Anonymous digital currency transaction method with offline receiver based on ID cryptography
Through the recipient's offline digital currency anonymous transaction method based on ID cryptography, the problem that existing systems cannot resist quantum computing and privacy leakage is solved, high-security anonymous transactions are achieved, system transformation and storage costs are reduced, and users are enhanced. Privacy protection.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202011244382.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2020-11-10
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-05
- Estimated Expiration
- 2040-11-10
AI Technical Summary
The existing digital currency system cannot resist quantum computing, the cost of CA authentication and IBC authentication is high, the storage of asymmetric key pools increases the burden on the client, the switching cost of traditional authentication systems is high, and the disclosure of the identity of the issuer and the recipient leads to privacy leakage.
Using anonymous transaction method of offline digital currency based on ID cryptography, the receptionist uses identity authentication of commercial banks and central banks to generate session keys, realize anonymous transactions, and calculate public and private keys using hash functions in the key management server. Key, reduce storage costs, maintain traditional authentication processes, and protect user privacy with symmetric keys.
The receiver's offline anonymous transactions that are resistant to quantum computing are realized, which reduces the cost of system transformation, enhances user privacy protection, avoids the increased burden of public key storage, and reduces the complexity of system switching.
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Figure CN114493556B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of identity authentication technology, and in particular to a digital currency quantum computing-resistant anonymous transaction method with an offline receiver based on ID cryptography. Background Art
[0002] The core elements of the digital currency D-RMB system of the People's Bank of China are one currency, two types of libraries and three centers. One currency, namely "D-RMB" (DC / EP), referred to as D currency, specifically refers to a string of encrypted digital strings representing a specific amount signed by the central bank. Two types of libraries: the D-RMB issuance library and the bank library (central bank digital currency database, commercial bank digital currency database). Digital currency in the issuance library is the central bank's digital currency fund; digital currency in the bank library is the commercial bank's inventory of digital cash. Three centers: one is the registration center (recording the entire process of currency generation, circulation, counting and verification, and extinction); the other two are certification centers, namely CA certification center (based on the PKI system, centralized management of institutional and user certificates, such as CFCA) and IBC certification center (that is, a certification center established based on identity-based cryptographic technology (Identity-Based Cryptograph)). Two tables can be designed in the registration center, one is the digital currency ownership registration table, which records the ownership of digital currency, and the other is the transaction flow table.
[0003] The D-RMB system is a hierarchical system, which is jointly built by the central bank and commercial banks. The central bank digital currency system is a computer system operated and maintained by the central bank or an institution designated by the central bank to process information about digital currency. Its main functions include being responsible for the issuance and verification monitoring of digital currency. The commercial bank digital currency system is a computer system operated and maintained by commercial banks or institutions designated by commercial banks to process information about digital currency. It performs various currency-related functions of existing banks, namely banking functions, mainly including being directly responsible for meeting various needs of providing digital currency circulation services to the society after applying for digital currency from the central bank.
[0004] As most people know, quantum computers have great potential in password cracking. Most of the current mainstream asymmetric (public key) encryption algorithms, such as the RSA encryption algorithm, are based on two mathematical problems: factorization of large integers or calculation of discrete logarithms over finite fields. The difficulty of their cracking depends on the efficiency of solving these problems. On traditional computers, solving these two mathematical problems takes exponential time (that is, the cracking time increases exponentially with the increase of the length of the public key), which is unacceptable in practical applications. The Shor algorithm, which is tailor-made for quantum computers, can perform integer factorization or discrete logarithm calculation in polynomial time (that is, the cracking time increases with the increase of the length of the public key at a rate of k, where k is a constant independent of the length of the public key), thus making it possible to crack the RSA and discrete logarithm encryption algorithms.
[0005] Problems with existing technologies:
[0006] 1. CA certification and IBC certification in the existing digital currency system are not resistant to quantum computing;
[0007] 2. The existing quantum computing-resistant communication systems based on quantum secure communication are too costly for users and the symmetric key management is complicated;
[0008] 3. In the existing quantum computing-resistant communication system based on asymmetric key pool, it is necessary to generate an asymmetric key pool from the public keys of all members and store them in each key card, which increases the storage cost and operation workload of the client key card;
[0009] 4. The existing quantum computing-resistant communication system based on asymmetric key pool has changed the overall process and data structure of the traditional CA authentication and IBC authentication system, resulting in excessively high costs for the CA authentication and IBC authentication systems and their corresponding user application systems to switch to quantum computing-resistant solutions;
[0010] 5. In the existing digital currency communication system, the identities of the sender and the payee are public, which can easily lead to user privacy leakage. Summary of the invention
[0011] In order to overcome the shortcomings of the prior art, the present invention proposes a digital currency quantum computing-resistant anonymous transaction method with the recipient offline based on ID cryptography, which can realize quantum computing-resistant recipient offline and digital currency anonymous transaction based on ID cryptography, and has high security, easy management, and can save system transformation costs.
[0012] To achieve the above purpose, the digital currency quantum computing-resistant anonymous transaction method with offline receiver based on ID cryptography of the present invention comprises the following steps:
[0013] S1: The commercial bank digital currency system and the central bank digital currency system perform identity authentication, which includes the following sub-steps:
[0014] S101: The commercial bank digital currency system sends its own identity to the central bank digital currency system;
[0015] S102: The central bank digital currency system performs authentication and sends the authentication result to the commercial bank digital currency system;
[0016] S103: The commercial bank digital currency system receives the authentication result. If the authentication is successful, the authentication result contains the session key;
[0017] S2: The online user performs identity authentication with the commercial bank digital currency system. This step includes the following sub-steps:
[0018] S201: The online user sends his / her identity information to the commercial bank digital currency system and applies for updating and generating a new anonymous identity;
[0019] S202: The commercial bank digital currency system performs authentication and sends the authentication result to the online user;
[0020] S203: The online user receives the authentication result, and if the authentication is successful, the authentication result includes the session key;
[0021] S3: The receiver is offline and the sender is an online user. Both parties conduct an anonymous digital currency transaction. This step includes the following sub-steps:
[0022] S301: The receiver and the sender communicate in close proximity to exchange information between the two parties, and the sender sends an encrypted signature transaction to the commercial bank digital currency system to which it belongs;
[0023] S302: The commercial bank digital currency system receives the signed transaction, decrypts it and verifies it. If the verification is successful, the signed transaction is sent to the central bank digital currency system.
[0024] S303: The central bank digital currency system receives the signed transaction, decrypts it and verifies it. If the verification succeeds, the message is sent to the commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs. If the verification fails, the commercial bank digital currency system to which the sender belongs is notified.
[0025] S304: The commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs receives the message, decrypts it and verifies the transaction. If the transaction verification fails, the central bank digital currency system is notified. If the transaction verification succeeds, the next step is entered;
[0026] S305: The commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs records the transaction locally and signs it, then generates a new anonymous identity for the recipient, encrypts it and sends the message to the central bank digital currency system;
[0027] S305: The central bank digital currency system receives the message, decrypts and verifies it. After successful verification, it records the change in the ownership of the digital currency and sends a successful transaction message to the commercial bank digital currency system to which the sender belongs.
[0028] S306: After receiving the message, the commercial bank digital currency system to which the sender belongs decrypts and verifies it. After successful verification, a new anonymous identity is generated for the sender, and the new anonymous identity and a successful transaction message are sent to the sender;
[0029] S307: After receiving the information, the sender decrypts and confirms the completion of the transaction and deletes the corresponding digital currency, saves the new identity information, and sends a message to the receiver. After receiving the message, the receiver decrypts and verifies it to confirm the completion of the transaction. If the transaction is successful, the received digital currency is stored and the new identity information is saved.
[0030] Furthermore, the central bank digital currency system, the commercial bank digital currency system and the user each have a quantum-resistant computing device, and the central bank digital currency system and the commercial bank digital currency system each have a key management server;
[0031] The system private key of the central bank digital currency system is randomly selected and stored only in the quantum-resistant computing device of the central bank digital currency system. The system public key of the central bank digital currency system is calculated based on the system private key. The key management server of the central bank digital currency system calculates the message authentication code for the identity of the commercial bank digital currency system based on the system private key of the central bank digital currency system. The key management server of the central bank digital currency system calculates the corresponding system public key for the system private key of the commercial bank digital currency system. The system private key of the key management server of the central bank digital currency system is stored in the quantum-resistant computing device of the central bank digital currency system. The system public key of the key management server of the central bank digital currency system is stored in the quantum-resistant computing device of the corresponding commercial bank digital currency system.
[0032] The key management server of the central bank digital currency system calls a hash function to calculate the public key issued by the central bank digital currency system, and then calculates the private key issued by the central bank digital currency system based on this public key. The key management server of the central bank digital currency system calls a hash function to calculate the public key issued by the commercial bank digital currency system, and then calculates the corresponding private key based on this public key. The public key and private key of each commercial bank digital currency system are different. The identity, public key and private key of the central bank digital currency system are all stored in its quantum-resistant computing device. The identity, public key and private key of the commercial bank digital currency system are all stored in its quantum-resistant computing device.
[0033] Furthermore, the system private key of the commercial bank digital currency system is randomly selected and stored only in the quantum-resistant computing device of the commercial bank digital currency system. The system public key of the commercial bank digital currency system is calculated based on the system private key. The key management server of the commercial bank digital currency system calculates the message authentication code for the user's identity based on the system private key of the commercial bank digital currency system. The key management server of the commercial bank digital currency system calculates the corresponding system public key based on the system private key of the user.
[0034] The key management server of the commercial bank digital currency system calls the hash function to calculate the public key issued to the user, and then calculates the user's private key based on the public key. The key management server of the commercial bank digital currency system calls the hash function to calculate the public key issued to the user, and then calculates the corresponding private key based on the public key. The public key and private key of each user are different. At the same time, the key management server of the commercial bank digital currency system records the correspondence between the user's real identity and anonymous identity.
[0035] Furthermore, in step S1, the commercial bank digital currency system calculates the public key of the central bank digital currency system through the identity of the central bank digital currency system, takes out its own private key based on the key management server of the central bank digital currency system, obtains the timestamp, calculates the symmetric key between the two, calculates the message authentication code and signs it, and then encrypts it with the symmetric key, sends the commercial bank digital currency system identity, the central bank digital currency system and the timestamp to the central bank digital currency system together. The central bank digital currency system calculates its system private key for the commercial bank digital currency system, calculates the decrypted message authentication code based on the symmetric key between the two, obtains all the information, and then verifies the signature with the public key of the commercial bank digital currency system and the system public key. If successful, the central bank digital currency system generates a session key, adds it to the new message together with the timestamp, encrypts it and sends it back to the commercial bank digital currency system, decrypts the message using the symmetric key, verifies the signature successfully, and obtains the session key.
[0036] Furthermore, in step S2, the online user calculates the public key of the commercial bank digital currency system through the identity of the commercial bank digital currency system, takes out his own private key based on the key management server of the commercial bank digital currency system, obtains the timestamp, calculates the symmetric key between the two, calculates the message authentication code and signs, and then encrypts the online user's anonymous identity, the commercial bank digital currency system identity and the timestamp through the symmetric key. The password management server of the commercial bank digital currency system calculates its system private key for the online user, and calculates the decrypted message authentication code in combination with the symmetric key between the two to obtain the identity and all information of the online user, and then verifies the signature with the user's public key and the system public key. If the verification is successful, a new anonymous identity is generated for the user, and a new public key, system public key, private key and system private key are generated, which are added to the new message together with the timestamp and encrypted and sent back to the online user. The online user uses the symmetric key to decrypt the message, verifies the signature successfully, obtains the session key, obtains and replaces the new anonymous identity, system public key and private key.
[0037] Furthermore, in step S3, the sender and the receiver exchange anonymous identities through short-range communication. The sender uses a private key to sign the information consisting of his anonymous identity, transaction and timestamp, encrypts it with the session key of the commercial bank digital currency system and sends it to the commercial bank digital currency system. The commercial bank digital currency system decrypts and verifies it with the session key. After successful verification, it encrypts the message including the sender's real identity, transaction and timestamp with the session key between the commercial bank digital currency system and sends it to the central bank digital currency system.
[0038] Furthermore, in step S3, after receiving the message, the central bank digital currency system uses the session key between the central bank digital currency system and the commercial bank digital currency system to which the sender belongs to decrypt the message to obtain the sender's real identity, transaction and timestamp. After verification, the transaction and timestamp are encrypt with the session key between the central bank digital currency system and the commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs, and send them to the commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs. The commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs decrypts the message after receiving it, and records the transaction and timestamp locally after verification.
[0039] Furthermore, in step S3, the commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs calculates the symmetric key and transaction key between itself and the recipient, and calculates another private key of the commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs, generates a new anonymous identity, system private key, system public key, private key and public key for the recipient, and signs the transaction, transaction time and success message with another private key of the commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs, encrypts it with the transaction key and then encrypts it with the symmetric key before sending it to the central bank digital currency system.
[0040] Furthermore, in step S3, the central bank digital currency system decrypts the message with the symmetric key of the commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs, records the change in ownership of the digital currency after the transaction is successful after verification, and encrypts the message of successful transaction with the symmetric password of the commercial bank digital currency system to which the sender belongs and sends it to the commercial bank digital currency system to which the sender belongs. The commercial bank digital currency system to which the sender belongs decrypts the message with the symmetric password of the central bank digital currency system, generates a new anonymous identity, system private key, system public key, private key and public key for the sender, and packages them with the information of successful transaction, encrypts them with the message authentication code, and then encrypts them with the sender's symmetric password and sends them to the sender.
[0041] Further, in step S3, after receiving the message, the sender decrypts the message with the symmetric password of the commercial bank digital currency system to which it belongs, obtains the success message, confirms the end of the transaction, deletes the digital currency in the transaction, saves the new anonymous identity, public key and system private key, and then sends the transaction and transaction success message to the recipient;
[0042] After receiving the message, the recipient calculates the symmetric password of the commercial bank's digital currency system to which it belongs, and calculates the message authentication code, decrypts the message, stores the received digital currency after verification, and saves the recipient's new anonymous identity, public key and system private key.
[0043] The digital currency quantum computing-resistant anonymous transaction method with offline receiver based on ID cryptography of the present invention has the following advantages:
[0044] 1. It can realize quantum computing-resistant receiver offline and anonymous digital currency transactions based on ID cryptography;
[0045] 2. There is no need to generate an asymmetric key pool from the public keys of all members and store them in each key card. The client key card only needs to store the key related to itself, so the storage cost and operation workload of the key card are small;
[0046] 3. The overall process and data structure of identity authentication and transaction communication in the traditional digital currency system have not been changed. Instead, the protection of symmetric keys based on ID cryptography has been added to the existing technology. Therefore, the cost of switching the digital currency communication system to a quantum computing-resistant solution is relatively low. The key issuance service based on ID cryptography has replaced the CA communication system that cannot resist quantum computing, which has reduced the complexity of system construction and upgrading and enhanced the central bank's control over commercial banks.
[0047] 4. The key management server issues an anonymous identity to the user, and the user uses the frequently updated anonymous identity to communicate with the commercial bank digital currency system, which can protect the user's privacy information and make transactions more secure.
[0048] 5. The key issuance server based on ID cryptography has different system public and private keys for each different user. Even if a user's system public key is lost and the corresponding system private key is cracked by a quantum computer, it will not endanger the system public and private keys of other users. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0049] The present invention will be further described and explained below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
[0050] Figure 1 It is the basic structural diagram of the central bank digital currency system in the preferred embodiment of the present invention.
[0051] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of an anonymous digital currency transaction based on ID cryptography and with the recipient offline in a preferred embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0052] The technical solution of the present invention will be more clearly and completely explained below through description of preferred embodiments of the present invention in combination with the accompanying drawings.
[0053] Example:
[0054] This embodiment proposes a digital currency quantum computing-resistant anonymous transaction method with an offline recipient based on ID cryptography, which is jointly implemented by the central bank digital currency system, the commercial bank digital currency system and the user end.
[0055] Taking the operation example of central bank digital currency as an example, Figure 1 As shown in the figure, the basic structure of the digital currency system mainly includes the central bank digital currency system, the commercial bank digital currency system (in practice, it can be multiple commercial bank digital currency systems) and users, among which the identity authentication between the central bank digital currency system and the commercial bank digital currency system, and the identity authentication between the commercial bank digital currency system and the user are all based on the theory of ID cryptography. The central bank digital currency system is used to generate and issue digital currency, as well as to register the ownership of digital currency; the commercial bank digital currency system is used to perform banking functions for digital currency; and users are the main users of digital currency.
[0056] Assume that the ID of the central bank digital currency system S is ID S , S has a quantum-resistant computing device T S , T S A key management server KMS based on ID cryptography is deployed in the system; the IDs of commercial bank digital currency systems A, B, C… are ID A 、ID B 、ID C ..., each with a quantum-resistant computing device T A , T B , TC …, while T A 、T B 、T C ...and the key management servers KMSA, KMSB, KMSC based on ID cryptography are deployed respectively; the commercial bank digital currency system A includes users A1, A2, A3..., the commercial bank digital currency system B includes users B1, B2, B3..., the commercial bank digital currency system C includes users C1, C2, C3..., and all users also have anti-quantum computing devices T A1 、T A2 、T A3 、T B1 、T B2 、T B3 、T C1 、T C2 、T C3 …. Among them, users A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2, C3… have variable anonymous identity IDs A1 、ID A2 、ID A3 、ID B1 、ID B2 、ID B3 、ID C1 、ID C2 、ID C3 …, these anonymous identities can be updated by the user’s corresponding commercial bank digital currency system to achieve the purpose of confidential communication.
[0057] The anti-quantum computing device can be a key card, a mobile terminal, a cipher machine, a gateway, etc., which can communicate with the bank currency system or each user end through the mainboard interface, short-range wireless communication, controllable intranet communication, etc., to ensure that information will not be stolen by quantum computers within the communication range. For example, the anti-quantum computing device can be a key card plugged into the host motherboard of the bank currency system, or the anti-quantum computing device can be a mobile terminal that conducts NFC communication with two mobile terminals, or the anti-quantum computing device can be a cipher machine or a gateway that conducts secure intranet communication with both user hosts in the same intranet.
[0058] When KMS issues public and private keys to a member, it first needs to establish a set of system parameters based on ID cryptography. The steps are as follows:
[0059] (1) G1, G2 are GDH (Diffie-Hellman) groups of order q, q is a large prime number, G1 is an additive cyclic group consisting of points on the elliptic curve, P is the generator of group G1; G2 is a multiplicative cyclic group; bilinear map e: G1×G1→G2.
[0060] (2) Randomly select SKMS ∈Z p * As the system private key of the central bank digital currency system, SK MS The system public key PK of the central bank digital currency system is only stored in the quantum-resistant computing device of the central bank digital currency system. MS =SK MS *P,PK MS Quantum-resistant computing device T stored in central bank digital currency system S KMS has different public and private keys for each commercial bank digital currency system. The system private key of A is SK MSA(KMS) =MAC(ID A , S.K. MS )(MAC(m, k) is the message authentication code calculated for message m using key k), the system public key of A is PK MSA(KMS) =SK MSA(KMS) *P; the system private key for B is SK MSB(KMS) =MAC(ID B , S.K. MS ), the system public key of B is PK MSB(KMS) =SK MSB(KMS) *P, KMS calculates the system public and private keys of other commercial bank digital currency systems in a similar way. The system private key based on KMS is stored in the quantum-resistant computing device of the central bank digital currency system, and the system public key based on KMS is stored in the quantum-resistant computing device of the corresponding commercial bank, that is, PK MSA(KMS) Save in T A PK MSB(KMS) Save in T B middle.
[0061] (3) When KMS issues public and private keys to S, it calls the hash function H1 to calculate the public key PK S =H1(ID S ), and then according to the public key PK S Calculate the private key SK S =SK MS *PK S , S's ID and public-private key, namely ID S ,PK S SK S A quantum-resistant computing device T stored in S S When KMS issues a public and private key to A, it calls the hash function H1 to calculate the public key PK A =H1(ID A ), and then according to the public key PK A Calculate the KMS-based private key SK A(KMS) =SK MSA(KMS) *PKA , A's ID and public and private keys, namely ID A ,PK A SK A(KMS) A quantum-resistant computing device T stored in A A The process of KMS issuing public and private keys to other commercial banks such as B, C, etc. is similar.
[0062] (4) Randomly select SK MSA ∈Z p * As the system private key of the commercial bank digital currency system, SK MSA The quantum-resistant computing device T is only stored in the commercial bank digital currency system A Calculate the system public key PK of the commercial bank digital currency system MSA =SK MSA *P,PK MSA The quantum computing device T stored in the commercial bank digital currency system A KMSA has different public and private keys for each user. The system private key for A1 is SK MSA1 =MAC(ID A1 , S.K. MSA ), the system public key of A1 is PK MSA1 =SK MSA1 *P; the system private key for A2 is SK MSA2 =MAC(ID A2 , S.K. MSA ), the system public key of A2 is PK MSA2 =SK MSA2 *P, KMSA calculates the system public and private keys of other users in a similar way. The system private key based on KMSA is stored in the quantum-resistant computing device T of the commercial bank digital currency system. A In the KMSA-based system, the public key is stored in the quantum-resistant computing device of the corresponding user end, namely PK MSA1 Save in T A1 PK MSA2 Save in T A2 The calculation methods of KMSB, KMSC, etc. for the system public and private keys of different users are similar.
[0063] (5) When KMSA issues public and private keys to user A1, it calls hash function H1 to calculate the public key PK A1 =H1(ID A1 ), and then according to the public key PK A1 Calculate the private key SK based on KMSA A1 =SK MSA1 *PK A1, A1's anonymous identity and public and private keys, i.e. ID A1 ,PK A1 SK A1 A quantum-resistant computing device T stored in A1 A1 At the same time, KMSA records A1's real identity and its anonymous identity ID A1 The process of KMSA issuing public and private keys to other users such as A1, A2, etc. is similar. The methods of other key management servers KMSB, KMSC, etc. issuing public and private keys to their respective users are similar.
[0064] The following describes the identity authentication process based on ID cryptography between the commercial bank digital currency system and the central bank digital currency system, and between users and the commercial bank digital currency system. Figure 2 The process of anonymous digital currency transactions between users based on ID cryptography and the recipient being offline is shown below:
[0065] Step S1: The commercial bank digital currency system and the central bank digital currency system S perform identity authentication
[0066] The following takes the identity authentication between commercial bank digital currency system A and central bank digital currency system S as an example. The identity authentication process between other commercial bank digital currency systems and central bank digital currency system S is similar.
[0067] S101: A sends his identity information to S
[0068] AAccording to ID S Calculate PK S =H1(ID S ), take out your own KMS-based private key SK A(KMS) Calculate the symmetric key K between A and S A-S =e(SK A(KMS) , PK S ). Get timestamp T1 and use K A-S Calculate the message authentication code for T1 and get K1=MAC(T1, K A-S ). Set the combination IDA||IDS||T1||AINFO as MSG A , where AINFO is the identity information of A to be used for authentication.
[0069] Use SK A(KMS) About MSG A To make a digital signature based on ID cryptography, the process is as follows: take the random number parameter r1, obtain r1 and PK A The product of r1*PK A , and then use function H1 to act on MSG A and r1*PK A, we can get the signature parameter h1=H1(MSG A , r1*PK A ). Then you can get MSG A Signature SIGN(MSG A , S.K. A(KMS) )=(r1*PK A , (r1+h1)*SK A(KMS) ).
[0070] Use K1 to AINFO and SIGN (MSG A , S.K. A(KMS) ) encrypted to obtain {AINFO||SIGN(MSG A , S.K. A(KMS) )}K1, together with ID A 、ID S and T1 are sent to S. The message sent can be represented by ID A ||ID S ||T1|{AINFO||SIGN(MSG A , S.K. A(KMS) )}K1.
[0071] S102: S sends the authentication result (including the session key if authentication is successful) to A
[0072] S receives the message ID from A A ||ID S ||T1|{AINFO||SIGN(MSG A , S.K. A(KMS) )}K1. The KMS in S calculates its system private key to A as SK MSA(KMS) =MAC(ID A , S.K. MS ), according to PK S =H1(ID S )Get SK S(KMS) =SK MSA(KMS) *PK S . Further obtain the symmetric key K between S and A S-A =e(SK S(KMS) , PK A ). According to ID cryptography, we can get: K A-S =e(SK A(KMS) , PK S )=e(SK MSA(KMS) *PK A , PK S )=e(PK A , S.K. MSA(KMS) *PK S )=e(PKA , S.K. S(KMS) )=e(SK S(KMS) , PK A )=K S-A . Use K S-A Calculate the message authentication code for T1 and get K′1=MAC(T1, K S-A ). Use K′1 to decrypt {AINFO||SIGN(MSG A , S.K. A(KMS) )}K1, get A's identity information AINFO and SIGN(MSG A , S.K. A(KMS) ).
[0073] S According to ID A Calculate PK A =H1(ID A ), according to the SK calculated above MSA(KMS) Calculate the system public key of KMS to A as PK MSA(KMS) =SK MSA(KMS) *P, use PK A and PK MSA(KMS) To verify the signature SIGN(MSG A , S.K. A(KMS) ). To verify the signature, you only need to verify (P, PK MSA(KMS) , r1*PK A +h1*PK A , (r1+h1)*SK A(KMS) ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. If the verification succeeds, S generates the session key KS S-A It is combined with the authentication success message and is called RET S ; If the verification fails, the authentication failure message is called RET S . Get timestamp T2 and combine IDS||IDA||T2||RET S As MSG S .
[0074] Use SK S(KMS) About MSG S To make a digital signature based on ID cryptography, the process is as follows: take the random number parameter r2, calculate r2 and PK S The product of r2*PK S , and then use function H1 to act on MSG S and r2*PK S , we can get the signature parameter h2=H1(MSG S , r2*PK S ). Then you can get MSG S Signature SIGN(MSGS , S.K. S(KMS) )=(r2*PK S , (r2+h2)*SK S(KMS) ).
[0075] Use K S-A Calculate the message authentication code for T2 and get K2=MAC(T2, K S-A ), use K2 to RET S and SIGN(MSG S , S.K. S(KMS) ) encrypted to obtain {RET S ||SIGN(MSG S , S.K. S(KMS) )}K2, together with ID S 、ID A and T2 are sent to A. The message sent can be represented by ID S ||ID A ||T2|{RET S ||SIGN(MSG S , S.K. S(KMS) )}K2.
[0076] S103: A receives the authentication result (including the session key if the authentication is successful)
[0077] A receives the message ID from S S ||ID A ||T2|{RET S ||SIGN(MSG S , S.K. S(KMS) )}K2. Use K A-S Calculate the message authentication code for T2 and get K′2=MAC(T2, K A-S ), decrypt using K′2 {RET S ||SIGN(MSG S , S.K. S(KMS) )}K2, get RET S and SIGN(MSG S , S.K. S(KMS) ).
[0078] A uses PK S and from T A PK taken out MSA(KMS) To verify the signature SIGN(MSG S , S.K. S(KMS) ). To verify the signature, you only need to verify (P, PK MSA(KMS) , r2*PK S +h2*PK S , (r2+h2)*SKS(KMS) ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. If A successfully verifies the signature, and RETS also contains a message that S successfully verifies the signature, then RETS can be retrieved. S The session key KS in S-A , so A and S can use the session key for confidential communication; in other cases, the session key cannot be obtained.
[0079] Similarly, B and S can use this method to authenticate each other and negotiate the session key KS between them. B-S .
[0080] From the above process, we can see that the public key of the system based on ID cryptography is not disclosed, and the digital signature based on ID cryptography is protected by a symmetric key. Therefore, this process can resist the attack of quantum computers on ID cryptography. In addition, the KMS based on ID cryptography has different system public and private keys for different users such as A, B, and C. Even if A's system public key PK MSA(KMS) Loss of the corresponding system private key SK MSA(KMS) Even if it is cracked by a quantum computer, it will not endanger the system public and private keys of other users such as B and C.
[0081] Step S2: User conducts identity authentication with the commercial bank digital currency system
[0082] The following takes the identity authentication of online user B1 and commercial bank digital currency system B as an example. The process of identity authentication of other online users and corresponding commercial bank digital currency systems is similar.
[0083] S201: B1 sends its identity information to B and applies to update and generate a new anonymous identity
[0084] B1 by ID B Calculate PK B =H1(ID B ), take out your own private key SK based on KMSB B1 Calculate the symmetric key K between B1 and B B1-B =e(SK B1 , PK B ). Get timestamp T3, using K B1-B Calculate the message authentication code for T3 and get K3=MAC(T3, K B1-B ). Use the combination IDB1||IDB||T3||B1INFO as MSG B1 , where B1INFO is the identity information of B1 to be used for authentication.
[0085] Use SK B1 About MSG B1To make a digital signature based on ID cryptography, the process is as follows: take the random number parameter r3, obtain r3 and PK B1 The product of r3*PK B1 , and then use function H1 to act on MSG B1 and r3*PK B1 , we can get the signature parameter h3=H1(MSG B1 , r3*PK B1 ). Then you can get MSG B1 Signature SIGN(MSG B1 , S.K. B1 )=(r3*PK B1 , (r3+h3)*SK B1 ).
[0086] Use K3 to check B1INFO and SIGN(MSG B1 , S.K. B1 ) encrypted to obtain {B1INFO||SIGN(MSG B1 , S.K. B1 )}K3, together with B1's anonymous ID B1 、ID B and T3 are sent to B. The message sent can be represented by ID B1 ||ID B ||T3|{B1INFO||SIGN(MSG B1 , S.K. B1 )}K3.
[0087] S202: B sends the authentication result (including the session key if the authentication is successful) to B1
[0088] B receives the message ID from B1 B1 ||ID B ||T3|{B1INFO||SIGN(MSG B1 , S.K. B1 )}K3. KMSB in B calculates its private key to B1 as SK MSB1 =MBC(ID B1 , S.K. MSB ), according to PK B =H1(ID B )Get SK B(MSB1) =SK MSB1* PK B . Further obtain the symmetric key K between B and B1 B-B1 =e(SK B(MSB1) , PK B1 ). According to ID cryptography, we can get: K B1-B =e(SK B1 , PKB )=e(SK MSB1 *PK B1 , PK B )=e(PK B1 , S.K. MSB1 *PK B )=e(PK B1 , S.K. B(MSB1) )=e(SK B(MSB1) , PK B1 )=K B-B1。 Use K B-B1 Calculate the message authentication code for T3 and get K′3=MAC(T3, K B-B1 ). Use K′3 to decrypt {B1INFO||SIGN(MSG B1 , S.K. B1 )}K3, get B1's identity information B1INFO and SIGN(MSG B1 , S.K. B1 ). B verifies whether B1INFO is ID B1 The corresponding real identity.
[0089] BAccording to ID B1 Calculate PK B1 =H1(ID B1 ), according to the SK calculated above MSB1 Calculate the system public key of KMSB to B1 as PK MSB1 =SK MSB1 *P, use PK B1 and PK MSB1 To verify the signature SIGN(MSG B1 , S.K. B1 ). To verify the signature, you only need to verify (P, PK MSB1 , r3*PK B1 +h3*PK B1 , (r3+h3)*SK B1 ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple.
[0090] If the verification is successful, B generates a new anonymous ID for B1 B1new , calculate KMSB pair ID B1new The system private key SK MSB1new =MAC(ID B1new , S.K. MSB ), system public key PK MSB1new =SK MSB1new *P, calculation ID B1new The public key PK B1new =H1(ID B1new ), private key SK B1new=SK MSB1new *PK B1new , and B generates a session key KS B-B1 And KS B-B1 , Authentication success message and ID B1new ||PK MSB1new ||SK B1new The combination is called RET B At the same time, KMSB records B1’s real identity and its anonymous ID B1new If the verification fails, the authentication failure message is called RET B . Get timestamp T4 and combine ID B ||ID B1 ||T4||RET B As MSG B .
[0091] Use SK B(MSB1) About MSG B To make a digital signature based on ID cryptography, the process is as follows: take the random number parameter r4, obtain r4 and PK B The product of r4*PK B , and then use function H1 to act on MSG B and r4*PK B , we can get the signature parameter h4=H1(MSG B , r4*PK B ). Then you can get MSG B Signature SIGN(MSG B , S.K. B(MSB1) )=(r4*PK B , (r4+h4)*SK B(MSB1) ).
[0092] Use K B-B1 Calculate the message authentication code for T4 and get K4=MAC(T4, K B-B1 ), use K4 to RET B and SIGN(MSG B , S.K. B(MSB1) ) encrypted to obtain {RET B ||SIGN(MSG B , S.K. B(MSB1) )}K4, together with ID B 、ID B1 and T4 are sent to B1. The message sent can be represented by ID B ||ID B1 ||T4||{RET B ||SIGN(MSG B , S.K. B(MSB1))}K4.
[0093] S203: B1 receives the authentication result (including the session key if the authentication is successful)
[0094] B1 receives the message ID from B B ||ID B1 ||T4||{RET B ||SIGN(MSG B , S.K. B(MSB1) )}K4. Use K B1-B Calculate the message authentication code for T4 and get K′4=MAC(T4, K B1-B ), decrypt using K′4 {RET B ||SIGN(MSG B , S.K. B(MSB1) )}K4, get RET B and SIGN(MSG B , S.K. B(MSB1) ).
[0095] B1 PK B and from T B1 PK taken out MSB1 To verify the signature SIGN(MSG B , S.K. B(MSB1) ). To verify the signature, you only need to verify (P, PK MSB1 , r4*PK B +h4*PK B , (r4+h4)*SK B(MSB1) ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. If B1 successfully verifies the signature, and RET B If the message carried in the message is that B successfully verified the signature, then RET can be taken out. B The session key KS in B-B1 and ID B1new ||PK MSB1new ||SK B1new , B1 will use the new anonymous identity, system public key and private key, namely ID B1new ||PK MSB1new ||SK B1new Replacement of quantum-resistant computing devices T B1 The ID originally stored in B1 ||PK MSB1 ||SK B1 and use the ID B1new As a new anonymous identity; and B1 and B can use the session key KS B-B1 In other cases, the session key cannot be obtained.
[0096] From the above process, we can see that the public key of the system based on ID cryptography is not disclosed, and the digital signature based on ID cryptography is protected by a symmetric key, so this process can resist the attack of quantum computers on ID cryptography. In addition, the public and private keys of the system based on ID cryptography are different for different users such as B1, B2, and B3. Even if B1's system public key PK MSB1 Loss of the corresponding system private key SK MSB1 Even if it is cracked by a quantum computer, it will not endanger the public and private keys of other users such as B2 and B3. In addition, the user's anonymous identity is frequently updated, and then the user uses the anonymous identity to communicate, which makes the communication more secure.
[0097] Step S3: Receiver A1's offline digital currency transaction
[0098] The receiver A1 is offline, and the sender B1 is online. Now, let's take the example of an anonymous digital currency transaction between the two parties. The flow chart is as follows: Figure 2 shown.
[0099] S301: B1 sends a signed transaction to B
[0100] A1 and B1 exchange information about each other through short-distance communication, where the sender's information includes the sender's anonymous ID, and the receiver's information includes the receiver's anonymous ID.
[0101] B1 uses private key SK B1 ID B1 , T and TX composed of the message MSG′ B1 Calculate the signature based on ID cryptography to get SIG B1 =SIGN(MSG′ B1 , S.K. B1 ), where T is the signing time, and TX is the message to be signed, i.e. the transaction, including the sender information, the receiver information, the digital currency and other transaction information. The signing process is as follows:
[0102] Take the random number parameter r5 and obtain r5 and PK B1 The product of r5*PK B1 , and then use function H1 to act on MSG′ B1 and r5*PK B1 , we can get the signature parameter h5=H1(MSG′ B1 , r5*PK B1 ). Then we can get MSG′ B1 Signature SIGN(MSG′ B1 , S.K. B1 )=(r5*PK B1 , (r5+h5)*SK B1 ).
[0103] B1 uses the session key KS between B1 and B B-B1 Encrypt MSG′ B1 and SIG B1 And send it to the commercial bank digital currency system B to which B1 belongs.
[0104] S302: B receives the signed transaction and sends it to the central bank
[0105] B receives the message and uses KS B-B1 Decrypted to get MSG′ B1 and SIG B1 Then use PK B1 and PK MSB1 To verify the signature SIG B1 To verify the signature, we only need to verify (P, PK MSB1 , r5*PK B1 +h5*PK B1 , (r5+h5)*SK B1 ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple.
[0106] If the verification is successful, it means that the message is indeed from B1. Then B uses the session key KS between B and S to send the message to B1. S-B MSG B1 The real identities of T, TX and B1 are encrypted and sent to the central bank digital currency system S.
[0107] S303: S receives the message and uses KS S-B Decryption obtains the true identity of T, TX and B1. S verifies the transaction TX, notifies B if the transaction fails, and uses the session key KS between S and A if the transaction succeeds S-A Encrypt T and TX to get {T||TX}KS S-A , and use KS S-A Calculate the message authentication code for T||TX to obtain MAC(T||TX, KS S-A ), then {T||TX}KS S-A and MAC(T||TX,KS S-A ) is sent to the commercial bank digital currency system A to which A1 belongs.
[0108] S304: A signs the transaction and generates a new anonymous identity for A1.
[0109] After receiving the message, A uses KS S-A Decrypt {T||TX}KS S-A Get T and TX, and MAC (T||TX, KS S-A) for verification. A verifies the transaction TX and notifies S if the transaction fails. If the transaction succeeds, it continues with the next steps.
[0110] S305: A records T||TX locally, and then calculates the symmetric key K between A and A1 according to the method in S202 A-A1 , use K A-A1 Calculate the message authentication code for T and get KT = MAC (T, K A-A1 ). Calculate another private key SK of A according to the method in 2.2. A(MSA1) , A generates a new anonymous ID for A1 A1new , calculate the KMSA pair ID A1new The system private key SK MSA1new =MAC(ID A1new , S.K. MSA ), system public key PK MSA1new =SK MSA1new *P, calculation ID A1new The public key PK A1new =H1(ID A1new ), private key SK A1new =SK MSA1new *PK A1new . Combination A1 new anonymous identity information ID A1new ||PK MSA1new ||SK A1new The transaction success message is RET, and SK A(MSA1) Make a digital signature based on ID cryptography on T||TX||RET to get SIG A =SIGN(T||TX||RET,SK A(MSA1) ). A encrypts with KT to obtain {TX||RET||SIG A}KT and named RET A Then use KS S-A Encrypted RET A Get {RET A}KS S-A , using KS S-A About RET A Calculate the message authentication code to get MAC (RET A , K.S. S-A ), and {RET A}KS S-A and MAC(RET A , K.S. S-A ) is sent to S.
[0111] S306: S sends the transaction result to B, B forwards it to B1, and B1 forwards it to A1
[0112] After S receives the message, if it is a transaction failure message, it will be named RET′; otherwise, it will be named KS S-A Decryption {RET A}KS S-A Get RET A , and MAC(RET A , K.S. S-A ) for verification. If the verification is successful, it means the transaction is successful. S records the ownership change of the digital currency after the transaction is successful, and names the successful transaction message RET′. S uses KS S-B Encrypt RET′||RET A And send it to B.
[0113] S307: B receives the message and uses KS S-B Decryption gives RET′||RET A After confirming that RET′ contains a successful transaction message, B generates a new anonymous ID for B1 according to the method in 2.2. B1new , and calculate the KMSB pair ID B1new The system private key SK MSB1new 、System public key PK MSB1new , Public Key PK B1new and private key SK B1new B will give B1 new identity information ID B1new ||PK MSB1new ||SK B1new The information of successful digital currency transaction constitutes RET′ B and use KS B-B1 Encrypted RET′ B ||RET A Then send it to B1.
[0114] S308: B1 receives the message and uses KS B-B1 Decrypted to get RET′ B ||RET A , B1 confirms RET′ B After confirming the transaction is complete, delete the digital currency in TX and save B1's new identity ID. B1new ||PK MSB1new ||SK B1new B1 will T||RET A Send to A1, A1 gets T||RET A A1 calculates the symmetric key K between A1 and A according to the method in 2.1 A1-A , and then use K A1-A Calculate the message authentication code for T and get KT′=MAC(T, K A1-A ), decrypted with KT′ to get TX||RET||SIGA A1 uses the method in 2.2 to sign SIG A After verification, A1 confirms the transaction is complete. If successful, the received digital currency is stored and A1's new anonymous identity ID is saved. A1new ||PK MSA1new ||SK A1new .
[0115] From the above process, we can see that the public key of the system based on ID cryptography is not disclosed, and the digital signature based on ID cryptography is protected by a symmetric key, so the process can resist the attack of quantum computers on ID cryptography. At the same time, A1 and B1 can obtain new anonymous identities from their respective commercial banks after each transaction; and in each digital currency transaction based on the offline recipient, the actual content of the transaction is encrypted by a symmetric key. Therefore, this process can protect user privacy and make user transactions safer.
[0116] The above specific implementations are only descriptions of the preferred implementations of the present invention, and do not limit the protection scope of the present invention. Without departing from the design concept and spirit of the present invention, various modifications, substitutions and improvements made by ordinary technicians in this field to the technical solution of the present invention based on the text description and drawings provided by the present invention should all fall within the protection scope of the present invention. The protection scope of the present invention is determined by the claims.
Claims
1. A quantum computing-resistant anonymous transaction method for digital currency with offline receiver based on ID cryptography, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1: The commercial bank digital currency system and the central bank digital currency system perform identity authentication, which includes the following sub-steps: S101: The commercial bank digital currency system sends its own identity to the central bank digital currency system; S102: The central bank digital currency system performs authentication and sends the authentication result to the commercial bank digital currency system; S103: The commercial bank digital currency system receives the authentication result. If the authentication is successful, the authentication result contains the session key; S2: The online user performs identity authentication with the commercial bank digital currency system. This step includes the following sub-steps: S201: The online user sends his / her identity information to the commercial bank digital currency system and applies for updating and generating a new anonymous identity; S202: The commercial bank digital currency system performs authentication and sends the authentication result to the online user; S203: The online user receives the authentication result, and if the authentication is successful, the authentication result includes the session key; S3: The receiver is offline and the sender is an online user. Both parties conduct an anonymous digital currency transaction. This step includes the following sub-steps: S301: The receiver and the sender communicate in close proximity to exchange information between the two parties, and the sender sends an encrypted signature transaction to the commercial bank digital currency system to which it belongs; S302: The commercial bank digital currency system receives the signed transaction, decrypts it and verifies it. If the verification is successful, the signed transaction is sent to the central bank digital currency system. S303: The central bank digital currency system receives the signed transaction, decrypts it and verifies it. If the verification succeeds, the message is sent to the commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs. If the verification fails, the commercial bank digital currency system to which the sender belongs is notified. S304: The commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs receives the message, decrypts it and verifies the transaction. If the transaction verification fails, the central bank digital currency system is notified. If the transaction verification succeeds, the next step is entered; S305: The commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs records the transaction locally and signs it, then generates a new anonymous identity for the recipient, encrypts it and sends the message to the central bank digital currency system; S305: The central bank digital currency system receives the message, decrypts and verifies it. After successful verification, it records the change in the ownership of the digital currency and sends a successful transaction message to the commercial bank digital currency system to which the sender belongs. S306: After receiving the message, the commercial bank digital currency system to which the sender belongs decrypts and verifies it. After successful verification, a new anonymous identity is generated for the sender, and the new anonymous identity and a successful transaction message are sent to the sender; S307: After receiving the information, the sender decrypts and confirms the completion of the transaction and deletes the corresponding digital currency, saves the new identity information, and sends a message to the receiver. After receiving the message, the receiver decrypts and verifies it to confirm the completion of the transaction. If the transaction is successful, the received digital currency is stored and the new identity information is saved.
2. The method for anonymous digital currency quantum computing-resistant transaction with offline recipient based on ID cryptography according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The central bank digital currency system, commercial bank digital currency system and user each have a quantum-resistant computing device, and the central bank digital currency system and commercial bank digital currency system each have a key management server; The system private key of the central bank digital currency system is randomly selected and is only stored in the anti-quantum computing device of the central bank digital currency system. The system public key of the central bank digital currency system is calculated based on the system private key. The key management server of the central bank digital currency system calculates the message authentication code for the identity of the commercial bank digital currency system based on the system private key of the central bank digital currency system. The key management server of the central bank digital currency system calculates the corresponding system public key for the system private key of the commercial bank digital currency system. The system private key of the key management server of the central bank digital currency system is stored in the anti-quantum computing device of the central bank digital currency system. The system public key of the key management server of the central bank digital currency system is stored in the anti-quantum computing device of the corresponding commercial bank digital currency system. The key management server of the central bank digital currency system calls a hash function to calculate the public key issued by the central bank digital currency system, and then calculates the private key issued by the central bank digital currency system based on the public key. The key management server of the central bank digital currency system calls a hash function to calculate the public key issued by the commercial bank digital currency system, and then calculates the corresponding private key based on this public key. The public key and private key of each commercial bank digital currency system are different. The identity, public key and private key of the central bank digital currency system are all stored in its quantum-resistant computing device. The identity, public key and private key of the commercial bank digital currency system are all stored in its quantum-resistant computing device.
3. The method for anonymous digital currency quantum computing-resistant transaction with offline recipient based on ID cryptography according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The system private key of the commercial bank digital currency system is randomly selected and is only stored in the quantum-resistant computing device of the commercial bank digital currency system. The system public key of the commercial bank digital currency system is calculated based on the system private key. The key management server of the commercial bank digital currency system calculates a message authentication code for the user's identity based on the system private key of the commercial bank digital currency system. The key management server of the commercial bank digital currency system calculates the corresponding system public key based on the system private key of the user. The key management server of the commercial bank digital currency system calls a hash function to calculate the public key issued to the user, and then calculates the private key issued to the user based on the public key. The key management server of the commercial bank digital currency system calls a hash function to calculate the public key issued to the user, and then calculates the corresponding private key based on the public key. The public key and private key of each user are different. At the same time, the key management server of the commercial bank digital currency system records the correspondence between the user's real identity and anonymous identity.
4. The method for anonymous digital currency quantum computing-resistant transaction with offline receiver based on ID cryptography according to claim 3 is characterized in that: In step S1, the commercial bank digital currency system calculates the public key of the central bank digital currency system through the identity of the central bank digital currency system, takes out its own private key based on the key management server of the central bank digital currency system, obtains the timestamp, calculates the symmetric key between the two, calculates the message authentication code and signs it, and then encrypts it with the symmetric key, sends the commercial bank digital currency system identity, the central bank digital currency system identity and the timestamp to the central bank digital currency system together. The central bank digital currency system calculates its system private key for the commercial bank digital currency system, calculates the decrypted message authentication code based on the symmetric key between the two, obtains all the information, and then verifies the signature with the public key of the commercial bank digital currency system and the system public key. If successful, the central bank digital currency system generates a session key, adds it to the new message together with the timestamp, encrypts it and sends it back to the commercial bank digital currency system. The message is decrypted using the symmetric key, the signature is verified successfully, and the session key is obtained.
5. The method for anonymous digital currency quantum computing-resistant transaction with offline recipient based on ID cryptography according to claim 4 is characterized in that: In step S2, the online user calculates the public key of the commercial bank digital currency system through the identity of the commercial bank digital currency system, takes out his own private key based on the key management server of the commercial bank digital currency system, obtains the timestamp, calculates the symmetric key between the two, calculates the message authentication code and signs, and then encrypts the anonymous identity of the online user, the commercial bank digital currency system identity and the timestamp through the symmetric key, and sends them to the commercial bank digital currency system together. The password management server of the commercial bank digital currency system calculates its system private key for the online user, and calculates the decrypted message authentication code in combination with the symmetric key between the two to obtain the identity and all information of the online user, and then verifies the signature with the user's public key and the system public key. If the verification is successful, a new anonymous identity is generated for the user, and a new public key, system public key, private key and system private key are generated, which are added to the new message together with the timestamp and encrypted and sent back to the online user. The online user uses the symmetric key to decrypt the message, verifies the signature successfully, obtains the session key, obtains and replaces the new anonymous identity, system public key and private key.
6. The method for anonymous digital currency quantum computing-resistant transaction with offline receiver based on ID cryptography according to claim 5 is characterized in that: In step S3, the sender and the receiver exchange anonymous identities through short-range communication. The sender uses the private key to sign the information consisting of his anonymous identity, transaction and timestamp, encrypts it with the session key of the commercial bank digital currency system and sends it to the commercial bank digital currency system. The commercial bank digital currency system decrypts and verifies it with the session key. After the verification is successful, it encrypts the message including the sender's real identity, transaction and timestamp with the session key between the commercial bank digital currency system and sends it to the central bank digital currency system.
7. The method for anonymous digital currency quantum computing-resistant transaction with offline receiver based on ID cryptography according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step S3, after receiving the message, the central bank digital currency system uses the session key between the central bank digital currency system and the commercial bank digital currency system to which the sender belongs to decrypt the message to obtain the sender's real identity, transaction and timestamp. After verification, the transaction and timestamp are encrypte with the session key between the central bank digital currency system and the commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs, and send them to the commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs. The commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs decrypts the message after receiving it, and records the transaction and timestamp locally after verification.
8. The method for anonymous digital currency quantum computing-resistant transaction with offline receiver based on ID cryptography according to claim 7 is characterized in that: In step S3, the commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs calculates the symmetric key and transaction key between itself and the recipient, and calculates another private key of the commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs, generates a new anonymous identity, system private key, system public key, private key and public key for the recipient, and signs the transaction, transaction time and success message with another private key of the commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs, encrypts it with the transaction key and then encrypts it with the symmetric key before sending it to the central bank digital currency system.
9. The method for anonymous digital currency quantum computing-resistant transaction with offline receiver based on ID cryptography according to claim 8 is characterized in that: In step S3, the central bank digital currency system decrypts the message with the symmetric key of the commercial bank digital currency system to which the recipient belongs, records the change in the ownership of the digital currency after the transaction is successful after successful verification, and encrypts the message of successful transaction with the symmetric password of the commercial bank digital currency system to which the sender belongs and sends it to the commercial bank digital currency system to which the sender belongs. The commercial bank digital currency system to which the sender belongs decrypts the message with the symmetric password of the central bank digital currency system, generates a new anonymous identity, system private key, system public key, private key and public key for the sender, and packages it with the information of successful transaction, encrypts it with a message authentication code, and then encrypts it with the sender's symmetric password and sends it to the sender.
10. The method for anonymous digital currency quantum computing-resistant transaction with offline receiver based on ID cryptography according to claim 9 is characterized in that: In step S3, after receiving the message, the sender decrypts the message with the symmetric password of the commercial bank digital currency system to which it belongs, obtains the success message, confirms the end of the transaction, deletes the digital currency in the transaction, saves the new anonymous identity, public key and system private key, and then sends the transaction and transaction success message to the recipient; After receiving the message, the recipient calculates the symmetric password of the commercial bank's digital currency system to which it belongs, and calculates the message authentication code, decrypts the message, stores the received digital currency after verification, and saves the recipient's new anonymous identity, public key and system private key.
