An opportunistic routing transmission method based on node dynamic trust

Through monitoring and trust evaluation of the behavior of the water acoustic sensor network nodes, an opportunity routing protocol for water acoustic sensor network based on node dynamic trust is designed, which solves the problems of malicious node attacks and selfish behaviors, and realizes the security and robustness of the network. Ensure efficient data transmission.

CN114845259BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-12NORTHWESTERN POLYTECHNICAL UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202210336083.6
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-03-31
Publication Date
2024-11-12
Estimated Expiration
2042-03-31

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing water acoustic sensor network opportunity routing protocol does not take into account node security, resulting in malicious nodes that may carry out location spoof attacks and selfish behaviors, causing network security threats, and may deny service or discard packets when resources are insufficient, affecting network performance.

Method used

By monitoring the behavior of network nodes, establishing and updating trust values, determining whether the node is trustworthy, and considering the trust degree in the selection process of candidate set nodes, designing a water acoustic sensor network opportunity routing protocol based on node dynamic trust to ensure network routing Security and robustness.

Benefits of technology

Effectively detect and isolate malicious nodes, eliminate deceptive effects, ensure the network's normal data transmission in the confrontation environment, reduce network performance damage, and increase the network's damage resistance and robustness.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention provides an opportunistic routing transmission method based on dynamic trust of nodes. By monitoring the behavior of nodes during network communication, it is determined whether network nodes are trustworthy. In the process of selecting candidate set nodes, on the basis of the selection criteria of the original opportunistic routing protocol of the underwater acoustic sensor network, it is considered whether the candidate set nodes are trustworthy nodes. In this way, the security of network routing is guaranteed, and the network with malicious nodes can still perform normal data transmission to maintain the robustness of the network. In the normal routing operation and data transmission process, the present invention updates the trust value of the node in real time by broadcasting a trust probe package, and uses whether the node is trustworthy as an indicator for selecting candidate set nodes, which can eliminate the influence of deceptive malicious nodes on the network, and for network nodes, the increase in additional overhead is not obvious. At the same time, it effectively alleviates the influence of malicious nodes on the performance of the underwater acoustic sensor network in the case of a joint attack, while ensuring the normal data transmission of the network.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of underwater acoustic sensor networks, and in particular to an underwater acoustic sensor network secure routing transmission method for identifying and isolating malicious nodes through node behavior monitoring and path selection. Background Art

[0002] The underwater acoustic sensor network is a typical application of wireless sensor networks. As an ideal medium in the marine environment, it can monitor the target sea area over a large range and in real time. It has broad application prospects in the fields of marine resource exploration, marine environment monitoring and marine safety assurance.

[0003] At present, the opportunistic routing protocol widely used in underwater acoustic sensor networks utilizes the characteristics of broadcast communication to effectively improve the end-to-end data packet delivery success rate of underwater acoustic sensor networks in harsh marine environments. However, the opportunistic selection of nodes in the opportunistic routing candidate set selection mechanism adds uncertainty to the selection of the next-hop relay node. At the same time, the positioning of nodes in underwater acoustic sensor networks is fuzzy, and in the design process of the opportunistic routing protocol for underwater acoustic sensor networks, there is no management mechanism to verify whether the node is actually in the position it claims. These problems create opportunities for malicious nodes to carry out location spoofing attacks in underwater acoustic sensor networks.

[0004] Existing studies on opportunistic routing protocols for underwater acoustic sensor networks all assume that all nodes in the network can be trusted, without considering the security and selfishness of nodes within the network. The DBR protocol network node determines whether it is a candidate set node based on its own depth and the depth of the previous sender, without considering whether the sender is trustworthy. The VBF protocol network node calculates their relative position by measuring the distance between it and the relay node and the angle of arrival of the signal, and determines whether it can become a candidate set node by comparing the distance with the routing vector of the source node and the destination node. It also assumes that all nodes in the network are trustworthy. The VARP protocol buoy node embeds its own depth, hop count, sequence number and data forwarding direction into the beacon and broadcasts it to neighboring sensor nodes. After the node receiving the beacon sets and updates its own status, it will increase the hop count by 1, embed its own information into the beacon, and broadcast this beacon to neighboring nodes. Network nodes consider each other to be trustworthy and secure.

[0005] From the above research, it can be seen that the existing opportunistic routing protocols for underwater acoustic sensor networks do not consider whether the nodes are trustworthy during design and operation. However, in actual networks, malicious nodes can attack the network by disguising themselves as legitimate nodes, and normal network nodes may also behave selfishly when resources are insufficient, such as only accepting services and refusing services, or even discarding received data packets, which poses a serious security threat to the network. Summary of the invention

[0006] In order to overcome the shortcomings of the prior art, the present invention provides an opportunistic routing transmission method based on node dynamic trust. In order to ensure the basic communication and transmission functions of one's own underwater acoustic sensor network in the event of node failure or unknown attack, and to improve the anti-destruction capability of one's own underwater acoustic sensor network, an opportunistic routing protocol for an underwater acoustic sensor network based on node dynamic trust is proposed. The present invention monitors the behavior of nodes during network communication to determine whether network nodes are trustworthy. In the process of selecting candidate set nodes, on the basis of the original selection criteria of the underwater acoustic sensor network opportunistic routing protocol, whether the candidate set nodes are trustworthy nodes is considered. In this way, the security of network routing is guaranteed, and the network with malicious nodes can still perform normal data transmission to maintain the robustness of the network.

[0007] The steps of the technical solution adopted by the present invention to solve its technical problem are as follows:

[0008] Step 1: Network node trust assessment;

[0009] The trust evaluation of nodes establishes or updates the trust value by monitoring and evaluating the behavior of neighboring nodes during network communication. The node trust evaluation involves four parts: trust value initialization, behavior monitoring, node comprehensive trust value, and malicious node management.

[0010] (1) Trust value initialization

[0011] Initialize the network. In the initial state, assume that all nodes are trustworthy and set the initial trust value of all nodes to λ.

[0012] (2) Behavior monitoring

[0013] Using the broadcast characteristics of the wireless underwater acoustic channel, the direct trust table is obtained by subjectively monitoring the behavior of its neighboring nodes during network communication; the indirect trust table comes from the trust probe package broadcast by the neighboring nodes; the historical trust table is the comprehensive trust of the node recorded in history; the monitoring record format of each behavior event is shown in the following table:

[0014]

[0015] Among them, NodeId is the node ID, Suc is the number of successful information interactions, Fail is the number of failed information interactions, Eve_DATA is the transmitted data, Num is the number of abnormal behaviors, Eve_Attack is the attack type, Rtrust_Value is the indirect trust recommended by the node, Source_Id is the source node ID, and Htrust_Value is the historical trust corresponding to the node;

[0016] (3) Comprehensive trust of nodes;

[0017] It is used to process monitoring records, quantify and calculate trust, and record node trust, as shown in the following table:

[0018] Neighbor_ID Trust_Value

[0019] Among them, Neighbor_ID is the neighbor node ID, Trust_Value is the comprehensive node trust corresponding to the node;

[0020] The quantification and aggregation calculation of node trust adopts the node trustworthiness evaluation method of underwater acoustic sensor network based on node behavior;

[0021] (4) Malicious Node Management

[0022] Malicious nodes do not comply with the opportunistic routing protocol and carry out malicious attack behaviors. Only by identifying and isolating them can a secure network environment be built; After the node comprehensive trust evaluation is completed, the malicious node management compares the comprehensive trust value with the trust threshold (0.6). If the comprehensive trust value is less than the trust threshold, it is identified as an untrustworthy node and isolated during the network communication process;

[0023] (5) Node trust assessment workflow;

[0024] In the node trust evaluation of the opportunistic routing protocol of underwater acoustic sensor networks based on node dynamic trust, the update of the neighbor node behavior record table comes from the broadcast of the trust probe package and network communication; among them, the broadcast of the trust probe package is mainly to obtain the recommended trust of the evaluated node by the neighbor nodes shared by the evaluated node and the evaluating node, and then update the indirect trust of the neighbor node; in the network communication process, the node updates the direct trust of the neighbor node by monitoring the behavior of the neighbor node, and calculates the comprehensive trust of the node by combining the indirect trust and the historical trust of the previous stage, and then updates the historical trust of the neighbor node;

[0025] Step 2: Design the node routing table structure;

[0026] In order to suppress redundant forwarding of data packets, each node must maintain its own two routing tables Q1 and Q2. Q1 is a temporary routing table, which is used by the node to mark the forwarding priority of a data packet. The record is cleared when the data packet is forwarded successfully. Q2 is used to record the node's recent forwarding of data packets. Whenever a node successfully forwards a data packet, the sequence number of this data packet is written into Q2. When Q2 is full, the least recently accessed sequence number will be overwritten by the latest one. The routing entries of routing tables Q1 and Q2 are shown in the following table:

[0027] Q1 DATA ST

[0028] Q2 Sender_Id Sequence_Num

[0029] Among them, DATA is the data packet received by the node; ST is the estimated sending time; Sequence_Num is the packet sequence number; Sender_Id is the node ID that sends the data packet;

[0030] Step 3: Data packet format specification;

[0031] There are two types of packets in the information interaction process: DATA and trust probe packets; DATA packets are information that the source node in the underwater acoustic sensor network needs to transmit, and the forwarding process requires the selection and coordination of candidate set nodes; trust probe packets are node indirect trust collection processes initiated by the Sink node, which requires the participation of all nodes in the network. The structure of DATA packets is shown in the following table:

[0032] Type Sequence_Num Source_Id Sender_Depth Data

[0033] The trust probe package structure is shown in the following table:

[0034] Type Sender_Info Rtrust_Value

[0035] It contains: Type indicates the message type, DATA packet takes value 1, trust probe packet takes value 0; Sequence_Num is the packet sequence number; Source_Id is the source node ID; Sender_Depth is the node depth of the most recent DATA packet sent, and the Sender_Depth value is updated every time the data packet is forwarded; Sender_Id sends the trust probe packet node ID and node depth information; Rtrust_Value includes all recommended node IDs and their trust values, which are derived from the historical trust table records of the behavior monitoring table;

[0036] Step 4: Trust probe packet forwarding;

[0037] After receiving the trust probe packet from the neighboring node, the network node waits for the RT time and sends the trust probe packet of the node; the depth difference between the current node and the previous hop node is Δd * (Δd * =d recent -d last ), define the time interval from receiving the trust probe packet to the node sending its own trust probe packet as RT;

[0038] Step 5: Candidate set node selection

[0039] In the process of DATA packet transmission, in order to better increase the effectiveness of candidate set nodes, define d th is the depth threshold parameter; only when the trust of the previous hop node is greater than the trust threshold and the depth difference Δd with the current node is greater than d th When the current node becomes a candidate node, Δd = dlast -d recent ; When d th = 0, indicating that nodes with a lower depth than the current node are eligible for forwarding; when d th = -R, which is equivalent to the global flooding protocol; d th The value is a trade-off between the end-to-end packet delivery success rate and the average energy consumption of network nodes. th When the value is small, the end-to-end packet delivery success rate is high, but the average energy consumption of network nodes also increases; th When the value is large, the end-to-end packet delivery success rate is low and the average energy consumption of network nodes is also reduced. Therefore, a compromise is needed to select d th value, while ensuring a high end-to-end data packet delivery success rate, the average energy consumption of network nodes is also low to meet network requirements;

[0040] Step 6: Candidate set node coordination

[0041] By coordinating the forwarding priority of the DATA packet of the candidate set nodes, redundant forwarding of the data packet is suppressed; by setting a waiting time for each relay node that receives the data packet, different relay nodes have different waiting times, and forward the data packet after waiting for different times. If the same packet is received before forwarding, it will not be forwarded again, that is, redundant forwarding of the data packet is suppressed; the forwarding priority of the DATA packet is reflected by the estimated forwarding time ST of the data packet in Q1. The smaller the ST of the node, the higher its forwarding priority; each node that receives the data packet first needs to calculate the estimated sending time ST of the data packet and write ST into the priority sequence Q1; the estimated sending time ST of the packet is related to the Holding Time (HT) and the time when the data packet is received, ST = the time when the data packet is received + HT, that is, when a node receives a data packet, it does not send the data packet immediately, but holds the HT time before sending it; HT is related to the distance Δd between the previous hop node and the current receiving node;

[0042] After receiving a data packet, the node first searches the node comprehensive trust table to determine whether the previous hop node is a trusted node. If the previous hop node is an untrusted node, the data packet is directly discarded. If the previous hop node is a trusted node, HT and ST are calculated, and ST is written into Q1. If the node receives the same data packet from a trusted node within the HT time, the data packet is discarded. If the node does not receive forwarding of the data packet from other nodes within the HT time, the node forwards the data packet and then writes the data packet information into Q2 to complete the forwarding of the data packet.

[0043] The calculation formula of the RT time is as follows:

[0044]

[0045] Wherein, τ=R / c; R is the maximum transmission distance of the node; c is the propagation speed of underwater sound, which is 1500m / s in the present invention; Δd * is the depth difference between the previous hop node and the current node.

[0046] The calculation formula of HT is as follows:

[0047]

[0048] Among them, τ = R / c; R is the maximum transmission distance of the node; c is the propagation speed of underwater sound, which is approximately equal to 1500m / s; Δd is the depth difference between the previous hop node and the current node. When δ is small, the larger the node HT value, the fewer nodes participate in data packet forwarding, the lower the energy consumption, but the end-to-end delay will also be longer.

[0049] The d th The value range is [-R,R]

[0050] The trust threshold is set to 0.6.

[0051] The beneficial effect of the present invention lies in the proposed opportunistic routing protocol for underwater acoustic sensor networks based on dynamic trust of nodes, which performs corresponding abnormal behavior detection for potential security threats of underwater acoustic sensor networks, and updates the trust value of nodes in real time by broadcasting trust probe packets during normal routing operations and data transmission, and uses whether the node is trustworthy as an indicator for selecting candidate set nodes. In this way, the impact of deceptive malicious nodes on the network can be eliminated, and for network nodes, the increase in additional overhead is not obvious. At the same time, the impact of malicious nodes on the performance of underwater acoustic sensor networks in the case of joint attacks is effectively alleviated, while ensuring normal data transmission of the network. Therefore, the present invention can complete efficient data transmission of underwater acoustic sensor networks in adversarial environments and maintain the robustness of the network, which promotes the application and development of underwater acoustic sensor networks and provides a technical foundation for the development of my country's integrated air, space and sea networks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0052] Figure 1 This is the data packet processing flow of the present invention.

[0053] Figure 2 It is a simulation topology diagram of the present invention.

[0054] Figure 3 It is a comparison chart of the data packet delivery rate results of the combined attack of the present invention and that of the non-attack.

[0055] Figure 4 This is a comparison chart of the average energy consumption results of the combined attack of the present invention and the absence of malicious nodes. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0056] The present invention is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0057] In view of this problem, the present invention combines the characteristics of the underwater acoustic sensor network and the opportunistic routing mechanism, and determines whether the network nodes are trustworthy by monitoring the behavior of the nodes during the network communication process. In the process of selecting candidate set nodes, on the basis of the selection criteria of the original underwater acoustic sensor network opportunistic routing protocol, whether the candidate set nodes are trustworthy nodes is considered, and then an underwater acoustic sensor network opportunistic routing protocol based on node dynamic trust is proposed. Therefore, the present invention is of great significance for completing the efficient and secure networking of underwater acoustic sensor networks in adversarial environments.

[0058] Aiming at the problem that underwater acoustic sensor networks are prone to node failure and unknown attacks, which affect the normal data transmission of the network, an opportunistic routing protocol for underwater acoustic sensor networks based on dynamic node trust was proposed.

[0059] Based on the DBR opportunistic routing protocol widely used in underwater acoustic sensor networks, the corresponding underwater acoustic sensor network opportunistic routing scheme based on node dynamic trust is given below: The data packet processing flow of the present invention is as follows: Figure 1 shown.

[0060] Network node scenarios of opportunistic routing protocol in underwater acoustic sensor network based on node dynamic trust Figure 2 As shown in the figure, acoustic signals are used to transmit information between nodes. The Sink node is located at the top layer of the entire network, that is, the node floating on the water surface. This node is responsible for receiving data transmitted by the underwater sensor network and aggregating and sending the data to the water console for further processing. Node 1 is a Sink node randomly deployed in the upper layer, Node 2 is a source node randomly deployed in the bottom layer of the network, and other underwater nodes are randomly distributed in the deployment area.

[0061] The specific implementation steps are as follows:

[0062] Step 1: Initialize the node number and trust table, start node trust evaluation, initialize the network, and set the initial trust value of each node in the network to λ = 0.6;

[0063] Step 2: The source node sends a trust probe package to start the trust process. The node that receives the trust probe package updates its indirect trust table. At the same time, the current node exports its direct trust table to generate a trust probe package and continues the trust process.

[0064] Step 3: The source node starts sending DATA packets. The node that receives the data packet:

[0065] (1) A node credibility evaluation method for underwater acoustic sensor networks based on node behavior is adopted. The direct trust table is updated by using the obtained packet header information and node behavior in the monitoring record. Then, the comprehensive trust value of the previous hop node is calculated in real time based on the indirect trust table and the historical trust table, and whether the previous hop node is trustworthy is determined.

[0066] (2) If the previous hop node is a trusted node and has not forwarded this data packet before (that is, there is no record of this packet in Q2), the data packet is written into Q1, and after the HT time, the data packet is broadcast and forwarded to the node with a smaller depth. After the node sends this data packet, it releases Q1 and writes the sequence number of this packet into Q2;

[0067] (3) If the previous hop node is a trusted node but the data packet with the same sequence number is received again within the HT time, repeat the operation (1) to calculate the trust of the node. If it comes from a trusted node, discard the packet and release Q1;

[0068] (4) If the previous hop node is an untrusted node, the received data packet is directly discarded;

[0069] Step 4: Every time the Sink node receives θ data packets, it performs a trust process, reads its own historical trust table, writes it into a trust probe package and broadcasts it. The node that receives the trust probe package uses the node behavior-based underwater acoustic sensor network node credibility assessment method to update its indirect trust table. At the same time, the current node reads its own historical trust table and writes it into the trust probe package, broadcasts it after RT time, and continues the trust process;

[0070] Step 5: Every time the source node sends θ packets, it will pause sending packets until the source node sends a trust probe packet;

[0071] Step 6: Continue sending data packets.

[0072] The delivery rate of the combined attack scenario of the present invention and the delivery rate of the DBR protocol data packets in the absence of the attack are compared as follows: Figure 3 As shown in the figure, the delivery rate of the joint attack scenario of the present invention is compared with the average energy consumption of the DBR protocol node in both the case of no attack and the case of no attack. Figure 4 shown.

Claims

1. An opportunistic routing transmission method based on node dynamic trust, characterized in that The steps include: Step 1: Network node trust assessment; The trust evaluation of nodes establishes or updates the trust value by monitoring and evaluating the behavior of neighboring nodes during network communication. The node trust evaluation involves four parts: trust value initialization, behavior monitoring, node comprehensive trust value, and malicious node management. (1) Trust value initialization Initialize the network. In the initial state, assume that all nodes are trustworthy and set the initial trust value of all nodes to λ. (2) Behavior monitoring Using the broadcast characteristics of the wireless underwater acoustic channel, the direct trust table is obtained by subjectively monitoring the behavior of its neighboring nodes during network communication; the indirect trust table comes from the trust probe package broadcast by the neighboring nodes; the historical trust table is the comprehensive trust of the node recorded in history; the monitoring record format of each behavior event is shown in the following table: Among them, NodeId is the node ID, Suc is the number of successful information interactions, Fail is the number of failed information interactions, Eve_DATA is the transmitted data, Num is the number of abnormal behaviors, Eve_Attack is the attack type, Rtrust_Value is the indirect trust recommended by the node, Source_Id is the source node ID, and Htrust_Value is the historical trust corresponding to the node; (3) Comprehensive trust of nodes; It is used to process monitoring records, quantify and calculate trust, and record node trust, as shown in the following table: Among them, Neighbor_ID is the neighbor node ID, Trust_Value is the comprehensive node trust corresponding to the node; The quantification and aggregation calculation of node trust adopts the node trustworthiness evaluation method of underwater acoustic sensor network based on node behavior; (4) Malicious Node Management Malicious nodes do not comply with the opportunistic routing protocol and carry out malicious attack behaviors. Only by identifying and isolating them can a secure network environment be built; After the node comprehensive trust evaluation is completed, the malicious node management compares the comprehensive trust value with the trust threshold. If the comprehensive trust value is less than the trust threshold, it is identified as an untrustworthy node and isolated during the network communication process; (5) Node trust assessment workflow; In the node trust evaluation of the opportunistic routing protocol of underwater acoustic sensor networks based on node dynamic trust, the update of the neighbor node behavior record table comes from the broadcast of the trust probe package and network communication; the broadcast of the trust probe package is to obtain the recommended trust of the evaluated node by the neighbor nodes shared by the evaluated node and the evaluating node, and then update the indirect trust of the neighbor node; in the network communication process, the node updates the direct trust of the neighbor node by monitoring the behavior of the neighbor node, and calculates the comprehensive trust of the node by combining the indirect trust and the historical trust of the previous stage, and then updates the historical trust of the neighbor node; Step 2: Design the node routing table structure; In order to suppress redundant forwarding of data packets, each node must maintain its own two routing tables Q1 and Q2. Q1 is a temporary routing table, which is used by the node to mark the forwarding priority of a data packet. The record is cleared when the data packet is forwarded successfully. Q2 is used to record the node's recent forwarding of data packets. Whenever a node successfully forwards a data packet, the sequence number of this data packet is written into Q2. When Q2 is full, the least recently accessed sequence number will be overwritten by the latest one. The routing entries of routing tables Q1 and Q2 are shown in the following table: Among them, DATA is the data packet received by the node; ST is the estimated sending time; Sequence_Num is the packet sequence number; Sender_Id is the node ID that sends the data packet; Step 3: Data packet format specification; There are two types of packets in the information interaction process: DATA and trust probe packets; DATA packets are information that the source node in the underwater acoustic sensor network needs to transmit, and the forwarding process requires the selection and coordination of candidate set nodes; trust probe packets are node indirect trust collection processes initiated by the Sink node, which requires the participation of all nodes in the network. The structure of DATA packets is shown in the following table: The trust probe package structure is shown in the following table: It contains: Type indicates the message type, DATA packet takes value 1, trust probe packet takes value 0; Sequence_Num is the packet sequence number; Source_Id is the source node ID; Sender_Depth is the node depth of the most recent DATA packet sent, and the Sender_Depth value is updated every time the data packet is forwarded; Sender_Info sends the trust probe packet node ID and node depth information; Rtrust_Value includes all recommended node IDs and their trust values, which are derived from the historical trust table records of the behavior monitoring table; Step 4: Trust probe packet forwarding; After receiving the trust probe packet from the neighboring node, the network node waits for the RT time and sends the trust probe packet of the node; the depth difference between the current node and the previous hop node is △d * , where Δd * =d recent -d last , define the time interval from receiving the trust probe packet to the node sending its own trust probe packet as RT; Step 5: Candidate set node selection Definition th is the depth threshold parameter; only when the trust of the previous hop node is greater than the trust threshold and the depth difference △d with the current node is greater than d th When the current node becomes a candidate node, Δd = d last -d recent ; Step 6: Candidate set node coordination By coordinating the DATA packet forwarding priority of the candidate set nodes, redundant forwarding of data packets can be suppressed; by setting a waiting time for each relay node that receives the data packet, different relay nodes have different waiting times, and forward the data packet after waiting for different times. If the same packet is received before forwarding, it will not be forwarded again, that is, redundant forwarding of data packets can be suppressed; the DATA packet forwarding priority is reflected by the estimated forwarding time ST of the data packet in Q1. The smaller the ST of the node, the higher its forwarding priority; each node that receives the data packet first needs to calculate the estimated sending time ST of the data packet and write ST into the priority sequence Q1; the estimated sending time ST of the packet is related to HT and the time when the data packet is received. ST = the time when the data packet is received + HT, that is, when a node receives a data packet, it does not send the data packet immediately, but keeps the HT time before sending it; HT is related to the distance △d between the previous hop node and the current receiving node; After receiving a data packet, the node first searches the node comprehensive trust table to determine whether the previous hop node is a trusted node. If the previous hop node is an untrusted node, the data packet is directly discarded. If the previous hop node is a trusted node, HT and ST are calculated, and ST is written into Q1. If the node receives the same data packet from a trusted node within the HT time, the data packet is discarded. If the node does not receive forwarding of the data packet from other nodes within the HT time, the node forwards the data packet and then writes the data packet information into Q2 to complete the forwarding of the data packet.

2. The opportunistic routing transmission method based on node dynamic trust according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The calculation formula of the RT time is as follows: δ∈(0,R] Among them, τ=R / c; R is the maximum transmission distance of the node; c is the propagation speed of underwater sound, which is 1500m / s; △d * is the depth difference between the current node and the previous hop node.

3. The opportunistic routing transmission method based on node dynamic trust according to claim 1, characterized in that: The calculation formula of HT is as follows: δ∈(0,R] Among them, τ = R / c; R is the maximum transmission distance of the node; c is the propagation speed of underwater sound, and △d is the depth difference between the previous hop node and the current node.

4. The opportunistic routing transmission method based on node dynamic trust according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The trust threshold is set to 0.

6.

5. The opportunistic routing transmission method based on node dynamic trust according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The d th The value range of is [-R,R].

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