Defense method and device of power system, storage medium and system

Through attack simulation model and circuit topology optimization algorithm, the switching state of the power system and the alarm information are adjusted, which solves the problem that existing power system defense methods are difficult to cope with the multi-variable attack strategies, and improves dynamic defense and attack resistance capabilities.

CN118944055APending Publication Date: 2024-11-12ELECTRIC POWER RES INST CHINA SOUTHERN POWER GRID CO LTD +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410961086.8
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-17
Publication Date
2024-11-12

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing power system defense methods are based on the configuration of defense resource, which is difficult to deal with changing attack strategies, and the static defense characteristics are insufficient.

Method used

Adopt the attack simulation model and circuit topology optimization algorithm, by simulating the line flow change and load cutting tampering of the power system, adjust the switch state to minimize the total cost, and use the least squares method to perform state estimation to determine whether alarm information is generated to deal with it. Changeable attacks.

Benefits of technology

It realizes dynamic defense of the power system, can spontaneously respond to attacks and promptly alarms, enhancing the system's attack resistance.

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Abstract

The invention provides a defense method and device for a power system, a storage medium and a system, and the method comprises the steps: tampering the power generation power and the load shedding amount of the power system according to the line power flow variation and the load shedding tampering amount, and carrying out the attack simulation of the power system. The method comprises the following steps: firstly, measuring an estimated value, then obtaining an optimized electric power system and the total cost of the optimized electric power system to optimize the topological structure of a circuit system, spontaneously coping with attacks to carry out internal adjustment of the system (specifically, adjusting the topological structure of the electric power system), and finally judging whether to generate alarm information according to the range of the measured estimated value. The method can defend an attack strategy to a certain extent, and can give an alarm in time when data of a circuit system is abnormal due to attack of an attack simulation model, thereby solving the problem that key nodes of a power system are protected by configuring protection resources in a defense method based on defense resource configuration in an existing scheme; and the existing scheme is difficult to cope with variable attack strategies.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of power systems, and in particular to a defense method, device, storage medium and system for a power system. Background Art

[0002] A load redistribution attack refers to a situation in which the attacker tampers with the load measurement information and topology knowledge of the power system to construct a covert attack vector.

[0003] The existing defense method based on defense resource configuration protects key nodes by configuring protection resources, which can detect load redistribution attacks. However, this method shows the characteristics of static defense and is difficult to cope with changing attack strategies. Summary of the invention

[0004] The main purpose of the present application is to provide a defense method, device, storage medium and system for an electric power system, so as to at least solve the problem that the existing solution is difficult to cope with changing attack strategies because the defense method based on defense resource configuration protects the key nodes of the electric power system by configuring protection resources.

[0005] In order to achieve the above object, according to one aspect of the present application, a defense method for a power system is provided, the method comprising:

[0006] Using an attack simulation model, obtaining a line flow change amount and a load shedding tampering amount of the power system, and tampering with the power generation power and load shedding amount of the power system according to the line flow change amount and the load shedding tampering amount;

[0007] Using a circuit topology optimization algorithm, adjusting the state of each switch in the power system so as to minimize the total cost of the power system and obtain the optimized total cost of the power system;

[0008] Using the least square method to perform state estimation on the total cost of the optimized power system and the final state of each switch in the optimized power system to obtain a measurement estimate;

[0009] According to the range of the measured estimated value, it is determined whether to generate alarm information, wherein the alarm information is used to prompt that the attack of the attack simulation model causes the data of the power system to be abnormal.

[0010] Optionally, the attack simulation model includes an upper attack model and a lower attack model, and the attack simulation model is used to obtain the line flow change amount and load shedding tampering amount of the power system, including:

[0011] The upper-layer attack model is used to simulate the attack on the total cost of the power system on the basis of maximizing the total cost, and the lower-layer attack model is used to simulate the attack on the total cost of the power coefficient on the basis of minimizing the total cost, so as to obtain the line flow change and the load shedding tampering amount of the power system.

[0012] Optionally, before adopting the attack simulation model to obtain the line flow change amount and load shedding tampering amount of the power system, the method further includes:

[0013] The upper layer attack model is constructed as follows:

[0014]

[0015] Among them, f g (P g ) is the power system when the power generation power is P g The power generation cost when the load shedding amount is P ds Load shedding loss, ΔP dj is the load shedding modification amount of the jth load node, ΔP d is the load shedding modification amount, ΔF is the line power flow change amount, ΔF l is the line power flow change of the power system at the lth line, nodP dj is the load measurement tampering number, nodF l is the number of tampering in power flow measurement, S is the transmission line and node transfer factor matrix, X is the inverse matrix of the reversible and symmetric susceptance matrix, N d is the load node set, N l is the number of lines, N ds is a set of load nodes that cannot be tampered with, N ls is the set of power flows of non-tamperable lines, τ is the percentage of tampering amplitude, and R is the limit value of tampering number;

[0016] The lower layer attack model is constructed as follows:

[0017]

[0018] Among them, f g (P g ) is the power system when the power generation power is P g The power generation cost when the load shedding amount is P ds Load shedding loss, ΔP d is the load shedding modification amount, S is the transmission line and node transfer factor matrix, X is the inverse matrix of the reversible and symmetric susceptance matrix, N d is the load node set, Nl is the number of lines, N g is the number of generators, F l is the power flow of the lth line, F lmin and F lmax are the lower and upper limits of the power flow of the lth line, respectively. gimin and P gimax are the lower and upper limits of the power generation of the i-th generator, P gi is the power generation of the i-th generator, P dsj is the load shedding amount of the jth load node, P dsjmin and P dsjmax are the lower and upper limits of the load shedding amount of the jth load node, respectively, F is the total power generation, P ds is the load shedding amount, P dj is the load of the jth load node.

[0019] Optionally, judging whether to generate alarm information according to the range of the measured estimated value includes:

[0020] according to Determine an abnormal criterion value, wherein the abnormal criterion value represents the probability that the attack of the attack simulation model causes the data of the power system to be abnormal, wherein r is the abnormal criterion value, z is the quantity measurement, H is the measurement matrix, is the estimated value of the measurement;

[0021] Comparing the binary norm of the abnormal criterion value and the alarm threshold to obtain a comparison result, wherein the alarm threshold is a threshold obtained by using a chi-square distribution;

[0022] According to the comparison result, it is determined whether to generate the alarm information.

[0023] Optionally, determining whether to generate the alarm information according to the comparison result includes:

[0024] When the comparison result indicates that the binary norm of the abnormal criterion value is greater than or equal to the alarm threshold, determining to generate the alarm information;

[0025] When the comparison result indicates that the binary norm of the abnormal criterion value is smaller than the alarm threshold, it is determined not to generate the alarm information.

[0026] Optionally, the method further comprises:

[0027] After determining to generate the alarm information, the total cost of the optimized power system and the final state of each switch are uploaded to the cloud platform.

[0028] According to another aspect of the present application, there is provided a control device for an electric power system, the device comprising:

[0029] A first processing unit is used to obtain a line flow change amount and a load shedding tampering amount of the power system by using an attack simulation model, and to tamper with the power generation power and load shedding amount of the power system according to the line flow change amount and the load shedding tampering amount;

[0030] A second processing unit is used to use a circuit topology optimization algorithm to adjust the state of each switch in the power system so as to minimize the total cost of the power system and obtain the optimized total cost of the power system;

[0031] A second processing unit is used to perform state estimation on the total cost of the optimized power system and the final state of each switch in the optimized power system by using the least square method to obtain a measurement estimation value;

[0032] The fourth processing unit is used to determine whether to generate an alarm message according to the range of the measured estimated value, wherein the alarm message is used to prompt that the attack of the attack simulation model causes the data of the power system to be abnormal.

[0033] According to another aspect of the present application, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, wherein the computer-readable storage medium includes a stored program, wherein when the program is executed, the device where the computer-readable storage medium is located is controlled to execute any one of the methods described.

[0034] According to another aspect of the present application, a control system of an electric power system is provided, the system comprising: one or more processors, a memory, and one or more programs, wherein the one or more programs are stored in the memory and are configured to be executed by the one or more processors, and the one or more programs include methods for executing any one of the described methods.

[0035] By applying the technical solution of the present application, an attack simulation model is firstly adopted to obtain the line flow change and load shedding tampering amount of the power system, and the power generation power and load shedding amount of the power system are tampered with according to the line flow change and the load shedding tampering amount, so as to simulate the attack on the power system. Then, a circuit topology optimization algorithm is adopted to adjust the state of each switch in the power system so as to minimize the total cost of the power system, and obtain the optimized power system and the total cost of the optimized power system, so as to optimize the topology structure of the circuit system, and spontaneously respond to the attack by performing internal adjustment of the system (specifically, adjusting the topology structure of the power system). Finally, according to the range of the measured estimated value, it is determined whether to generate an alarm message, which can not only defend against the attack strategy to a certain extent, but also timely alarm when the attack of the attack simulation model causes the data of the circuit system to be abnormal, thereby solving the problem that the existing solution is difficult to cope with the changing attack strategy because the defense method based on defense resource configuration protects the key nodes of the power system by configuring protection resources. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0036] The drawings constituting part of the present application are used to provide a further understanding of the present application. The exemplary embodiments and descriptions of the present application are used to explain the present application and do not constitute an improper limitation on the present application. In the drawings:

[0037] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a flow chart of a power system defense method provided according to an embodiment of the present application is shown;

[0038] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a three-node system (i.e., a power system) in a double busbar connection mode according to an embodiment of the present application is shown;

[0039] Figure 3 A schematic diagram showing a topological structure after a mobile target defense method based on bus splitting provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown;

[0040] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a flow chart of another power system defense method provided according to an embodiment of the present application is shown;

[0041] Figure 5 A schematic diagram showing a comparison of load distribution before and after an attack provided according to an embodiment of the present application is shown;

[0042] Figure 6 A structural block diagram of a defense device for an electric power system provided according to an embodiment of the present application is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0043] It should be noted that, in the absence of conflict, the embodiments and features in the embodiments of the present application can be combined with each other. The present application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and in combination with the embodiments.

[0044] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the solution of the present application, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0045] It should be noted that the terms "first", "second", etc. in the specification and claims of the present application and the above-mentioned drawings are used to distinguish similar objects, and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequential order. It should be understood that the data used in this way can be interchanged where appropriate, so that the embodiments of the present application described here. In addition, the terms "including" and "having" and any of their variations are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions, for example, a process, method, system, product or device comprising a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units clearly listed, but may include other steps or units that are not clearly listed or inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices.

[0046] For the convenience of description, some nouns or terms involved in the embodiments of the present application are explained below:

[0047] SCADA system (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system) is a computer-based production process control and dispatching automation system. It can monitor and control the operating equipment on site. Since the requirements of SCADA in various application fields are different, the development of SCADA systems in different application fields is not exactly the same.

[0048] As introduced in the background technology, load redistribution attack refers to the tampering of load measurement and constructing a concealed attack vector when the attacker has the measurement information and topological structure knowledge of the power system. The existing solution is based on the defense method of defense resource configuration to protect key nodes by configuring protection resources, which can realize the detection of load redistribution attack. However, this method shows the characteristics of static defense. In order to solve the problem that the existing solution is difficult to cope with the changing attack strategies, the embodiment of the present application provides a defense method, device, storage medium and system for a power system.

[0049] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be described clearly and completely below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention.

[0050] In this embodiment, a defense method for an electric power system is provided. It should be noted that the steps shown in the flowchart of the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer executable instructions, and although a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases, the steps shown or described can be executed in an order different from that shown here.

[0051] Figure 1 FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a power system defense method provided according to an embodiment of the present application. Figure 1 As shown, the method comprises the following steps:

[0052] Step S101, using an attack simulation model to obtain a line flow change amount and a load shedding tampering amount of the power system, and tampering with the power generation power and load shedding amount of the power system according to the line flow change amount and the load shedding tampering amount;

[0053] Specifically, it is necessary to first use an attack simulation model to obtain the line flow change amount and load shedding tampering amount of the power system, then use the above line flow change amount to tamper with the power generation power of the power system, and use the load shedding tampering amount to tamper with the load shedding amount of the power system, so as to achieve the purpose of tampering with the power system;

[0054] In one embodiment of the present application, the above-mentioned attack simulation model includes an upper attack model and a lower attack model. Step S101, i.e., using the attack simulation model to obtain the line flow change amount and load shedding tampering amount of the power system, includes:

[0055] The upper-level attack model is used to simulate the attack on the total cost of the power system on the basis of maximizing the total cost, and the lower-level attack model is used to simulate the attack on the total cost of the power coefficient on the basis of minimizing the total cost, so as to obtain the line flow change and load shedding tampering of the power system.

[0056] Specifically, the upper-level attack model is used to simulate the attack on the total cost of the power system on the basis of maximizing the total cost, that is, the upper-level attack model is used to determine the line flow change and the load shedding tampering amount, and at the same time, the lower-level attack model is used to simulate the attack on the total cost of the power coefficient on the basis of minimizing the total cost, so as to constrain the line flow change and the load shedding tampering amount determined by the upper-level attack model.

[0057] Specifically, regarding the upper-level attack model:

[0058] The above upper-level attack model is constructed as follows:

[0059]

[0060] Among them, f g (P g ) is the above power system when the power generation power is P g The power generation cost when the load shedding amount is P ds Load shedding loss, ΔP dj is the load shedding modification amount of the jth load node, ΔP d is the load shedding modification amount, ΔF is the line power flow change amount, ΔF l is the change in the power flow of the above-mentioned power system at the lth line, nodP dj is the load measurement tampering number, nodF l is the number of tampering in power flow measurement, S is the transmission line and node transfer factor matrix, X is the inverse matrix of the reversible and symmetric susceptance matrix, N d is the load node set, N l is the number of lines, N ds is a set of load nodes that cannot be tampered with, N ls is the set of tamper-proof line flows, τ is the percentage of tampering amplitude, and R is the limit value of tampering number.

[0061] Specifically, regarding the underlying attack model:

[0062] The above lower-level attack model is constructed as follows:

[0063]

[0064] Among them, f g (P g ) is the above power system when the power generation power is P g The power generation cost when the load shedding amount is P ds Load shedding loss, ΔP d is the load shedding modification amount, S is the transmission line and node transfer factor matrix, X is the inverse matrix of the reversible and symmetric susceptance matrix, N d is the load node set, N l is the number of lines, N g is the number of generators, F l is the power flow of the lth line, F lmin and F lmax are the lower and upper limits of the power flow of the lth line, respectively. gimin and P gimax are the lower and upper limits of the power generation of the i-th generator, P giis the power generated by the i-th generator, P dsj is the load shedding amount of the jth load node, P dsjmin and P dsjmax are the lower and upper limits of the load shedding amount of the jth load node, respectively, F is the total power generation, P ds is the load shedding amount, P dj is the load of the jth load node.

[0065] Specifically, a two-layer attack model is used to simulate attacks on the power system, so as to facilitate subsequent tampering of the power generation power and load shedding amount of the power system according to the above-mentioned line flow change amount and the above-mentioned load shedding tampering amount.

[0066] Step S102, using a circuit topology optimization algorithm to adjust the state of each switch in the power system so as to minimize the total cost of the power system and obtain the optimized total cost of the power system;

[0067] Specifically, for example, a topological structure such as Figure 2 As shown, the circuit topology optimization algorithm model is established:

[0068]

[0069] Among them, f s 、f g 、f d are the states of bus tie switch, generator tie switch and load tie switch respectively, f lf,k and f lt,k are the states of the connecting switches at the start and end of the line, θ i represents the phase angle of the i-th node, θ i,1 represents the phase angle of the first bus in the ith node, θ i,2 represents the phase angle of the second bus in the i-th node, and i, j, and k represent counting variables. g (P g ) is the power system when the power generation power is P g The power generation cost when the load shedding amount is P ds Load shedding loss at time, P ij is the line power flow, N d is the load node set, N l is the set of line numbers. b ij is the line susceptance value, is the product of the maximum reactance value and the maximum power flow, Respectively represent the minimum and maximum power generation of the generator, Respectively represent the upper and lower limits of load shedding, P ijmin and Pijmax They represent the upper and lower limits of the line power flow respectively.

[0070] Using the circuit topology optimization algorithm, the process of adjusting the state of each switch in the above power system mainly includes two parts: topology structure optimization and state estimation.

[0071] In the topology optimization part, the topology optimization is modeled as a mixed integer linear programming problem, and the optimal topology structure under the current system state is determined by solving the topology optimization algorithm.

[0072] In the state estimation part, bad data detection is performed through the state estimation module of the SCADA system, which mainly includes the following steps: first, the switch state of the current system is analyzed through the wiring analysis function to determine the specific topology structure, and then the state variables and true state of the system are obtained through state estimation. Finally, the bad data detection module can detect the attack vector constructed by the attacker based on the original topology structure.

[0073] In this embodiment, in step S101, the circuit topology optimization algorithm is used to adjust the state of each switch in the above power system to minimize the total cost of the above power system, and obtain the power system state modified by the attacker, and implement the mobile target defense method based on topology transformation. By solving the proposed mobile target defense model based on bus splitting, a new topology structure can be obtained. The result is as follows: Figure 3 As shown, node 2 is split into nodes 2_0 and 2_1, and the subsequent node numbers are increased by one; the load is located at node 2_0, and the generator is located at node 2_1.

[0074] Step S103, using the least square method to perform state estimation on the total cost of the optimized power system and the final state of each switch in the optimized power system to obtain measurement estimation values, wherein the measurement estimation values ​​include line power measurement estimation values ​​and node voltage measurement estimation values;

[0075] Specifically, according to Determine the measurement estimate, where is the state estimation result, W is the measurement noise diagonal matrix, H is the measurement matrix, Z represents the quantity measurement, x is the state variable, and L represents the objective function with x as the variable.

[0076] The relationship between the quantity measured and the state variable is:

[0077] Z = Hx + e;

[0078] Among them, x is the state variable; e represents the measurement error, which is generally represented by Gaussian white noise.

[0079] represents Gaussian white noise, where N is the abbreviation of Gaussian white noise, 0 is the mean,

[0080] represents variance; H is the measurement matrix, which contains the system topology information and is constructed as follows:

[0081]

[0082] Among them, S is the transmission line and node transfer factor matrix, B is the symmetric node susceptance matrix, A and D are the transmission line node connection matrix and the transmission line susceptance value diagonal matrix respectively. k ={i,j} represents the transmission line connecting nodes i and j. Only the diagonal elements of the D matrix have values. kk Negative susceptance value (-b ij );

[0083] Element a of the transmission line node connection matrix A ki Represents the element of matrix A at position (k,i), which can be expressed as:

[0084]

[0085] z is the quantity measurement, which comes from the measuring instruments of the power system. The measuring instruments measure the voltage, current, power and other electrical quantities of the power system in real time;

[0086] H is the measurement matrix, which is determined according to the topological structure of the power system.

[0087] Step S104, judging whether to generate alarm information according to the range of the measured estimated value, wherein the alarm information is used to prompt that the attack of the attack simulation model causes the data of the power system to be abnormal.

[0088] In the above steps, firstly, an attack simulation model is used to obtain the line flow change and load shedding tampering amount of the power system, and the power generation power and load shedding amount of the power system are tampered with according to the line flow change and the load shedding tampering amount, so as to simulate the attack on the power system. Then, a circuit topology optimization algorithm is used to adjust the state of each switch in the above power system so as to minimize the total cost of the above power system, and obtain the optimized power system and the total cost of the above optimized power system, so as to optimize the topology structure of the above circuit system, and spontaneously respond to the attack by performing internal adjustment of the system (specifically, adjusting the topology structure of the power system). Finally, according to the range of the above measured estimated value, it is determined whether to generate an alarm information, which can not only defend against the attack strategy to a certain extent, but also timely alarm when the attack of the above attack simulation model causes the data of the above circuit system to be abnormal, thereby solving the problem that the existing solution is difficult to cope with the changing attack strategy because the defense method based on defense resource configuration protects the key nodes of the power system by configuring protection resources.

[0089] In one embodiment of the present application, judging whether to generate alarm information according to the range of the above-mentioned measurement estimation value includes:

[0090] according to Determine an abnormal criterion value, wherein the abnormal criterion value represents the probability that the attack of the attack simulation model causes the data of the power system to be abnormal, wherein r is the abnormal criterion value, z is the quantity measurement, H is the measurement matrix, is the estimated value of the above measurement;

[0091] Compare the binary norm of the abnormal criterion value and the alarm threshold to obtain a comparison result, where the alarm threshold is a threshold obtained by using a chi-square distribution;

[0092] Based on the comparison result, determine whether to generate the alarm information.

[0093] Specifically, when the comparison result indicates that the binary norm of the abnormal criterion value is greater than or equal to the alarm threshold, it is determined to generate the alarm information;

[0094] When the comparison result indicates that the binary norm of the abnormal criterion value is smaller than the alarm threshold, it is determined that the alarm information is not generated.

[0095] Specifically, when ||r||2≥r τ In the case of abnormal data, it is determined that the above alarm information is generated, r τ is the alarm threshold, r is the abnormal criterion value (the difference between the actual measured value and the measured estimated value obtained by state estimation, that is, the residual), and is the chi-square distribution lookup table value, and σ is the standard deviation.

[0096] Otherwise, the data is deemed normal and no alarm information needs to be generated.

[0097] In one embodiment of the present application, after determining to generate the alarm information, the method further includes:

[0098] The total cost of the optimized power system and the final state of each of the switches are uploaded to the cloud platform.

[0099] Specifically, by uploading the above-mentioned total cost of the above-mentioned optimized power system and the above-mentioned final state of each of the above-mentioned switches to the cloud platform, it is convenient for staff to maintain and repair the power system.

[0100] The power system has n nodes and l lines, so there are n node voltage measurements and l line power measurements, and the total number of measurements is m (m=n+l).

[0101] In order to enable those skilled in the art to more clearly understand the technical solution of the present application, the implementation process of the power system defense method of the present application will be described in detail below in combination with specific embodiments.

[0102] This embodiment relates to a specific power system defense method, such as Figure 4 As shown, the following steps are included:

[0103] Step S1: construct a measurement system for the power system, including line power measurement and node voltage measurement;

[0104] Step S2: Under normal operation of the power system, obtain the measurement value of each measurement point, and obtain the normal state estimation value through the state estimation program; construct the measurement system of the power system, including line power measurement and node voltage measurement:

[0105] In the constructed measurement system, the line power measurement is the same as the number of lines, and the node voltage measurement is the same as the number of nodes. Assuming that a system has n nodes and l lines, there are n node voltage measurements and l line power measurements, and the total number of measurements is m (m=n+l).

[0106] First, determine the objective function of the least squares method:

[0107]

[0108] in, represents the state estimation result, W is the measurement noise diagonal matrix, H is the measurement matrix, Z represents the quantity measurement, and x is the state variable.

[0109] The acquired quantity measurements are then input into a state estimation module with the least square method as the objective function, and the objective function is solved to obtain a normal state estimation value.

[0110] Step S3: The power system performs security-constrained economic dispatch to obtain the optimal economic dispatch strategy;

[0111] Step S4: in the case of a load redistribution attack, obtaining a false measurement value generated by the attacker based on the measurement value and topology structure of the current system, and obtaining an attack state estimation value through a state estimation program;

[0112] Specifically, it is equivalent to using an attack simulation model to obtain the line flow change and load shedding tampering amount of the power system.

[0113] Step S5: Implement the circuit topology optimization algorithm to obtain a new topology structure and measurement values, and simultaneously obtain the topology structure and dispatch plan of the optimal economic operation point of the power system;

[0114] It is equivalent to the circuit topology optimization algorithm step in the defense method of the power system.

[0115] Step S6: Perform state estimation, estimate the real operating state of the power system based on the constructed quantity measurement, obtain the defense state estimation value, and then perform bad data detection to determine whether it is subject to load redistribution attack.

[0116] This is equivalent to the step where an alarm message needs to be generated.

[0117] Under normal operation of the power system, the normal measured value is used to obtain the normal state estimation value through the state estimation program;

[0118] In the case of load redistribution attack, the attack measurement value is used to obtain the attack state estimation value through the state estimation procedure;

[0119] When the bus splitting optimization algorithm is implemented, a new topology and measurement values ​​are obtained. The defense state estimation value can be obtained through state estimation, and the optimal economic operation point and the most economical dispatch plan of the power system can be determined; and through the bad data detection module of the state estimation, it can be determined whether the system is under load redistribution attack.

[0120] Based on the above topology optimization algorithm and state estimation module, a mobile target defense method based on bus splitting is implemented against load redistribution attacks, and the effect of the mobile target defense method based on bus splitting is displayed by comparing the normal state with the attack state.

[0121] Figure 5 The load distribution before and after the attack is shown. Figure 5It can be seen that the load of node 3, which originally had a large load, continued to increase under the manipulation of the attacker. The attacker will obtain the node injection measurement value and construct the line measurement value under this load distribution.

[0122] Before and after the load redistribution attack, the power (pu) and load shedding (pu) of each generator are shown in the table, and the operating cost ($ / h) in the two cases can be calculated.

[0123] The economic performance comparison of the power system before and after the attack is shown in Table 1. The economic performance of the system before and after the attack is analyzed. The difference in operating costs before and after the attack is the attack revenue that the attacker can obtain after implementing the attack strategy or the economic loss that can be caused to the dispatcher (4846.4-4144=702.4$ / h). It can be calculated that compared with normal circumstances, the implementation of the attack strategy increases the dispatch cost by 16.95%.

[0124] Table 1

[0125]

[0126] The economic effect of the moving target defense method based on bus splitting is shown by comparing the system power generation costs in various situations. The detailed comparison is shown in Table 2. By implementing the moving target defense strategy based on topology transformation, the dispatcher can reach a new economic operating point in the face of incorrect load distribution.

[0127] Table 2

[0128] Scheduling plan Load shedding Running costs Normal economic dispatch 0 4144 Error in economic dispatch 0.0128 4846.4 Defense Economic Scheduling 0 4144

[0129] The residual results in various cases are calculated respectively and compared with the residual detection threshold of the bad data detector to show the defense effect of the proposed scheme against load redistribution attacks. The detailed comparison is shown in Table 3.

[0130] Table 3

[0131]

[0132] From the results, it can be seen that the attacker makes the economic dispatch result wrong by implementing the load redistribution attack strategy, resulting in increased operating costs and economic losses, and the residual calculation result is less than the detection threshold, which can evade the detection of the bad data detector, indicating that the attack strategy is concealed; and by implementing the mobile target defense strategy based on topological transformation, in the face of incorrect load distribution, the dispatch can reach a new economic operation point, and more importantly, in conjunction with the state estimation program of the SCADA system, it can detect the existence of bad data in the current system, thereby realizing the defense against the load redistribution attack. By implementing the proposed mobile target defense strategy based on topological transformation, it can effectively defend against false data injection attacks represented by load redistribution attacks, and significantly enhance the attack resistance of the power system.

[0133] It should be noted that the steps shown in the flowcharts of the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer executable instructions, and that, although a logical order is shown in the flowcharts, in some cases, the steps shown or described can be executed in an order different from that shown here.

[0134] The embodiment of the present application also provides a defense device for an electric power system. It should be noted that the defense device for an electric power system in the embodiment of the present application can be used to execute the defense method for an electric power system provided in the embodiment of the present application. The device is used to implement the above-mentioned embodiments and preferred implementation modes, and those that have been described will not be repeated here. As used below, the term "module" can be a combination of software and / or hardware that implements a predetermined function. Although the devices described in the following embodiments are preferably implemented in software, the implementation of hardware, or a combination of software and hardware, is also possible and conceived.

[0135] The following is an introduction to the defense device of the power system provided in the embodiment of the present application.

[0136] Figure 6 1 is a structural block diagram of a power system defense device provided according to an embodiment of the present application. Figure 6 As shown, the device comprises:

[0137] The first processing unit 61 is used to obtain the line flow change amount and the load shedding tampering amount of the power system by using the attack simulation model, and tamper with the power generation power and load shedding amount of the power system according to the line flow change amount and the load shedding tampering amount;

[0138] The second processing unit 62 is used to use a circuit topology optimization algorithm to adjust the state of each switch in the power system so as to minimize the total cost of the power system and obtain the total cost of the power system after optimization;

[0139] A third processing unit 63 is used to perform state estimation on the total cost of the optimized power system and the final state of each switch in the optimized power system by using the least square method to obtain a measurement estimation value;

[0140] The fourth processing unit 64 is used to determine whether to generate alarm information according to the range of the measured estimated value, wherein the alarm information is used to indicate that the attack of the attack simulation model causes abnormal data of the power system.

[0141] In the above-mentioned device, an attack simulation model is firstly adopted to obtain the line flow change and load shedding tampering amount of the power system, and the power generation power and load shedding amount of the power system are tampered with according to the line flow change and the load shedding tampering amount, so as to simulate the attack on the power system. Then, a circuit topology optimization algorithm is adopted to adjust the state of each switch in the above-mentioned power system so as to minimize the total cost of the above-mentioned power system, and obtain the optimized power system and the total cost of the above-mentioned optimized power system, so as to optimize the topological structure of the above-mentioned circuit system, and can spontaneously respond to the attack by internal adjustment of the system (specifically, adjusting the topological structure of the power system). Finally, according to the range of the above-mentioned measured estimated value, it is determined whether to generate an alarm information, which can not only defend against the attack strategy to a certain extent, but also timely alarm when the attack of the above-mentioned attack simulation model causes the data of the above-mentioned circuit system to be abnormal, thereby solving the problem that the existing solution is difficult to cope with the changing attack strategy because the defense method based on defense resource configuration protects the key nodes of the power system by configuring protection resources.

[0142] In one embodiment of the present application, the above-mentioned attack simulation model includes an upper-layer attack model and a lower-layer attack model, and the first processing unit includes a first processing module.

[0143] The first processing module is used to use the above-mentioned upper-level attack model to simulate an attack on the total cost of the power system on the basis of maximizing the total cost, and to use the above-mentioned lower-level attack model to simulate an attack on the total cost of the above-mentioned power coefficient on the basis of minimizing the total cost, so as to obtain the above-mentioned line flow change and the above-mentioned load shedding tampering amount of the above-mentioned power system.

[0144] In one embodiment of the present application, the apparatus further comprises a first construction unit, which, before using the attack simulation model to obtain the line flow change amount and the load shedding tampering amount of the power system,

[0145] The first construction unit is used to construct the above upper-layer attack model:

[0146]

[0147] Among them, f g (Pg ) is the above power system when the power generation power is P g The power generation cost when the load shedding amount is P ds Load shedding loss, ΔP dj is the load shedding modification amount of the jth load node, ΔP d is the load shedding modification amount, ΔF is the line power flow change amount, ΔF l is the change in the power flow of the above-mentioned power system at the lth line, nodP dj is the load measurement tampering number, nodF l is the number of tampering in power flow measurement, S is the transmission line and node transfer factor matrix, X is the inverse matrix of the reversible and symmetric susceptance matrix, N d is the load node set, N l is the number of lines, N ds is a set of load nodes that cannot be tampered with, N ls is the set of tamper-proof line flows, τ is the percentage of tampering amplitude, and R is the limit value of tampering number.

[0148] In one embodiment of the present application, the apparatus further includes a second construction unit, which, before using the attack simulation model to obtain the line flow change amount and load shedding tampering amount of the power system,

[0149] The second construction unit is used to construct the above-mentioned lower-layer attack model:

[0150]

[0151] Among them, f g (P g ) is the above power system when the power generation power is P g The power generation cost when the load shedding amount is P ds Load shedding loss, ΔP d is the load shedding modification amount, S is the transmission line and node transfer factor matrix, X is the inverse matrix of the reversible and symmetric susceptance matrix, N d is the load node set, N l is the number of lines, N g is the number of generators, F l is the power flow of the lth line, F lmin and F lmax are the lower and upper limits of the power flow of the lth line, respectively. gimin and P gimax are the lower and upper limits of the power generation of the i-th generator, P gi is the power generated by the i-th generator, P dsjis the load shedding amount of the jth load node, P dsjmin and P dsjmax are the lower and upper limits of the load shedding amount of the jth load node, respectively, F is the total power generation, P ds is the load shedding amount, P dj is the load of the jth load node.

[0152] In one embodiment of the present application, the fourth processing unit includes a second processing module, a third processing module and a fourth processing module.

[0153] The second processing module is used to Determine an abnormal criterion value, wherein the abnormal criterion value represents the probability that the attack of the attack simulation model causes the data of the power system to be abnormal, wherein r is the abnormal criterion value, z is the quantity measurement, H is the measurement matrix, is the estimated value of the above measurement;

[0154] The third processing module is used to compare the bi-norm of the abnormal criterion value and the alarm threshold to obtain a comparison result, where the alarm threshold is a threshold obtained by using a chi-square distribution;

[0155] The fourth processing module is used to determine whether to generate the above-mentioned alarm information according to the above-mentioned comparison result.

[0156] In one embodiment of the present application, the fourth processing module includes a first processing submodule and a second processing submodule.

[0157] The first processing submodule is used for determining to generate the above-mentioned alarm information when the above-mentioned comparison result indicates that the binary norm of the above-mentioned abnormal criterion value is greater than or equal to the above-mentioned alarm threshold value;

[0158] The second processing submodule is used for determining not to generate the above-mentioned alarm information when the above-mentioned comparison result represents that the binary norm of the above-mentioned abnormal criterion value is smaller than the above-mentioned alarm threshold.

[0159] In one embodiment of the present application, the above-mentioned device further includes an uploading unit, after determining to generate the alarm information,

[0160] The uploading unit is used to upload the above-mentioned total cost of the above-mentioned power system after optimization and the above-mentioned final state of each of the above-mentioned switches to the cloud platform.

[0161] The power system defense device includes a processor and a memory. The first processing unit, the second processing unit, the third processing unit and the fourth processing unit are stored in the memory as program units, and the processor executes the program units stored in the memory to implement corresponding functions. The modules are all located in the same processor; or, the modules are located in different processors in any combination.

[0162] The processor includes a kernel, which calls the corresponding program unit from the memory. One or more kernels can be set, and the kernel parameters can be adjusted to solve the problem that the existing solution is difficult to cope with the changing attack strategies by configuring protection resources to protect the key nodes of the power system.

[0163] The memory may include non-permanent memory in a computer-readable medium, random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory, such as read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM, and the memory includes at least one memory chip.

[0164] An embodiment of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium includes a stored program, wherein when the program is executed, the device where the computer-readable storage medium is located is controlled to execute the power system defense method.

[0165] An embodiment of the present invention provides a processor, and the processor is used to run a program, wherein the power system defense method is executed when the program is running.

[0166] The embodiment of the present invention provides a device, the device includes a processor, a memory and a program stored in the memory and can be run on the processor, and the processor implements at least the following steps when executing the program: using an attack simulation model to obtain the line flow change and load shedding tampering amount of the power system, and tampering the power generation power and load shedding amount of the power system according to the above line flow change and the above load shedding tampering amount; using a circuit topology optimization algorithm to adjust the state of each switch in the above power system so that the total cost of the above power system is minimized, and the total cost of the above power system after optimization is obtained; using the least squares method to estimate the total cost of the above power system after optimization and the final state of each switch in the above power system after optimization, and obtain a measurement estimate; according to the range of the above measurement estimate, it is determined whether to generate an alarm message, and the above alarm message is used to prompt that the attack of the above attack simulation model causes the data of the above power system to be abnormal. The device in this article can be a server, a PC, a PAD, a mobile phone, etc.

[0167] The present application also provides a computer program product, which, when executed on a data processing device, is suitable for executing a program that is initialized with at least the following method steps: using an attack simulation model to obtain the line flow change and load shedding tampering amount of the power system, and tampering with the power generation power and load shedding amount of the power system based on the above-mentioned line flow change and the above-mentioned load shedding tampering amount; using a circuit topology optimization algorithm to adjust the state of each switch in the above-mentioned power system so that the total cost of the above-mentioned power system is minimized, and the total cost of the above-mentioned power system after optimization is obtained; using the least squares method to perform state estimation on the total cost of the above-mentioned power system after optimization and the final state of each of the above-mentioned switches in the above-mentioned power system after optimization, to obtain a measurement estimate; based on the range of the above-mentioned measurement estimate, determining whether to generate an alarm message, the above-mentioned alarm message is used to prompt that the attack of the above-mentioned attack simulation model causes the data of the above-mentioned power system to be abnormal.

[0168] The present application also provides a control system for an electric power system, the system comprising: one or more processors, a memory, and one or more programs, wherein the one or more programs are stored in the memory and are configured to be executed by the one or more processors, and the one or more programs include means for executing any one of the methods described above. Firstly, an attack simulation model is adopted to obtain the line flow change and load shedding tampering amount of the power system, and the power generation power and load shedding amount of the power system are tampered according to the above line flow change and the above load shedding tampering amount, so as to simulate the attack on the power system. Then, a circuit topology optimization algorithm is adopted to adjust the state of each switch in the above power system so as to minimize the total cost of the above power system, and obtain the optimized power system and the total cost of the above optimized power system, so as to optimize the topology structure of the above circuit system, and spontaneously respond to the attack by internal adjustment of the system (specifically, adjusting the topology structure of the power system). Finally, according to the range of the above measured estimated value, it is determined whether to generate an alarm information, which can not only defend against the attack strategy to a certain extent, but also timely alarm when the attack of the above attack simulation model causes the data of the above circuit system to be abnormal, thereby solving the problem that the existing solution is difficult to cope with the changing attack strategy because the defense method based on defense resource configuration protects the key nodes of the power system by configuring protection resources.

[0169] Obviously, those skilled in the art should understand that the above modules or steps of the present invention can be implemented by a general computing device, they can be concentrated on a single computing device, or distributed on a network composed of multiple computing devices, they can be implemented by a program code executable by a computing device, so that they can be stored in a storage device and executed by the computing device, and in some cases, the steps shown or described can be executed in a different order than here, or they can be made into individual integrated circuit modules, or multiple modules or steps therein can be made into a single integrated circuit module for implementation. Thus, the present invention is not limited to any specific combination of hardware and software.

[0170] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present application may adopt the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment in combination with software and hardware. Moreover, the present application may adopt the form of a computer program product implemented in one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) that include computer-usable program code.

[0171] The present application is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that each process and / or box in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of the processes and / or boxes in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to generate a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.

[0172] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.

[0173] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps for the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0174] In a typical configuration, a computing device includes one or more processors (CPU), input / output interfaces, network interfaces, and memory.

[0175] The memory may include non-permanent memory in a computer-readable medium, random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory in the form of read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM. The memory is an example of a computer-readable medium.

[0176] Computer readable media include permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media that can be implemented by any method or technology to store information. Information can be computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital versatile disk (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices or any other non-transmission media that can be used to store information that can be accessed by a computing device. As defined herein, computer readable media does not include temporary computer readable media (transitory media), such as modulated data signals and carrier waves.

[0177] It should also be noted that the terms "include", "comprises" or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, commodity or device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, commodity or device. In the absence of more restrictions, the elements defined by the sentence "comprises a ..." do not exclude the existence of other identical elements in the process, method, commodity or device including the elements.

[0178] From the above description, it can be seen that the above embodiments of the present application achieve the following technical effects:

[0179] 1) The power system defense method of the present application first adopts an attack simulation model to obtain the line flow change and load shedding tampering amount of the power system, and tamper with the power generation power and load shedding amount of the power system according to the above line flow change and the above load shedding tampering amount, thereby simulating the attack on the power system, and then adopts a circuit topology optimization algorithm to adjust the state of each switch in the above power system to minimize the total cost of the above power system, and obtain the optimized power system and the total cost of the above optimized power system, so as to optimize the topology structure of the above circuit system, and can spontaneously respond to attacks by internal adjustment of the system (specifically, adjusting the topology structure of the power system), and finally, according to the range of the above measured estimated value, it is determined whether to generate an alarm information, which can not only defend against the attack strategy to a certain extent, but also timely alarm when the attack of the above attack simulation model causes the data of the above circuit system to be abnormal, thereby solving the problem that the existing solution is difficult to cope with the changing attack strategy because the defense method based on defense resource configuration protects the key nodes of the power system by configuring protection resources.

[0180] 2) The power system defense device of the present application first adopts an attack simulation model to obtain the line flow change and load shedding tampering amount of the power system, and tamper with the power generation power and load shedding amount of the power system according to the above line flow change and the above load shedding tampering amount, thereby simulating the attack on the power system, and then adopts a circuit topology optimization algorithm to adjust the state of each switch in the above power system to minimize the total cost of the above power system, and obtain the optimized power system and the total cost of the above optimized power system, so as to optimize the topology structure of the above circuit system, and can spontaneously respond to attacks by internal adjustments of the system (specifically, adjusting the topology structure of the power system), and finally, according to the range of the above measured estimated value, it is determined whether to generate an alarm message, which can not only defend against the attack strategy to a certain extent, but also timely alarm when the attack of the above attack simulation model causes the data of the above circuit system to be abnormal, thereby solving the problem that the existing solution is difficult to cope with the changing attack strategy because the defense method based on defense resource configuration protects the key nodes of the power system by configuring protection resources.

[0181] The above description is only the preferred embodiment of the present application and is not intended to limit the present application. For those skilled in the art, the present application may have various modifications and variations. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present application shall be included in the protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A method for defending a power system, characterized in that: include: Using an attack simulation model, obtaining a line flow change amount and a load shedding tampering amount of the power system, and tampering with the power generation power and load shedding amount of the power system according to the line flow change amount and the load shedding tampering amount; Using a circuit topology optimization algorithm, adjusting the state of each switch in the power system so as to minimize the total cost of the power system and obtain the optimized total cost of the power system; Using the least square method to perform state estimation on the total cost of the optimized power system and the final state of each switch in the optimized power system to obtain a measurement estimate; According to the range of the measured estimated value, it is determined whether to generate alarm information, wherein the alarm information is used to prompt that the attack of the attack simulation model causes the data of the power system to be abnormal.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The attack simulation model includes an upper layer attack model and a lower layer attack model; Using the attack simulation model, the line flow change and load shedding tampering of the power system are obtained, including: The upper-layer attack model is used to simulate the attack on the total cost of the power system on the basis of maximizing the total cost, and the lower-layer attack model is used to simulate the attack on the total cost of the power coefficient on the basis of minimizing the total cost, so as to obtain the line flow change and the load shedding tampering amount of the power system.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that Before using the attack simulation model to obtain the line flow change amount and load shedding tampering amount of the power system, the method further includes: The upper layer attack model is constructed as follows: Among them, f g (P g ) is the power system when the power generation power is P g The power generation cost at that time, f ds (P ds ) is the load shedding capacity of the power system ds Load shedding loss, ΔP dj is the load shedding modification amount of the jth load node, ΔP d is the load shedding modification amount, ΔF is the line power flow change amount, ΔF l is the line power flow change of the power system at the lth line, nodP dj is the load measurement tampering number, nodF l is the number of tampering in power flow measurement, S is the transmission line and node transfer factor matrix, X is the inverse matrix of the reversible and symmetric susceptance matrix, N d is the load node set, N l is the number of lines, N ds is a set of load nodes that cannot be tampered with, N ls is the set of power flows of non-tamperable lines, τ is the percentage of tampering amplitude, and R is the limit value of tampering number; The lower layer attack model is constructed as follows: Among them, f g (P g ) is the power system when the power generation power is P g The power generation cost at that time, f ds (P ds ) is the load shedding capacity of the power system ds Load shedding loss, ΔP d is the load shedding modification amount, S is the transmission line and node transfer factor matrix, X is the inverse matrix of the reversible and symmetric susceptance matrix, N d is the load node set, N l is the number of lines, N g is the number of generators, F l is the power flow of the lth line, F lmin and F lmax are the lower and upper limits of the power flow of the lth line, respectively. gimin and P gimax are the lower and upper limits of the power generation of the i-th generator, P gi is the power generation of the i-th generator, P dsj is the load shedding amount of the jth load node, P dsjmin and P dsjmax are the lower and upper limits of the load shedding amount of the jth load node, respectively, F is the total power generation, P ds is the load shedding amount, P dj is the load of the jth load node.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Determining whether to generate an alarm message according to the range of the measured estimated value includes: according to Determine an abnormal criterion value, wherein the abnormal criterion value represents the probability that the attack of the attack simulation model causes the data of the power system to be abnormal, wherein r is the abnormal criterion value, z is the quantity measurement, H is the measurement matrix, is the estimated value of the measurement; Comparing the binary norm of the abnormal criterion value and the alarm threshold to obtain a comparison result, wherein the alarm threshold is a threshold obtained by using a chi-square distribution; According to the comparison result, it is determined whether to generate the alarm information.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that Determining whether to generate the alarm information according to the comparison result includes: When the comparison result indicates that the binary norm of the abnormal criterion value is greater than or equal to the alarm threshold, determining to generate the alarm information; When the comparison result indicates that the binary norm of the abnormal criterion value is smaller than the alarm threshold, it is determined not to generate the alarm information.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that The method further comprises: After determining to generate the alarm information, the total cost of the optimized power system and the final state of each switch are uploaded to the cloud platform.

7. A control device for an electric power system, characterized in that: include: A first processing unit is used to obtain a line flow change amount and a load shedding tampering amount of the power system by using an attack simulation model, and to tamper with the power generation power and load shedding amount of the power system according to the line flow change amount and the load shedding tampering amount; A second processing unit is used to use a circuit topology optimization algorithm to adjust the state of each switch in the power system so as to minimize the total cost of the power system and obtain the optimized total cost of the power system; A second processing unit is used to perform state estimation on the total cost of the optimized power system and the final state of each switch in the optimized power system by using the least square method to obtain a measurement estimation value; The fourth processing unit is used to determine whether to generate an alarm message according to the range of the measured estimated value, wherein the alarm message is used to prompt that the attack of the attack simulation model causes the data of the power system to be abnormal.

8. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium includes a stored program, wherein when the program is executed, the device where the computer-readable storage medium is located is controlled to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

9. A control system for an electric power system, characterized in that: include: One or more processors, a memory, and one or more programs, wherein the one or more programs are stored in the memory and are configured to be executed by the one or more processors, and the one or more programs include methods for executing any one of claims 1 to 6.