Power distribution network excitation strategy considering electric vehicle load response characteristics
By establishing an interactive game model between the distribution network and electric vehicles, combining V2G functions, optimizing electricity prices and incentive mechanisms, the problem of low charging load response efficiency in the existing technology is solved, and the operating cost of the distribution network and the electric vehicle are reduced. Reduced charging costs for car owners.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411027729.8
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-30
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-08
AI Technical Summary
The existing distribution network incentive strategy has inefficient problems in the charging load response of electric vehicles, especially the failure to effectively utilize the response potential of electric vehicles and the failure to consider V2G (vehicle-to-network) functions, resulting in an increase in the operating cost of distribution networks. Poor charging experience with users.
By analyzing the demand response mechanism of the distribution network and the response methods of electric vehicles, establish an interactive game model between the distribution network and electric vehicle aggregators, formulate reasonable incentive strategies, including price-oriented and incentive-oriented demand response, and combine V2G functions to optimize electricity prices and incentive mechanisms form a cost model of the distribution network and a revenue model of the electric vehicle aggregator to ensure the existence of the unique solution of the model.
The optimization of the distribution network incentive strategy has been achieved, delaying the expansion of the distribution network, improving equipment utilization, reducing the charging cost of electric vehicle owners, and improving the economical operation of the distribution network.
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Figure CN118920545A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The invention relates to an optimization method for charging stations to participate in the safe operation of a distribution network, discloses a distribution network incentive strategy based on demand response, belongs to the technical field of electric vehicle charging, and specifically is a distribution network incentive strategy that takes into account the load response characteristics of electric vehicles. Background Art
[0002] In recent years, in order to reduce the impact of the greenhouse effect caused by large-scale carbon dioxide emissions, a large number of distributed power sources and electric vehicles have been connected to the distribution network. As the scale of electric vehicles continues to increase, there will inevitably be a huge demand for charging. However, the current unreasonable layout of charging facilities will increase the construction and operation costs of the distribution network, cause the operation risk of the distribution network, and affect the user's charging experience and travel efficiency. If certain incentives can be used to guide charging behavior, the electric vehicle charging load can be used as a flexibly configured resource to reduce the peak load of the distribution network, actively interact with the distribution network, optimize the operation of the distribution network, and become an effective auxiliary resource for the distribution network to improve the operation economy. It has important theoretical value and practical significance.
[0003] In terms of the strategies for distribution network (DNO) to guide the charging load of electric vehicles, there are mainly two strategies: electricity price and incentive. Among them, electricity price includes time-of-use electricity price, real-time electricity price and peak electricity price, but the effects of various electricity prices are not ideal. For example, time-of-use electricity price is easy to cause electric vehicles to over-respond, turning the original distribution network load valley period into peak period due to concentrated charging, and the guiding effect of real-time electricity price is poor, because users are tired of responding to frequently changing electricity prices. The incentive strategy is generally that the distribution network and electric vehicle users (EV) sign a fixed contract a day in advance, and if EV response is required, it will respond according to the contract, but this method is limited by the number of contracted users and has poor response ability. In addition, DNO interacts with a large number of EV information, which is easy to cause communication congestion. Therefore, DNO generally signs a contract directly with EVA, and EVA coordinates each EV, and EVA shares the additional income of EV. The main problems of current research include two: First, the demand response of the distribution network only considers the formulation of time-of-use electricity price or incentive price, and does not consider how to reasonably formulate incentive strategies under specific time-of-use electricity price to give full play to the response potential of electric vehicles. Second, when conducting electric vehicle demand response, V2G is not taken into account to increase the types of response methods for electric vehicles.
[0004] Therefore, this patent first analyzes the main types of demand response mechanisms of distribution networks and the responses of electric vehicles to distribution network mechanisms, and establishes an interactive framework between distribution networks and electric vehicle aggregators. Secondly, a cost model of the distribution network and a revenue model of electric vehicle aggregators are established, their respective interaction variables are clarified, and the existence of a unique solution to the model is verified. Summary of the invention
[0005] The object of the present invention is to provide a distribution network incentive strategy taking into account the load response characteristics of electric vehicles.
[0006] The following technical solutions are used to achieve this:
[0007] A distribution network incentive strategy considering the load response characteristics of electric vehicles includes the following steps:
[0008] S1 analyzes the main types of demand response mechanisms of distribution networks and the responses of electric vehicles to distribution network mechanisms, and establishes an interactive game model between distribution networks and electric vehicle aggregators;
[0009] S2 established the cost model of the distribution network based on the main types of demand response mechanisms of the distribution network obtained by S1 analysis;
[0010] S3 establishes a revenue model for electric vehicle aggregators based on the response of electric vehicles to the distribution network mechanism obtained by S1 analysis;
[0011] S4 combines the interactive game model between the distribution network and the electric vehicle aggregator to solve the cost model of the distribution network and the profit model of the electric vehicle aggregator.
[0012] Moreover, the demand response mechanism of the distribution network specifically includes:
[0013] The first is price-based demand response, which guides users to change their charging and discharging behaviors through changes in electricity prices. The electricity price mechanisms mainly include time-of-use electricity prices, real-time electricity prices, and peak electricity prices.
[0014] The second is incentive-based demand response, which provides users with economic compensation through signing contracts or agreements to guide users to change their charging and discharging behaviors.
[0015] Moreover, the response modes of the electric vehicles to the distribution network mechanism specifically include: transferable, curtailable, and shiftable.
[0016] Moreover, the interactive game model between the distribution network and the electric vehicle aggregator,
[0017] First, electric vehicle users charge according to their personal wishes under the time-of-use electricity price conditions of the distribution network. The disorderly charging of electric vehicles plus conventional loads may cause the distribution network load to exceed the limit;
[0018] Then, the distribution network determines the demand response electricity price for each period based on the line load characteristics;
[0019] The demand response electricity prices set by the distribution network target two types of electric vehicles: an incentive electricity price for electric vehicles that can perform V2G and an incentive electricity price for those that cannot perform V2G;
[0020] Electric vehicles have three response modes: load reduction, load transfer, or V2G based on load reduction and load transfer.
[0021] Moreover, the cost model of the distribution network includes the reduced equipment expansion investment, the reduction of electricity sales revenue, the cost of V2G, the DR cost of the load that can be reduced and transferred, and the DR cost of V2G. The specific objective function is as follows:
[0022]
[0023]
[0024] Among them, C con represents the distribution network cost that is saved due to demand response, Represents the charging benefit obtained from EVA, represents the demand response cost of the distribution network, c G represents the unit cost of equipment that is avoided from construction, represents the normal load at time t, represents the EV load after receiving demand response, Indicates the maximum capacity of the distribution network equipment, This indicates the incentive electricity price that DNOs provide to EVs that can only perform load reduction and shifting. N represents the incentive electricity price for EVs that can perform both load reduction and transfer and V2G. A N represents the number of EVs that can only perform load shedding and transfer. B represents the number of EVs that can perform both load shedding and transfer and V2G, N represents the total number of EVs participating in the response, and N = N A +N B , Indicates the disorderly charging power of EVs that can only perform load reduction and transfer, This indicates the random charging power of EVs that can perform both load reduction and shifting and V2G.
[0025] Moreover, the revenue model of the electric vehicle aggregator includes failure cost, charging cost, and demand response revenue. The specific objective function is as follows:
[0026]
[0027] in, represents the failure cost. Due to demand response, EV changes its original charging plan, causing losses to EV. The failure cost has a monotonic and concave characteristic with respect to the response power, that is, the user's marginal cost increases. Formula (7) indicates that the response charging power of EV that can only perform load reduction and transfer is less than its maximum charging power. Formula (8) indicates that the response power of EV that can perform both load reduction and transfer and V2G is between its maximum discharge power and maximum charging power. Formula (9) indicates that the power of EV when leaving must meet the next travel plan. Indicates the amount of electricity that the EV has when it arrives at the station. Indicates the amount of electricity when the EV leaves, Q n Indicates the battery capacity of the EV.
[0028] Moreover, the solution process of S4 is specifically as follows: the cost model of the distribution network and the revenue model of the electric vehicle aggregator form a Steinberg game,
[0029] Other but
[0030]
[0031] again, and Same format.
[0032] From formula (5), it can be found that the objective function of EVA is a monotonically non-decreasing function as the load reduction increases, and when When along with It is monotonically increasing, so for the game between DNO and EVA, there is definitely a unique solution for both;
[0033] The solution is solved by using the replication dynamic method. The specific solution method is as follows:
[0034]
[0035] Where s is the number of iterations, σ 1 is the iteration step size;
[0036] The termination criteria are
[0037]
[0038] In the formula, ε is a very small number;
[0039] The specific algorithm is described as follows:
[0040] Step 1: s = 1, EVn arbitrarily decides its response power.
[0041] Step 2: Calculate the EVA benefit according to formula (5);
[0042] Step 3: After obtaining the returns of EVA for all time periods, calculate the average value;
[0043] Step 4: s=s+1 again, and repeat the above process until equations (11) and (12) are satisfied.
[0044] An electronic device comprises a processor and a memory, wherein the memory is used to store instructions, and the processor is used to execute the instructions stored in the memory so that the electronic device executes any one of the methods described above.
[0045] A computer-readable storage medium stores instructions, and when the instructions are executed, any one of the above methods is executed.
[0046] Beneficial effects of the present invention:
[0047] 1. This method takes the distribution network incentive electricity price as the optimization object, comprehensively considers the distribution network cost and the benefits of electric vehicle aggregators, and formulates a reasonable distribution network incentive electricity price optimization method.
[0048] 2. The invention has two innovative points: First, it analyzes the main types of demand response mechanisms of distribution networks and the response methods of electric vehicles to distribution network mechanisms, and establishes an interactive framework between distribution networks and electric vehicle aggregators. Second, it establishes a cost model for distribution networks and a revenue model for electric vehicle aggregators.
[0049] 3. The present invention can provide guidance for the distribution network to formulate incentive strategies, thereby delaying the expansion of the distribution network and improving the utilization rate of distribution network equipment. At the same time, it can provide electric car owners with a way to participate in the operation of the distribution network and reduce charging costs. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0050] In order to more clearly illustrate the specific implementation methods of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the specific implementation methods or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some implementation methods of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.
[0051] Figure 1 This is the interaction framework diagram between DNO and EVA. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0052] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solution of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0053] A distribution network incentive strategy considering the load response characteristics of electric vehicles includes the following steps.
[0054] (1) Interaction between distribution networks and electric vehicle aggregators
[0055] 1 Design of demand response mechanism for distribution network
[0056] In order for the distribution network to guide electric vehicles to participate in demand response, it needs to use certain guiding means and allocate certain benefits to electric vehicle users so that car owners are willing to participate and respond to the charging and discharging plans formulated by the power grid, thus achieving a win-win situation for the distribution network and users. At present, there are two main demand response mechanisms for distribution networks. One is price-based demand response, which guides users to change their charging and discharging behaviors through changes in electricity prices. The electricity price mechanism mainly includes time-of-use electricity prices, real-time electricity prices, and peak electricity prices. The second is incentive-based demand response, which guides users to change their charging and discharging behaviors by giving them economic compensation through signing contracts or agreements. This patent adopts an incentive-based demand response method under specific time-of-use electricity price conditions.
[0057] 2 How electric vehicles respond
[0058] The main load demand response methods include transferable, curtailable, and shiftable. Current research on electric vehicles only considers their transferability characteristics, and has not studied the curtailment method. However, in the real environment, car owners are likely to give up charging due to high electricity prices. In addition, the V2G form of electric vehicles has a great impact on demand response, which can help the distribution network reduce the peak load, but the V2G form has high requirements for the demand response mechanism of the distribution network, and the demand response strategy needs to be re-formulated. This patent mainly considers the design of the demand response mechanism of the distribution network, while considering curtailable, transferable loads and V2G forms. An incentive electricity price is used for curtailable and transferable EV loads, and an incentive electricity price is used for loads that can be both reduced and transferred and can be V2G. The detailed design is as follows in Section 3.
[0059] 3 Interaction framework between distribution networks and electric vehicle aggregators
[0060] First, electric vehicle users charge according to their personal wishes under the time-of-use electricity price conditions of the distribution network. The disorderly charging of electric vehicles plus conventional loads may cause the distribution network load to exceed the limit. Then, the distribution network determines the demand response electricity price for each time period based on the characteristics of the line load. The demand response electricity price formulated by the distribution network is for two types of electric vehicles. The electric vehicle that can perform V2G is an incentive electricity price, and the electric vehicle that cannot perform V2G is an incentive electricity price. There are three response methods for electric vehicles: load reduction, load transfer, or V2G based on load reduction and load transfer. The specific interaction methods are as follows: Figure 1 shown.
[0061] The above part establishes the interactive framework diagram of DNO and EVA. On this basis, an interactive game model between the two is established. The specific model is shown in Section (2).
[0062] (2) Demand response game between DNO and EVA
[0063] The conventional load of DNO (except EV load) fluctuates greatly, and in some periods, it even causes load overload, affecting the power quality, and even causing equipment overheating, affecting equipment life, and causing safety risks. If the disordered electric vehicle charging load is superimposed, the risk of the power grid will be aggravated. The traditional method is to expand the distribution network equipment, but since the proportion of load overload periods is small, equipment expansion will cause equipment utilization to further decrease. If a demand response plan is issued for EV charging load, EV will reduce or transfer its charging load during peak load periods. If a demand response plan is issued for EV that can perform V2G, EV can not only reduce or transfer charging load, but also provide energy for the distribution network, helping the distribution network to reduce the pressure caused by the peak of conventional load.
[0064] 1. Cost model of distribution network
[0065] The cost model of the distribution network includes the reduced investment in equipment expansion, the reduction in electricity sales revenue (reduction in the amount of load that can be cut, and transfer of load that can be shifted to periods with low electricity prices), the cost of V2G, the DR cost of reducible / shiftable loads, and the DR cost of V2G.
[0066]
[0067]
[0068] Among them, C con represents the distribution network cost that is saved due to demand response, Represents the charging benefit obtained from EVA, represents the demand response cost of the distribution network. G represents the unit cost of equipment that is avoided from construction, represents the normal load at time t, represents the EV load after receiving demand response, Indicates the maximum capacity of the distribution network equipment. This indicates the incentive electricity price that DNOs provide to EVs that can only perform load reduction and shifting. N represents the incentive electricity price for EVs that can perform both load reduction and transfer and V2G. A N represents the number of EVs that can only perform load shedding and transfer. B represents the number of EVs that can perform both load shedding and transfer and V2G, N represents the total number of EVs participating in the response, and N = N A +N B , Indicates the disorderly charging power of EVs that can only perform load reduction and transfer, This indicates the random charging power of EVs that can perform both load reduction and shifting and V2G.
[0069] 2EVA's profit model
[0070] The benefits of EVA include failure costs, charging costs, and demand response benefits. The specific objective function is as follows:
[0071]
[0072] in, represents the failure cost. Due to demand response, EV changes its original charging plan, causing losses to EV. Generally speaking, the failure cost function has a monotonic and convex characteristic with respect to the response power; therefore, its failure cost has a monotonic and concave characteristic with respect to the response power, that is, the user's marginal cost increases. Formula (7) indicates that the response charging power of EV that can only perform load reduction and transfer can be less than its maximum charging power. Formula (8) indicates that the response power of EV that can perform load reduction and transfer and V2G can be between its maximum discharge power and maximum charging power. Indicates (9) The power of EV when leaving must meet the next travel plan, Indicates the amount of electricity that the EV has when it arrives at the station. Indicates the amount of electricity when the EV leaves, Q n Indicates the battery capacity of the EV.
[0073] This section mainly establishes the DNO and EVA models, but the two models are coupled and difficult to solve directly. Section (3) proves the existence of the solution of the model.
[0074] (3) Model solution method
[0075] in accordance with Figure 1From the interactive framework, it can be found that the DNO's profit model and the EVA's profit model form a Steinberg game.
[0076] Other but
[0077]
[0078] again, and Same format.
[0079] From formula (5), it can be found that the objective function of EVA is a monotonically non-decreasing function as the load reduction increases, and when When along with It is monotonically increasing, so for the game between DNO and EVA, there must be a unique solution for both.
[0080] At present, the master-slave game model is generally solved by analytical method or iterative method. The analytical method first solves the optimization problem of the lower-level followers and obtains the analytical expression of the follower's optimal strategy. Then substitute it into the objective function of the dominant party to find the optimal decision of the dominant party, and then find the optimal decision of the follower. When the game model is too complex and its analytical equilibrium solution cannot be obtained, you can try to solve the game model by iterative method. The general steps of the iterative method are to first randomly determine the decision amount of the dominant party, and the follower obtains its own optimal decision based on the current decision amount of the dominant party. Then the dominant party substitutes the current optimal decision amount of the follower into the profit function to find its own optimal decision, or adjusts its own decision amount based on the constraints that must be met, and then iterates continuously until the game equilibrium is reached. This article uses the analytical method.
[0081] This paper uses the replication dynamic method to solve the problem. The specific solution method is as follows:
[0082]
[0083] Where s is the number of iterations, σ 1 is the iteration step size.
[0084] The termination criteria are
[0085]
[0086] In the formula, ε is a very small number.
[0087] The algorithm is described as follows:
[0088] Step 1: s = 1, EVn arbitrarily decides its response power.
[0089] Step 2: Calculate the EVA benefit according to formula (5).
[0090] Step 3: After obtaining the returns of EVA for all time periods, calculate the average.
[0091] Step 4: s=s+1 again, and repeat the above process until equations (11) and (12) are satisfied.
[0092] The present application also provides an electronic device, which may include: at least one processor and at least one memory.
[0093] The processor may include one or more processing cores. The processor uses various interfaces and lines to connect various parts of the entire server, and executes various functions of the server and processes data by running or executing instructions, programs, code sets or instruction sets stored in the memory, and calling data stored in the memory.
[0094] Optionally, the processor can be implemented in at least one hardware form of digital signal processing (DSP), field programmable gate array (FPGA), and programmable logic array (PLA). The processor can integrate one or a combination of a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), and a modem. Among them, the CPU mainly processes the operating system, user interface, and application programs; the GPU is responsible for rendering and drawing the content to be displayed on the display; and the modem is used to process wireless communications. It is understandable that the above-mentioned modem may not be integrated into the processor, but may be implemented separately through a chip.
[0095] Among them, the memory may include a random access memory (RAM) or a read-only memory (Read-Only Memory). Optionally, the memory includes a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. The memory can be used to store instructions, programs, codes, code sets or instruction sets. The memory may include a program storage area and a data storage area, wherein the program storage area may store instructions for implementing an operating system, instructions for at least one function (such as a touch function, a sound playback function, an image playback function, etc.), instructions for implementing the above-mentioned various method embodiments, etc.; the data storage area may store data involved in the above-mentioned various method embodiments, etc. The memory may also be optionally at least one storage device located away from the aforementioned processor. The memory as a computer storage medium may include an operating system, a network communication module, a user interface module, and an application program for a method for diagnosing a fault of a worm gearbox.
[0096] The present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores instructions. When executed by one or more processors, the electronic device executes one or more of the methods described in the above embodiments.
[0097] In addition, each functional unit in the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit. The above integrated unit may be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional units.
[0098] If the integrated unit is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable memory. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a memory and includes several instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, server or network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the various embodiments of the present application. The aforementioned memory includes: various media that can store program codes, such as USB flash drives, mobile hard drives, magnetic disks or optical disks.
[0099] Finally, it should be noted that the above-described embodiments are only specific implementations of the present invention, which are used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit them. The protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Although the present invention is described in detail with reference to the above-described embodiments, ordinary technicians in the field should understand that any technician familiar with the technical field can still modify the technical solutions recorded in the above-described embodiments within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, or can easily think of changes, or make equivalent replacements for some of the technical features therein; and these modifications, changes or replacements do not make the essence of the corresponding technical solutions deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, and should be included in the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.
Claims
1. A distribution network incentive strategy considering the load response characteristics of electric vehicles, It is characterized in that The following steps are involved: S1 analyzes the main types of demand response mechanisms of distribution networks and the responses of electric vehicles to distribution network mechanisms, and establishes an interactive game model between distribution networks and electric vehicle aggregators; S2 established a cost model of the distribution network based on the results of the main types of demand response mechanisms of the distribution network obtained by S1 analysis; S3 establishes a revenue model for electric vehicle aggregators based on the response of electric vehicles to the distribution network mechanism obtained by S1 analysis; S4 combines the interactive game model between the distribution network and the electric vehicle aggregator to solve the cost model of the distribution network and the profit model of the electric vehicle aggregator.
2. A distribution network incentive strategy considering the load response characteristics of electric vehicles according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The demand response mechanism of the distribution network specifically includes: The first is price-based demand response, which guides users to change their charging and discharging behaviors through changes in electricity prices. The electricity price mechanism includes time-of-use electricity prices, real-time electricity prices, and peak electricity prices. The second is incentive-based demand response, which provides users with economic compensation through signing contracts or agreements to guide users to change their charging and discharging behaviors.
3. A distribution network incentive strategy considering the load response characteristics of electric vehicles according to claim 2, It is characterized in that The response modes of the electric vehicle to the distribution network mechanism specifically include: transferable, curtailable, and shiftable.
4. A distribution network incentive strategy considering the load response characteristics of electric vehicles according to claim 3, It is characterized in that The interactive game model between the distribution network and the electric vehicle aggregator, First, electric vehicle users charge according to their personal wishes under the time-of-use electricity price conditions of the distribution network. The disorderly charging of electric vehicles plus conventional loads may cause the distribution network load to exceed the limit; Then, the distribution network determines the demand response electricity price for each period based on the line load characteristics; The demand response electricity prices set by the distribution network target two types of electric vehicles: an incentive electricity price for electric vehicles that can perform V2G and an incentive electricity price for those that cannot perform V2G; Electric vehicles have three response modes: load reduction, load transfer, or V2G based on load reduction and load transfer.
5. A distribution network incentive strategy considering electric vehicle load response characteristics according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The cost model of the distribution network includes the reduced equipment expansion investment, the reduction of electricity sales revenue, the cost of V2G, the DR cost of the load that can be reduced and transferred, and the DR cost of V2G. The specific objective function is as follows Among them, C con represents the distribution network cost that is saved due to demand response, Represents the charging benefit obtained from EVA, represents the demand response cost of the distribution network, c G represents the unit cost of equipment that is avoided from construction, represents the normal load at time t, represents the EV load after receiving demand response, Indicates the maximum capacity of the distribution network equipment, This indicates the incentive electricity price that DNOs provide to EVs that can only perform load reduction and shifting. N represents the incentive electricity price for EVs that can perform both load reduction and transfer and V2G. A N represents the number of EVs that can only perform load shedding and transfer. B represents the number of EVs that can perform both load shedding and transfer and V2G, N represents the total number of EVs participating in the response, and N = N A +N B , Indicates the disorderly charging power of EVs that can only perform load reduction and transfer, This indicates the random charging power of EVs that can perform both load reduction and shifting and V2G.
6. A distribution network incentive strategy considering electric vehicle load response characteristics according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The revenue model of the electric vehicle aggregator includes failure cost, charging cost, and demand response revenue. The specific objective function is as follows: in, represents the failure cost. Due to demand response, EV changes its original charging plan, causing losses to EV. The failure cost has a monotonic and concave characteristic with respect to the response power, that is, the user's marginal cost increases. Formula (7) indicates that the response charging power of EV that can only perform load reduction and transfer is less than its maximum charging power. Formula (8) indicates that the response power of EV that can perform both load reduction and transfer and V2G is between its maximum discharge power and maximum charging power. Formula (9) indicates that the power of EV when leaving must meet the next travel plan. Indicates the amount of electricity that the EV has when it arrives at the station. Indicates the amount of electricity when the EV leaves, Q n Indicates the battery capacity of the EV.
7. A distribution network incentive strategy considering electric vehicle load response characteristics according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The specific solution process of S4 is as follows: the cost model of the distribution network and the revenue model of the electric vehicle aggregator form a Steinberg game. Other but again, and Same format. From formula (5), it can be found that the objective function of EVA is a monotonically non-decreasing function as the load reduction increases, and when When along with It is monotonically increasing, so for the game between DNO and EVA, there is definitely a unique solution for both; The solution is solved by using the replication dynamic method. The specific solution method is as follows: Where s is the number of iterations, σ 1 is the iteration step size; The termination criteria are In the formula, ε is a very small number; The specific algorithm is described as follows: Step 1: s = 1, EVn arbitrarily decides its response power. Step 2: Calculate the EVA benefit according to formula (5); Step 3: After obtaining the returns of EVA for all time periods, calculate the average value; Step 4: s=s+1 again, and repeat the above process until equations (11) and (12) are satisfied.
8. An electronic device, comprising a processor and a memory, wherein the memory is used to store instructions, and the processor is used to execute the instructions stored in the memory, so that the electronic device executes the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.
9. A computer-readable storage medium storing instructions, wherein when the instructions are executed, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 is executed.
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