A method for finding the intersection cardinality of tripartite private sets based on bilinear mapping and Bloom filter
Through bilinear mapping and Bloom filter combined with secret sharing technology, an efficient method for finding intersection cardinality of three-party privacy sets is designed, which solves the problem of large calculation and communication overhead in multi-party calculations, and realizes a safe and efficient intersection cardinality. Calculation ensures the privacy of information.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202311538196.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-11-17
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-22
- Estimated Expiration
- 2043-11-17
AI Technical Summary
The existing multi-party privacy set intersection cardinal calculation method has large calculation and communication overhead, and when extended to multi-party scenarios, it is easy to leak set relationships or information, which is difficult to meet the needs of efficiency and security.
Using the method of finding the intersection cardinality of the three-party privacy set based on bilinear mapping and Bloom filter, the calculation and communication complexity is reduced through secret sharing technology and AND operation of the Bloom filter, and only one party is allowed to obtain intersection in the tripartite calculation. Cardinality results ensure safety.
It realizes efficient calculation of intersection cardinality of multi-party privacy sets, reduces the complexity of calculation and communication, and forms a secure three-party computing framework that can resist semi-honest rivals, ensuring the privacy protection of intersection cardinality.
Smart Images

Figure CN117478330B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The invention relates to a method for calculating the intersection cardinality of tripartite privacy sets based on bilinear mapping and Bloom filters, and belongs to the technical field of data security. Background Art
[0002] With the rapid development of emerging technologies such as the Internet, mobile devices, and the Internet of Things, there is a huge amount of data in a large number of data sources. By mining and analyzing big data, patterns and trends in the data can be discovered, thereby obtaining a large amount of valuable information. However, big data contains a lot of sensitive information, which will bring great data privacy and personal information security issues. In addition to these data security issues, the "data island" phenomenon is also relatively common at present, which means that data from different sources are isolated from each other and cannot interact or share with each other, forming isolated islands of data, which seriously hinders the comprehensive and in-depth analysis of data. Therefore, how to achieve the safe circulation and sharing of data is an urgent problem to be solved.
[0003] Privacy computing is a new technology that can perform calculations under data encryption to protect the privacy of data, that is, to make data available but invisible. At present, a series of privacy data calculation methods have been proposed, and secure multi-party computing is an important part of privacy computing. Private Set Intersection (PSI) is a classic specific problem in secure multi-party computing, which refers to calculating the intersection elements of two or more sets without revealing the elements of individual sets.
[0004] In recent years, the application scenarios of PSI have become increasingly extensive, but it is still difficult to meet some practical needs. Therefore, many variant problems of PSI have emerged, such as Private Set Union (PSU) and Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA). PSI-CA allows two or more parties to calculate the size of the intersection of their respective sets, but will not disclose private information other than the size of the intersection. Currently, PSI-CA is widely used in scenarios such as online advertising conversion rate calculation, genetic similarity detection, and contact tracing. The results of two-party PSI-CA are now relatively rich, but this can no longer meet the needs of most multi-party applications. Multi-party PSI-CA has not made much progress due to the inevitable large communication and computing overhead and more stringent requirements on technology and methods. If the two-party PSI-CA calculation method is directly extended to the multi-party scenario, it will bring great overhead and even disclose the set relationship between any two parties or the set information of any party. Therefore, how to achieve efficient multi-party PSI-CA is still in urgent need of research. Summary of the invention
[0005] In view of the shortcomings of the prior art, the present invention provides a method for calculating the intersection cardinality of three-party private sets based on bilinear mapping and Bloom filter, and provides an efficient solution method for the design of a multi-party PSI-CA protocol, which reduces the computational and communication complexity of the existing methods, performs more prominently on large data sets, and forms a secure three-party calculation framework that can resist semi-honest adversaries, which includes three parties that can securely calculate the intersection cardinality. After the three parties calculate the intersection cardinality, only the designated party will obtain the intersection cardinality result.
[0006] Terminology explanation:
[0007] Bilinear Map:
[0008] Bilinear mapping is a basic cryptographic tool that has been widely used in various cryptographic schemes in recent years. It defines a q-order additive cyclic group G1 and a q-order multiplicative cyclic group G T And a mapping relation e:G1×G1→G2 on these two groups. The bilinear mapping also satisfies the following three properties:
[0009] (1) Bilinear: For any g1,g2∈G1,a,b∈Z q , then e(ag1,bg2)=e(g1,g2) ab .
[0010] (2) Non-degeneracy: There exist g1,g2∈G1, satisfying e(g1,g2)≠1 G2 , where 1 G2 is the identity element of the group G2.
[0011] (3) Computability: There is an effective algorithm for Both e(g1,g2) can be calculated.
[0012] Bloom filter:
[0013] Bloom filter is a probabilistic data structure proposed by Bloom in 1970. It can store the elements in a set in a 0,1 string of length m using k hash functions, and can be used to quickly retrieve whether an element is in a set. Bloom filter has excellent space efficiency and query efficiency, but it cannot delete elements in the filter and has a certain false recognition rate. The detailed steps are described as follows:
[0014] In the initial stage, all position data of the Bloom filter are 0, and there are k hash functions h i :{0,1} * →[1,m], 1≤i≤k.
[0015] Element insertion: Assume that element x is inserted into the Bloom filter, first calculate hi (x), then let BF[h i (x)]=1, where 1≤i≤k.
[0016] Element search: Assume that we are searching for element y in the Bloom filter, and first calculate h i (y), query BF[h i (y)] are all 1, where 1≤i≤k. If all are 1, the element y may be in the Bloom filter. If one or more elements are 0, the element is not in the Bloom filter.
[0017] Secret Sharing:
[0018] Secret sharing is a technique in cryptography that allows a secret message to be split into multiple parts and distributed to different participants. Only when a sufficient number of participants cooperate can the complete secret message be reconstructed to ensure the security of the information during transmission. Each participant can also use these shares to perform privacy protection calculations, thereby achieving the availability and invisibility of data. Secret sharing can be divided into strict secret sharing and threshold secret sharing according to the number of people required for decryption: strict secret sharing means that everyone must participate in the decryption. Threshold secret sharing means that decryption can be completed with only a certain number of people.
[0019] The technical solution of the present invention is as follows:
[0020] A method for finding the intersection cardinality of tripartite private sets based on bilinear mapping and Bloom filter. Assume that P1 holds a private data set X = {x1, x2, ..., x n}, P2 holds a private data set Y = {y1,y2,...,y n}, P3 holds a private data set Z = {z1,z2,...,z n}, the three parties agree in advance on a q-order cyclic group Z q , based on an elliptic curve, a p-order additive cyclic group G1 and a p-order multiplicative cyclic group G T , an element g on a group G1, a bilinear map e:G1×G1→G T And a hash function H:{0,1} * →G1, designate P3 as the party to obtain the cardinality of the three-party intersection. The specific steps are as follows:
[0021] (1) P1, P2, and P3 select a set of public keys and private keys respectively, then perform hash operations on their own set elements and use the generated private keys to calculate the hash values. The calculated hash values are then transmitted together with their respective public keys.
[0022] (2) P1, P2, and P3 construct a bilinear map using the received hash values after the operation, and P1 and P2 insert the constructed bilinear map into the Bloom filter respectively;
[0023] (3) Treat the two Bloom filters as two 0,1 strings S1 and S2, perform secret sharing operations on the two strings respectively, and distribute the secret sharing shares to P3;
[0024] (4) P3 uses the obtained secret sharing share to calculate the result of the AND operation of the two strings in step (3), and then uses the calculation result to construct a new Bloom filter. P3 queries whether the bilinear mapping it owns exists in the newly constructed Bloom filter. If so, the cardinality of the intersection of the three sets increases by 1.
[0025] According to the preferred embodiment of the present invention, in step (1), first, P1, P2 and P3 randomly generate a, b, c∈Z respectively. q As their respective private keys, ag, bg and cg are calculated as their respective public keys, and then the hash function H(·) is used to map the elements of their respective sets to the group G1;
[0026] P1, P2 and P3 use their own selected private keys to encrypt the hash values of their respective set elements and obtain aH(x i ), bH(y j ) and cH(z k ), 1≤i,j,k≤n, and finally P1 converts aH(x i ) is sent to P2, and ag is sent to P3; P2 sends bH(y j ) is sent to P3, and bg is sent to P1; P3 sends cH(z k ) is sent to P1 and cg is sent to P2.
[0027] According to the preferred embodiment of the present invention, in step (2), P1 uses bg, cH (z k ) and its own private key a, calculate u k =e(cH(z k ),bg) a =e(H(z k ),g) abc ;
[0028] Similarly, P2 and P3 are calculated to obtain v i =e(aH(x i ),cg) b =e(H(x i ),g) abc With w j =e(bH(y j ),ag)c =e(H(y j ),g) abc ;
[0029] At this time, if you directly k With v i Sent to P3, by comparing u k 、v i With w j , P3 can calculate the intersection cardinality of the three sets, but at the same time it will expose the intersection cardinality of set X and set Y, which has a huge privacy leakage problem. In order to solve the above problems, Bloom filter and secret sharing technology are introduced. The specific operations are described as follows. P1, P2 and P3 agree that the length of the Bloom filter is m=20n, and use three hash functions h1, h2 and h3 to insert Bloom filter elements. The initial state of Bloom filters BF1, BF2 and BF3 is a full 0 string of length m. BF[i] represents the i-th position of filter BF. P1, P2 and P3 calculate u respectively. k , v i and w j After that, P1 sets the element u k Insert it into Bloom filter BF1, that is, calculate h1(u k )、h2(u k ) and h3(u k ) and then BF1[h1(u k )]、BF1[h2(u k )] and BF1[h3(u k )] is set to 1, where 1≤k≤n, and P2 sets v i Insert it into Bloom filter BF2, that is, calculate h1(v i )、h2(v i ) and h3(v i ) and then BF1[h1(v i )]、BF1[h2(v i )] and BF1[h3(v i )] is set to 1, where 1≤i≤n.
[0030] Preferably, in step (3), BF1 and BF2 in step (2) are regarded as two 0, 1 strings of length m. According to the properties of the Bloom filter, the two strings are AND-operated to reconstruct the Bloom filter BF3, which contains u k and v iIn simple terms, if sets X and Y have the same element item, then the storage location of the item in BF1 and BF2 must be the same, and the location is 1. After the AND operation, these locations are still 1. If sets X and Y do not have any identical elements, then when BF1 and BF2 are ANDed, any location will be 0. In order to protect the set information when doing the AND operation, we introduce secret sharing technology. The string composed of BF1 is named S1, and the string composed of BF2 is named S2. P1 shares the secret of string S1 as: m1 and λ1; P2 shares the secret of string S2 as: m2 and λ2.
[0031] According to the present invention, in step (3), the specific operation of secret sharing is as follows: Among them, m1 and m2 are a bit string randomly selected by P1 and P2 respectively, with a length of m. P1 sends m1 to P2 and λ1 to P3. P2 sends m2 to P1 and λ2 to P3. P1 uses the information obtained to calculate m1∧m2 and λ1∧m2 and then sends them to P3. P2 calculates m1∧λ2 and then sends it to P3.
[0032] According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, in step (4), P3 calculates based on the information received in step (3) P3 uses S3 to reconstruct a Bloom filter BF3 of length m, and BF3 contains all the elements of X∩Y. P3 queries w j Whether to obtain the intersection cardinality of the privacy sets of P1, P2 and P3 in BF3, that is, to calculate h1(w j )、h2(w j ) and h3(w j ), then judge BF1[h1(w j )]、BF1[h2(w j )] and BF1[h3(w j )] is 1 to query w j Does it exist? If so, the cardinality of the intersection of the three sets increases by 1. j What is contained in is the set information in set Y, but P3 knows nothing about the element information in set Y, so it cannot reveal the set intersection information and can only get the set intersection cardinality.
[0033] Design idea: The idea of this technical solution comes from the three-party one-round key negotiation protocol based on bilinear pairing. The solution process is as follows: Figure 3As shown, the summary is as follows: three participants P1, P2 and P3 want to negotiate a common key, and have agreed in advance on a q-order additive cyclic group G1 and a q-order multiplicative cyclic group G based on an elliptic curve. T , an element g on a group G1, and a bilinear map e:G1×G1→G T First, participants P1, P2 and P3 randomly generate a private key a, b, c∈Z respectively q , and calculate cg, bg and cg respectively and broadcast them. After receiving the broadcast message, P1 locally calculates e(bg,cg) a , P2 locally calculates e(ag,cg) b , P3 locally calculates e(ag,bg) c According to the relevant properties of bilinear mapping, we can get e(bg,cg) a =e(ag,cg) b =e(ag,bg) c =e(g,g) abc Through the above steps, the three parties can negotiate a common key through one round of communication. We combine this idea with Bloom filter and secret sharing technology to design a secure and efficient three-party PSI-CA protocol.
[0034] The beneficial effects of the present invention are:
[0035] The present invention provides a method for calculating the intersection cardinality of three-party private sets based on bilinear mapping and Bloom filter, and provides an efficient solution method for designing a multi-party PSI-CA protocol, reduces the computational and communication complexity of existing methods, performs more prominently on large data sets, and forms a secure three-party computing framework that can resist semi-honest adversaries, which includes three parties that can securely calculate the intersection cardinality. After the three parties calculate the intersection cardinality, only the designated party will obtain the intersection cardinality result. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0036] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the process of the present invention;
[0037] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the initial stage of the Bloom filter and element insertion and search of the present invention;
[0038] Figure 3 This is a flow chart of a three-party one-round key agreement protocol based on bilinear pairings; DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0039] The present invention will be further described below by way of embodiments in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, but is not limited thereto.
[0040] Embodiment 1:
[0041] like Figure 1-2 As shown, this embodiment provides a method for finding the intersection cardinality of a tripartite private set based on bilinear mapping and Bloom filter. Assume that P1 holds a private data set X = {x1, x2, ..., x n}, P2 holds a private data set Y = {y1,y2,...,y n}, P3 holds a private data set Z = {z1,z2,...,z n}, the three parties agree in advance on a q-order cyclic group Z q , based on an elliptic curve, a p-order additive cyclic group G1 and a p-order multiplicative cyclic group G T , an element g on a group G1, a bilinear map e:G1×G1→G T And a hash function H:{0,1} * →G1, designate P3 as the party to obtain the cardinality of the three-party intersection. The specific steps are as follows:
[0042] (1) P1, P2, and P3 select a set of public keys and private keys respectively, then perform hash operations on their own set elements and use the generated private keys to calculate the hash values. The calculated hash values are then transmitted together with their respective public keys.
[0043] The specific operation is as follows: first, P1, P2 and P3 randomly generate a, b, c∈Z respectively. q As their respective private keys, ag, bg and cg are calculated as their respective public keys, and then the hash function H(·) is used to map the elements of their respective sets to the group G1;
[0044] P1, P2 and P3 use their own selected private keys to encrypt the hash values of their respective set elements and obtain aH(x i ), bH(y j ) and cH(z k ), 1≤i,j,k≤n, and finally P1 converts aH(x i ) is sent to P2, and ag is sent to P3; P2 sends bH(y j ) is sent to P3, and bg is sent to P1; P3 sends cH(z k ) is sent to P1 and cg is sent to P2.
[0045] (2) P1, P2, and P3 construct a bilinear map using the received hash values after the operation, and P1 and P2 insert the constructed bilinear map into the Bloom filter respectively;
[0046] The specific operation is as follows: P1 uses the bg and cH (z k ) and its own private key a, calculate u k =e(cH(z k),bg) a =e(H(z k ),g) abc ;
[0047] Similarly, P2 and P3 are calculated to obtain v i =e(aH(x i ),cg) b =e(H(x i ),g) abc With w j =e(bH(y j ),ag) c =e(H(y j ),g) abc ;
[0048] At this time, if you directly k With v i Sent to P3, by comparing u k 、v i With w j , P3 can calculate the intersection cardinality of the three sets, but at the same time it will expose the intersection cardinality of set X and set Y, which has a huge privacy leakage problem. In order to solve the above problems, Bloom filter and secret sharing technology are introduced. The specific operations are described as follows. P1, P2 and P3 agree that the length of the Bloom filter is m=20n, and use three hash functions h1, h2 and h3 to insert Bloom filter elements. The initial state of Bloom filters BF1, BF2 and BF3 is a full 0 string of length m. BF[i] represents the i-th position of filter BF. P1, P2 and P3 calculate u respectively. k , v i and w j After that, P1 sets the element u k Insert it into Bloom filter BF1, that is, calculate h1(u k )、h2(u k ) and h3(u k ) and then BF1[h1(u k )]、BF1[h2(u k )] and BF1[h3(u k )] is set to 1, where 1≤k≤n, and P2 sets v i Insert it into Bloom filter BF2, that is, calculate h1(v i )、h2(v i ) and h3(v i ) and then BF1[h1(v i )]、BF1[h2(v i )] and BF1[h3(v i )] is set to 1, where 1≤i≤n.
[0049] (3) Treat the two Bloom filters as two 0,1 strings S1 and S2, perform secret sharing operations on the two strings respectively, and distribute the secret sharing shares to P3;
[0050] The specific operation is to regard BF1 and BF2 in step (2) as two 0, 1 strings of length m. According to the properties of Bloom filter, the two strings are ANDed and reconstructed into Bloom filter BF3. BF3 contains u k and v i In simple terms, if sets X and Y have the same element item, then the storage location of the item in BF1 and BF2 must be the same, and the location is 1. After the AND operation, these locations are still 1. If sets X and Y do not have any identical elements, then when BF1 and BF2 are ANDed, any location will be 0. In order to protect the set information when doing the AND operation, we introduce secret sharing technology. The string composed of BF1 is named S1, and the string composed of BF2 is named S2. P1 shares the secret of string S1 as: m1 and λ1; P2 shares the secret of string S2 as: m2 and λ2.
[0051] The specific operation of secret sharing is as follows: Among them, m1 and m2 are a bit string randomly selected by P1 and P2 respectively, with a length of m. P1 sends m1 to P2 and λ1 to P3. P2 sends m2 to P1 and λ2 to P3. P1 uses the information obtained to calculate m1∧m2 and λ1∧m2 and then sends them to P3. P2 calculates m1∧λ2 and then sends it to P3.
[0052] (4) P3 uses the obtained secret sharing share to calculate the result of the AND operation of the two strings in step (3), and then uses the calculation result to construct a new Bloom filter. P3 checks whether the bilinear map it owns exists in the newly constructed Bloom filter. If so, the cardinality of the intersection of the three sets increases by 1.
[0053] The specific operation is that P3 calculates based on the information received in step (3) P3 uses S3 to reconstruct a Bloom filter BF3 of length m, and BF3 contains all the elements of X∩Y. P3 queries w j Whether to obtain the intersection cardinality of the privacy sets of P1, P2 and P3 in BF3, that is, to calculate h1(w j )、h2(w j ) and h3(w j ), then judge BF1[h1(w j)]、BF1[h2(w j )] and BF1[h3(w j )] is 1 to query w j Does it exist? If so, the cardinality of the intersection of the three sets increases by 1. j What is contained in is the set information in set Y, but P3 knows nothing about the element information in set Y, so it cannot reveal the set intersection information and can only get the set intersection cardinality.
[0054] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit the same. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments may still be modified, or some of the technical features thereof may be replaced by equivalents. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.
Claims
1. A method for finding the intersection cardinality of tripartite private sets based on bilinear mapping and Bloom filter. It is characterized in that Assume P 1 Holding private data set X = {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n }, P 2 Holding private data set Y = {y 1 ,y 2 , ..., y n }, P 3 Holds private data set Z = {z 1 , z 2 , ..., z n }, the three parties agree in advance on a q-order cyclic group Z a , a p-order additive cyclic group G based on elliptic curves 1 , a p-order multiplicative cyclic group G T , a group G 1 An element g on G, a bilinear map e: 1 ×G 1 →G T And a hash function H: {0, 1} * →G 1 , specify P 3 To obtain one side of the cardinality of the three-way intersection, the specific steps are as follows: (1)P 1 , P 2 With P 3 Select a set of public keys and private keys respectively, then perform hash operations on the elements of their own set, and use the generated private key to calculate the hash value, and the calculated hash value is transmitted with the respective public keys; (2)P 1 , P 2 With P 3 Use the received hash value to construct a bilinear map, P 1 With P 2 Insert the constructed bilinear maps into the Bloom filters respectively; (3) Consider the two Bloom filters as two 0, 1 strings S 1 and S 2 , perform secret sharing operations on the two strings respectively, and distribute the secret sharing shares to P 3 ; (4)P 3 Use the obtained secret sharing share to calculate the result of the AND operation of the two strings in step (3), and then use the calculation result to construct a new Bloom filter, P 3 Check whether the bilinear map you have exists in the newly constructed Bloom filter. If so, the cardinality of the intersection of the three sets increases by 1.
2. The method for finding the intersection cardinality of a tripartite private set based on bilinear mapping and Bloom filter as claimed in claim 1, It is characterized in that In step (1), first P 1 , P 2 and P 3 Randomly generate a, b, c∈Z respectively q As their respective private keys, ag, bg and cg are calculated as their respective public keys, and then the hash function H(·) is used to map their respective set elements to the group G. 1 superior; P 1 , P 2 and P 3 Use the private key selected by each to encrypt the hash value of each set element, and get aH(x i ), bH(y j ) and cH(z k ), 1≤i, j, k≤n, and finally P 1 aH(x i )Send to P 2 , send ag to P 3 ;P 2 bH(y j )Send to P 3 , send bg to P 1 ;P 3 cH(z k )Send to P 1 , send cg to P 2 .
3. The method for finding the intersection cardinality of tripartite private sets based on bilinear mapping and Bloom filter as claimed in claim 2, It is characterized in that In step (2), P 1 Using the bg and cH (z k ) and its own private key a, calculate u k =e(cH(z k ), bg) a =e(H(z k ), g) abc ; Likewise, P 2 and P 3 Calculate v i =e(aH(x i ), cg) b =e(H(x i ), g) abc With w j =e(bH(y j ), ag) c =e(H(y j ), g) abc ; P 1 , P 2 and P 3 The agreed Bloom filter length is m = 20n, and three hash functions h are used. 1 、h 2 and h 3 Insert Bloom filter elements, Bloom filter BF 1 , BF 2 With BF 3 The initial state is a string of length m with all zeros, BF[i] represents the i-th position of filter BF, P 1 , P 2 and P 3 Calculate u separately k , v i and w j After that, P 1 Set the collection element u k Insert into Bloom filter BF 1 In the calculation of h 1 (u k ),h 2 (u k ) and h 3 (u k ) and then BF 1 [h 1 (u k )], BF 1 [h 2 (u k )] and BF 1 [h 3 (u k )] is set to 1, where 1≤k≤n, P 2 Set v i Insert into Bloom filter BF 2 In the calculation of h 1 (v i ),h 2 (v i ) and h 3 (v i ) and then BF 1 [h 1 (v i )], BF 1 [h 2 (v i )] and BF 1 [h 3 (v i )] is set to 1, where 1≤i≤n.
4. The method for finding the intersection cardinality of tripartite private sets based on bilinear mapping and Bloom filter as claimed in claim 3, It is characterized in that In step (3), replace BF in step (2) 1 With BF 2 Consider them as two strings of length m, 0 and 1. According to the properties of the Bloom filter, the two strings are ANDed together to reconstruct the Bloom filter BF. 3 , BF 3 Contains u k and v i The intersection information of BF 1 The string is named S 1 , BF 2 The string is named S 2 , P 1 The string S 1 Secret sharing is: m 1 and λ 1 ;P 2 The string S 2 Secret sharing is: m 2 and λ 2 .
5. The method for finding the intersection cardinality of a tripartite private set based on bilinear mapping and Bloom filter as claimed in claim 4, It is characterized in that In step (3), the specific operation of secret sharing is as follows: Among them, m 1 and m 2 YesP 1 and P 2 A randomly selected bit string of length m, P 1 M 1 Send to P 2 , and 1 Send to P 3 , P 2 M 2 Send to P 1 , and 2 Send to P 3 , P 1 Using the information obtained, we can calculate m 1 ∧m 2 With λ 1 ∧m 2 Then send it to P 3 , P 2 Calculate m 1 ∧λ 2 Then send it to P 3 .
6. The method for finding the intersection cardinality of tripartite private sets based on bilinear mapping and Bloom filter as claimed in claim 5, It is characterized in that In step (4), P 3 Calculate based on the information received in step (3) P 3 Using S 3 Reconstruct a Bloom filter BF of length m 3 , and BF 3 contains all the elements of X∩Y, P 3 By querying w j Is it in BF 3 Get P 1 , P 2 and P 3 The intersection cardinality of the privacy sets is calculated by 1 (w j ),h 2 (w j ) and h 3 (w j ), then judge BF 1 [h 1 (w j )], BF 1 [h 2 (w j )] and BF 1 [h 3 (w j )] is 1 to query w j Does it exist? If so, the cardinality of the intersection of the three sets increases by 1.
