Information security protection method and device, equipment, storage medium and program product

By using target protection schemes and post-quantum cryptography algorithms between mobile devices and home networks, SUPI is encrypted, which solves the problem of SUPI protection in USIM with limited functions, improves the security of quantum attacks, and ensures SUPI's Security.

CN119071773APending Publication Date: 2024-12-03CHINA MOBILE COMM LTD RES INST +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410910576.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-08
Publication Date
2024-12-03

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing SUPI protection scheme cannot effectively protect the user permanent identifier (SUPI) in the universal user identity module (USIM) with limited functions, especially when facing quantum computing attacks, the risk of traditional public key cryptography algorithms being cracked. , cannot cope with the SUPI protection problem of existing USIMs.

Method used

Encrypt the SUPI by using a target protection scheme between the mobile device (ME) and the home network (HN), encrypting the SUPI to generate a second SUCI, and selecting the highest priority protection scheme between the ME and USIM for secondary encryption, ensuring SUPI The security of the post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithm is used to resist quantum attacks.

Benefits of technology

Even for USIMs with limited functions, SUPI security protection can be achieved, improving the anti-quantum attack security of SUPI encryption, solving the problem that existing USIMs do not support PQC algorithm encryption, reducing the cost of repair, and compatible with existing 3G. AKA protocols for 4G and 5G.

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Abstract

The invention discloses an information security protection method and device, equipment, a storage medium and a program product. The method comprises the steps that ME adopts a target protection scheme to encrypt an SUPI to obtain a second SUCI, or encrypts a first SUCI generated by a USIM to obtain the second SUCI; wherein the target protection scheme is determined based on the protection scheme with the highest priority supported by the ME and / or the USIM in the SUCI calculation information; and the ME sends the second SUCI to the HN of the USIM.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of wireless communication technology, and in particular to an information security protection method and apparatus, equipment, storage medium, and program product. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of Internet technology, the network security risks of information systems continue to increase, and the threat challenges are becoming increasingly severe. Cryptographic security is an important foundation for information security and can be used to effectively protect the data security of network information systems. Cryptographic technology is the core technology and important means to protect network information systems.

[0003] At present, the 5G communication network uses the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol to complete the two-way authentication between the terminal and the network. At the same time, in order to improve the security of the user identity - the Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI) on the air interface, when it is necessary to transmit SUPI through the air interface, the User Equipment (UE) encrypts and encapsulates the SUPI, generates a Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI), and uses SUCI as the user identity to transmit on the air interface, thereby ensuring the privacy of the user and preventing the user from being tracked and other attacks. However, the current SUPI protection scheme cannot achieve SUPI security protection for the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) with limited functions. Summary of the invention

[0004] To solve the above technical problems, the present application provides an information security protection method and device, UE, communication equipment, computer storage medium, and computer program product.

[0005] The information security protection method provided in the present application is applied to UE, wherein the UE includes a USIM and a mobile equipment (Mobile Equipment, ME); the security protection method includes:

[0006] The ME encrypts the SUPI using a target protection scheme to obtain a second SUCI, or encrypts the first SUCI generated by the USIM to obtain a second SUCI; wherein the target protection scheme is determined based on the highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME and / or the USIM in the SUCI calculation information;

[0007] The ME sends the second SUCI to a home network (Home Network, HN) of the USIM.

[0008] The information security protection method provided in this application is applied to HN, and the information security protection method includes:

[0009] The HN receives a second SUCI sent by the UE;

[0010] The HN decrypts the second SUCI to obtain first information;

[0011] If the format of the first information is the SUPI format, the HN determines that the first information is the SUPI; if the format of the first information is not the SUPI format and / or the SUCI format, the HN decrypts the first information to obtain the SUPI.

[0012] The UE provided in this application includes a USIM and an ME; wherein,

[0013] The ME is configured to encrypt the SUPI using a target protection scheme to obtain a second SUCI, or encrypt the first SUCI generated by the USIM to obtain the second SUCI; wherein the target protection scheme is determined based on a highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME and / or the USIM in the SUCI calculation information; and send the second SUCI to the HN of the USIM.

[0014] The information security protection device provided in this application is applied to ME, and the information security protection device includes:

[0015] a first processing unit, configured to encrypt the SUPI by adopting a target protection scheme to obtain a second SUCI, or to encrypt the first SUCI generated by the USIM to obtain the second SUCI; wherein the target protection scheme is determined based on a highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME and / or the USIM in the SUCI calculation information;

[0016] The first communication unit is configured to send the second SUCI to the HN of the USIM.

[0017] The information security protection device provided in this application is applied to HN, and the security protection device includes:

[0018] A second communication unit, configured to receive a second SUCI sent by the UE;

[0019] The second processing unit is configured to decrypt the second SUCI to obtain first information; if the format of the first information is a SUPI format, determine that the first information is a SUPI; if the format of the first information is not a SUPI format and / or a SUCI format, decrypt the first information to obtain a SUPI.

[0020] The communication device provided in the present application includes: a processor and a memory, the memory is used to store computer programs, and the processor is used to call and run the computer programs stored in the memory to execute any one of the above-mentioned information security protection methods.

[0021] The computer-readable storage medium provided in the present application is used to store a computer program, and the computer program enables a computer to execute any one of the above-mentioned information security protection methods.

[0022] The computer program product provided in the present application includes computer program instructions, which enable a computer to execute any one of the above-mentioned information security protection methods.

[0023] In the technical solution of the present application, on the one hand, the ME selects the highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME from the SUCI calculation information to generate the SUCI; on the other hand, the USIM selects the highest priority protection scheme supported by the USIM from the SUCI calculation information to generate the SUCI, and sends the SUCI to the ME, and the ME selects the highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME from the SUCI calculation information to perform secondary encryption on the SUCI; through this solution, even for a USIM with limited functions, the generation of SUCI or the secondary encryption of SUCI can be realized by the ME, that is, the security protection of SUPI is realized. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0024] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the structure of the SUCI provided in the embodiment of the present application;

[0025] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the information security protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 1 ;

[0026] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the information security protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 2 ;

[0027] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the information security protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 3 ;

[0028] Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of a double-encrypted SUCI provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0029] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the information security protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 4 ;

[0030] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the information security protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 5 ;

[0031] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the information security protection device provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 1 ;

[0032] Fig. 9 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the information security protection device provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 2 ;

[0033] Fig.10 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0034] Fig.11 It is a schematic structural diagram of the chip of an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0035] In the traditional public key cryptographic algorithm, UE uses the public key of HN to encrypt and encapsulate SUPI using the Elliptic Curve Integrate Encrypt Scheme (ECIES) to generate SUCI. With the development of quantum computing technology, traditional public key cryptographic algorithms face serious security threats. Quantum computers have powerful computing power and can crack traditional public key cryptographic algorithms, crack public keys to obtain private keys, and then forge signatures.

[0036] In order to deal with quantum attacks, researchers have studied the Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithm. Compared with traditional public key cryptography algorithms, the PQC algorithm can deal with quantum attacks and is more secure. However, the PQC algorithm has not been tested for a long time. If the PQC algorithm is cracked after large-scale application, the cost of patching is high. Moreover, the PQC algorithm cannot solve the SUPI protection problem of existing USIMs. This is because most of the existing USIMs are limited-function USIMs, which do not support SUPI encryption based on the PQC algorithm.

[0037] Since USIM only stores the user identity for the user, it will not be actively upgraded for a long time, which will result in a large number of unupgraded existing USIMs in the network. These existing USIMs may not support SUPI encryption, let alone SUPI encryption based on the PQC algorithm. For such users, even if the network side (HN) and the UE side (ME) both support SUPI encryption or even support SUPI encryption based on the PQC algorithm, if SUPI protection is enabled on the network side, the current SUPI protection solution cannot solve the SUPI protection problem of the existing USIMs.

[0038] In order to solve the above problems, the following technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application are proposed. The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0039] It should be noted that the term "and / or" in this article is only a description of the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that there may be three kinds of relationships. For example, A and / or B can represent: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone. In addition, the character " / " in this article generally indicates that the objects associated before and after are in an "or" relationship. It should also be understood that the "indication" mentioned in the embodiments of the present application can be a direct indication, an indirect indication, or an indication of an association relationship. For example, A indicates B, which can mean that A directly indicates B, for example, B can be obtained through A; it can also mean that A indirectly indicates B, for example, A indicates C, and B can be obtained through C; it can also mean that there is an association relationship between A and B. It should also be understood that the "correspondence" mentioned in the embodiments of the present application can mean that there is a direct or indirect correspondence relationship between the two, or it can mean that there is an association relationship between the two, or it can mean a relationship between indication and indication, configuration and configuration, etc.

[0040] To facilitate understanding of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the relevant technologies of the embodiments of the present application are first described below. The following related technologies can be arbitrarily combined with the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application as optional solutions, and they all belong to the protection scope of the embodiments of the present application.

[0041] 1) USIM: Universal Subscriber Identity Module, which stores the user's core key K and identifier data.

[0042] 2) ME: Mobile Equipment, works with USIM to complete network authentication.

[0043] 3) UE: User Equipment, a general term for ME and USIM.

[0044] 4) SEAF: Secure Anchor Function, used to authenticate the UE to the access network.

[0045] 5)AUSF: Authentication Server Function, used to authenticate the UE by the home network.

[0046] 6) UDM / ARPF: Unified Data Manage / Authentication credential Repository and Processing Function, which stores user contract information, authentication data K, etc.

[0047] 7)HN: Home Network.

[0048] 8)SN: Service network.

[0049] 9) KEM: Key Encapsulation Mechanism, mainly including the following algorithms:

[0050] a. KeyGen(pp)→(SK, PK): Generate a public-private key pair. The input pp is the public parameter used to generate the key pair. The output is the generated public-private key pair.

[0051] b. Encap(PK)→(sk, csk): Generate a temporary symmetric key based on the public key. The input is the public key, and the output is the temporary symmetric key sk and the encrypted sk, i.e. csk.

[0052] c. Decap(SK, csk)→(sk): Decrypts the temporary symmetric key based on the private key. The input is the private key and csk, and the output is the temporary symmetric key sk.

[0053] 10) DEM: Data Encapsulation Mechanism, mainly including the following algorithms:

[0054] a. SEnc(sk, M)→C: The input is the symmetric key sk and the plaintext M, which are encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm and the output is the ciphertext C.

[0055] b. SDec(sk, C)→M: The input is the symmetric key sk and the ciphertext C, which is decrypted using the symmetric encryption algorithm and the output is the plaintext M.

[0056] 11) ECIES: Elliptic Curve Integrate Encrypt Scheme. 5GAKA uses ECIES to encrypt SUPI to generate SUCI, which mainly includes two algorithms:

[0057] a. ECIES_ENC (encryption): input public key PK and plaintext M, output C:

[0058] Encap_ECIES(PK): Use KeyGen(pp) to generate a temporary public-private key pair (eSK, ePK), generate a temporary symmetric key sk based on PK and eSK, and output (sk, ePK).

[0059] SEnc_ECIES(sk, M): Use the temporary key sk to encrypt and integrity protect M to obtain C1 and C2, and output C = (ePK, C1, C2).

[0060] b. ECIES_DEC (decryption): Input private key SK and ciphertext C, output plaintext M:

[0061] Decap_ECIES(SK): Generates a temporary key sk based on SK and ePK, and outputs sk.

[0062] SDec_ECIES(sk, C): Use the temporary key sk to decrypt and verify the integrity of C, and output M.

[0063] 12) PQC_KEM: Post Quantum Cryptography-based Key Encapsulation Scheme. The KEM scheme based on the post-quantum public key cryptography algorithm, that is, the public key cryptography algorithm in KEM adopts the post-quantum public key cryptography algorithm.

[0064] 13) KEM_ENC: encryption mechanism based on key encapsulation. Input the public key PK and the message M, use the KEM technology to generate a temporary symmetric key, and then protect M to output the ciphertext C. The KEM technology here can use traditional public key cryptographic algorithms such as ECC, RSA, and PQC. ECIES encryption is an implementation of KEM_ENC.

[0065] 14) KEM_DEC: Decryption mechanism based on key encapsulation. Input the private key SK and ciphertext C, use KEM technology to decrypt to obtain a temporary symmetric key, and then decrypt the ciphertext C to output the plaintext M. The KEM technology here can use traditional public key cryptographic algorithms such as ECC, RSA, and PQC. ECIES decryption is an implementation of KEM_DEC.

[0066] 15) KEM_ENC_t: KEM_ENC based on traditional cryptographic algorithms. Traditional cryptographic algorithms here mainly include elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), RSA, etc. ECIES is the KEM_ENC used in 5G. Input the public key PK and message M, and encrypt them through KEM_ENC_t to obtain the ciphertext C: C = KEM_ENC_t (PK, M).

[0067] 16) KEM_DEC_t: KEM_DEC based on traditional cryptographic algorithms. Traditional cryptographic algorithms here mainly include ECC, RSA, etc. ECIES encryption is KEM_ENC used in 5G. Enter the private key SK and ciphertext C, and decrypt through KEM_DEC_t to get the plaintext M: M = KEM_DEC_t (SK, C).

[0068] 17) KEM_ENC_p: KEM_ENC based on the PQC cryptographic algorithm. Input the public key PK and the message M, and encrypt them through KEM_ENC_p to obtain the ciphertext C: C = KEM_ENC_p (PK, M).

[0069] 18) KEM_DEC_p: KEM_DEC based on the PQC cryptographic algorithm. Input the private key SK and the ciphertext C, and decrypt through KEM_DEC_p to obtain the plaintext M: M = KEM_DEC_p (SK, C).

[0070] 19) KEM_ENC_p_t: KEM_ENC is a hybrid calculation based on PQC and traditional cryptographic algorithms. Input the public key PK and the message M, and encrypt them through KEM_ENC_p_t to obtain the ciphertext C: C = KEM_ENC_p_t (PK, M).

[0071] 20) KEM_DEC_p_t: KEM_DEC is a hybrid calculation based on PQC and traditional cryptographic algorithms. Input the private key SK and ciphertext C, and decrypt through KEM_DEC_p_t to get the plaintext M: M = KEM_DEC_p_t (SK, C).

[0072] 21) Symmetric encryption function: C = E(K, M), using the symmetric key K to symmetrically encrypt M, E is a quantum-safe symmetric encryption algorithm.

[0073] 22) Symmetric decryption function: M = D(K, C), using the symmetric key K to symmetrically decrypt C, D is a quantum-safe symmetric decryption algorithm.

[0074] 23) Asymmetric encryption function: C = E_PUB (PK, M), M is asymmetrically encrypted using the public key PK. E_PUB is a quantum-safe public key encryption algorithm.

[0075] 24) Asymmetric decryption function: M = D_PUB (SK, C), use the private key SK to asymmetric decrypt C, D_PUB is a quantum-safe public key decryption algorithm.

[0076] 25) Signature function: S=SIGN(K,M), use the private key K to sign M.

[0077] 26) Verification function: VERIFY(K, M, S), use the public key K to verify the signature of S.

[0078] 27) Digest function: H = HASH(M), using a quantum-safe digest algorithm to calculate the digest value of M.

[0079] 28)tAlgorithm: traditional public key algorithm, such as RSA, ECC, etc.

[0080] 29)p algorithm: PQC algorithm, which can resist quantum attacks.

[0081] 30) t+p hybrid algorithm: A hybrid algorithm of the traditional public key algorithm and the PQC algorithm to prevent the PQC algorithm from being hacked in the future.

[0082] To facilitate understanding of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the technical solutions of the present application are described in detail below through specific embodiments. The above related technologies can be combined arbitrarily with the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application as optional solutions, and they all belong to the protection scope of the embodiments of the present application. The embodiments of the present application include at least part of the following contents.

[0083] It should be noted that the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application is not only applicable to the AKA protocols of 3G, 4G and 5G, but also to other types of AKA protocols (such as EAP-AKA protocol).

[0084] To facilitate understanding of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the technical solutions of the present application are described in detail below through specific embodiments. The above related technologies can be combined arbitrarily with the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application as optional solutions, and they all belong to the protection scope of the embodiments of the present application. The embodiments of the present application include at least part of the following contents.

[0085] Figure 1 is the structure of SUCI provided in the embodiment of the present application, such as Figure 1 As shown, SUCI consists of the following fields:

[0086] 1) SUPI Type field: The value range is 0 to 7 (inclusive). It identifies the type of SUPI encapsulated in SUCI.

[0087] 2) Home Network Identifier (HN Identifier): used to identify the user's home network. The format of the HN identifier is related to the SUPI type.

[0088] 3) Routing Indicator: The length is 1 to 4 digits (variable length), which is allocated by the home operator and stored in the USIM.

[0089] 4) Protection Scheme Identifier: ranges from 0 to 15 (inclusive), used to identify the protection scheme of SUPI (i.e., the scheme for encrypting SUPI). The types of protection schemes include empty scheme (i.e., not protecting SUPI) and non-empty scheme.

[0090] For example, as shown in the following Table 1, Table 1 lists several protection schemes. Operators can add new protection schemes in Table 1 as needed, such as adding two protection schemes, "T+P hybrid algorithm" and "P algorithm", and assign corresponding protection scheme identifiers to these two protection schemes. It should be noted that the meanings of the P algorithm and the T+P hybrid algorithm can refer to the above-mentioned related descriptions.

[0091]

[0092] Table 1: Protection scheme

[0093] 5) Home Network Public Key ID (HN): ranges from 0 to 255 (inclusive), and is used to indicate the public key used to protect SUPI (i.e., encrypt SUPI according to the protection scheme corresponding to the protection scheme ID).

[0094] 6) Protection Output: The value obtained by encrypting SUPI using the protection scheme corresponding to the protection scheme identifier. The format of the protection output is related to the protection scheme.

[0095] It should be noted that the KEM_ENC algorithm described in the embodiments of the present application may be a KEM_ENC_t algorithm (belonging to the t algorithm), or a KEM_ENC_p algorithm (belonging to the p algorithm), or a KEM_ENC_p_t algorithm (belonging to the t+p hybrid algorithm), etc. The KEM_DEC algorithm described in the embodiments of the present application may be a KEM_DEC_t algorithm (belonging to the t algorithm), or a KEM_DEC_p algorithm (belonging to the p algorithm), or a KEM_DEC_p_t algorithm (belonging to the t+p hybrid algorithm), etc.

[0096] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the information security protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 1 , the information security protection method is applied to UE, the UE includes USIM and ME; Figure 2 As shown, the information security protection method includes the following steps:

[0097] Step 201: The ME adopts a target protection scheme to encrypt the SUPI to obtain a second SUCI, or encrypts the first SUCI generated by the USIM to obtain a second SUCI; wherein the target protection scheme is determined based on the highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME and / or the USIM in the SUCI calculation information.

[0098] Specifically, 1) the ME selects the highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME from the SUCI calculation information as the target protection scheme, and encrypts the SUPI using the target protection scheme to obtain the second SUCI; or, 2) the ME receives the first SUCI generated by the USIM; the ME selects the highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME from the SUCI calculation information as the second protection scheme, determines the target protection scheme according to the second protection scheme and the first protection scheme; and encrypts the first SUCI using the target protection scheme to obtain the second SUCI. Here, the first SUCI is obtained by the USIM encrypting the SUPI using the first protection scheme, and the first protection scheme is the highest priority protection scheme supported by the USIM selected by the USIM from the SUCI calculation information.

[0099] It should be noted that the “SUCI calculation information” described in the embodiments of the present application can be replaced by other names, such as SUCI protection strategy information, etc.

[0100] In the embodiment of the present application, the ME checks whether there is SUCI calculation information of the USIM locally; 1) if the ME has SUCI calculation information locally, the ME selects the highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME from the local SUCI calculation information; 2) if the ME does not have SUCI calculation information locally, the ME obtains the SUCI calculation information from the USIM, and selects the highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME from the obtained SUCI calculation information.

[0101] In some implementations, the SUCI calculation information includes one or more of the following information: an HN public key identifier, an HN public key, and a protection scheme identifier list. Here, the protection scheme identifier list includes one or more protection scheme identifiers, each protection scheme identifier corresponding to a protection scheme. Optionally, the SUCI calculation information obtained by the ME from the USIM also includes the SUPI of the USIM. Alternatively, the ME may also obtain the SUPI of the USIM from the USIM alone.

[0102] It should be noted that there is a corresponding relationship between the SUCI calculation information and the USIM. When the ME obtains the SUCI calculation information, it will save the SUCI calculation information locally and establish a corresponding relationship between the SUCI calculation information and the current USIM.

[0103] In some implementations, before step 201, when the HN requires the UE to send an identity for network authentication, the ME reads the SUPI generation policy from the USIM. The SUPI generation policy includes the following two types:

[0104] SUPI generation strategy 1: SUCI is generated by ME;

[0105] SUPI generation strategy 2: SUCI is generated by USIM.

[0106] Case A: When the ME reads the SUCI calculated by the ME from the USIM (that is, when the USIM indicates that the SUCI is generated by the ME), the ME checks whether there is SUCI calculation information of the USIM locally; 1) If the ME has SUCI calculation information locally, the ME selects the highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME from the local SUCI calculation information as the target protection scheme; the ME encrypts the SUPI using the target protection scheme to obtain the second SUCI. 2) If the ME does not have SUCI calculation information locally, the ME obtains (or reads) the SUCI calculation information from the USIM, selects the highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME from the SUCI calculation information as the target protection scheme; the ME encrypts the SUPI using the target protection scheme to obtain the second SUCI.

[0107] Here, the ME adopts the target protection scheme to generate the second SUCI, which specifically includes:

[0108] i) If the target protection scheme is a null scheme, the ME calculates the second SUCI using the null scheme, i.e., the protection output field of the second SUCI is set to the unencrypted SUPI, the protection scheme identifier field is set to 0, and the HN public key identifier field is set to 0.

[0109] ii) If the target protection scheme is not a null-scheme, the ME uses the KEM_ENC algorithm corresponding to the target protection scheme to calculate SUPI_C = KEM_ENC (PK_HN, SUPI). The Protection Output field of the second SUCI is set to SUPI_C, the Protection Scheme Identifier field is set to the identifier of the target protection scheme, and the HN Public Key Identifier field is set to the identifier of PK_HN.

[0110] Case B: When the ME reads from the USIM that the SUCI is calculated by the USIM (that is, when the USIM indicates that the SUCI is generated by the USIM), the ME receives the first SUCI generated by the USIM, the first SUCI is obtained by the USIM encrypting the SUPI using the first protection scheme (that is, one-time encryption), and the first protection scheme is the highest priority protection scheme supported by the USIM selected by the USIM from the SUCI calculation information; further, the ME checks whether there is SUCI calculation information of the USIM locally; 1) if the ME has SUCI calculation information locally, the ME selects the highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME from the local SUCI calculation information as the second protection scheme; 2) if the ME does not have SUCI calculation information locally, the ME obtains (or reads) the SUCI calculation information from the USIM, and selects the highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME from the SUCI calculation information as the second protection scheme; the ME determines the first protection scheme according to the protection scheme identification field in the first SUCI; the ME determines the target protection scheme according to the second protection scheme and the first protection scheme, and encrypts the first SUCI using the target protection scheme (that is, secondary encryption) to obtain the second SUCI.

[0111] It should be noted that the target protection scheme may be a null scheme or may not be a null scheme.

[0112] As a case where the target protection scheme is the null scheme, the ME does not process the first SUCI and directly sends the first SUCI to the HN. Alternatively, the ME processes the first SUCI using the null scheme to obtain a second SUCI, that is, the protection output field of the second SUCI is set to the unencrypted first SUCI, the protection scheme identifier field is set to 0, and the HN public key identifier field is set to 0.

[0113] As another case, the target protection scheme is not a null scheme. For the convenience of description, the second protection scheme may also be recorded as P_ME, the first protection scheme may also be recorded as P_USIM, and the target protection scheme may also be recorded as P_UE.

[0114] Here, the ME adopts a target protection scheme to encrypt the first SUCI (i.e., secondary encryption) to obtain a second SUCI, which specifically includes:

[0115] i) If the first protection scheme is not a null scheme, the ME encrypts the first SUCI using the target protection scheme to obtain a first ciphertext; the ME generates a second SUCI according to the first ciphertext, wherein the protection output field of the second SUCI is set to the first ciphertext, and the protection scheme identifier field of the second SUCI is set to the identifier of the target protection scheme.

[0116] Specifically, if P_USIM is not a null-scheme, the ME uses the KEM_ENC algorithm corresponding to the P_UE to calculate SUCI_C=KEM_ENC(PK_HN, first SUCI). The protection output field of the second SUCI is set to SUCI_C, the protection scheme identifier field is set to the identifier of the P_UE, and the HN public key identifier field is set to the identifier of the PK_HN.

[0117] ii) If the first protection scheme is a null scheme, the ME encrypts the SUPI in the first SUCI or encrypts the first SUCI using the target protection scheme to obtain a first ciphertext; the ME generates a second SUCI according to the first ciphertext, wherein the protection output field of the second SUCI is set to the first ciphertext, and the protection scheme identifier field of the second SUCI is set to the identifier of the target protection scheme.

[0118] Specifically, if the P_USIM is a null-scheme, the ME uses the KEM_ENC algorithm corresponding to the P_UE to calculate SUPI_C=KEM_ENC(PK_HN, SUPI). The protection output field of the second SUCI is set to SUPI_C, the protection scheme identifier field is set to the identifier of the P_UE, and the HN public key identifier field is set to the identifier of the PK_HN. Alternatively, if the P_USIM is a null-scheme, the ME uses the KEM_ENC algorithm corresponding to the P_UE to calculate SUCI_C=KEM_ENC(PK_HN, first SUCI). The protection output field of the second SUCI is set to SUCI_C, the protection scheme identifier field is set to the identifier of the P_UE, and the HN public key identifier field is set to the identifier of the PK_HN.

[0119] Step 202: The ME sends the second SUCI to the HN of the USIM.

[0120] Specifically, the ME sends the second SUCI to the HN through an initial registration request (Initial Registration Request).

[0121] In some implementations, the ME may obtain the above SUCI calculation information in the following manner:

[0122] If the ME does not have SUCI calculation information locally or the ME actively requests to update the SUCI calculation information, the ME queries the SUCI calculation information from the SUCI calculation information query service provided by the HN. Specifically, the ME determines the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) of the SUCI calculation information query service of the HN, and queries the SUCI calculation information from the SUCI calculation information query service provided by the HN according to the URL.

[0123] Here, ME queries SUCI calculation information from the SUCI calculation information query service provided by HN in the following two ways:

[0124] Method 1: The ME obtains the URL of the SUCI calculation information query service of the HN according to the HN identifier and / or routing indicator corresponding to the second SUCI and the specified rule combination; and queries the SUCI calculation information from the SUCI calculation information query service provided by the HN according to the URL. For example, the URL is: suci.Routing Indicator.NAI. The Network Access Identifiers (NAI) here represents the HN identifier.

[0125] Method 2: The ME obtains the URL of the SUCI calculation information query service of the HN from the query platform according to the HN identifier and / or routing indication corresponding to the second SUCI; and queries the SUCI calculation information from the SUCI calculation information query service provided by the HN according to the URL.

[0126] The technical solution of the embodiment of the present application designs an enhanced SUPI protection method. The ME preferentially uses the SUCI calculation information of the current USIM stored locally to generate SUCI. Even for a USIM with limited functions, the generation of SUCI can be achieved through the ME, that is, the security protection of SUPI is achieved.

[0127] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the information security protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 2 , the information security protection method is applied to HN; Figure 3 As shown, the information security protection method includes the following steps:

[0128] Step 301: The HN receives a second SUCI sent by the UE.

[0129] The generation method of the second SUCI here can refer to the aforementioned Figure 2 Related description.

[0130] Step 302: The HN decrypts the second SUCI to obtain the first information;

[0131] Specifically, the HN reads the protection scheme identifier, the HN public key identifier field, and the protection output field in the second SUCI. The HN uses the KEM_DEC algorithm corresponding to the protection scheme identifier to decrypt the content of the protection output field to obtain SUCI_D=KEM_DEC (SK_HN, second SUCI protection output field). Here, SK_HN represents the public key corresponding to the HN public key identifier, and SUCI_D represents the first information.

[0132] It should be noted that the content of the protected output field in the second SUCI is SUPI_C or SUCI_C, where SUPI_C=KEM_ENC(PK_HN, SUPI), that is, SUPI_C is obtained by encrypting SUPI. SUCI_C=KEM_ENC(PK_HN, first SUCI), that is, SUCI_C is obtained by encrypting the first SUCI. The specific generation method of SUPI_C or SUCI_C can refer to the above Figure 2 Related description.

[0133] Step 303: If the format of the first information is the SUPI format, the HN determines that the first information is the SUPI; if the format of the first information is not the SUPI format and / or the SUCI format, the HN decrypts the first information to obtain the SUPI.

[0134] Here, if the format of the first information is not the SUPI format and / or the SUCI format, the HN decrypts the first information according to the protection scheme identification field and the HN public key identification field in the first information.

[0135] Specifically, if SUCI_D is in SUPI format, HN has decrypted and obtained the final SUPI (SUCI_D is SUPI). If SUCI_D is not in SUPI format but in SUCI format, HN performs secondary decryption on SUCI_D. Specifically, HN reads the protection scheme identifier, HN public key identifier field and protection output field in SUCI_D, and HN uses the KEM_DEC algorithm corresponding to the protection scheme identifier to decrypt the content of the protection output field to obtain SUPI=KEM_DEC (SK_HN, SUCI_D protection output field). Here, SK_HN represents the public key corresponding to the HN public key identifier.

[0136] In some implementations, the HN sends SUCI calculation information to the UE, where the SUCI calculation information is used by the UE to generate the second SUCI.

[0137] The following is an example of the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application in combination with a specific application example. It should be noted that the following application examples are all described using 5G AKA as an example, but are not limited to this. The technical solution of the embodiment of the present application can be applied to other types of AKA. It should be noted that the meaning and generation method of each parameter name in the following application example can refer to the description of the aforementioned related solution.

[0138] Application Example 1

[0139] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the information security protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 3 ,like Figure 4 As shown, the information security protection method includes the following steps:

[0140] Step 401: When the network side requires the UE to send an identity for network authentication, the ME reads the SUPI generation policy from the USIM.

[0141] Here, the SUPI generation strategies include the following two:

[0142] SUPI generation strategy 1: SUCI is generated by ME;

[0143] SUPI generation strategy 2: SUCI is generated by USIM.

[0144] When the ME reads from the USIM that the SUCI is calculated by the ME (that is, when the USIM indicates that the SUCI is generated by the ME), the following steps 402 are executed; when the ME reads from the USIM that the SUCI is calculated by the USIM (that is, when the USIM indicates that the SUCI is generated by the USIM), the following steps 403 are executed.

[0145] Step 402: 1) ME checks whether there is SUCI calculation information of the current USIM locally; 2) if not, reads the SUCI calculation information from the USIM and generates SUCI based on the SUCI calculation information; 3) if yes, generates SUCI based on the SUCI calculation information stored locally; execute step 405.

[0146] Case 1: If the ME does not have the SUCI calculation information of the current USIM locally, it means that this is the first time that the current USIM sends the identity. The ME obtains the SUCI calculation information from the USIM and generates the SUCI according to the SUCI calculation information.

[0147] Specifically, 1) ME reads SUCI calculation information from USIM, and the SUCI calculation information mainly includes SUPI, SUPI type, HN identifier (i.e., NAI), routing indication, HN public key identifier, HN public key, and protection scheme identifier list. 2) ME selects the highest priority protection scheme that it can support from the protection scheme identifier list obtained by USIM to calculate SUCI, and there are two specific cases: i) If the highest priority protection scheme is a null scheme, ME calculates SUCI using the null scheme, that is, the protection output field of SUCI is set to unencrypted SUPI, the protection scheme identifier field is set to 0, and the HN public key identifier field is set to 0. ii) If the highest priority protection scheme is not a null scheme, ME calculates SUPI_C=KEM_ENC(PK_HN, SUPI) using the corresponding KEM_ENC algorithm, and the protection output field of SUCI is set to SUPI_C, and the protection scheme identifier field and HN public key identifier field are set accordingly.

[0148] Case 2: If the ME has the SUCI calculation information of the current USIM locally, it means that the ME has stored the SUCI calculation information of the current USIM locally, and the ME generates the SUCI using the locally stored SUCI calculation information.

[0149] Specifically, 1) ME selects the highest priority protection scheme that it can support from the SUCI calculation information of the current USIM stored locally (specifically, the protection scheme identifier list) to calculate SUCI, and there are two specific cases: i) If the highest priority protection scheme is a null scheme, ME calculates SUCI using the null scheme, that is, the protection output field of SUCI is set to unencrypted SUPI, the protection scheme identifier field is set to 0, and the HN public key identifier field is set to 0. ii) If the highest priority protection scheme is not a null scheme, ME calculates SUPI_C=KEM_ENC(PK_HN, SUPI) using the corresponding KEM_ENC algorithm, sets the protection output field of SUCI to SUPI_C, and sets the protection scheme identifier field and HN public key identifier field accordingly.

[0150] Step 403: 1) USIM reads SUCI calculation information from the local, where the SUCI calculation information mainly includes SUPI, SUPI type, HN identifier (i.e., NAI), routing indication, HN public key identifier, HN public key, and protection scheme identifier list; 2) USIM selects the highest priority protection scheme it can support from the local protection scheme identifier list to calculate SUCI; 3) USIM returns SUCI to ME.

[0151] Here, the USIM calculates the SUCI, specifically in the following two cases:

[0152] i) If the highest priority protection scheme is the null-scheme, the USIM calculates the SUCI using the null-scheme, i.e., the protection output field of the SUCI is set to the unencrypted SUPI, the protection scheme identifier field is set to 0, and the HN public key identifier field is set to 0. ii) If the highest priority protection scheme is not the null-scheme, the USIM calculates SUPI_C=KEM_ENC(PK_HN, SUPI) using the corresponding KEM_ENC algorithm, sets the protection output field of the SUCI to SUPI_C, and sets the protection scheme identifier field and the HN public key identifier field accordingly.

[0153] Step 404: 1) ME checks whether there is SUCI calculation information of the current USIM locally; 2) if not, execute step 405; 3) if yes, generate SUCI based on the locally stored SUCI calculation information.

[0154] Case 1: If the ME does not have the SUCI calculation information of the current USIM locally, it means that this is the first time that the current USIM sends the identity, and the ME sends the SUCI from the USIM to the HN.

[0155] Case 2: If the ME has the SUCI calculation information of the current USIM locally, it means that the ME has stored the SUCI calculation information of the current USIM locally, and the ME generates the SUCI using the locally stored SUCI calculation information.

[0156] Specifically, 1) ME selects the highest priority protection scheme it can support from the SUCI calculation information of the current USIM stored locally, and sets it as P_ME. 2) ME checks the protection scheme identification field in the SUCI from the USIM and sets it as P_USIM. 3) ME selects the final protection scheme as P_UE according to the corresponding policy, where P_UE prefers a high-strength algorithm. 4) ME uses P_UE to re-encrypt the SUCI from the USIM.

[0157] Exemplarily, the following Table 2 shows the SUCI processing schemes (ie, P_UE) corresponding to different P_MEs and P_USIMs, wherein "no processing" represents that the P_UE is a null scheme.

[0158]

[0159] Table 2: SUCI processing solutions for different P_ME and P_USIM

[0160] ME uses P_UE to re-encrypt the SUCI from USIM. There are two specific cases:

[0161] i) If P_USIM is not a null-scheme, the ME uses the KEM_ENC algorithm corresponding to P_UE to calculate SUCI_C = KEM_ENC (PK_HN, SUCI). The protection output field of the double-encrypted SUCI is set to SUCI_C, the protection scheme identifier field is set to the identifier of P_UE, and the HN public key identifier field is set accordingly.

[0162] like Figure 5 As shown, in the SUCI obtained after the first encryption, the protection output field is set to SUPI_C=KEM_ENC(PK_HN, SUPI), and the protection scheme identification field is set to the identification of P_USIM. In the SUCI obtained after the second encryption, the protection output field is set to SUCI_C=KEM_ENC(PK_HN, SUCI), and the protection scheme identification field is set to the identification of P_UE.

[0163] ii) If P_USIM is a null-scheme, the ME uses the KEM_ENC algorithm corresponding to the P_UE to calculate SUPI_C = KEM_ENC (PK_HN, SUPI), or the ME uses the KEM_ENC algorithm corresponding to the P_UE to calculate SUPI_C = KEM_ENC (PK_HN, SUCI). The protection output field of the double-encrypted SUCI is set to SUPI_C, the protection scheme identifier field is set to the identifier of the P_UE, and the HN public key identifier field is set accordingly.

[0164] Step 405: The ME sends the SUCI to the HN via an Initial Registration Request.

[0165] Step 406: After receiving the SUCI sent by the UE, the HN decrypts it to obtain the final SUPI.

[0166] Here, HN processes the received SUCI as follows:

[0167] 1) Obtain the protection scheme identifier and HN public key identifier field in SUCI, and use the corresponding KEM_DEC algorithm to decrypt the protection output field to obtain SUCI_D=KEM_DEC(SK_HN, SUCI protection output field).

[0168] 2) If SUCI_D is in SUPI format, SUCI_D is the final SUPI.

[0169] 3) If SUCI_D is not in SUPI format but in SUCI format, perform secondary decryption on SUCI_D as follows: obtain the protection scheme identifier and HN public key identifier field in SUCI_D, and use the corresponding KEM_DEC algorithm to decrypt the protection output field in SUCI_D to obtain SUPI=KEM_DEC(SK_HN, SUCI_D protection output field).

[0170] Afterwards, the HN generates an authentication vector (AV) based on the decrypted SUPI, completes AKA two-way authentication, and the UE and the network side establish a data connection.

[0171] Application Example 2

[0172] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the information security protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 4 ,like Figure 6 As shown, the information security protection method includes the following steps:

[0173] Step 601: The ME checks whether there is SUCI calculation information of the current USIM locally. If the ME does not have SUCI calculation information locally or the ME actively requests to update the SUCI calculation information, step 602 is executed.

[0174] Step 602: The ME queries the SUCI calculation information from the SUCI calculation information query service provided by the HN of the current USIM.

[0175] The ME obtains the URL of the SUCI calculation information query service of the HN according to the relevant information in the SUCI, and queries the SUCI calculation information from the SUCI calculation information query service according to the URL.

[0176] Here, ME obtains the URL of the SUCI computing information query service in the following two ways:

[0177] Method 1: The ME obtains the URL of the SUCI calculation information query service of the HN according to certain rules based on the HN identifier (such as NAI) and the routing indicator in the SUCI, for example: suci.Routing Indicator.NAI.

[0178] Method 2: The ME queries the URL of the SUCI computing information query service corresponding to the HN from a unified platform according to the HN identifier (such as NAI) and routing indication in the SUCI.

[0179] The SUCI calculation information obtained by the above-mentioned ME from the SUCI calculation information query service provided by the HN mainly includes the HN public key identifier, the HN public key and the protection scheme identifier list, etc. The ME saves the SUCI calculation information locally and establishes a corresponding relationship between it and the current USIM.

[0180] It should be noted that if the ME has the SUCI calculation information locally or the ME does not actively request to update the SUCI calculation information, the above step 602 does not need to be performed.

[0181] Application Example 3

[0182] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the information security protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 5 ,like Figure 7 As shown, the information security protection method includes the following steps:

[0183] Step 701: ME sends a SUCI acquisition request to USIM.

[0184] Step 702: The USIM generates a SUCI.

[0185] Here, the process of USIM generating SUCI can refer to the above Figure 4 The relevant description of step 403 in .

[0186] Step 703: The USIM returns SUCI to the ME.

[0187] Step 704: 1) ME selects the highest priority protection scheme it can support from the SUCI calculation information of the current USIM stored locally, and sets it as P_ME; 2) ME checks the protection scheme identification field in the SUCI from the USIM and sets it as P_USIM; 3) ME selects the final protection scheme as P_UE according to the corresponding policy, where P_UE preferably selects a high-strength algorithm; 4) ME uses P_UE to re-encrypt the SUCI from the USIM.

[0188] Here, the process of ME using P_UE to re-encrypt the SUCI from USIM can refer to the above Figure 4 The relevant description of step 404 in .

[0189] Step 705: The ME sends the SUCI to the UDM / ARPF on the HN side via an Initial Registration Request.

[0190] Step 706: UDM / ARPF performs secondary decryption on SUCI to obtain SUPI.

[0191] Here, HN processes the received SUCI as follows:

[0192] 1) Obtain the protection scheme identifier and HN public key identifier field in SUCI, and use the corresponding KEM_DEC algorithm to decrypt the protection output field to obtain SUCI_D=KEM_DEC(SK_HN, SUCI protection output field).

[0193] 2) Perform secondary decryption on SUCI_D as follows: obtain the protection scheme identifier and HN public key identifier field in SUCI_D, and use the corresponding KEM_DEC algorithm to decrypt the protection output field in SUCI_D to obtain SUPI=KEM_DEC(SK_HN, SUCI_D protection output field).

[0194] Step 707: UDM / ARPF generates an authentication vector (AV) according to the decrypted SUPI, completes AKA two-way authentication, and the UE and the network side establish a data connection.

[0195] Step 708: The ME obtains the URL of the SUCI calculation information query service of the HN according to the relevant information in the SUCI.

[0196] Here, ME obtains the URL of the SUCI computing information query service in the following two ways:

[0197] Method 1: The ME obtains the URL of the SUCI calculation information query service of the HN according to certain rules based on the HN identifier (such as NAI) and the routing indicator in the SUCI, for example: suci.Routing Indicator.NAI.

[0198] Method 2: The ME queries the URL of the SUCI computing information query service corresponding to the HN from a unified platform according to the HN identifier (such as NAI) and routing indication in the SUCI.

[0199] Step 709: The ME queries the SUCI calculation information from the SUCI calculation information query service according to the URL.

[0200] The technical solution of the embodiment of the present application, 1) by introducing the t+p hybrid algorithm and the P algorithm in the protection scheme, the security of SUPI encryption against quantum attacks can be improved. 2) In the process of selecting the SUCI protection scheme, the strategy of giving priority to high-intensity algorithms is adopted to improve the security of SUPI encryption against quantum attacks. 3) It can solve the SUPI protection problem of existing USIMs (including USIMs that do not support SUCI encryption, USIMs that do not support PQC algorithm encryption, etc.), and after deployment and implementation, it can support no card replacement. 4) The service network does not need to be modified and is not aware of the new protocol modification. 5) Compatible with the existing 3GPP protocol, compared with the original 3GPP AKA authentication protocol, only ME and UDM need to be modified, without modifying other network elements and related interfaces, the modification cost is low, and the compatibility with the original protocol is high.

[0201] An embodiment of the present application further provides a UE, the UE including a USIM and an ME; wherein the ME is configured to encrypt a SUPI using a target protection scheme to obtain a second SUCI, or to encrypt a first SUCI generated by the USIM to obtain a second SUCI; wherein the target protection scheme is determined based on a highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME and / or the USIM in the SUCI calculation information; and the second SUCI is sent to an HN of the USIM.

[0202] Specifically, the ME is configured to select a protection scheme with the highest priority supported by the ME as a target protection scheme from the SUCI calculation information, encrypt the SUPI using the target protection scheme, and obtain a second SUCI; send the second SUCI to the HN of the USIM; or,

[0203] The ME is configured to receive a first SUCI generated by the USIM, where the first SUCI is obtained by the USIM encrypting a SUPI using a first protection scheme, where the first protection scheme is a protection scheme with a highest priority supported by the USIM selected by the USIM from SUCI calculation information; the ME selects a protection scheme with a highest priority supported by the ME from the SUCI calculation information as a second protection scheme, and determines a target protection scheme according to the second protection scheme and the first protection scheme; encrypts the first SUCI using the target protection scheme to obtain a second SUCI; and sends the second SUCI to the HN of the USIM.

[0204] In some implementations, the ME is configured to check whether there is SUCI calculation information of the USIM locally; if there is SUCI calculation information locally, select a protection scheme with the highest priority supported by the ME from the local SUCI calculation information; if there is no SUCI calculation information locally, obtain SUCI calculation information from the USIM, and select a protection scheme with the highest priority supported by the ME from the obtained SUCI calculation information.

[0205] In some embodiments, the ME is configured to, if the first protection scheme is not an empty scheme, encrypt the first SUCI using the target protection scheme to obtain a first ciphertext; generate a second SUCI according to the first ciphertext, wherein a protection output field of the second SUCI is set to the first ciphertext, and a protection scheme identification field of the second SUCI is set to an identification of the target protection scheme; if the first protection scheme is an empty scheme, encrypt the SUPI in the first SUCI or encrypt the first SUCI using the target protection scheme to obtain a first ciphertext; and generate a second SUCI according to the first ciphertext, wherein a protection output field of the second SUCI is set to the first ciphertext, and a protection scheme identification field of the second SUCI is set to an identification of the target protection scheme.

[0206] In some implementations, the ME is configured to query the SUCI calculation information from a SUCI calculation information query service provided by the HN if the ME does not have the SUCI calculation information locally or the ME actively requests to update the SUCI calculation information.

[0207] In some implementations, the ME is configured to determine a URL of a SUCI calculation information query service of the HN, and query the SUCI calculation information from the SUCI calculation information query service provided by the HN according to the URL.

[0208] In some implementations, the ME is configured to obtain, according to the HN identifier and / or routing indication corresponding to the second SUCI, a URL of a SUCI calculation information query service of the HN by combining according to a specified rule; or, according to the HN identifier and / or routing indication corresponding to the second SUCI, obtain, from a query platform, a URL of a SUCI calculation information query service of the HN.

[0209] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the information security protection device provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 1 , applied to ME, such as Figure 8 As shown, the information security protection device includes:

[0210] The first processing unit 801 is configured to encrypt the SUPI by adopting a target protection scheme to obtain a second SUCI, or encrypt the first SUCI generated by the USIM to obtain a second SUCI; wherein the target protection scheme is determined based on the highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME and / or the USIM in the SUCI calculation information;

[0211] The first communication unit 802 is configured to send the second SUCI to the HN of the USIM.

[0212] In some implementations, the first processing unit 801 is configured to select a protection scheme with the highest priority supported by the ME as a target protection scheme from the SUCI calculation information, and encrypt the SUPI using the target protection scheme to obtain a second SUCI; or

[0213] The first communication unit 802 is configured to receive a first SUCI generated by the USIM, where the first SUCI is obtained by the USIM encrypting the SUPI using a first protection scheme, where the first protection scheme is a protection scheme with a highest priority supported by the USIM selected by the USIM from the SUCI calculation information; the first processing unit 801 is configured to select a protection scheme with a highest priority supported by the ME from the SUCI calculation information as a second protection scheme, determine a target protection scheme according to the second protection scheme and the first protection scheme; and encrypt the first SUCI using the target protection scheme to obtain a second SUCI.

[0214] In some implementations, the first processing unit 801 is configured to check whether there is SUCI calculation information of the USIM locally; if there is SUCI calculation information locally, select a protection scheme with a highest priority supported by the ME from the local SUCI calculation information; if there is no SUCI calculation information locally, obtain SUCI calculation information from the USIM, and select a protection scheme with a highest priority supported by the ME from the obtained SUCI calculation information.

[0215] In some embodiments, the first processing unit 801 is configured to, if the first protection scheme is not an empty scheme, encrypt the first SUCI using the target protection scheme to obtain a first ciphertext; generate a second SUCI according to the first ciphertext, wherein a protection output field of the second SUCI is set to the first ciphertext, and a protection scheme identification field of the second SUCI is set to an identification of the target protection scheme; if the first protection scheme is an empty scheme, encrypt the SUPI in the first SUCI or encrypt the first SUCI using the target protection scheme to obtain a first ciphertext; and generate a second SUCI according to the first ciphertext, wherein a protection output field of the second SUCI is set to the first ciphertext, and a protection scheme identification field of the second SUCI is set to an identification of the target protection scheme.

[0216] In some implementations, the first communication unit 802 is configured to query the SUCI calculation information from a SUCI calculation information query service provided by the HN if the ME does not have the SUCI calculation information locally or the ME actively requests to update the SUCI calculation information.

[0217] In some implementations, the first processing unit 801 is configured to determine a URL of a SUCI calculation information query service of the HN; and the first communication unit 802 is configured to query SUCI calculation information from the SUCI calculation information query service provided by the HN according to the URL.

[0218] In some implementations, the first processing unit 801 is configured to obtain, according to the HN identifier and / or routing indication corresponding to the second SUCI, a URL of a SUCI calculation information query service of the HN by combining according to a specified rule; or, according to the HN identifier and / or routing indication corresponding to the second SUCI, obtain, from a query platform, a URL of a SUCI calculation information query service of the HN.

[0219] Those skilled in the art should understand that Figure 8 The implementation functions of each unit in the information security protection device shown can be understood by referring to the relevant description of the aforementioned method. Figure 8 The functions of each unit in the information security protection device shown can be implemented by a program running on a processor, or by a specific logic circuit.

[0220] Fig. 9 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the information security protection device provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 2 , applied to HN, such as Fig. 9 As shown, the information security protection device includes:

[0221] The second communication unit 901 is configured to receive a second SUCI sent by the UE;

[0222] The second processing unit 902 is configured to decrypt the second SUCI to obtain first information; if the format of the first information is a SUPI format, determine that the first information is a SUPI; if the format of the first information is not a SUPI format and / or a SUCI format, decrypt the first information to obtain a SUPI.

[0223] In some implementations, the second processing unit 902 is configured to decrypt the first information according to the protection scheme identification field and the HN public key identification field in the first information.

[0224] In some implementations, the second communication unit 901 is configured to send SUCI calculation information to the UE, where the SUCI calculation information is used by the UE to generate the second SUCI.

[0225] Those skilled in the art should understand that Fig. 9 The implementation functions of each unit in the information security protection device shown can be understood by referring to the relevant description of the aforementioned method. Fig. 9 The functions of each unit in the information security protection device shown can be implemented by a program running on a processor, or by a specific logic circuit.

[0226] Fig.10 It is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device 1000 provided in an embodiment of the present application. Fig.10 The communication device 1000 shown includes a processor 1010, and the processor 1010 can call and run a computer program from a memory to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.

[0227] Alternatively, if Fig.10 As shown, the communication device 1000 may further include a memory 1020. The processor 1010 may call and run a computer program from the memory 1020 to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.

[0228] The memory 1020 may be a separate device independent of the processor 1010 , or may be integrated into the processor 1010 .

[0229] Alternatively, if Fig.10 As shown, the communication device 1000 may further include a transceiver 1030, and the processor 1010 may control the transceiver 1030 to communicate with other devices, specifically, may send information or data to other devices, or receive information or data sent by other devices.

[0230] The transceiver 1030 may include a transmitter and a receiver. The transceiver 1030 may further include an antenna, and the number of antennas may be one or more.

[0231] Optionally, the communication device 1000 may specifically be a network device of an embodiment of the present application (such as UDM / ARPF on the HN side), and the communication device 1000 may implement the corresponding processes implemented by the network device (such as UDM / ARPF on the HN side) in each method of the embodiment of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they will not be repeated here.

[0232] Optionally, the communication device 1000 may specifically be a UE of an embodiment of the present application, and the communication device 1000 may implement corresponding processes implemented by the UE in various methods of the embodiments of the present application, which will not be described in detail here for the sake of brevity.

[0233] Fig.11 It is a schematic structural diagram of the chip of an embodiment of the present application. Fig.11 The chip 1100 shown includes a processor 1110, which can call and run a computer program from a memory to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.

[0234] Alternatively, if Fig.11 As shown, the chip 1100 may further include a memory 1120. The processor 1110 may call and run a computer program from the memory 1120 to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.

[0235] The memory 1120 may be a separate device independent of the processor 1110 , or may be integrated into the processor 1110 .

[0236] Optionally, the chip 1100 may further include an input interface 1130. The processor 1110 may control the input interface 1130 to communicate with other devices or chips, and specifically, may obtain information or data sent by other devices or chips.

[0237] Optionally, the chip 1100 may further include an output interface 1140. The processor 1110 may control the output interface 1140 to communicate with other devices or chips, and specifically, may output information or data to other devices or chips.

[0238] Optionally, the chip can be applied to the network device in the embodiments of the present application (such as UDM / ARPF on the HN side), and the chip can implement the corresponding processes implemented by the network device (such as UDM / ARPF on the HN side) in the various methods of the embodiments of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they will not be repeated here.

[0239] Optionally, the chip can be applied to the UE in the embodiments of the present application, and the chip can implement the corresponding processes implemented by the UE in the various methods in the embodiments of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they will not be repeated here.

[0240] It should be understood that the chip mentioned in the embodiments of the present application can also be called a system-level chip, a system chip, a chip system or a system-on-chip chip, etc.

[0241] It should be understood that the processor of the embodiment of the present application may be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capabilities. In the implementation process, each step of the above method embodiment can be completed by the hardware integrated logic circuit or software instructions in the processor. The above processor can be a general processor, a digital signal processor (Digital Signal Processor, DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (Application Specific Integrated Circuit, ASIC), a field programmable gate array (Field Programmable Gate Array, FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gates or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components. The methods, steps and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of the present application can be implemented or executed. The general processor can be a microprocessor or the processor can also be any conventional processor. The steps of the method disclosed in the embodiment of the present application can be directly embodied as a hardware decoding processor to perform, or the hardware and software modules in the decoding processor are combined and performed. The software module can be located in a random access memory, a flash memory, a read-only memory, a programmable read-only memory or an electrically erasable programmable memory, a register, and other mature storage media in the art. The storage medium is located in the memory, and the processor reads the information in the memory and completes the steps of the above method in combination with its hardware.

[0242] It can be understood that the memory in the embodiments of the present application can be a volatile memory or a non-volatile memory, or can include both volatile and non-volatile memories. Among them, the non-volatile memory can be a read-only memory (ROM), a programmable read-only memory (PROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or a flash memory. The volatile memory can be a random access memory (RAM), which is used as an external cache. By way of example and not limitation, many forms of RAM are available, such as static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM), double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory (DDR SDRAM), enhanced synchronous dynamic random access memory (ESDRAM), synchronous link dynamic random access memory (SLDRAM), and direct RAM bus random access memory (DR RAM). It should be noted that the memory of the systems and methods described herein is intended to include, but is not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.

[0243] It should be understood that the above-mentioned memory is exemplary but not restrictive. For example, the memory in the embodiments of the present application may also be static random access memory (static RAM, SRAM), dynamic random access memory (dynamic RAM, DRAM), synchronous dynamic random access memory (synchronous DRAM, SDRAM), double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory (double data rate SDRAM, DDR SDRAM), enhanced synchronous dynamic random access memory (enhanced SDRAM, ESDRAM), synchronous link dynamic random access memory (synch link DRAM, SLDRAM) and direct memory bus random access memory (Direct Rambus RAM, DR RAM), etc. That is to say, the memory in the embodiments of the present application is intended to include but not limited to these and any other suitable types of memory.

[0244] An embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program.

[0245] Optionally, the computer-readable storage medium can be applied to the network device (such as UDM / ARPF on the HN side) in the embodiments of the present application, and the computer program enables the computer to execute the corresponding processes implemented by the network device (such as UDM / ARPF on the HN side) in the various methods of the embodiments of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they are not repeated here.

[0246] Optionally, the computer-readable storage medium can be applied to the UE in the embodiments of the present application, and the computer program enables the computer to execute the corresponding processes implemented by the UE in the various methods of the embodiments of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they are not repeated here.

[0247] An embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program product, including computer program instructions.

[0248] Optionally, the computer program product can be applied to the network device (such as UDM / ARPF on the HN side) in the embodiments of the present application, and the computer program instructions enable the computer to execute the corresponding processes implemented by the network device (such as UDM / ARPF on the HN side) in the various methods of the embodiments of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they are not repeated here.

[0249] Optionally, the computer program product may be applied to the UE in the embodiments of the present application, and the computer program instructions enable the computer to execute the corresponding processes implemented by the UE in the various methods in the embodiments of the present application, which will not be described in detail here for the sake of brevity.

[0250] Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the units and algorithm steps of each example described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional and technical personnel can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of this application.

[0251] Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the systems, devices and units described above can refer to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned method embodiments and will not be repeated here.

[0252] In the several embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are only schematic. For example, the division of the units is only a logical function division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0253] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

[0254] In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.

[0255] If the functions are implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application can be essentially or partly embodied in the form of a software product that contributes to the prior art. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in each embodiment of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes: various media that can store program codes, such as a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk.

[0256] The above is only a specific implementation of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto. Any technician familiar with the technical field can easily think of changes or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the present application, which should be included in the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be based on the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. An information security protection method, characterized in that: Applied to user equipment UE, the UE includes a universal user identity module USIM and a mobile equipment ME; the method includes: The ME encrypts the user permanent identifier SUPI using a target protection scheme to obtain a second SUCI, or encrypts the user hidden identifier first SUCI generated by the USIM to obtain the second SUCI; wherein the target protection scheme is determined based on the highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME and / or the USIM in the SUCI calculation information; The ME sends the second SUCI to the home network HN of the USIM.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The ME adopts a target protection scheme to encrypt a user permanent identifier SUPI to obtain a second SUCI, or encrypts a user hidden identifier first SUCI generated by a USIM to obtain a second SUCI, including: The ME selects, from the SUCI calculation information, a protection scheme with the highest priority supported by the ME as a target protection scheme, and encrypts the SUPI using the target protection scheme to obtain a second SUCI; or The ME receives a first SUCI generated by the USIM, where the first SUCI is obtained by the USIM encrypting a SUPI using a first protection scheme, where the first protection scheme is a protection scheme with a highest priority supported by the USIM selected by the USIM from the SUCI calculation information; the ME selects a protection scheme with a highest priority supported by the ME from the SUCI calculation information as a second protection scheme, determines a target protection scheme according to the second protection scheme and the first protection scheme; and encrypts the first SUCI using the target protection scheme to obtain a second SUCI.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The ME selects a protection scheme with the highest priority supported by the ME from the SUCI calculation information, including: The ME checks whether there is SUCI calculation information of the USIM locally; If the ME has SUCI calculation information locally, the ME selects a protection scheme with the highest priority supported by the ME from the local SUCI calculation information; If the ME does not have the SUCI calculation information locally, the ME obtains the SUCI calculation information from the USIM, and selects the highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME from the obtained SUCI calculation information.

4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The adopting the target protection scheme to encrypt the first SUCI to obtain a second SUCI includes: If the first protection scheme is not an empty scheme, the ME encrypts the first SUCI using the target protection scheme to obtain a first ciphertext; the ME generates a second SUCI according to the first ciphertext, wherein a protection output field of the second SUCI is set to the first ciphertext, and a protection scheme identifier field of the second SUCI is set to an identifier of the target protection scheme; If the first protection scheme is a null scheme, the ME encrypts the SUPI in the first SUCI or encrypts the first SUCI using the target protection scheme to obtain a first ciphertext; the ME generates a second SUCI according to the first ciphertext, wherein a protection output field of the second SUCI is set to the first ciphertext, and a protection scheme identifier field of the second SUCI is set to an identifier of the target protection scheme.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that The method further comprises: If the ME does not have the SUCI calculation information locally or the ME actively requests to update the SUCI calculation information, the ME queries the SUCI calculation information from the SUCI calculation information query service provided by the HN.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The ME queries the SUCI calculation information from the SUCI calculation information query service provided by the HN, including: The ME determines a uniform resource locator URL of a SUCI calculation information query service of the HN, and queries SUCI calculation information from the SUCI calculation information query service provided by the HN according to the URL.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The ME determines the uniform resource locator URL of the SUCI computing information query service of the HN, including: The ME obtains the URL of the SUCI calculation information query service of the HN according to the HN identifier and / or routing indication corresponding to the second SUCI and a combination according to a specified rule; or The ME obtains the URL of the SUCI calculation information query service of the HN from the query platform according to the HN identifier and / or routing indication corresponding to the second SUCI.

8. An information security protection method, characterized in that: Applied to HN, the method comprises: The HN receives a second SUCI sent by the UE; The HN decrypts the second SUCI to obtain first information; If the format of the first information is the SUPI format, the HN determines that the first information is the SUPI; if the format of the first information is not the SUPI format and / or the SUCI format, the HN decrypts the first information to obtain the SUPI.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that The HN decrypts the first information, including: The HN decrypts the first information according to the protection scheme identification field and the HN public key identification field in the first information.

10. The method according to claim 8 or 9, characterized in that: The method further comprises: The HN sends SUCI calculation information to the UE, where the SUCI calculation information is used by the UE to generate the second SUCI.

11. A UE, characterized in that: The UE includes a USIM and a ME; wherein, The ME is configured to encrypt the SUPI using a target protection scheme to obtain a second SUCI, or encrypt the first SUCI generated by the USIM to obtain the second SUCI; wherein the target protection scheme is determined based on a highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME and / or the USIM in the SUCI calculation information; and send the second SUCI to the HN of the USIM.

12. An information security protection device, characterized in that: Applied to ME, the device comprises: a first processing unit, configured to encrypt the SUPI by adopting a target protection scheme to obtain a second SUCI, or to encrypt the first SUCI generated by the USIM to obtain the second SUCI; wherein the target protection scheme is determined based on a highest priority protection scheme supported by the ME and / or the USIM in the SUCI calculation information; The first communication unit is configured to send the second SUCI to the HN of the USIM.

13. An information security protection device, characterized in that: Applied to HN, the device comprises: A second communication unit, configured to receive a second SUCI sent by the UE; The second processing unit is configured to decrypt the second SUCI to obtain first information; if the format of the first information is a SUPI format, determine that the first information is a SUPI; if the format of the first information is not a SUPI format and / or a SUCI format, decrypt the first information to obtain a SUPI.

14. A communication device, characterized in that: include: A processor and a memory, the memory being used to store a computer program, the processor being used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 10.

15. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: Used to store a computer program, wherein the computer program causes a computer to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 10.

16. A computer program product, characterized in that The method comprises computer program instructions which cause a computer to execute the method as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 10.

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