Safety protection method, device and equipment for train door coupled on platform and medium

Abstract

The invention relates to a train door safety protection method, device and equipment for coupling a train at a platform and a medium, and the method comprises the following steps: the coupled states of a head vehicle-mounted controller and a tail vehicle-mounted controller in a train unit are synchronized, and when the train is in the coupled state, a vehicle-mounted control system forbids a vehicle door to be enabled. Compared with the prior art, the risk of mistakenly opening the door due to the fact that the coupled states calculated by the head and tail vehicle-mounted controllers are inconsistent is avoided, and it can be ensured that the train door is always prohibited from being enabled when the train is in the coupled state.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The invention relates to a train operation control system, and in particular to a method, device, equipment and medium for protecting the safety of doors of a train connected to a platform. Background Art

[0002] In order to solve the problems of waste of transportation capacity and decreased passenger satisfaction caused by the uneven temporal and spatial distribution of passenger flow on urban rail transit lines (tides, Y-shaped lines, large and small routes, co-lines, etc.), transportation organization technology based on flexible marshaling has come into being. It realizes automatic coupling and decoupling of train units at specific positions on the line (such as depot lines, storage lines, reversing rails, platforms), thereby flexibly changing the train formation and realizing a transportation organization mode with the best coordination between demand and capacity.

[0003] When coupling operation is carried out on the main line platform, the coupled train stops accurately and steadily at the coupling stop point on the platform, and enters the coupled state after receiving the "coupling command" issued by the automatic train monitoring system (hereinafter referred to as ATS). The coupling-free train collides with the coupled train at a low speed according to the coupling-free command issued by the ATS, and then completes the coupling. Considering the collision speed and impact force during coupling, the coupled train may produce unexpected displacement. If the coupled train is currently carrying out boarding and alighting operations because it has the conditions to open the doors, the unexpected movement of the coupled train may cause harm to the passengers.

[0004] After searching, CN116279668A discloses a fully automatic coupling safety protection method with on-board autonomous confirmation, which specifically discloses that after the coupled train stops at the designated position according to the operating instructions, the coupling conditions to be checked include: when the train stops at the platform, checking whether the doors are in a closed and locked state, and the door enable has been canceled.

[0005] For the on-board control system based on the head-to-tail hot standby redundant architecture, since the controllers at both ends operate independently, the train coupling status and door enable output calculated by the controllers at both ends may be inconsistent, resulting in the train being unable to prohibit the door opening operation as expected. The currently disclosed technology only mentions the cancellation of the door enable when the coupled train stops at the platform, but does not consider how the coupled train based on the head-to-tail redundant architecture can ensure that the controllers at both ends cancel the door enable synchronously. Therefore, for the on-board control system using the head-to-tail hot standby redundant architecture, how to always ensure that the door enable of the coupled train will not be output incorrectly has become a technical problem that needs to be solved at present. Summary of the invention

[0006] The purpose of the present invention is to overcome the defects of the above-mentioned prior art and to provide a method, device, equipment and medium for protecting the doors of trains connected to the platform.

[0007] The purpose of the present invention can be achieved by the following technical solutions:

[0008] According to a first aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method for protecting the doors of trains coupled at a platform, the method comprising synchronizing the coupled status between the head and tail on-board controllers in a train unit, and prohibiting the doors from being enabled by the on-board control system when the train is in the coupled state.

[0009] As a preferred technical solution, the coupling and uncoupling states of the coupled train include: CS0_reload state, CS1_nooperation state and CS2_be coupled state, wherein the CS0_reload state is the state when the train is loading data, the CS1_no operation state is the state when the train is not coupling and uncoupling operation, and the CS2_be coupled state is the state when the train is in a coupled state.

[0010] As a preferred technical solution, the synchronization of the connected status between the head and tail onboard controllers in the train unit includes the following steps:

[0011] Step S1, when the safety condition is met, any onboard controller in the train unit determines that the train enters the coupled state, that is, the coupling and uncoupling state changes from the CS1_no operation state to the CS2_be coupled state, and the train unit is provided with two onboard controllers, which are respectively arranged at the head and the tail of the train unit;

[0012] Step S2, the onboard controller records the cycle number of the time of entering the CS2_be coupled state as Be_Coupled_SN, and sends the cycle number to another onboard controller in the train unit;

[0013] Step S3, when both onboard controllers in the train unit enter the connected state, the master onboard controller requests to be connected to the regional controller, wherein in each communication cycle, one of the two onboard controllers is determined to be the master onboard controller according to the health status of the two onboard controllers, and the master onboard controller sends a communication message to the outside;

[0014] Step S4, when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the train unit is interrupted, the main onboard controller requests the regional controller to cancel the connection;

[0015] Step S5, after receiving the authorization cancellation information from the regional controller, both vehicle-mounted controllers exit the coupled state, that is, change from the CS2_be coupled state back to the CS1_no operation state;

[0016] Step S6, when the main vehicle controller requests the regional controller to cancel the connection for more than the first delay time, the connected state is automatically exited;

[0017] Step S7, when one onboard controller exits the connected state, another onboard controller in the train unit also exits synchronously.

[0018] As a preferred technical solution, the safety conditions in step S1 are to simultaneously meet the following conditions: the communication between the two on-board controllers in the train unit is normal; the coupler is centered; the train unit is positioned in a safe area where coupling is allowed; the train has stopped safely; and the doors are closed and locked.

[0019] As a preferred technical solution, the first delay time in step S6 is determined by taking into account the validity period of the connection request message sent by the connected train to the regional controller, the validity period of the movement authorization message calculated by the regional controller for the detaching train, and the time required for the detaching train to emergency brake and stop.

[0020] As a preferred technical solution, when the train is in a coupled state, the onboard control system prohibits the door from being enabled, comprising the following steps:

[0021] Step S8, any onboard controller in the train unit checks whether the local end is in the coupled state CS2_becoupled, if so, directly prohibits the door from being enabled, otherwise, executes step S9;

[0022] Step S9, the onboard controller checks whether the communication with another onboard controller in the train unit is normal;

[0023] Step S10, if the communication is normal, check whether the Be_Coupled_SN signal sent by another vehicle controller is valid, if it is valid, prohibit the door from being enabled, otherwise, jump to step S12;

[0024] Step S11, if the communication is interrupted, check whether the Be_Coupled_SN signal sent by another vehicle controller before the communication is interrupted is valid, if it is valid, continuously prohibit the door from being enabled within the second delay time after the communication is interrupted, otherwise, jump to step S12;

[0025] Step S12, outputting door enable after other door opening safety conditions are met.

[0026] As a preferred technical solution, the second delay time in step S11 is determined by taking into account the validity period of the connection request message sent by the connected train to the regional controller, the validity period of the movement authorization message calculated by the regional controller for the detaching train, and the time required for the detaching train to emergency brake and stop.

[0027] As a preferred technical solution, the coupling operation is allowed only when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the coupled train is normal.

[0028] As a preferred technical solution, during the execution of the coupling operation, when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the coupled train is interrupted, the coupled train is allowed to exit the coupled state and restore door enablement only after ensuring that the uncoupled train has stopped.

[0029] As a preferred technical solution, during the execution of the coupling operation, when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the coupled train is interrupted and then restored, if the preset conditions are met, the coupling is requested to the regional controller again without manual intervention.

[0030] According to a second aspect of the present invention, there is provided a device for implementing the door safety protection method of a train coupled to a platform as described above, the device comprising a first onboard controller and a second onboard controller, a three-layer switching communication device and a regional controller in a train unit, the onboard controller comprising a first logic operation unit, a vehicle input acquisition unit, and a door enable drive unit, and the regional controller comprising a second logic operation unit.

[0031] As a preferred technical solution, the first logic operation unit in the on-board controller receives the door closing and locking status and the coupler centering status obtained by the vehicle input acquisition unit, and simultaneously calculates the coupled status of the train by integrating information from another on-board controller and the regional controller; the door enable is calculated using the coupled status, and is output to the vehicle through the door enable drive unit.

[0032] As a preferred technical solution, the three-layer switching communication equipment is used for network communication between the first onboard controller and the second onboard controller in the train unit, and for train-to-ground wireless communication.

[0033] As a preferred technical solution, the second logic operation unit in the regional controller calculates the cancellation authorization information and cooperates with the first logic operation unit in the on-board controller to maintain the coupled status of the train.

[0034] According to a third aspect of the present invention, there is provided an electronic device, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and the method described above is implemented when the processor executes the program.

[0035] According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, there is provided a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, wherein the program implements the method described when executed by a processor.

[0036] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0037] 1. The present invention designs the front and rear vehicle-mounted controllers to exchange the connection status information, and confirms whether the connection status can be exited through the request / response mechanism with the regional controller, and designs a safe exit mechanism for the connection status when the vehicle-ground communication is interrupted, thereby avoiding the risk of mistaken door opening caused by the inconsistency of the connection status calculated by the front and rear vehicle-mounted controllers;

[0038] 2. The present invention calculates the door enable by combining the coupled state calculated by the head and tail on-board controllers and the head and tail communication states, ensuring that the door enable is always prohibited when the train is in the coupled state, and that the door enable will not be output incorrectly in the case of head and tail asynchronous operation, thereby ensuring the safety of passengers when the platform performs the coupling operation;

[0039] 3. The present invention is implemented through software logic, without adding additional hardware devices or additional communication interfaces;

[0040] 4. The present invention is completed automatically by the system without human intervention. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0041] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of train coupling at a platform in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0042] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the coupling and uncoupling state transition of a coupled train in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0043] Figure 3 It is a flowchart of the synchronization of the connected state between the vehicle-mounted controllers in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0044] Figure 4 This is a working diagram of the vehicle control system prohibiting door enabling in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0045] Figure 5 It is a schematic diagram of a door safety protection device connected to a train at a platform according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0046] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0047] Unless otherwise defined, the technical terms or scientific terms involved in this application should be understood by people with ordinary skills in the technical field to which this application belongs. The words "one", "a", "a", "the" and the like involved in this application do not indicate a quantitative limitation, and may represent the singular or plural. The terms "include", "comprise", "have" and any of their variations involved in this application are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions; for example, a process, method, system, product or device that includes a series of steps or modules (units) is not limited to the listed steps or units, but may also include steps or units that are not listed, or may also include other steps or units inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices. The words "connect", "connected", "coupled" and the like involved in this application are not limited to physical or mechanical connections, but may include electrical connections, whether direct or indirect. The "multiple" involved in this application refers to two or more. "And / or" describes the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that there may be three relationships, for example, "A and / or B" can represent: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone. The character " / " generally indicates that the objects before and after are in an "or" relationship. The terms "first", "second", "third", etc. involved in this application are only used to distinguish similar objects and do not represent a specific ordering of the objects.

[0048] The present embodiment provides a method for protecting the doors of trains coupled at a platform, the method comprising synchronizing the coupled status between the head and tail on-board controllers in a train unit, and prohibiting the doors from being enabled by the on-board control system when the train is in the coupled state.

[0049] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of train coupling at the platform in an embodiment of the present invention, and the specific process is as follows:

[0050] The coupled train stops accurately and steadily at the coupled stop point on the platform, enters the coupled state when the conditions are met, and sends a "request to be coupled" to the zone controller (hereinafter referred to as ZC); based on the coupling request information, the ZC determines that the coupled train in front of the going train has met the coupling conditions, and calculates the movement authorization allowing the coupling for the going train.

[0051] When the coupled train does not meet the coupling conditions, it sends a "request to cancel coupling" to ZC; after receiving the cancellation request sent by the coupled train, ZC first withdraws the mobile authorized terminal of the coupled train, and after confirming that the coupled train has stopped in front of the withdrawn mobile authorized terminal, it sends an "authorization to cancel coupling" message to the coupled train; after receiving the "authorization to cancel coupling" message sent by ZC, the coupled train exits the coupled state.

[0052] It can be seen from this that during the entire process from the coupled train entering the coupled state to the exiting the coupled state, there is a possibility of collision with the uncoupled train. In order to avoid the risk of injury to passengers boarding and alighting due to unexpected movement of the coupled train during coupling, the doors of the coupled train should be prohibited from being enabled throughout the coupling process.

[0053] The following part of the embodiment of the present invention will describe how to always ensure that the door enable of the connected train will not be output incorrectly for an on-board control system that adopts a head-to-tail hot standby redundant architecture.

[0054] Figure 2 The figure is a schematic diagram of the coupling and uncoupling state transition of the coupled train in this embodiment. The coupling and uncoupling states of the coupled train include: CS0_reload state, CS1_no operation state and CS2_be coupled state, wherein the CS0_reload state is the state when the train is loading data, the CS1_no operation state is the state when the train is not in coupling and uncoupling operation, and the CS2_be coupled state is the state when the train is in the coupled state.

[0055] The coupling and uncoupling state changes from the CS2_be coupled state to the CS0_reload state, indicating that the coupling is successful and new train marshaling data can be loaded; the coupling and uncoupling state changes from the CS1_no operation state to the CS0_reload state, indicating that the train has been uncoupling and new train marshaling data can be loaded; the coupling and uncoupling state changes from the CS0_reload state to the CS1_no operation state, indicating that the train marshaling data has been loaded and normal operation services can be started; the transfer of the above states does not occur during the coupling process and has no safety impact on boarding and alighting operations. Therefore, the present invention mainly focuses on the transfer between the coupling and uncoupling states CS2_be coupled and CS1_no operation, and how to achieve synchronization between the two onboard controllers in the train unit.

[0056] For the on-board control system that adopts the head-to-tail hot standby redundant architecture, there are two on-board controllers in the train unit, located at the head and tail of the train unit respectively. In each communication cycle, one of the two on-board controllers is determined as the main on-board controller based on the health status of the two on-board controllers, and the main on-board controller sends communication messages to the outside.

[0057] like Figure 3 As shown, the synchronization of the connected state between the head and tail onboard controllers in the train unit includes the following steps:

[0058] Step S1, when the following safety conditions are met, any onboard controller in the train unit determines that the train enters the coupled state, that is, the coupling and uncoupling state changes from the CS1_no operation state to the CS2_be coupled state:

[0059] The communication between the two onboard controllers in the train unit is normal;

[0060] The coupler is centered;

[0061] The train unit is positioned in a safe area where coupling is allowed;

[0062] The train has stopped safely;

[0063] The doors are closed and locked.

[0064] In step S2, the onboard controller records the cycle number of the moment of entering the CS2_be coupled state as Be_Coupled_SN, and sends the cycle number to another onboard controller in the train unit.

[0065] Step S3: When both onboard controllers in the train unit enter the coupled state, the main onboard controller requests the regional controller to be coupled.

[0066] Step S4, when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the train unit is interrupted, the main onboard controller requests the zone controller (ZC) to cancel the coupling.

[0067] Step S5, upon receiving the authorization cancellation information from the regional controller, both vehicle-mounted controllers exit the coupled state, that is, switch from the CS2_be coupled state back to the CS1_no operation state.

[0068] Step S6, when the master vehicle controller requests the regional controller to cancel the connection for more than the delay time T1, the connection state is automatically exited.

[0069] The delay time T1 is determined by taking into account the validity period of the message requesting to be coupled sent by the coupled train to the regional controller, the validity period of the movement authorization message calculated by the regional controller for the coupling train, and the time required for the emergency braking of the coupling train.

[0070] Step S7, when one onboard controller exits the connected state, another onboard controller in the train unit also exits synchronously.

[0071] like Figure 4 As shown, when the train is in the coupled state, the onboard control system prohibits the door from being enabled, including the following steps:

[0072] Step S8, any onboard controller in the train unit checks whether the local end is in the coupled state CS2_becoupled, if so, directly prohibits the door from being enabled, otherwise, executes step S9;

[0073] Step S9, the onboard controller checks whether the communication with another onboard controller in the train unit is normal;

[0074] Step S10, if the communication is normal, check whether the Be_Coupled_SN signal sent by another vehicle controller is valid, if it is valid, prohibit the door from being enabled, otherwise, jump to step S12;

[0075] Step S11, if the communication is interrupted, check whether the Be_Coupled_SN signal sent by another vehicle controller before the communication is interrupted is valid, if it is valid, continuously disable the door enabling within the delay time T2 after the communication is interrupted, otherwise, jump to step S12;

[0076] Step S12, outputting door enable after other door opening safety conditions are met.

[0077] The delay time T2 is determined by taking into account the validity period of the message requesting to be coupled sent by the coupled train to the regional controller, the validity period of the movement authorization message calculated by the regional controller for the coupling train, and the time required for the emergency braking of the coupling train.

[0078] The coupling operation is allowed only when the communication between the two on-board controllers in the coupled train is normal, to avoid the erroneous output of the door enable command to the vehicle during the coupling due to the asynchrony between the two on-board controllers (one end prohibits door enable due to entering the coupled state, while the other end allows door enable due to not entering the coupled state).

[0079] During the coupling operation, when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the coupled train is interrupted, the coupled train is allowed to exit the coupled state and restore the door enable only after ensuring that the uncoupled train has stopped.

[0080] During the coupling operation, when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the coupled train is interrupted and then restored, if the preset conditions are met, the coupling will be requested to the regional controller again without human intervention.

[0081] For the vehicle control system adopting the head-to-tail hot standby redundant architecture, the present invention briefly describes the safety protection of the doors of the coupled trains in the case of head-to-tail asynchronous operation as follows:

[0082] - Single-ended restart: When one end of the vehicle controller is restarted, the CS2_be coupled state calculated previously will be lost, but it can communicate with the other vehicle controller in the train unit to obtain whether the current train is in the coupled state (step S2), thereby disabling the door enable according to step S10.

[0083] - The head and tail calculations are asynchronous. The onboard controller 1 is in the CS2_be coupled state, and the onboard controller 2 is in the CS1_nooperation state. First, according to step S3, when the coupled states calculated by the onboard controllers at both ends are inconsistent, no coupling request will be made to the ZC, and therefore the ZC will not authorize the uncoupling train to execute the uncoupling. If the head and tail calculations are asynchronous after the coupling request is made to the ZC, according to steps S2 and S10, the onboard controller 2 can also prohibit the door enabling.

[0084] - The head-to-tail communication is interrupted. First, according to step S1, the on-board controller does not allow the train to enter the coupled state; secondly, if the communication is interrupted after the train enters the coupled state, according to step S4, the on-board controller 1 will request the ZC to cancel the coupling; according to steps S5 and S6, it is ensured that the on-board controller 1 has definitely exited the coupled state after the delay time T1; therefore, according to step S11, the on-board controller 2 only needs to keep the door enabled during the delay time T2 of the communication interruption.

[0085] The above is an introduction to a method embodiment. The following is a further explanation of the solution of the present invention through an apparatus embodiment.

[0086] This embodiment also provides a device for implementing the above-mentioned method for protecting the door safety of a train connected to a platform, such as Figure 5 As shown, the device includes an onboard controller 1 and an onboard controller 2 in a train unit, a three-layer switching communication device and a regional controller, wherein the onboard controller includes a first logic operation unit, a vehicle input acquisition unit, and a door enabling drive unit, and the regional controller includes a second logic operation unit.

[0087] The first logic operation unit in the on-board controller receives the door closing and locking status and the coupler centering status obtained by the vehicle input acquisition unit, and at the same time calculates the coupled status of the train by integrating information from another on-board controller and the regional controller; the door enable is calculated using the coupled status, and is output to the vehicle through the door enable drive unit.

[0088] The three-layer switching communication equipment is used for network communication between the onboard controller 1 and the onboard controller 2 in the train unit, and can perform vehicle-to-ground wireless communication between the onboard controller and the regional controller to achieve secure interaction of network information.

[0089] The second logic operation unit in the area controller calculates the uncoupling movement authorization for the uncoupling train based on the coupling request of the coupled train; and feeds back the coupling cancellation authorization information to the coupled train based on the coupling cancellation request of the coupled train, and cooperates with the first logic operation unit in the on-board controller to maintain the coupled status of the train.

[0090] The electronic device of the present invention includes a central processing unit (CPU), which can perform various appropriate actions and processes according to computer program instructions stored in a read-only memory (ROM) or loaded from a storage unit into a random access memory (RAM). In the RAM, various programs and data required for device operation can also be stored. The CPU, ROM and RAM are connected to each other via a bus. An input / output (I / O) interface is also connected to the bus.

[0091] Multiple components in the device are connected to the I / O interface, including: input units, such as keyboards, mice, etc.; output units, such as various types of displays, speakers, etc.; storage units, such as disks, optical disks, etc.; and communication units, such as network cards, modems, wireless communication transceivers, etc. The communication unit allows the device to exchange information / data with other devices through computer networks such as the Internet and / or various telecommunication networks.

[0092] The processing unit performs the various methods and processes described above, such as methods S1 to S12. For example, in some embodiments, methods S1 to S12 may be implemented as a computer software program, which is tangibly contained in a machine-readable medium, such as a storage unit. In some embodiments, part or all of the computer program may be loaded and / or installed on the device via a ROM and / or a communication unit. When the computer program is loaded into the RAM and executed by the CPU, one or more steps of methods S1 to S12 described above may be performed. Alternatively, in other embodiments, the CPU may be configured to execute methods S1 to S12 in any other appropriate manner (e.g., by means of firmware).

[0093] The functions described above herein may be performed at least in part by one or more hardware logic components. For example, without limitation, exemplary types of hardware logic components that may be used include: field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), application specific standard products (ASSPs), systems on chips (SOCs), complex programmable logic devices (CPLDs), and the like.

[0094] The program code for implementing the method of the present invention can be written in any combination of one or more programming languages. These program codes can be provided to a processor or controller of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer or other programmable data processing device, so that the program code, when executed by the processor or controller, enables the functions / operations specified in the flow chart and / or block diagram to be implemented. The program code can be executed entirely on the machine, partially on the machine, partially on the machine as a stand-alone software package and partially on a remote machine, or entirely on a remote machine or server.

[0095] In the context of the present invention, a machine-readable medium may be a tangible medium that may contain or store a program for use by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, device, or equipment. A machine-readable medium may be a machine-readable signal medium or a machine-readable storage medium. A machine-readable medium may include, but is not limited to, electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor systems, devices, or equipment, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. A more specific example of a machine-readable storage medium may include an electrical connection based on one or more lines, a portable computer disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber, a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

[0096] The above is only a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any technician familiar with the technical field can easily think of various equivalent modifications or replacements within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, and these modifications or replacements should be included in the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be based on the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms, characterized in that: The method includes synchronizing the coupled state between the head and tail on-board controllers in the train unit, and prohibiting the door enabling by the on-board control system when the train is in the coupled state.

2. A method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms according to claim 1, characterized in that: The coupling and uncoupling states of the coupled train include: CS0_reload state, CS1_no operation state and CS2_be coupled state, wherein the CS0_reload state is the state when the train is loading data, the CS1_no operation state is the state when the train is not coupling and uncoupling operation, and the CS2_be coupled state is the state when the train is in the coupled state.

3. A method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms according to claim 1, characterized in that: The synchronization of the connected status between the head and tail onboard controllers in the train unit comprises the following steps: Step S1, when the safety condition is met, any onboard controller in the train unit determines that the train enters the coupled state, that is, the coupling and uncoupling state changes from the CS1_no operation state to the CS2_be coupled state, and the train unit is provided with two onboard controllers, which are respectively arranged at the head and the tail of the train unit; Step S2, the onboard controller records the cycle number of the time of entering the CS2_be coupled state as Be_Coupled_SN, and sends the cycle number to another onboard controller in the train unit; Step S3, when both onboard controllers in the train unit enter the connected state, the master onboard controller requests to be connected to the regional controller, wherein in each communication cycle, one of the two onboard controllers is determined to be the master onboard controller according to the health status of the two onboard controllers, and the master onboard controller sends a communication message to the outside; Step S4, when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the train unit is interrupted, the main onboard controller requests the regional controller to cancel the connection; Step S5, after receiving the authorization cancellation information from the regional controller, both vehicle-mounted controllers exit the coupled state, that is, change from the CS2_be coupled state back to the CS1_no operation state; Step S6, when the main vehicle controller requests the regional controller to cancel the connection for more than the first delay time, the connected state is automatically exited; Step S7, when one onboard controller exits the connected state, another onboard controller in the train unit also exits synchronously.

4. A method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms according to claim 3, characterized in that: The safety conditions in step S1 are that the following conditions are met at the same time: the communication between the two onboard controllers in the train unit is normal; the coupler is aligned; the train unit is positioned in a safe area where coupling is allowed; the train has stopped safely; and the doors are closed and locked.

5. A method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms according to claim 3, characterized in that: The first delay time in step S6 is determined by considering the validity period of the connection request message sent by the connected train to the regional controller, the validity period of the movement authorization message calculated by the regional controller for the unconnected train, and the time required for the unconnected train to stop by emergency braking.

6. A method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms according to claim 1, characterized in that: When the train is in the coupled state, the onboard control system prohibits the door from being enabled, including the following steps: Step S8, any onboard controller in the train unit checks whether the local end is in the coupled state CS2_be coupled, if so, directly prohibits the door from being enabled, otherwise, executes step S9; Step S9, the onboard controller checks whether the communication with another onboard controller in the train unit is normal; Step S10, if the communication is normal, check whether the Be_Coupled_SN signal sent by another vehicle controller is valid, if it is valid, prohibit the door from being enabled, otherwise, jump to step S12; Step S11, if the communication is interrupted, check whether the Be_Coupled_SN signal sent by another vehicle controller before the communication is interrupted is valid, if it is valid, continuously prohibit the door from being enabled within the second delay time after the communication is interrupted, otherwise, jump to step S12; Step S12, outputting door enable after other door opening safety conditions are met.

7. A method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms according to claim 6, characterized in that: The second delay time in step S11 is determined by considering the validity period of the connection request message sent by the connected train to the regional controller, the validity period of the movement authorization message calculated by the regional controller for the unconnected train, and the time required for the unconnected train to stop by emergency braking.

8. A method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms according to claim 1, characterized in that: The coupling operation is allowed only when the communication between the two on-board controllers in the coupled train is normal.

9. A method for protecting the doors of trains connected to a platform according to claim 8, characterized in that: During the coupling operation, when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the coupled train is interrupted, the coupled train is allowed to exit the coupled state and restore door enablement only after ensuring that the uncoupled train has stopped.

10. A method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms according to claim 8, characterized in that: During the execution of the coupling operation, when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the coupled train is interrupted and then restored, if the preset conditions are met, the regional controller is requested to be coupled again without manual intervention.

11. A device for implementing the door safety protection method of a train connected to a platform as described in any one of claims 1 to 10, the device comprising a first onboard controller and a second onboard controller, a three-layer switching communication device and a regional controller in a train unit, the onboard controller comprising a first logic operation unit, a vehicle input acquisition unit, and a door enable drive unit, and the regional controller comprising a second logic operation unit.

12. The device according to claim 11, characterized in that The first logic operation unit in the on-board controller receives the door closing and locking status and the coupler centering status obtained by the vehicle input acquisition unit, and at the same time calculates the coupled status of the train by integrating information from another on-board controller and the regional controller; calculates the door enable using the coupled status, and outputs it to the vehicle through the door enable drive unit.

13. The device according to claim 11, characterized in that The three-layer switching communication equipment is used for network communication between the first onboard controller and the second onboard controller in the train unit, and for wireless communication between the train and the ground.

14. The device according to claim 11, characterized in that The second logic operation unit in the regional controller calculates the cancellation authorization information and cooperates with the first logic operation unit in the onboard controller to maintain the coupled state of the train.

15. An electronic device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, wherein: When the processor executes the program, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 10 is implemented.

16. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the program is executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 10 is implemented.

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