two parties, that is, the retained profits of both parties if no agreement is reached; b) For the volume purchasing platform led by the purchasing unit, its focus is on the patient's consumer surplus; c) For pharmaceutical companies, if they fail to reach an agreement with the volume-based procurement platform, they can only seek to maximize profits in the remaining drug usage market; d) Pharmaceutical companies and volume-based purchasing platforms negotiate on the price of drugs for the agreed purchase volume; e) The bargaining power of pharmaceutical companies is r, and the bargaining power of volume-based procurement platforms is 1-r.

3. A bargaining-based volume purchasing decision system and method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The model construction in steps a and b further includes obtaining data such as the agreed purchase volume and demand volume of the volume-based procurement platform, and estimating the company's marketing level based on data such as the company's historical marketing investment costs, net profit, and marketing investment coefficient.

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