Cross-domain disaster recovery system for heterogeneous cryptographic platforms based on key consistency protection

Abstract

The present invention discloses a cross-domain disaster recovery system for a heterogeneous cryptographic platform based on key consistency protection, comprising a heterogeneous first computer room and a second computer room, wherein the first computer room comprises a first server cryptographic machine and a first cryptographic service scheduling platform interacting therewith, the second computer room comprises a second server cryptographic machine and a second cryptographic service scheduling platform interacting therewith, the first server cryptographic machine and the second server cryptographic machine both comprise a No. 1 index master key and a No. 2 index master key, the No. 1 index master key of the first server cryptographic machine and the No. 2 index master key of the second server cryptographic machine are backed up and restored offline, the No. 2 index master key of the first server cryptographic machine and the No. 1 index master key of the second server cryptographic machine are backed up and restored offline, the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform have consistent keys, consistent cryptographic interface standards, consistent authorization key information, and are reachable through network permissions; the present invention has the advantages of realizing disaster recovery redundancy of heterogeneous cryptographic service platforms.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of information security, and in particular to a cross-domain disaster recovery system for heterogeneous cryptographic platforms based on key consistency protection. Background Art

[0002] In today's highly developed information technology, the application of cryptography has penetrated into all aspects of social production and life, from confidential communications involving national security to various government services, financial transactions, anti-counterfeiting and tax control related to national economy and people's livelihood, and in businesses involving personal privacy, electronic payment, social security, provident fund, etc., cryptography provides security behind all information technology. Cryptography is the core technology and basic support for ensuring network and information security, and is the most effective, reliable and economical means to solve network and information security problems. In recent years, provinces across the country have accelerated the application of commercial cryptography in important fields such as government information systems in accordance with relevant policies and regulations, and used cryptographic technology to protect the safe development of the digital economy.

[0003] The construction of a unified password service platform can solve the problems of the lack of widespread password application in various password application units, repeated construction of password resources, inconsistent password interface standards, and non-compliant password applications. It provides standardized password service capabilities that are allocated on demand and elastically expanded, standardizes the use of domestic passwords in various application systems, and realizes the visibility, controllability, and manageability of password services. For example, a method for building a government cloud password application platform based on cloud computing technology is disclosed in Chinese patent publication number CN108418856A. Traditional password service platforms will consider dual-machine redundancy solutions to ensure the reliability of services. Usually, two identical systems are used to back up each other and run at the same time. When one system fails, the other system can take over to ensure the normal operation of the system. The key issues that need to be solved in this solution are how to achieve data consistency and how to perform fault detection and switching. For data synchronization, technologies such as Oracle Streams can be used to copy changes on the primary database to the standby database to ensure data consistency between the two databases; for fault detection and switching, the primary-standby switching method can be adopted. When the primary server fails, the standby server automatically takes over and becomes the new primary server.

[0004] Since cryptographic service platforms have become an important infrastructure for more and more important business systems, in order to prevent a single cryptographic service platform developer from being unable to provide good and long-term after-sales service, more and more cryptographic service platform construction units are considering building two sets of heterogeneous cryptographic service platforms developed by different manufacturers to provide unified standard cryptographic services to the outside world. However, due to the inconsistency of system architecture and data structure, this type of heterogeneous cryptographic service platform cannot achieve disaster recovery redundancy of the platform relying on existing technologies. Summary of the invention

[0005] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is that the heterogeneous cryptographic service platform in the prior art cannot achieve disaster recovery redundancy of the platform due to inconsistencies in system architecture and data structure.

[0006] The present invention solves the above-mentioned technical problems through the following technical means: a cross-domain disaster recovery system of a heterogeneous cryptographic platform based on key consistency protection, comprising a heterogeneous first computer room and a second computer room, the first computer room comprising a first server cryptographic machine and a first cryptographic service scheduling platform interacting therewith, the second computer room comprising a second server cryptographic machine and a second cryptographic service scheduling platform interacting therewith, the first server cryptographic machine and the second server cryptographic machine both having index No. 1 and index No. 2, index No. 1 comprising an index No. 1 master key, index No. 2 comprising an index No. 2 master key, the index No. 1 master key of the first server cryptographic machine and the index No. 2 master key of the second server cryptographic machine being backed up and restored offline, the index No. 2 master key of the first server cryptographic machine and the index No. 1 master key of the second server cryptographic machine being backed up and restored offline, the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform having consistent keys, consistent cryptographic interface standards, consistent authorization key information and being reachable through network permissions.

[0007] Furthermore, the key consistency between the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform refers to the consistency of key information of the server cryptographic machines used by the two cryptographic service scheduling platforms.

[0008] Furthermore, the technical process of the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform having the same key is as follows:

[0009] The server cryptographic machine maintenance personnel first logs in to the first server cryptographic machine, applies to generate a key import request Q at index position 2 of the first server cryptographic machine, the key import request Q includes public key Q1 and private key Q2, exports private key Q2 to the local client, and then logs in to the second server cryptographic machine, selects the key K at index position 1 of the second server cryptographic machine that needs to be backed up, uploads private key Q2 to the second server cryptographic machine, encrypts key K with private key Q2 to obtain key K1, and downloads key K1 to the local client; then uploads key K1 to index position 2 of the first server cryptographic machine, decrypts with public key Q1 to obtain key K to be synchronized, installs and stores key K at index position 2 of the first server cryptographic machine, and the one-way key synchronization is completed; the second server cryptographic machine synchronizes the key of index 1 of the first server cryptographic machine to index position 2 of the second server cryptographic machine in the same way.

[0010] Furthermore, the second server cryptographic machine synchronizes the key of index 1 of the first server cryptographic machine to index 2 of the second server cryptographic machine in the same manner, including:

[0011] The server cryptographic machine maintenance personnel first logs in to the second server cryptographic machine, and applies to generate a key import request Q' at index position 2 of the second server cryptographic machine. The key import request Q' includes public key Q1' and private key Q2', and exports private key Q2' to the local client. The server cryptographic machine maintenance personnel then logs in to the first server cryptographic machine, selects the key K' at index position 1 of the first server cryptographic machine that needs to be backed up, uploads private key Q2' to the first server cryptographic machine, encrypts key K' using private key Q2' to obtain key K1', and downloads key K1' to the local client; then uploads key K1' to index position 2 of the second server cryptographic machine, uses public key Q1' to decrypt to obtain key K' to be synchronized, and installs and stores key K' at index position 2 of the second server cryptographic machine.

[0012] Furthermore, the consistency of the cryptographic interface standards of the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform means that all interfaces of the cryptographic service scheduling platforms of the two computer rooms remain consistent, ensuring that the business system does not need to make any interface changes or adjustments after switching to another cryptographic service scheduling platform.

[0013] Furthermore, the interface remains consistent including the interface authentication mechanism, interface call path, and input and return parameters remaining consistent.

[0014] Furthermore, the consistency of the authorization key information of the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform means that the application authorization information, application permission information, and key index information of the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform are consistent.

[0015] Furthermore, the technical process for the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform to have consistent authorization key information is as follows:

[0016] The first cryptographic service scheduling platform calls the interface to apply for data synchronization with the application authorization information and key information of the second cryptographic service scheduling platform; after receiving the request, the second cryptographic service scheduling platform encrypts the synchronization information using the index master key No. 2 in the second server cryptographic machine; the second cryptographic service scheduling platform returns the encrypted data packet to the first cryptographic service scheduling platform; after receiving the encrypted data packet, the first cryptographic service scheduling platform calls the index master key No. 1 in the first server cryptographic machine for decryption; then, according to the data format of the first cryptographic service scheduling platform, the application authorization information and key information of the other end are processed and downloaded and installed to the first cryptographic service scheduling platform; the second cryptographic service scheduling platform synchronizes the application authorization information and key information of the first cryptographic service scheduling platform in the same way.

[0017] Furthermore, the network accessibility of the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform means that a user can simultaneously access two cryptographic service scheduling platforms in two computer rooms in the current network environment.

[0018] Furthermore, the technical process of the network permissions of the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform being accessible is:

[0019] When the business system calls the password service, the DNS server first resolves the domain name into an IP address, and then accesses the IP address; when the password platform service in this computer room is normal, the DNS server points to the password service dispatching platform in this computer room; when the password service dispatching platform in this computer room fails, the operator uniformly modifies the DNS resolution record of this computer room range to the password service dispatching platform in another computer room; the business system resolves and accesses the password service dispatching platform in another computer room through the DNS server, and the service call returns to normal, so that the user does not need to operate and the network access address is automatically switched.

[0020] The advantages of the present invention are:

[0021] (1) The present invention performs offline backup and restoration of the index master key No. 1 of the first server cryptographic machine and the index master key No. 2 of the second server cryptographic machine, and performs offline backup and restoration of the index master key No. 2 of the first server cryptographic machine and the index master key No. 1 of the second server cryptographic machine, thereby realizing off-site backup and consistency protection of key data, and ensuring the reliability of off-site storage of key data. When catastrophic problems such as fire and storage failure occur to the cryptographic service platform data, the business system is provided with the ability to recover user keys. In the case of off-site backup, if a cryptographic service platform in any network area fails, it can switch to a cryptographic service platform with normal service without the user's perception, thereby ensuring business continuity and realizing disaster recovery redundancy of heterogeneous platforms.

[0022] (2) The present invention formulates a unified cryptographic service interface standard to provide consistent interface standards for services to users, including the interface authentication mechanism, interface call path, and input and return parameters, which must be consistent, to ensure that the business system does not need to make any interface changes or adjustments after switching to another manufacturer's cryptographic service platform.

[0023] (3) Since the cryptographic service capability calculation of the cryptographic service platform is based on the underlying cryptographic hardware devices, the key information of the key cryptographic devices must be kept consistent. The key information of the server cryptographic machines used by the cryptographic service platforms on both sides of the first computer room and the second computer room of the present invention must be kept consistent.

[0024] (4) The present invention uses a heterogeneous data synchronization mechanism. The two heterogeneous cryptographic service scheduling platforms in the first computer room and the second computer room synchronize authorization and key information through a predetermined key authorization information synchronization interface, thereby ensuring the authorization and key information of the same application, which can be used on the cryptographic service scheduling platforms of the two computer rooms at the same time.

[0025] (5) The address of the password service platform accessed by the application of the present invention can be automatically switched. The application needs to enable the application to simultaneously access the two password service scheduling platforms of the two computer rooms in the current network environment by opening the corresponding network policy. When the password service platform in the user's current area fails, by changing the DNS domain name resolution address and switching the password service platform access address, the user can switch to the password service platform with normal service without being aware of it. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0026] Figure 1 A technical flow chart of cryptographic device key consistency in a cross-domain disaster recovery system of a heterogeneous cryptographic platform based on key consistency protection disclosed in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0027] Figure 2 A technical flow chart of the consistency of authorized key information in a cross-domain disaster recovery system of a heterogeneous cryptographic platform based on key consistency protection disclosed in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0028] Figure 3 The present invention discloses a technical flow chart of network permission accessibility in a cross-domain disaster recovery system of a heterogeneous cryptographic platform based on key consistency protection according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0029] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in combination with the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0030] like Figures 1 to 3As shown, the present invention provides a cross-domain disaster recovery system for heterogeneous cryptographic platforms based on key consistency protection, including a heterogeneous first computer room and a second computer room, the first computer room including a first server cryptographic machine and a first cryptographic service scheduling platform interacting therewith, the second computer room including a second server cryptographic machine and a second cryptographic service scheduling platform interacting therewith, the first server cryptographic machine and the second server cryptographic machine both including index No. 1 and index No. 2, index No. 1 including index No. 1 master key, index No. 2 including index No. 2 master key, the index No. 1 master key of the first server cryptographic machine and the index No. 2 master key of the second server cryptographic machine are backed up and restored offline, the index No. 2 master key of the first server cryptographic machine and the index No. 1 master key of the second server cryptographic machine are backed up and restored offline, the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform have consistent keys, consistent cryptographic interface standards, consistent authorization key information, and are reachable through network permissions. For the convenience of description, Figures 1 to 3 In the embodiment, the first computer room and the second computer room are respectively computer room A and computer room B, the first server cryptographic machine is server cryptographic machine A, the first cryptographic service scheduling platform is cryptographic service scheduling platform A, the second server cryptographic machine is server cryptographic machine B, and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform is cryptographic service scheduling platform B. It should be noted that the present invention is applied to a certain government cloud unified cryptographic service platform to solve the disaster recovery and redundancy problem of the cryptographic service platform in the heterogeneous mode of the government cloud telecommunication computer room and mobile computer room, that is, the telecommunication computer room and the mobile computer room are respectively the first computer room and the second computer room mentioned above. The following is a detailed introduction to the detailed technical contents of the consistency of cryptographic device keys, the consistency of cryptographic interface standards, the consistency of authorization key information, and the reachability of network permissions.

[0031] 1. The password device key is consistent

[0032] See also Figure 1 ,The cryptographic device key consistency refers to that the key information of the server cryptographic machines used by the cryptographic service scheduling platforms on both sides remain consistent. ,Since the cryptographic service capability calculation of the cryptographic service platform is based on the underlying cryptographic hardware devices, the key information of the key cryptographic devices must ,be consistent.

[0033] The device master key information stored in the server cryptographic machine will affect the encryption and decryption of the user's password. The user key is encrypted using the master key of the cloud server cryptographic machine and stored in the cryptographic service scheduling platform. Each time the business system uses the user key, it needs to be decrypted in the cloud server cryptographic machine and perform business operations.

[0034] The technical process of key consistency is as follows:

[0035] 1) Through the offline backup and offline restoration mechanism of the server cryptographic machine master key, the No. 1 master key backup of the server cryptographic machine in another computer room can be restored to the No. 2 key index position of the server cryptographic machine in this computer room;

[0036] For example, the server cryptographic machine maintenance personnel first logs in to the first server cryptographic machine, applies to generate a key import request Q at index position 2 of the first server cryptographic machine, the key import request Q includes public key Q1 and private key Q2, exports private key Q2 to the local client, and then logs in to the second server cryptographic machine, selects the key K at index position 1 of the second server cryptographic machine that needs to be backed up, uploads private key Q2 to the second server cryptographic machine, encrypts key K with private key Q2 to obtain key K1, and downloads key K1 to the local client; then uploads key K1 to index position 2 of the first server cryptographic machine, decrypts with public key Q1 to obtain key K to be synchronized, installs and stores key K at index position 2 of the first server cryptographic machine, and completes one-way key synchronization.

[0037] 2) The same mechanism can be used in another computer room to ensure that the server cryptographic machines in the two computer rooms have the same master key information;

[0038] For example, the second server cryptographic machine synchronizes the key of index No. 1 of the first server cryptographic machine to the index No. 2 of the second server cryptographic machine in the same way. Specifically, the server cryptographic machine maintenance personnel first logs in to the second server cryptographic machine, applies to generate a key import request Q' at the index No. 2 of the second server cryptographic machine, and the key import request Q' includes the public key Q1' and the private key Q2', and exports the private key Q2' to the local client. The server cryptographic machine maintenance personnel then logs in to the first server cryptographic machine, selects the key K' at the index No. 1 of the first server cryptographic machine that needs to be backed up, uploads the private key Q2' to the first server cryptographic machine, encrypts the key K' with the private key Q2' to obtain the key K1', and downloads the key K1' to the local client; then uploads the key K1' to the index No. 2 of the second server cryptographic machine, decrypts it with the public key Q1' to obtain the key K' to be synchronized, and installs and stores the key K' at the index No. 2 of the second server cryptographic machine.

[0039] 3) When decrypting and calculating the original user key of the computer room, call the index master key No. 1 of the computer room;

[0040] 4) When decrypting the user key of another computer room, use the index master key No. 2 of this computer room. The decryption process of steps 3) and 4) refers to the detailed design scheme for achieving the consistency of authorization key information below.

[0041] 2. The password interface standard is consistent

[0042] The consistency of password interface standards means that the interface standards for providing services to users must be consistent, including the interface authentication mechanism, interface call path, input and return parameters must be consistent, to ensure that the business system does not need to make any interface changes or adjustments after switching to another manufacturer's password service platform. By formulating a unified password service restful interface standard, all interfaces of the password service scheduling platform of the two computer rooms are completely consistent.

[0043] Unified authentication interface, for example:

[0044] Application Token Authentication

[0045] Interface description: Application password authentication

[0046] URI: / app / auth / {version} / getaccesstoken

[0047] Request method: POST

[0048] Data format: JSON

[0049] Request message (as shown in Table 1 below):

[0050] Table 1 Request message for application password authentication

[0051]

[0052] Response message (as shown in Table 2 below):

[0053] Table 2 Response message of application password authentication

[0054]

[0055] Data nodes (see Table 3 below):

[0056] Table 3 Data nodes using password authentication

[0057] Parameter name Parameter Type illustrate token String Token value expirationTime String Token expiration time

[0058] Unified service interface, for example:

[0059] Symmetric session key creation

[0060] Interface Description: Create a symmetric session key.

[0061] URI: / api / {version} / kms / sk / createSymmKey

[0062] Request method: POST

[0063] Data format: JSON

[0064] Request message (as shown in Table 4 below):

[0065] Table 4 Request message corresponding to symmetric session key creation

[0066]

[0067] Response message (as shown in Table 5 below):

[0068] Table 5 Response message corresponding to symmetric session key creation

[0069]

[0070] Data nodes (see Table 6 below):

[0071] Table 6 Symmetric session key creation corresponding data node

[0072] Parameter name Parameter Type illustrate symmKey String Symmetric key [BASE64]

[0073] 3. Authorization key information is consistent

[0074] See also Figure 2 ,The consistency of authorization key information means that the application authorization information, ,application permission information, and key index information of the password service scheduling platforms on both sides need to be consistent. ,Currently, when a user applies for a password service in a network area, the platform will generate authorization ,information and key information for the user on the password service scheduling platform in the ,specified area. The user can only use the password service in the specified area.

[0075] The detailed design scheme to achieve the consistency of authorization key information is as follows:

[0076] 1) Cryptographic service dispatching platform A calls the interface to apply for synchronization of application authorization information and key information of cryptographic service dispatching platform B;

[0077] 2) After receiving the request, the cryptographic service scheduling platform B encrypts the synchronization information using the peer master key in the server cryptographic machine B, i.e., the index master key No. 2;

[0078] 3) Cryptographic service dispatching platform B returns the encrypted data packet to cryptographic service dispatching platform A;

[0079] 4) After receiving the encrypted data packet, the cryptographic service dispatching platform A calls the local master key in the server cryptographic machine A, that is, the index master key No. 1, to decrypt it;

[0080] 5) According to the data format of this platform, the application authorization information and key information of the other party are processed and downloaded and installed on this platform;

[0081] 6) Side B synchronizes the application authorization information and key information of Side A in the same way.

[0082] 4. Network permissions are accessible

[0083] See also Figure 3 Network accessibility means that users need to be able to access two vendors' password service scheduling platforms in two computer rooms in the current network environment at the same time. When the password service platform in the user's current area fails, the most basic prerequisite for using the capabilities of other password service platforms is network accessibility.

[0084] In order to realize the automatic switching of password service addresses, the password service addresses provided to users need to use domain names, so as to avoid the impact of IP address changes on user use. The specific technical process is as follows:

[0085] 1) When the business system calls the password service, the DNS server first resolves the domain name into an IP address, and then accesses the target IP;

[0086] 2) When the password service platform in one computer room is normal, the DNS points to the local computer room password service platform;

[0087] 3) When the password service dispatching platform of this computer room fails, the operator shall uniformly modify the DNS resolution record of this computer room range to the password service dispatching platform on the other side;

[0088] 4) The business system resolves access to the password service dispatching platform in another computer room through the DNS server, and the service call returns to normal, allowing the user to automatically switch the network access address without any operation.

[0089] Through the above technical scheme, the construction and implementation of the heterogeneous disaster recovery redundancy of the unified cryptographic service platform of the government cloud of the present invention ensures the stability of the cryptographic service platform. When a cryptographic service platform in any network area fails, it can be switched to a cryptographic service platform with normal service without the user's perception, thereby ensuring the continuity of the business. The key information provided by the cryptographic service platform to each business system for encryption and decryption of key data is related to whether the encrypted data can be decrypted normally. The construction and implementation of the heterogeneous disaster recovery redundancy of the unified cryptographic service platform of the government cloud ensures the reliability of the off-site storage of key data. When catastrophic problems such as fire and storage failure occur in the data of the cryptographic service platform, it is necessary to provide the business system with the ability to recover the user's key. Secondly, the present invention realizes data synchronization between two different architecture systems and different databases by establishing a unified data synchronization mechanism, is applicable to the data synchronization of cryptographic service platforms of different manufacturers, and uses a server cryptographic machine to perform confidentiality protection and integrity protection on the synchronized data, which has higher security.

[0090] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit the same. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments may still be modified, or some of the technical features may be replaced by equivalents. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A cross-domain disaster recovery system for heterogeneous cryptographic platforms based on key consistency protection, characterized by: It comprises a heterogeneous first computer room and a second computer room, the first computer room comprises a first server cryptographic machine and a first cryptographic service scheduling platform interacting therewith, the second computer room comprises a second server cryptographic machine and a second cryptographic service scheduling platform interacting therewith, the first server cryptographic machine and the second server cryptographic machine both comprise index No. 1 and index No. 2, index No. 1 comprises index No. 1 master key, index No. 2 comprises index No. 2 master key, the index No. 1 master key of the first server cryptographic machine and the index No. 2 master key of the second server cryptographic machine are backed up and restored offline, the index No. 2 master key of the first server cryptographic machine and the index No. 1 master key of the second server cryptographic machine are backed up and restored offline, the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform have the same key, the same cryptographic interface standard, the same authorization key information and are reachable through network permissions; The technical process of the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform having the same authorization key information is as follows: The first cryptographic service scheduling platform calls the interface to apply for data synchronization with the second cryptographic service scheduling platform application authorization information and key information; after receiving the request, the second cryptographic service scheduling platform encrypts the synchronization information using the index master key No. 2 in the second server cryptographic machine; The second cryptographic service scheduling platform returns the encrypted data packet to the first cryptographic service scheduling platform; After receiving the encrypted data packet, the first cryptographic service scheduling platform calls the index master key No. 1 in the first server cryptographic machine to decrypt it; then, according to the data format of the first cryptographic service scheduling platform, the application authorization information and key information of the other end are processed and downloaded and installed to the first cryptographic service scheduling platform; The second cryptographic service scheduling platform synchronizes the application authorization information and key information of the first cryptographic service scheduling platform in the same manner.

2. The cross-domain disaster recovery system for heterogeneous cryptographic platforms based on key consistency protection according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The key consistency between the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform refers to the consistency of key information of the server cryptographic machine used by the two cryptographic service scheduling platforms.

3. The cross-domain disaster recovery system for heterogeneous cryptographic platforms based on key consistency protection according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The technical process for the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform to have the same key is: The server cryptographic machine maintenance personnel first logs in to the first server cryptographic machine, applies to generate a key import request Q at index position 2 of the first server cryptographic machine, the key import request Q includes public key Q1 and private key Q2, exports private key Q2 to the local client, and then logs in to the second server cryptographic machine, selects the key K at index position 1 of the second server cryptographic machine that needs to be backed up, uploads private key Q2 to the second server cryptographic machine, encrypts key K with private key Q2 to obtain key K1, and downloads key K1 to the local client; then uploads key K1 to index position 2 of the first server cryptographic machine, decrypts with public key Q1 to obtain key K to be synchronized, installs and stores key K at index position 2 of the first server cryptographic machine, and the one-way key synchronization is completed; the second server cryptographic machine synchronizes the key of index 1 of the first server cryptographic machine to index position 2 of the second server cryptographic machine in the same way.

4. The cross-domain disaster recovery system for heterogeneous cryptographic platforms based on key consistency protection according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The second server cryptographic machine synchronizes the key of index No. 1 of the first server cryptographic machine to the index No. 2 position of the second server cryptographic machine in the same manner, including: The server cryptographic machine maintenance personnel first logs in to the second server cryptographic machine, and applies to generate a key import request Q' at index position 2 of the second server cryptographic machine. The key import request Q' includes public key Q1' and private key Q2', and exports private key Q2' to the local client. The server cryptographic machine maintenance personnel then logs in to the first server cryptographic machine, selects the key K' at index position 1 of the first server cryptographic machine that needs to be backed up, uploads private key Q2' to the first server cryptographic machine, encrypts key K' using private key Q2' to obtain key K1', and downloads key K1' to the local client; then uploads key K1' to index position 2 of the second server cryptographic machine, uses public key Q1' to decrypt to obtain key K' to be synchronized, and installs and stores key K' at index position 2 of the second server cryptographic machine.

5. The cross-domain disaster recovery system for heterogeneous cryptographic platforms based on key consistency protection according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The consistency of the cryptographic interface standards of the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform means that all interfaces of the cryptographic service scheduling platforms of the two computer rooms are consistent.

6. The cross-domain disaster recovery system for heterogeneous cryptographic platforms based on key consistency protection according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The interface remains consistent, including the interface authentication mechanism, interface calling path, and input and return parameters being consistent.

7. The cross-domain disaster recovery system for heterogeneous cryptographic platforms based on key consistency protection according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The consistency of the authorization key information of the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform means that the application authorization information, application permission information, and key index information of the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform are consistent.

8. The cross-domain disaster recovery system for heterogeneous cryptographic platforms based on key consistency protection according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The network accessibility of the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform means that a user can simultaneously access the two cryptographic service scheduling platforms of the two computer rooms in the current network environment.

9. The cross-domain disaster recovery system for heterogeneous cryptographic platforms based on key consistency protection according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The technical process of the network permissions of the first cryptographic service scheduling platform and the second cryptographic service scheduling platform being accessible is: When the business system calls the password service, the DNS server first resolves the domain name into an IP address, and then accesses the IP address; when the password platform service in this computer room is normal, the DNS server points to the password service dispatching platform in this computer room; when the password service dispatching platform in this computer room fails, the operator uniformly modifies the DNS resolution record of this computer room range to the password service dispatching platform in another computer room, and the business system resolves and accesses the password service dispatching platform in another computer room through the DNS server, and the service call returns to normal.

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