Voltage control strategy of power cyber-physical system under data tampering attack

By constructing a power information physics system model and using particle swarm algorithms and combining OLTC for voltage regulation, the problem of grid voltage instability under data tampering attacks is solved, and effective defense and stable control of the power system is achieved.

CN111817290BActive Publication Date: 2024-12-03KAILI POWER SUPPLY BUREAU
View PDF 3 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202010531879.8
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2020-06-11
Publication Date
2024-12-03
Estimated Expiration
2040-06-11

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing power grid control technology lacks effective means when resisting information system attacks, especially ineffectively coping with the voltage instability caused by data tampering attacks, and in-depth analysis of the impact of information systems on the power system.

Method used

A voltage control strategy for power information physics system under data tamper attack was proposed. By constructing a power information physics system model, using event triggering mechanism and particle swarm algorithm, combined with OLTC (on-load voltage regulator) for voltage regulation, evaluate the risk of vulnerabilities and Calculate the voltage regulator ratio to achieve timely adjustment and stable control of the voltage.

Benefits of technology

Trigger in time within a wider voltage regulation range to effectively prevent the voltage limit of the power system caused by network attacks, reduce the damage to the system by attacks, and ensure the safe and stable operation of the power system.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure CN111817290B_ABST
    Figure CN111817290B_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

The present invention proposes a voltage control strategy for an electric information-physical system under a data tampering attack, including the following steps: 1) Determine the system status: collect voltage data of each node, detect whether the system is attacked, and use the event trigger threshold to make a judgment; 2) Equipment key value evaluation: perform node voltage measurement and vulnerability risk index evaluation, determine whether the voltage of each node in the system exceeds the threshold through the risk index threshold, and adjust the voltage of the key area; 3) Calculate the voltage regulator ratio: calculate the voltage regulator ratio according to the objective function, and adjust the node voltage with problems through the on-load voltage regulator. According to the voltage regulation model, the present invention proposes a voltage regulation strategy based on OLTC and event trigger mechanism. Under the conditions of a wider voltage regulation range and more timely triggering, a more reasonable solution is given to the voltage limit problem of the power system caused by network attacks, and a simulation example is performed to prove the effectiveness of the proposed method.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to a voltage control strategy for an electric power information-physical system under data tampering attacks, and belongs to the technical field of power grid voltage regulation control. Background Art

[0002] With the intelligence of modern power systems, the security issues of power systems are no longer limited to the security issues of power grid infrastructure, but also involve network information security issues. In the power information-physical system, the dispatching, control, and management of the power grid are highly dependent on information and communication systems. Problems with the information system or network attacks will threaten the safe and stable operation of the power system. Due to the increasingly frequent network attacks, information security issues have become a key issue affecting the normal operation of the power system. At present, common information security issues mainly include attacks on physical instruments, malicious attacks on the host and its controlled puppet machines, modifications to network communication protocols, interference with communication signals, etc. These attacks will lead to the theft of confidential documents, interruption of normal communications, and affect the normal operation of the system; in the power system, these attacks will not only damage the information network, but also cause the power grid equipment to fail to work properly, especially false data injection and tampering attacks, which will seriously threaten the smooth operation of the power grid, resulting in the power system being unable to provide power services to users, and even causing serious economic losses.

[0003] The information security issues of power cyber-physical systems seriously threaten the operation status of key infrastructure and systems. Under the influence of cyber attacks, the power grid structure will undergo great changes, causing system instability. In the existing technology, both the methods and theories of power systems and information systems separate the two, and it is impossible to show the impact of information systems on power systems, and it is impossible to conduct a systematic and in-depth analysis of the relationship between the two. For technicians in the field of power engineering, the key to studying smart grids is to think about how to integrate advanced sensing, communication, and computing technologies with power systems, so as to establish a unified control model and propose attack response plans. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to overcome the defect of existing power grid control technology in lacking effective means to resist information system attacks, and to propose a control strategy for power information-physical systems subjected to network attacks, especially a voltage control strategy for voltage instability caused by tampering attacks. This strategy effectively combines the existing information system and power system theories, constructs a power information-physical system model, and establishes an information transmission model of the power information-physical system to represent the coupling relationship between the physical power grid and the power information system, and proposes a new voltage regulation strategy based on this model.

[0005] The technical solution of the present invention: a voltage control strategy for a power cyber-physical system under a data tampering attack, specifically comprises the following steps:

[0006] 1) Determine the system status: Through the data acquisition and monitoring control system in the power cyber-physical system, use the power management unit PMU to collect the voltage data of each node, detect whether the system is under attack, define the trigger time sequence and event generator function, and use the event trigger threshold to make a judgment;

[0007] 2) Equipment key value assessment: Measure node voltages and use the common vulnerability scoring system CVSS to assess whether the vulnerability can be successfully exploited. Calculate the probability of successful malicious attacks on data tampering based on the probability of successful exploitation of the vulnerability. Traverse all lines to calculate the probability and importance of successful malicious attacks on each PMU that will have an impact on the system after being attacked. Use the average value of the risk index of each area to obtain the risk index threshold. Use the risk index threshold to determine whether the difference between the voltage of each node in the system and the reference voltage of the node exceeds the set dead zone voltage. If it exceeds, adjust the voltage of the key area.

[0008] 3) Calculation of voltage regulator ratio: The particle swarm algorithm is used to calculate the voltage regulator ratio according to the given objective function. The voltage information received by the controller and the voltage change are defined. The tap value that satisfies the normal operation of the system and causes the least loss is obtained through power flow calculation. The operating amount of each device is determined by solving the objective function of the entire distribution system, and the node voltage with problems is adjusted through the on-load voltage regulator.

[0009] Compared with the prior art, the advantages of the present invention are:

[0010] According to the voltage regulation model, the present invention proposes a voltage regulation strategy based on OLTC and event trigger mechanism. Under the conditions of a wider voltage regulation range and more timely triggering, a more reasonable solution is given to the voltage over-limit problem of the power system caused by network attacks, and a simulation example is performed to prove the effectiveness of the proposed method. Therefore, on the premise of fully understanding the impact of the attack on the power system, the attack can be defended against through the proposed strategy, effectively reducing the damage caused by the attack to the system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0011] Attached Figure 1 It is the IEEE14 node location structure diagram of the measurement equipment;

[0012] Attached Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the data tampering attack process;

[0013] Attached Figure 3 It is the schematic diagram of the voltage regulation process;

[0014] Attached Figure 4It is a flow chart of the voltage adjustment steps;

[0015] Attached Figure 5 is an OLTC configuration diagram of the first embodiment;

[0016] Attached Figure 6 is an OLTC configuration diagram of the second embodiment;

[0017] Attached Figure 7 This is a graph showing the voltage changes of each node after a data tampering attack in scenario 1 of the embodiment;

[0018] Attached Figure 8 This is a graph showing the voltage changes of each node after the data tampering attack in scenario 2 of the embodiment;

[0019] Attached Fig. 9 It is the structure diagram of the test simulation IEEE33 node system;

[0020] Attached Fig.10 It is the voltage change diagram of each node before and after the attack;

[0021] Attached Fig.11 This is the OLTC setup diagram;

[0022] Attached Fig.12 It is the voltage change diagram of each node after adjustment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0023] The technical solution of the present invention is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. It should be noted that the contents directly recorded in the drawings of the specification or described by referring to the drawings are exemplary and are intended to be used to explain the technical solution of the present invention, and cannot be understood as limiting the present invention.

[0024] The voltage control strategy of the power cyber-physical system under data tampering attack in the present invention is constructed based on the unified voltage regulation model of the power cyber-physical system based on Petri net theory, and OLTC (on-load voltage regulator) is selected as the voltage regulation device. The voltage regulation strategy under tampering attack is proposed, thereby maintaining the safety and stability of the power system under tampering attack. The strategy specifically includes the following steps: (1) Determine the system status: Detect whether the system is attacked and use the event trigger threshold to make a judgment.

[0025] When the system is attacked by false data injection, the attacker will destroy the real data and send the wrong information to the controller. On the basis of general periodic sampling, the present invention adds an event trigger mechanism to update the control input signal. Compared with periodic sampling, which can only collect data at a fixed time, event triggering can collect information when an event occurs in the system, and can handle the impact of the event in a timely manner without causing the system to deteriorate due to the inability to perceive the event. In order to characterize this mechanism, the trigger time series is defined as μ0, μ1, μ2, ..., μ j,..., the event generator γ function is:

[0026] Υ=P ei -θ i (1)

[0027] Among them, θ i is the minimum attack probability determined by the number of vulnerabilities i in the device, P ei For device i The probability of being successfully attacked.

[0028] Although data tampering attacks can exploit certain network vulnerabilities, due to the existence of security protection devices and communication protocols, the probability of a successful attack on the device conforms to a certain probability distribution. The event triggering conditions are:

[0029] Υ>0 (2).

[0030] (2) Equipment key value assessment: Measure the node voltage to determine whether the difference between the node voltage in the system and the reference voltage of the node exceeds the set dead zone voltage. If so, adjustment is required.

[0031] To evaluate the key value of a device, we must first calculate the success rate of attacks on device-related vulnerabilities. The present invention uses the CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) provided by the American Common Criteria and Technicians to evaluate whether a vulnerability can be successfully exploited. The public vulnerability scoring system has three sets of characteristics, namely base, temporal, and environmental, among which the base attribute is mainly used to evaluate the probability of vulnerability exploitation. The specific levels and scores of the Base indicators are shown in Table 1.

[0032]

[0033] Table 1

[0034] The scoring system uses the following formula (3) to grade the exploitation of vulnerabilities. The value range of the result P is 0 to 10, where 0 means the vulnerability poses no threat, 0.1 to 3.9 means the vulnerability has a low threat level, 4 to 6.9 means the vulnerability has a medium threat level, 7 to 8.9 means the vulnerability has a high threat level, and 9.0 to 10 means the vulnerability is in a critical state of being attacked:

[0035] P=20×AV×AC×AU (3)

[0036] Since the probability of being attacked usually ranges from 0 to 1, the exploit value of the vulnerability can be reduced proportionally without affecting the evaluation effect. Therefore, the final probability of successful exploitation of the vulnerability is:

[0037] Pr(v i)=2×AV×AC×AU (4)

[0038] The power grid information-physical fusion system used in the present invention adopts IEEE14 nodes, and the measurement device takes PMU (power management unit) as an example. If the information in the PMU is directly transmitted to the control center, there is no information interaction process of the information network, and the topology of the information node will not affect the criticality of the device. In this case, the criticality index of the device can be considered as a risk index. The PMU set according to the IEEE14 node configuration rules is as follows: Figure 1 As shown in the figure, n1~n16 are 16 PMUs corresponding to each node of the line. The 16 PMUs are divided into 7 areas A~G according to the open ports of the devices and the exploitable vulnerabilities. The PMUs in each area have the same probability of being attacked. The PMUs contained in each area are as follows: Area A: n13, n16; Area B: n4, n12, n14, n15; Area C: n11; Area D: n6, n7, n8, n9, n10; Area E: n1, n2; Area F: n3; Area G: n5.

[0039] Taking the attack on PMU in area D as an example, the attack process is as follows: Figure 2 As shown: there are exploitable ports 8001 (S1) and 8000 (S4) in the system, among which exploitable port 8001 has a probability of 0.124 to have the vulnerability CVE-2001-4056 (S2), and exploitable port 8000 has a probability of 0.124 to have the protocol vulnerability CVE-2016-5695 (S5); the attacker chooses between the two exploitable ports. If the attacker chooses to attack the exploitable port 8001, he will use social engineering methods to access and obtain unauthorized files (A1), and then there is a probability of 0.2 to tamper with the sampling sequence of voltage and current in the merging unit (S3); if the attacker chooses to attack the exploitable port 8000, he will hijack the unencrypted traffic (A3) or destroy the encrypted communication (A4), and then there is a probability of 0.6 to use the independent component decomposition method (ICA) to separate the composite data stream and inject malicious data (S6). In the above process, S1~S6 are the vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the attacker, and A1~A4 are the attack methods adopted by the attacker.

[0040] Define the probability that the attacker initially selects S1 as 0.6 and the probability that the attacker initially selects S4 as 0.8, then the probability that port vulnerability C1 is successfully exploited is for:

[0041]

[0042] Where P(v K ) is the probability of vulnerability being exploited, obtained by the CVSS scoring system; P(a K) is the success probability of atomic attack during the attack process, which is obtained based on the adopted attack method A1; P(S1) is defined as the initial attack capability of the attacker. The initial attack capability of the attacker and the success probability of atomic attack are generally defined by the expert knowledge base and are divided into three categories: 1) easy attack takes 0.8; 2) general attack takes 0.6; 3) difficult attack takes 0.2. The probability of successful exploitation of port vulnerability C2 for:

[0043]

[0044] P n9 =1-(1-P C1 )×(1-P C2 )=0.062 (7)

[0045] Where P n9 is the success probability of malicious attack in area D.

[0046] Traversing all lines, Table 2 shows the probability of successful false data injection and voltage change rate (%) of each PMU that will affect the system after being attacked. The probability of successful false data injection of each PMU multiplied by the voltage change rate is used as the risk indicator value.

[0047]

[0048]

[0049] Table 2

[0050] The threshold is defined using the method of the average value of the risk indicators in Table 2, and the risk indicator threshold is 1.09.

[0051] Because some measurements must be provided to ensure system observability, PMUn1, n2, n3, n5, n6, n7, n8, n9, n10, n12, n14, n15 are key devices to ensure system observability. In addition, the proposed method finds that the risk value of PMUn13, n16 is greater than the set threshold, that is, the measurement change in PMU n13, n16 will have a greater impact on the system, so under the premise of ensuring observability, the key PMUs are n1, n2, n3, n5, n6, n7, n8, n9, n10, n12, n13, n14, n15, n16.

[0052] (3) Calculation of voltage regulator ratio: According to the set objective function, the tap value that satisfies the normal operation of the system and causes the least loss is obtained.

[0053] The present invention adopts a particle swarm algorithm to calculate the voltage regulator ratio according to a given objective function.

[0054] The load in the power system at each moment consists of dynamic load and static load, which are defined as:

[0055] X m (k) = X ms (k)+X md (k) (8)

[0056] Where X m (k) represents the load value of the m nodes uploaded to the control center at time k, which is equal to the dynamic load value at time k plus the static load value. The incorrect data injection attack will change the size of this value;

[0057] Define the load value of node m after data tampering is successful:

[0058] X m (k+1)=X m (k)+η m (k)(X m (k)+δ m (k)) (9)

[0059] where δ m (k) is the load tampered by false data injection attack, η m (k) is a random variable representing the success or failure of the attack. It is a Bernoulli distribution white sequence with a value of 0 or 1. The specific value probability is as follows:

[0060] Prob{η m (k) = 1} = α (10)

[0061] Prob{η m (k) = 0} = 1-α (11)

[0062] Where α is the success probability of false data injection attack, which is obtained from Table 2;

[0063] Define the voltage information received by the controller as follows:

[0064] y m (k+1)=f(X m (k+1)) (12)

[0065] Where f(X m (k+1)) means the indicated load level is X m Voltage value at (k+1);

[0066] Define the voltage change as:

[0067] u m (k+1)=y m (k+1)-V ref (13)

[0068] Where V ref is the reference voltage of node m;

[0069] After the power flow calculation, the position that the tap should reach at time k+1 is:

[0070]

[0071] The regulated voltage satisfies:

[0072] y m,tap =y m (k+1)·[1+n(k+1)] (15)

[0073] In the proposed method, the operation amount of each device is determined by solving the objective function of the entire distribution system. The controller determines the operation amount based on the particle swarm algorithm. The adjusted voltage should not only be controlled between the upper and lower limits, but also consider the maximization of voltage margin and the reduction of power loss under the condition of full balance. Therefore, the objective function is shown in Equation 16:

[0074] minξ1∑|y m,tap (k)-y m (k)|+ξ2P Loss

[0075]

[0076] Among them, y m,tap is the voltage of node m after adjustment, n tap,min and n tap,max are the minimum and maximum values ​​of the OLTC tap, respectively. ξ1 and ξ2 are weights. In order to fully consider the balance between voltage deviation maximization and power loss, the weighting coefficients are determined to be 1.0 and 10.0 after repeated experiments.

[0077] Figure 3 This is the principle of specific voltage regulation in the power information-physical system: the voltage transformer set at each node in the power grid uploads the voltage data to the data acquisition and monitoring control system (SCADA). SCADA monitors the voltage data in the power information-physical system and determines in real time whether the voltage change extreme value of each node is greater than the given dead zone voltage. If the difference between the node voltage and the reference voltage of the node exceeds the set dead zone voltage, the particle swarm algorithm is used to calculate the voltage regulator ratio according to the given objective function, and the node voltage with the problem is adjusted through the on-load voltage regulator.

[0078] The specific implementation means and technical effects of the present invention are described below in conjunction with embodiments.

[0079] Example

[0080] The embodiments of the present invention may be specifically implemented as a control method, a control system, or a computer program product. Therefore, the present invention may take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Moreover, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program codes, which does not mean that the present invention only involves algorithms or mathematical calculation rules, nor does it mean that the technical solution of the invention can only be implemented in a complete software form.

[0081] The present invention is described with reference to the flowcharts of the methods, devices and computer program products according to the present embodiments. It should be understood that each process in the flowchart, as well as the combination of processes in the flowchart, can be implemented by computer program instructions. Providing these computer program instructions to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor or other programmable data processing device to generate a device that implements the technical purpose of the present invention, or causing the instructions executed by the processor of a computer or other programmable data processing device to generate a device for implementing the functions specified in a certain process or multiple processes in the flowchart also belongs to the protection scope of the present invention.

[0082] like Figure 4 The figure shows the process flow of voltage adjustment in the power cyber-physical system under data tampering attack. The specific simulation steps are as follows:

[0083] 1) Determine whether the system status is attacked by the power grid. If so, measure the node voltage; if not, implement the normal voltage regulation strategy;

[0084] 2) If the difference between the node voltage and the reference voltage of the node exceeds a given threshold, then according to the set objective function, the tap value that satisfies the normal operation of the system and causes the least loss is obtained;

[0085] 3) Calculate the adjustment amount of the on-load voltage regulator and make corresponding voltage adjustments.

[0086] This embodiment is roughly divided into two aspects: voltage control strategy considering key measurement equipment and IEEE33 node system.

[0087] (1) Consider the voltage control strategy of key measurement equipment

[0088] If the attacker has mastered the grid topology and power flow information, he can choose the weakest and most critical place to launch an attack, so more effective control and defense measures should be taken for the most risky parts of the grid. The following two scenarios analyze the impact of OLTC installation location on voltage strategy implementation.

[0089] Scenario 1: Considering the tampering attack, the most critical PMUs are concentrated Figure 1 Area A and Area D in the diagram, so the on-load voltage regulator is set near these two areas, and is placed on bus No. 12 and bus No. 4. Figure 5 shown.

[0090] Scenario 2: If the criticality of PMU under network attack is not considered, two locations are randomly selected in the system to place OLTC, such as Figure 6 shown.

[0091] From the perspective of attack probability, since PMU n13 and n16 are most vulnerable to attack, the load values ​​on node 12 and line 12-13 are more likely to be changed, causing the load value on line 6-12 to exceed the limit during state estimation, resulting in line 6-12 disconnection. Through simulation, it can be seen that in this case, if not controlled, the voltage value of node 12 will decrease and fall below the voltage lower limit. The OLTC set in scenario 1 and scenario 2 are used for control respectively. The results are shown in Figure 2. Figure 7 and 8 As shown, Table 3 shows the tap adjustment of OLTC in two scenarios.

[0092] OLTC1 OLTC2 Scene 1 tap value 1.025 1 Scene 1 tap value 1.02 1.01

[0093] Table 3

[0094] It can be seen from the adjusted curve that both voltage regulator settings can adjust the voltage of node 12 to within the normal range. In scenario 1, not only the voltage of node 12 is adjusted, but also the voltage of node 13 is improved to a certain extent. However, in scenario 2, in order to adjust the voltage of node 12, voltage fluctuations occur at other nodes, which will lead to an increase in network losses and have an adverse effect on the stability of the power system.

[0095] (2) IEEE33 node system

[0096] To analyze the proposed method, simulations were performed using a test system, e.g. Fig. 9 As shown, the red circle is the node attacked by data tampering. The simulation process considers the IEEE 33 bus system, that is, the false data injection attack, whose target is the line active power flow exceeding the limit, which will cause the line 9-15 to be disconnected. The simulation results show that the voltage of the node in the red circle has changed, and the voltage of other nodes has not changed substantially.

[0097] The comparison between the voltage of the node in the red circle after the attack and the normal voltage is as follows Fig.10As shown in the figure, it can be seen that the voltage of node 15 has seriously exceeded the lower limit. In addition, the voltages of nodes 9 and 14 are already at the edge of the limit. If they are not controlled, the voltages of these two nodes will have the risk of exceeding the limit.

[0098] Set two on-load tap-changers according to the number of nodes to be controlled, such as Fig.11 As shown in Figure 1. Each on-load voltage regulator is responsible for receiving central regulation commands and performing local control. The central agent makes decisions based on the information collected locally and sends control commands to each regulator.

[0099] If the voltage in the system is regulated and controlled according to the proposed method, the voltage can be regulated within the permissible variation range. Fig.12 The adjusted voltage waveform is shown, and it can be seen that the voltages of nodes 9, 14, and 15 have been adjusted to the allowable range. Due to the existence of OLTC, the voltages of other nodes in the IEEE 33 bus system will also change to a certain extent, but will not exceed the threshold, so it will not be repeated.

[0100] The above descriptions are merely embodiments of the present invention and are not intended to limit the protection scope of the present invention. Any equivalent structure or equivalent process transformation made using the contents of this specification and the drawings, or directly or indirectly applied in other related technical fields, are also included in the patent protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A voltage control method for a power cyber-physical system under data tampering attacks, characterized by: The steps include: 1) Determine the system status: Through the data acquisition and monitoring control system in the power cyber-physical system, the power management unit PMU is used to collect the voltage data of each node, detect whether the system is under attack, and use the event trigger threshold to make a judgment; 2) Equipment critical value assessment: Node voltage measurement and vulnerability risk index assessment are performed. The risk index threshold is used to determine whether the difference between the voltage of each node in the system and the reference voltage of the node exceeds the set dead zone voltage. If so, the voltage of the critical area is adjusted. 3) Calculation of voltage regulator ratio: Calculate the voltage regulator ratio according to the objective function to obtain the tap value that satisfies the normal operation of the system and causes the least loss, and adjust the node voltage with problems through the on-load voltage regulator; The step 3) uses a particle swarm algorithm to calculate the voltage regulator ratio according to a given objective function, and the specific steps are as follows: The load in the power system at each moment consists of dynamic load and static load, which are defined as: X m (k)=X ms (k)+X md (k) (8) Where X m (k) represents the load value of the m nodes uploaded to the control center at time k, which is equal to the dynamic load value at time k plus the static load value. The incorrect data injection attack will change the size of this value; Define the load value of node m after data tampering is successful: X m (k+1)=X m (k)+η m (k)(X m (k)+δ m (k)) (9) where δ m (k) is the load tampered by false data injection attack, η m (k) is a random variable representing the success or failure of the attack. It is a Bernoulli distribution white sequence with a value of 0 or 1. The specific value probability is as follows: Prob{η m (k)=1}=a (10) Prob{η m (k)=0}=1-α (11) Where α is the probability of a successful malicious attack on data tampering; Define the voltage information received by the controller as follows: y m (k+1)=f(X m (k+1)) (12) Where f(X m (k+1)) means the indicated load level is X m Voltage value at (k+1); Define the voltage change as: u m (k+1)=y m (k+1)-V ref (13) Where V ref is the reference voltage of node m; After the power flow calculation, the position that the tap should reach at time k+1 is The regulated voltage satisfies: and m,tap =and m (k+1)·[1+n(k+1)] (15) The step 3) determines the operation amount of each device by solving the objective function of the entire power distribution system. The controller determines the operation amount based on the particle swarm algorithm. The adjusted voltage should not only be controlled between the upper and lower limits, but also consider the maximization of the voltage margin and the reduction of power loss under the condition of full balance. Therefore, the objective function is shown in the following formula: min ξ1∑|y m,tap (k)-y m (k)|+ξ2P Loss Among them, y m,tap is the voltage of node m after adjustment, n tap,min and n tap,max are the minimum and maximum values ​​of the on-load voltage regulator OLTC tap, respectively; ξ1 and ξ2 are weights. In order to fully consider the balance between voltage deviation maximization and power loss, the weighting coefficients are determined to be 1.0 and 10.0 after repeated experiments.

2. The method for controlling voltage of a power cyber-physical system under data tampering attack according to claim 1 is characterized in that The specific steps of using the event trigger threshold to make a judgment in step 1) are as follows: Define the trigger time sequence as μ0,μ1,μ2,...,μ j ,..., the event generator γ function is: γ=P ei -θ i (1) Among them, θ i is the minimum attack probability determined by the number of vulnerabilities i in the device, P ei For device i The probability of being successfully attacked; Although data tampering attacks can exploit certain network vulnerabilities, due to the existence of security protection devices and communication protocols, the probability of a successful attack on the device conforms to a certain probability distribution. The event triggering conditions are: γ>0 (2).

3. The voltage control method of the power cyber-physical system under data tampering attack according to claim 1 is characterized by: The step 2) uses the common vulnerability scoring system CVSS to evaluate whether the vulnerability can be successfully exploited: the common vulnerability scoring system has three groups of characteristics, namely base, temporal and environmental. The base attribute is used to evaluate the probability of vulnerability exploitation. The specific level and score of the Base indicator are shown in the following table: The scoring system uses the following formula to rank the vulnerability's exploitability: P=20×AV×AC×AU (3) The value range of the result P is 0-10, where 0 means the vulnerability poses no threat, 0.1-3.9 means the vulnerability has a low threat level, 4-6.9 means the vulnerability has a medium threat level, 7-8.9 means the vulnerability has a high threat level, and 9.0-10 means the vulnerability is in a critical state of being attacked. Since the probability of being attacked usually ranges from 0 to 1, the exploit value of the vulnerability is reduced proportionally without affecting the evaluation effect. Therefore, the final probability of successful exploitation of the vulnerability is: Pr(v i )=2×AV×AC×AU (4)。 4. The voltage control method of the power cyber-physical system under data tampering attack according to claim 1 is characterized by: The step 2) calculates the probability of successful data tampering malicious attack based on the probability of successful exploitation of the vulnerability: P C1 =P(v K )×P(a K )×P(S1) (5) P n9 =1-(1-P C1 )(1-P C2 ) (6) Where P(v K ) is the probability of successful exploitation of the vulnerability, obtained by the CVSS scoring system; P(a K ) is the success probability of atomic attack during the attack process, which is obtained according to the adopted attack method; P(S1) is defined as the initial attack capability of the attacker. The initial attack capability and the success probability of atomic attack are defined by the expert knowledge base and are divided into three categories: easy attack takes 0.8; For normal attacks, use 0.6; for more difficult attacks, use 0.2; Traverse all lines, calculate the probability and importance of each PMU that will affect the system after being attacked and successfully attacked by malicious means, and when the same PMU has different risk index values ​​in different calculation examples, take the largest one; define the threshold by using the average value of the risk index of each area calculated to obtain the risk index threshold.

5. The voltage control method of the power cyber-physical system under data tampering attack according to claim 1 is characterized by: The electric power information-physical system adopts the IEEE14-node architecture, including 14 groups of busbars and 16 PMUs n1 to n16 corresponding to each node of the line. The 16 PMUs are divided into 7 areas A to G according to the open ports of the devices and the exploitable vulnerabilities. The PMUs in each area have the same probability of being attacked; the PMUs contained in each area are as follows: Area A: n13, n16; Area B: n4, n12, n14, n15; Area C: n11; Area D: n6, n7, n8, n9, n10; Area E: n1, n2; Area F: n3; Area G: n5.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

  • Information network attack-oriented vulnerability node evaluation method for power grid

    CN105429133A

  • Power grid information physical fusion system risk assessment method

    CN110022293A

  • Apparatus for detecting an attack on an electric circuit

    US20070182421A1