Safety protection method of terminal equipment, terminal equipment and readable storage medium

Abstract

The invention discloses a safety protection method of terminal equipment, the terminal equipment and a readable storage medium, and relates to the technical field of communication, and the safety protection method of the terminal equipment comprises the following steps: executing a preset protection operation through a target interface of a nonvolatile NAND flash memory under the condition that the state of the terminal equipment is detected to be in a target abnormal state; wherein the preset protection operation is used for enabling the terminal equipment not to be powered on or refurbished, and the target interface is a private CMD interface. According to the method and the device, data security protection on the terminal equipment can be effectively realized, and data leakage in an abnormal state is prevented.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a security protection method for a terminal device, a terminal device, and a readable storage medium. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of mobile communication technology, terminal devices have become an indispensable part of personal work and life. These devices not only greatly facilitate people's daily lives, but also become key tools in many business processes. However, as the functions of terminal devices continue to increase, they are also increasingly used to process and store sensitive information, including but not limited to personal identity information, financial data, health records, and corporate secrets.

[0003] The number and variety of applications on terminal devices are increasing, covering all aspects of users, from social media to financial transactions. At the same time, with the advancement of camera technology, terminal devices have also become one of the main tools for people to record moments in their lives. Therefore, these devices often contain a large amount of valuable personal and corporate data.

[0004] However, due to the portability of terminal devices and their frequent use scenarios, they face a high risk of being lost or stolen. Once this happens, it may not only lead to the leakage of personal privacy, but also cause more serious consequences, such as the leakage of corporate secrets or economic losses.

[0005] Therefore, how to effectively protect the data security of terminal devices and prevent data leakage under abnormal conditions (such as device loss or theft) has become an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the invention

[0006] The main purpose of this application is to provide a terminal device security protection method, a terminal device and a readable storage medium, aiming to solve the technical problem of how to effectively protect the data security of the terminal device and prevent data leakage under abnormal conditions.

[0007] To achieve the above objectives, the present application provides a terminal device security protection method, comprising:

[0008] When it is detected that the state of the terminal device is in a target abnormal state, a preset protection operation is performed through a target interface of the non-volatile NAND flash memory;

[0009] The preset protection operation is used to prevent the terminal device from being turned on and flashed, and the target interface is a private CMD interface.

[0010] In addition, to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, the present application also provides a terminal device, which includes: a memory, a processor, and a security protection program for the terminal device stored in the memory and executable on the processor, and when the security protection program for the terminal device is executed by the processor, the security protection method for the terminal device as described above is implemented.

[0011] In addition, to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which a security protection program of a terminal device is stored. When the security protection program of the terminal device is executed by a processor, the security protection method of the terminal device as described above is implemented.

[0012] In addition, to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, the present application also provides a computer program product, which includes a security protection program for a terminal device, and when the security protection program for the terminal device is executed by a processor, it implements the steps of the security protection method for the terminal device as described above.

[0013] The embodiment of the present application provides a terminal device security protection method, a terminal device and a readable storage medium. The technical solution of the terminal device security protection method in the embodiment of the present application is to perform a preset protection operation through a target interface of a non-volatile NAND flash memory when it is detected that the state of the terminal device is in a target abnormal state, wherein the preset protection operation is used to make the terminal device unable to boot and flash, and the target interface is a private CMD interface. When the embodiment of the present application detects that the state of the terminal device is in a target abnormal state, the private interface design of the non-volatile NAND flash memory can be used to quickly erase the flash firmware data or trigger the protection mechanism of the flash firmware mapping table, so that the terminal device cannot be booted and flashed, thereby realizing a fast and reliable system protection method, ensuring the terminal device system security and the terminal user data security, and then being able to effectively realize the security protection of the terminal device data and prevent data leakage in an abnormal state. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0014] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with the present application and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of the present application.

[0015] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on the structures shown in these drawings without paying any creative work.

[0016] Figure 1 A flowchart of the security protection method for the terminal device of the present application is provided;

[0017] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a module provided for a specific embodiment of the present application;

[0018] Figure 3 This is a structural block diagram of an eMMC / UFS flash memory in a specific embodiment of the present application;

[0019] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of illegal flashing identification provided in a specific embodiment of the present application;

[0020] Figure 5 A schematic diagram for identifying illegal disassembly provided in a specific embodiment of the present application;

[0021] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of issuing a CMD interface instruction provided in a specific embodiment of the present application;

[0022] Figure 7 A schematic diagram of firmware data erasure provided in a specific embodiment of the present application;

[0023] Figure 8 A schematic diagram of updating a firmware mapping table provided in a specific embodiment of the present application;

[0024] Fig. 9 This is a schematic diagram of the device structure of the hardware operating environment involved in the security protection method for the terminal device in the embodiment of the present application.

[0025] The purpose, features and advantages of this application will be further described in conjunction with the embodiments and with reference to the accompanying drawings. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0026] Exemplary embodiments will be described in detail herein, examples of which are shown in the accompanying drawings. When the following description refers to the drawings, the same numbers in different drawings represent the same or similar elements unless otherwise indicated. The implementations described in the following exemplary embodiments do not represent all implementations consistent with the present application. Instead, they are merely examples of devices and methods consistent with some aspects of the present application as detailed in the appended claims.

[0027] It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the technical solutions of the present application and are not used to limit the present application.

[0028] Currently, due to the portability of terminal devices and their frequent use scenarios, they face a high risk of being lost or stolen. Once this happens, it may not only lead to the leakage of personal privacy, but also cause more serious consequences, such as the leakage of corporate secrets or economic losses.

[0029] Therefore, how to effectively protect the data security of terminal devices and prevent data leakage under abnormal conditions (such as device loss or theft) has become an urgent problem to be solved.

[0030] In response to the above technical problems, the main solution of the embodiment of the present application is: when it is detected that the state of the terminal device is in the target abnormal state, a preset protection operation is performed through the target interface of the non-volatile NAND flash memory; wherein, the preset protection operation is used to make the terminal device unable to be turned on and flashed, and the target interface is a private CMD interface.

[0031] When the embodiment of the present application detects that the state of the terminal device is in the target abnormal state, the private interface design of the non-volatile NAND flash memory can be used to quickly erase the flash firmware data or trigger the protection mechanism of the flash firmware mapping table, so that the terminal device cannot be turned on or flashed, thereby realizing a fast and reliable system protection method to ensure the system security of the terminal device and the security of the terminal user data, and further effectively realize the security protection of the data of the terminal device to prevent data leakage in abnormal states.

[0032] It should be noted that the execution subject of this application is a terminal device, which may include but is not limited to mobile phones (i.e., mobile phones), laptop computers, digital broadcast receivers, PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants), PADs (Portable Application Descriptions), PMPs (Portable Media Players), vehicle-mounted terminals (such as vehicle-mounted navigation terminals) and other mobile terminals, as well as fixed terminals such as digital TVs (Televisions), desktop computers, etc., or any electronic device that can achieve the above functions, and this application does not make specific restrictions on this. The following uses the terminal device as an example to illustrate the following embodiments of this application.

[0033] In order to better understand the technical solution of the present application, a detailed description will be given below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods.

[0034] Please refer to Figure 1 , Figure 1 A flowchart of the security protection method for the terminal device of the present application is provided.

[0035] In this embodiment, the security protection method of the terminal device includes step S100:

[0036] Step S100, when it is detected that the state of the terminal device is in a target abnormal state, a preset protection operation is performed through a target interface of the non-volatile NAND flash memory.

[0037] The preset protection operation is used to prevent the terminal device from being turned on and flashed, and the target interface is a private CMD interface.

[0038] As those skilled in the art know, non-volatile NAND flash memory is a memory that can retain stored data after power failure and is widely used in various terminal devices to store data. NAND (NOT AND) refers to the NOT AND logic gate, and flash refers to flash memory. Non-volatility means that the data in the memory will not be lost even if there is no power supply.

[0039] Exemplarily, the non-volatile NAND flash memory may be an eMMC memory, a UFS flash memory, or a NVMe SSD memory.

[0040] As those skilled in the art will know, eMMC (Embedded MultiMedia Card) memory is a packaged memory that integrates a controller, a flash memory chip, and a flash memory interface, and is commonly used in smartphones, tablets, and other portable devices. UFS flash (Universal Flash Storage) memory is a memory designed specifically for mobile devices and other portable electronic devices. It uses a serial interface and provides higher data transfer speeds and lower power consumption than eMMC memory. It is widely used in smartphones, tablets, laptops, and other devices. NVMe SSD (Non-Volatile Memory Express Solid State Drive) memory is a solid-state drive that uses the NVMe protocol.

[0041] It should be noted that, in this embodiment, the target interface is a private CMD (Command) interface, which allows the processor of the terminal device to interact directly with the non-volatile NAND flash memory. In general, the private CMD interface refers to a CMD interface using a specific protocol, through which the control unit of the non-volatile NAND flash memory can be communicated, that is, a specific instruction is sent to the control unit through the specific protocol, so that the control unit of the non-volatile NAND flash memory performs a preset protection operation, and the preset protection operation is used to make the terminal device unable to boot and flash. In one embodiment, the preset protection operation can be to erase the firmware data of the firmware unit of the non-volatile NAND flash memory. It can be understood that since the firmware unit of the non-volatile NAND flash memory stores a driver program that can drive the terminal device to boot and flash normally, after erasing the firmware data of the firmware unit of the non-volatile NAND flash memory, the terminal device will be unable to boot and flash. It should be noted that the erased firmware data of the firmware unit includes a driver program for driving the terminal device to boot and flash normally. In another embodiment, the preset protection operation may be to change the firmware mapping table of the non-volatile NAND flash memory. It is understandable that, when the terminal device is turned on or flashed, it is necessary to query the block storage address of the driver program used to drive the terminal device to normally start up or flash normally from the firmware mapping table of the non-volatile NAND flash memory, and then load the driver program used to drive the terminal device to normally start up or flash normally by querying the block storage address obtained, so that the terminal device can be normally started up or flashed. Therefore, by changing the firmware mapping table of the non-volatile NAND flash memory, the terminal device can be unable to load the driver program used to drive the terminal device to normally start up or flash normally from the correct block storage address, thereby causing the terminal device to be unable to start up and flash. It should be noted that the data changed in the firmware mapping table of the non-volatile NAND flash memory includes the firmware address mapping relationship of the driver program used to drive the terminal device to normally start up or flash normally.

[0042] The private CMD interface can be an interface that can directly interact with the processor (or CPU) and is specially provided by the manufacturer of the non-volatile NAND flash memory after being pre-agreed with the manufacturer of the terminal device. The private CMD interface uses a specific protocol to transmit specific instructions between the processor and the non-volatile NAND flash memory to perform preset protection operations.

[0043] In this embodiment, the terminal device uses a non-volatile NAND flash memory to store data, and a private CMD interface is preset on the non-volatile NAND flash memory as a target interface. The target interface allows the processor of the terminal device to directly access the non-volatile NAND flash memory without going through an operating system or a file system. This ability to directly access the non-volatile NAND flash memory enables this embodiment to implement more secure data protection measures at the bottom layer.

[0044] In this way, even if the operating system or file system of the terminal device is tampered with or replaced, the hardware-level protection operation implemented through the target interface can still be effective. Therefore, when it is detected that the state of the terminal device is in the target abnormal state, the non-volatile NAND flash memory is directly accessed through the target interface to execute the preset protection operation, making it impossible for the terminal device to be turned on and flashed, thereby ensuring the data security of the terminal device and preventing information leakage.

[0045] It should be noted that, in this embodiment, the preset protection operation refers to a series of protection operations defined in advance, which are used to prevent the terminal device from booting up and flashing when it is determined that the terminal device is in a target abnormal state, thereby protecting the data security of the terminal device and preventing data leakage. The preset protection operation may include, but is not limited to, writing a lock mark for locking the terminal device so that it cannot be normally booted up or flashed, erasing key data used to enable the terminal device to boot up or flash normally, and modifying the firmware mapping table, etc.

[0046] Exemplarily, in a feasible implementation manner, the preset protection operation includes at least one of the following:

[0047] Erasing firmware data of a firmware unit of the nonvolatile NAND flash memory;

[0048] A firmware mapping table of the non-volatile NAND flash memory is changed.

[0049] It should be noted that, in this embodiment, the firmware unit refers to a logical or physical area in the non-volatile NAND flash memory for storing firmware data, wherein the firmware data generally includes key codes and configuration information required for the startup and operation of the terminal device, such as the boot loader, kernel image, and device tree. The firmware mapping table is a data structure for recording the location and size of the firmware data in the non-volatile NAND flash memory, which can help the terminal device correctly find and load the firmware data during the startup process, thereby ensuring that the terminal device can be successfully started and operated.

[0050] In this embodiment, when it is detected that the state of the terminal device is in the target abnormal state, the non-volatile NAND flash memory can be directly accessed through the target interface, thereby erasing the firmware data of the firmware unit, so that the terminal device cannot be turned on or enter the flashing mode due to the lack of necessary startup files, or the firmware mapping table is changed, so that the terminal device cannot be turned on or enter the flashing mode due to the inability to correctly find and load the firmware data. Then, when the terminal device is in the target abnormal state, the terminal device cannot be turned on or flashed through the above-mentioned preset protection operation, thereby effectively protecting the data security of the terminal device and preventing data leakage.

[0051] It is worth mentioning that, in a feasible implementation, the step of performing the preset protection operation through the target interface of the non-volatile NAND flash memory may include step S110:

[0052] Step S110 , sending a target command to a control unit of the non-volatile NAND flash memory through a target interface of the non-volatile NAND flash memory.

[0053] The target instruction is used to trigger the control unit to perform a preset protection operation.

[0054] It should be noted that, in this embodiment, the control unit refers to a circuit inside the non-volatile NAND flash memory for processing commands and managing data read and write operations. The control unit receives a target instruction sent by the processor of the terminal device through the target interface, and performs a corresponding preset protection operation according to the content of the target instruction. In this way, when it is determined that the terminal device is in a target abnormal state, the terminal device cannot be turned on or flashed, thereby protecting the data security of the terminal device and preventing data leakage.

[0055] In this embodiment, the target instruction can only be sent to the control unit of the non-volatile NAND flash memory through the target interface, ensuring that only authorized systems or software can trigger the preset protection operation, which helps prevent unauthorized access or tampering and improves the overall security of the terminal device. In addition, once an abnormal target state such as illegal flashing or illegal disassembly is detected, the processor of the terminal device can immediately send the target instruction to the control unit of the non-volatile NAND flash memory through the target interface to execute the preset protection operation without going through the operating system or file system, with a faster response speed, and will not fail due to tampering or replacement of the operating system or file system, which can fully protect the data security of the terminal device and prevent data leakage.

[0056] In addition, it should be noted that, in this embodiment, the target abnormal state refers to the terminal device being in an abnormal working state, such as illegal flashing, illegal disassembly, long-term network disconnection, and unauthorized access.

[0057] For example, in a feasible implementation manner, the target abnormal state detection method includes at least one of the following:

[0058] In the case of identifying that an illegal flashing operation is performed on the terminal device, determining that the state of the terminal device is in a target abnormal state;

[0059] In the case where it is identified that an illegal disassembly operation has been performed on the terminal device, it is determined that the state of the terminal device is in a target abnormal state.

[0060] Those skilled in the art will know that illegal flashing operation refers to the act of modifying the operating system of a terminal device without authorization or in violation of the regulations of the terminal device manufacturer, and illegal disassembly operation refers to the act of opening the terminal device casing without authorization.

[0061] This implementation can detect whether the flashing operation is illegal through the security software or service built into the terminal device.

[0062] Specifically, in a feasible implementation manner, the identification method of the illegal flashing operation includes at least one of the following:

[0063] Verifying the flashing version signature information indicated by the current flashing instruction of the terminal device, and if the verification of the flashing version signature information fails, determining that an illegal flashing operation is performed on the terminal device;

[0064] Determine the flashing version number indicated by the current flashing instruction of the terminal device, and if it is determined based on the flashing version number that the current flashing is a version rollback, determine that an illegal flashing operation is performed on the terminal device;

[0065] Determine the flashing mode indicated by the current flashing instruction of the terminal device. When the flashing mode is fastboot flashing, determine that an illegal flashing operation is performed on the terminal device.

[0066] It should be noted that flashing instructions refer to commands or instruction sets used to update or replace the existing firmware or operating system on the device; flashing version signature information refers to the digital signature of the firmware version, which is used to verify the authenticity and integrity of the firmware version; flashing version number refers to the number of the firmware version, which is usually used to identify different versions of the firmware; version rollback flashing refers to an attempt to flash the terminal device back to the old version of the firmware; flashing method refers to the specific method or tool for flashing; fastboot (fast boot) flashing refers to flashing using Fastboot mode.

[0067] Those skilled in the art will know that most legitimate operating system updates contain digital signatures to verify their source and integrity. If the signature information of the firmware version indicated by the firmware flashing instruction fails to pass the verification, it means that the firmware may be provided by an untrusted source or has been tampered with, so it can be determined that this is an illegal firmware flashing operation.

[0068] Therefore, this implementation can verify the legitimacy of the firmware version by checking the flashing version signature information and using a digital signature algorithm to ensure the authenticity of the firmware, ensuring that only verified legal firmware can be loaded, and in the event that the flashing version signature information verification fails, it can be determined that the terminal device has been subjected to an illegal flashing operation, and then the preset protection operation can be executed to prevent unauthorized firmware versions from being installed, thereby preventing illegal flashing.

[0069] Those skilled in the art also know that sometimes, illegal flashing may involve rolling back the operating system of the terminal device to an older version, which may be because there are vulnerabilities in the old version that can be exploited, or certain functions are disabled in the new version. If it is detected that the flashing instruction attempts to roll back the device to an earlier version, it can be considered an illegal flashing operation.

[0070] Therefore, this implementation can also prohibit the terminal device from rolling back to an old version of the firmware by verifying the flash version number, prevent version rollback, and ensure that the device always uses the latest firmware version to obtain the latest security patches and functional improvements, thereby preventing potential security risks and ensuring the security of the device.

[0071] Those skilled in the art also know that some flashing methods, such as using the fastboot tool, are usually used by developers or advanced users. Although this is not direct evidence of illegal flashing, if an organization or company has a clear policy prohibiting the use of this method to flash the device, then detecting the use of fastboot to flash the device can be considered an illegal flashing operation.

[0072] Therefore, this implementation can also limit the use of certain specific tools (such as fastboot tools) by verifying the flashing method, ensuring that only certified flashing tools can be used for flashing, thereby preventing unauthorized flashing behavior and improving the data security of terminal devices.

[0073] This implementation can detect illegal flashing operations (such as verifying the flashing version signature information, determining the flashing version number, and determining the flashing method), and execute preset protection operations through the target interface when illegal flashing is detected. This can prevent the terminal device from starting up and flashing when the terminal device is in an abnormal working state, thereby effectively protecting the data security of the terminal device and preventing data leakage.

[0074] This implementation can also monitor whether the terminal device has been disassembled through hardware sensors (such as accelerometers, gyroscopes, etc.), and then determine whether the disassembly operation is illegal through a preset identity authentication method.

[0075] In one example, the method for identifying the illegal disassembly operation includes:

[0076] In the case of triggering the generation of a target interrupt signal, performing a first identity authentication, wherein the target interrupt signal is generated based on the target Hall switch of the terminal device detecting that the housing of the terminal device is disassembled;

[0077] When the first identity authentication fails, it is determined that an illegal disassembly operation has been performed on the terminal device.

[0078] When the shell of the terminal device is disassembled, the switch state of the target Hall switch of the terminal device is triggered to change, and when the switch state changes, the target interrupt signal is triggered to be generated.

[0079] As those skilled in the art will know, identity authentication is a process used to verify or confirm whether an entity's identity is consistent with its claimed identity. In this process, the system or application will ask the user to provide some credentials (such as username and password, biometrics, digital certificates, etc.), and then compare them with the known information stored in the system or database. If the comparison is successful, the system will confirm that the user's identity is legitimate and allow the user to perform corresponding operations or access resources; if the comparison fails, access is denied to protect the system or data from unauthorized access and operation.

[0080] In this embodiment, the first identity authentication method may include one or a combination of password authentication, gesture authentication, voice authentication, fingerprint recognition authentication, palm print recognition authentication, face recognition authentication, iris recognition authentication, eye print recognition authentication, etc. This embodiment does not make specific limitations on this.

[0081] It should be noted that in this example, the target Hall switch is a specially configured Hall effect sensor used to monitor the state of the terminal device housing. Normally, the magnet and the Hall switch inside the terminal device are close to each other, forming a closed magnetic field environment. Once the housing is disassembled, the distance between the magnet and the Hall switch increases, resulting in a decrease in the magnetic field strength, and the switch state of the Hall switch changes, thereby triggering the generation of an interrupt signal, that is, the target interrupt signal. After the target interrupt signal is generated, the terminal device will be triggered to perform an identity authentication associated with the target interrupt signal, that is, the first identity authentication, to verify whether the disassembly operation is legal, and if the first identity authentication is successful, it is determined that the disassembly operation is legal, and if the first identity authentication fails, it is determined that the terminal device is subjected to an illegal disassembly operation, thereby determining that the state of the terminal device is in the target abnormal state, and performing a preset protection operation through the target interface of the non-volatile NAND flash memory, so that the terminal device cannot be turned on and flashed, thereby effectively protecting the data security of the terminal device and preventing data leakage.

[0082] In another example, the method for identifying the illegal disassembly operation includes:

[0083] In the case of triggering a change in the target GPIO level, performing a second identity authentication, wherein the target GPIO level changes based on the target spring of the terminal device detecting that the housing of the terminal device is disassembled;

[0084] When the second identity authentication fails, it is determined that an illegal disassembly operation has been performed on the terminal device.

[0085] When the shell of the terminal device is disassembled, the state of the target shrapnel of the terminal device is triggered to change. When the state of the shrapnel changes, the target GPIO level is triggered to change.

[0086] It should be noted that, in this example, the target shrapnel refers to one or more shrapnel (similar to mechanical switches) inside the terminal device. When the shell of the terminal device is closed, the target shrapnel is in a first state (e.g., a compressed state or a closed state), and when the shell of the terminal device is opened or disassembled, the target shrapnel changes state from the first state to the second state (e.g., from a compressed state to an extended state, from a closed state to an open state).

[0087] In this embodiment, the second identity authentication method may include one or a combination of password authentication, gesture authentication, voice authentication, fingerprint recognition authentication, palm print recognition authentication, face recognition authentication, iris recognition authentication, eye print recognition authentication, etc. This embodiment does not make specific limitations on this.

[0088] In this example, the target shrapnel can be connected to the GPIO (General Purpose Input / Output) pins on the terminal device motherboard, and the software can be configured to monitor the level status of these pins. Under normal circumstances, if the shell of the terminal device is not disassembled, the levels corresponding to these GPIO pins, that is, the target GPIO level, will remain in a stable state. When the shell of the terminal device is opened, the state change of the target shrapnel will cause the change of the target GPIO level. The change of the target GPIO level will further trigger the terminal device to perform identity authentication associated with the target GPIO level, that is, the second identity authentication, to verify whether the disassembly operation is legal, and if the second identity authentication is successful, it is determined that the disassembly operation is legal, and if the second identity authentication fails, it is determined that the terminal device is subjected to an illegal disassembly operation, thereby determining that the state of the terminal device is in the target abnormal state, and performing a preset protection operation through the target interface of the non-volatile NAND flash memory, so that the terminal device cannot be turned on and flashed, thereby effectively protecting the data security of the terminal device and preventing data leakage.

[0089] In another example, the method for identifying the illegal disassembly operation includes:

[0090] In the case of triggering a change in target magnetic field information, performing a third identity authentication, wherein the target magnetic field information changes based on the magnetic sensing element of the terminal device detecting that the housing of the terminal device is disassembled;

[0091] When the third identity authentication fails, it is determined that an illegal disassembly operation has been performed on the terminal device.

[0092] In one embodiment, the terminal device has a detection module for detecting a relative position change between a shell of the terminal device and a terminal body of the terminal device, the detection module includes a detection unit and a sensing unit, the detection unit is a magnetic member provided on the shell, and the sensing unit is a magnetic sensing member provided on the terminal body;

[0093] The detection module also has a capture unit and an analysis unit;

[0094] The capture module is used to capture the target magnetic field information sensed by the magnetic induction component.

[0095] In one embodiment, a main board is provided in the terminal body, and the shell at least partially covers the main board; the magnetic component is provided on a side of the shell close to the main board, and the magnetic sensing component is provided on the main board and corresponds to the position of the magnetic component.

[0096] In this embodiment, the third identity authentication method may include one or a combination of password authentication, gesture authentication, voice authentication, fingerprint recognition authentication, palm print recognition authentication, face recognition authentication, iris recognition authentication, and eye print recognition authentication. This embodiment does not make specific limitations on this.

[0097] It should be noted that in this example, one or more magnetic sensing components (such as Hall effect sensors, anisotropic magnetoresistive sensors or giant magnetoresistive sensors, etc.) are installed inside the terminal device, which can detect changes in the magnetic field strength (that is, target magnetic field information) inside the terminal device.

[0098] In this example, the magnetic part can be a magnet. When the shell of the terminal device is closed, the distance between the magnet and the magnetic sensing part is close, generating a magnetic field with a high magnetic field strength. When the shell of the terminal device is opened, the distance between the magnet and the magnetic sensing part increases, and the magnetic field strength of the magnetic field decreases. After the magnetic sensing part detects the change in the magnetic field strength, that is, the change in the target magnetic field information, it converts it into an electrical signal to trigger the terminal device to perform identity authentication associated with the target magnetic field information, that is, the third identity authentication, to verify whether the disassembly operation is legal, and if the third identity authentication is successful, it is determined that the disassembly operation is legal, and if the third identity authentication fails, it is determined that the terminal device is subjected to an illegal disassembly operation, thereby determining that the state of the terminal device is in the target abnormal state, and executing a preset protection operation through the target interface of the non-volatile NAND flash memory, so that the terminal device cannot be turned on and flashed, thereby effectively protecting the data security of the terminal device and preventing data leakage.

[0099] It is not difficult to understand that in addition to setting up magnets, structures that can generate magnetic fields, such as electromagnets and current loops, can also be set up.

[0100] In another example, the method for identifying the illegal disassembly operation includes:

[0101] In the case of triggering a change in target illumination information, performing a fourth identity authentication, wherein the target illumination information changes based on a light sensor of the terminal device detecting that a housing of the terminal device is disassembled;

[0102] When the fourth identity authentication fails, it is determined that an illegal disassembly operation has been performed on the terminal device.

[0103] It should be noted that, in this example, one or more light sensors (such as photodiodes, phototransistors or photoresistors, etc.) are installed inside the terminal device, which can detect changes in the ambient light intensity (ie, target lighting information) inside the terminal device.

[0104] In this embodiment, the fourth identity authentication method may include one or a combination of password authentication, gesture authentication, voice authentication, fingerprint recognition authentication, palm print recognition authentication, face recognition authentication, iris recognition authentication, and eye print recognition authentication. This embodiment does not make specific limitations on this.

[0105] The terminal device may be provided with a shielding object inside. When the shell of the terminal device is closed, the shielding object shields the light sensor, making it in a low-light (or no-light) state. When the shell of the terminal device is disassembled, the shielding object is removed, causing the light sensor to be exposed to external light, making it in a strong-light (or light) state, thereby detecting a change in the ambient light intensity inside the terminal device, that is, a change in the target light information. The change in the target light information will trigger the terminal device to perform an identity authentication associated with the target GPIO level, that is, the fourth identity authentication, to verify whether the disassembly operation is legal, and if the fourth identity authentication is successful, it is determined that the disassembly operation is legal, and if the fourth identity authentication fails, it is determined that the terminal device is subjected to an illegal disassembly operation, thereby determining that the state of the terminal device is in a target abnormal state, and executing a preset protection operation through the target interface of the non-volatile NAND flash memory, so that the terminal device cannot be turned on and flashed, thereby effectively protecting the data security of the terminal device and preventing data leakage.

[0106] It is not difficult to understand that, instead of setting a shield inside the terminal device alone, the shell of the terminal device can be used as the shield.

[0107] This embodiment can identify whether the flashing operation or disassembly operation performed on the terminal device is illegal in the above manner, thereby determining whether the state of the terminal device is in a target abnormal state, and when it is detected that the state of the terminal device is in a target abnormal state, a preset protection operation is executed through the target interface of the non-volatile NAND flash memory, so that the terminal device cannot be turned on or flashed, thereby effectively protecting the data security of the terminal device and preventing data leakage.

[0108] This embodiment uses the private interface design of the non-volatile NAND flash memory to quickly erase the flash firmware data or trigger the protection mechanism of the flash firmware mapping table when it is detected that the state of the terminal device is in the target abnormal state, so that the terminal device cannot be turned on or flashed, thereby realizing a fast and reliable system protection method to ensure the system security of the terminal device and the security of the terminal user data, and further can effectively realize the security protection of the data of the terminal device and prevent data leakage in the abnormal state.

[0109] In order to facilitate understanding of the technical concept or technical principle of the above-mentioned embodiment of the security protection method for the terminal device of the present application, a specific embodiment is listed.

[0110] like Figure 2 As shown, this specific embodiment includes a monitoring module, a control module and a protection module. Among them, the monitoring module, i.e., the sensor module, monitors the working status of the terminal device and sends the monitoring results to the control module; the control module, i.e., the CPU (Central Processing Unit) receives the monitoring results of the monitoring module, determines whether the terminal device (i.e., the terminal device) performs the system protection operation (i.e., the preset protection operation), and if the system protection operation is performed, sends a special instruction (i.e., the target instruction) to the protection module through the CMD56 private interface (i.e., the target interface, i.e., the private CMD interface); the protection module, i.e., the controller of the eMMC / UFS flash memory (i.e., the control unit of the non-volatile NAND flash memory) receives the special instruction sent by the CPU through the CMD56 private interface, and can perform a fast full erase operation on the flash firmware (i.e., the firmware unit of the non-volatile NAND flash memory), so that the terminal device cannot be turned on and flashed after restarting and powering on.

[0111] like Figure 3 As shown, in this specific embodiment, the eMMC / UFS flash memory is divided into two parts: a control module and a storage module. The controller module includes an MMC I / O BLOCK (MultiMediaCard Input / Output Block), a NAND I / O BLOCK, and a main control chip (i.e., a flash controller, a control unit of a non-volatile NAND flash memory). Among them, the MMC I / O BLOCK is an input / output interface between the main control chip and an external device, and the NAND I / O BLOCK is an interface for connecting the main control chip to the storage module. The main control chip receives instructions sent by an external device through the MMC I / O BLOCK, interacts with the storage module through the NAND I / O BLOCK, sends a control signal, and performs NAND I / O operations such as reading, writing, or erasing data. The storage module includes I / O BLOCK, firmware partition (i.e. flash firmware, firmware unit of non-volatile NAND flash memory) and user partition, wherein I / O BLOCK is the data exchange interface inside the eMMC / UFS flash memory, the firmware partition is used to store flash firmware data (i.e. firmware data of the firmware unit of non-volatile NAND flash memory), and the user partition is used to store user data.

[0112] Specifically, the steps of this specific embodiment are as follows:

[0113] Step 1: Set the system protection trigger conditions of the terminal device, including illegal flashing, illegal disassembly, etc.

[0114] That is, it is set to execute a preset protection operation when it is detected that the state of the terminal device is in a target abnormal state.

[0115] Step 2: The sensor module of the terminal device monitors the working status of the terminal device and sends the monitoring results to the terminal CPU;

[0116] That is, it is to identify whether the terminal device has been illegally flashed or disassembled.

[0117] Step 3: The terminal device CPU receives the monitoring results sent by the sensor module and determines whether the terminal device performs system protection operations. If the system protection trigger conditions are matched, a special instruction is sent to the eMMC / UFS flash memory of the terminal device through the CMD56 private interface;

[0118] That is, it detects whether the state of the terminal device is in the target abnormal state, and when it is detected that the state of the terminal device is in the target abnormal state, sends the target instruction to the control unit of the non-volatile NAND flash memory through the target interface of the non-volatile NAND flash memory.

[0119] like Figure 4 As shown, the illegal flashing identification of this specific embodiment detects the version signature information by the platform fuse scheme to determine whether the flashing version signature information matches, detects the version number information by the anti-rollback flashing scheme to determine whether the flashing version number is greater than the current version number, and determines whether the adb (Android Debug Bridge) command is used to flash the machine by disabling the fastboot flashing method. Therefore, when any method fails the detection, it is identified as an illegal flashing, and only when all methods pass the detection can it be identified as a normal flashing.

[0120] That is, verify the signature information of the flashing version indicated by the current flashing instruction of the terminal device. When the verification of the flashing version signature information fails, it is determined that an illegal flashing operation has been performed on the terminal device; determine the flashing version number indicated by the current flashing instruction of the terminal device. When it is determined based on the flashing version number that the current version is a rollback flashing, it is determined that an illegal flashing operation has been performed on the terminal device; determine the flashing method indicated by the current flashing instruction of the terminal device. When the flashing method is fastboot flashing, it is determined that an illegal flashing operation has been performed on the terminal device.

[0121] like Figure 5As shown, the illegal disassembly identification of this specific embodiment is implemented by adopting the design of Hall switch detection or shrapnel state detection in the terminal device. Once the rear shell of the terminal device (that is, the outer shell of the terminal device) is disassembled, the Hall switch (that is, the target Hall switch) detection is triggered to generate an interrupt signal (that is, the target interrupt signal), or the shrapnel (that is, the target shrapnel) state detection is triggered to change the GPIO level state (that is, the target GPIO level). The CPU determines whether the rear shell of the terminal device has been disassembled by identifying whether the interrupt signal is triggered or polling whether the GPIO level state changes. If the interrupt signal is not identified, or the GPIO level state change is not polled, it is determined that the rear shell has not been disassembled. If the interrupt signal is identified, or the GPIO level state change is polled, it is determined that the rear shell has been disassembled.

[0122] When it is identified that the back cover has been disassembled, this specific embodiment authenticates the user's identity (i.e., performs identity authentication) by popping up a user password input interface to determine whether the entered user password is correct. If the user password entered is incorrect for three consecutive times, it is identified as illegal disassembly. If the user password entered is correct within three times, it is identified as normal disassembly.

[0123] That is, when the target interrupt signal is triggered, the first identity authentication is performed, wherein the target interrupt signal is generated when the target Hall switch of the terminal device detects that the shell of the terminal device is disassembled; when the first identity authentication fails, it is determined that the terminal device has been illegally disassembled.

[0124] Alternatively, when a change in the target GPIO level is triggered, a second identity authentication is performed, wherein the target GPIO level changes based on the target shrapnel of the terminal device detecting that the shell of the terminal device is disassembled; when the second identity authentication fails, it is determined that the terminal device has been illegally disassembled.

[0125] Step 4: The controller of the eMMC or UFS flash memory of the terminal device receives a special instruction from the CPU through the CMD56 private interface, and quickly erases the flash firmware data, making it impossible to boot or flash the terminal device after it is restarted and powered on.

[0126] like Figure 6As shown, in this specific embodiment, the terminal CPU can directly send a special instruction to the flash controller of the eMMC / UFS flash memory through the CMD56 private interface, when it is determined that the system protection operation needs to be performed, to control the flash controller to perform a fast full erase operation on the flash firmware in the storage module of the eMMC / UFS flash memory. That is, when it is detected that the state of the terminal device is in the target abnormal state, the target instruction is sent to the control unit of the non-volatile NAND flash memory through the target interface of the non-volatile NAND flash memory, triggering the control unit to perform a preset protection operation and erase the firmware data of the firmware unit of the non-volatile NAND flash memory.

[0127] like Figure 7 As shown, in one example, this specific embodiment controls and protects the terminal device to identify whether it is illegally flashed or illegally disassembled. If not, the terminal device runs normally. If so, the CPU writes 0x01 to the CMD56[99:98] field of the flash firmware through the CMD56 instruction (that is, the target instruction), and then the flash controller (that is, the control unit of the non-volatile NAND flash memory) reads the CMD56[99:98] field value and determines whether CMD56[99:98] is enabled. If not, the terminal device runs normally. If so, the flash firmware data is erased, so that the terminal device cannot be turned on and flashed after restarting and powering on, that is, the firmware data of the firmware unit of the non-volatile NAND flash memory is erased.

[0128] like Figure 8 As shown, in another example, this specific embodiment controls and protects the terminal device to identify whether it is illegally flashing or illegally disassembling the device. If not, the terminal device operates normally. If so, the CPU changes the flash firmware mapping table value through the CMD56 instruction, and then the flash controller updates the firmware mapping table (that is, changes the firmware mapping table of the non-volatile NAND flash memory), and determines whether a FATAL ERROR is triggered. If not, the terminal device operates normally. If so, the flash enters the ROM code mode, making it impossible to boot and flash the terminal device after restarting and powering on.

[0129] It should be noted that the above specific embodiments are only used to assist in understanding the present application and do not constitute a limitation on the security protection method of the terminal device of the present application. More simple transformations based on this technical concept are all within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0130] In addition, please refer to Fig. 9 , Fig. 9 This is a schematic diagram of the device structure of the hardware operating environment involved in the security protection method for the terminal device in the embodiment of the present application.

[0131] The present application also provides a terminal device, which includes: at least one processor; and a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, and the instructions are executed by the at least one processor so that the at least one processor can execute the security protection method for the terminal device in the above-mentioned embodiment.

[0132] Reference below Fig. 9 , which shows a schematic diagram of the structure of a terminal device suitable for implementing the embodiment of the present application. The terminal device in the embodiment of the present application may include but is not limited to a mobile phone (i.e., a mobile phone), a laptop computer, a digital broadcast receiver, a PDA (Personal Digital Assistant), a PAD (Portable Application Description: a tablet computer), a PMP (Portable Media Player: a portable multimedia player), a mobile terminal such as a vehicle terminal (such as a vehicle navigation terminal), and a fixed terminal such as a digital TV (Television), a desktop computer, etc., or any electronic device that can implement the above functions. Fig. 9 The terminal device shown is merely an example and should not bring any limitation to the functions and scope of use of the embodiments of the present application.

[0133] like Fig. 9As shown, the terminal device may include a processing device 1001 (e.g., a central processing unit, a graphics processor, etc.), which can perform various appropriate actions and processes according to a program stored in a read-only memory (ROM: Read Only Memory) 1002 or a program loaded from a storage device 1003 to a random access memory (RAM: Random Access Memory) 1004. In RAM1004, various programs and data required for the operation of the terminal device are also stored. The processing device 1001, ROM1002, and RAM1004 are connected to each other through a bus 1005. An input / output (I / O) interface 1006 is also connected to the bus. Generally, the following systems can be connected to the I / O interface 1006: an input device 1007 including, for example, a touch screen, a touch pad, a keyboard, a mouse, an image sensor, a microphone, an accelerometer, a gyroscope, etc.; an output device 1008 including, for example, a liquid crystal display (LCD: Liquid Crystal Display), a speaker, a vibrator, etc.; a storage device 1003 including, for example, a magnetic tape, a hard disk, etc.; and a communication device 1009. The communication device 1009 can allow the terminal device to communicate with other devices wirelessly or by wire to exchange data. Although the figure shows a terminal device with various systems, it should be understood that it is not required to implement or have all the systems shown. More or fewer systems can be implemented or provided instead.

[0134] In particular, according to the embodiments disclosed in the present application, the process described above with reference to the flowchart can be implemented as a computer software program. For example, the embodiments disclosed in the present application include a computer program product, which includes a computer program carried on a computer-readable medium, and the computer program includes a program code for executing the method shown in the flowchart. In such an embodiment, the computer program can be downloaded and installed from a network through a communication device, or installed from a storage device 1003, or installed from a ROM 1002. When the computer program is executed by the processing device 1001, the above-mentioned functions defined in the method of the embodiment disclosed in the present application are executed.

[0135] The terminal device provided by the present application adopts the security protection method of the terminal device in the above embodiment, which can solve the technical problem of how to effectively protect the data security of the terminal device and prevent data leakage in an abnormal state. Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the terminal device provided by the present application are the same as the beneficial effects of the security protection method of the terminal device provided by the above embodiment, and other technical features in the terminal device are the same as the features disclosed in the above embodiment method, which will not be repeated here.

[0136] It should be understood that the various parts disclosed in this application can be implemented by hardware, software, firmware or a combination thereof. In the description of the above embodiments, specific features, structures, materials or characteristics can be combined in any one or more embodiments or examples in a suitable manner.

[0137] The above is only a specific implementation of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art who is familiar with the present technical field can easily think of changes or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the present application, which should be included in the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be based on the protection scope of the claims.

[0138] In addition, the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium having computer-readable program instructions (ie, computer programs) stored thereon, and the computer-readable program instructions are used to execute the security protection method for the terminal device in the above-mentioned embodiment.

[0139] The computer-readable storage medium provided in the present application may be, for example, a USB flash drive, but is not limited to electrical, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor systems, systems or devices, or any combination of the above. More specific examples of computer-readable storage media may include, but are not limited to: an electrical connection with one or more wires, a portable computer disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber, a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the above. In this embodiment, the computer-readable storage medium may be any tangible medium containing or storing a program that can be used by or in combination with an instruction execution system, system or device. The program code contained on the computer-readable storage medium may be transmitted using any appropriate medium, including but not limited to: wires, optical cables, RF (Radio Frequency), etc., or any suitable combination of the above.

[0140] The computer-readable storage medium may be included in the terminal device; or may exist independently without being installed in the terminal device.

[0141] The computer-readable storage medium carries one or more programs. When the one or more programs are executed by the terminal device, the terminal device: when it is detected that the state of the terminal device is in a target abnormal state, performs a preset protection operation through a target interface of a non-volatile NAND flash memory; wherein the preset protection operation is used to prevent the terminal device from being turned on and flashed, and the target interface is a private CMD interface.

[0142] Computer program code for performing the operations of the present application may be written in one or more programming languages ​​or a combination thereof, including object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Java, Smalltalk, C++, and conventional procedural programming languages ​​such as "C" or similar programming languages. The program code may be executed entirely on the user's computer, partially on the user's computer, as a separate software package, partially on the user's computer and partially on a remote computer, or entirely on a remote computer or server. In the case of a remote computer, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer through any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or may be connected to an external computer (e.g., via the Internet using an Internet service provider).

[0143] The flow chart and block diagram in the accompanying drawings illustrate the possible architecture, function and operation of the system, method and computer program product according to various embodiments of the present application. In this regard, each square box in the flow chart or block diagram can represent a module, a program segment or a part of a code, and the module, the program segment or a part of the code contains one or more executable instructions for realizing the specified logical function. It should also be noted that in some alternative implementations, the functions marked in the square box can also occur in a sequence different from that marked in the accompanying drawings. For example, two square boxes represented in succession can actually be executed substantially in parallel, and they can sometimes be executed in the opposite order, depending on the functions involved. It should also be noted that each square box in the block diagram and / or flow chart, and the combination of the square boxes in the block diagram and / or flow chart can be implemented with a dedicated hardware-based system that performs a specified function or operation, or can be implemented with a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions.

[0144] The modules involved in the embodiments described in this application may be implemented by software or hardware, wherein the name of the module does not constitute a limitation on the unit itself in some cases.

[0145] The computer-readable storage medium provided by the present application stores computer-readable program instructions (i.e., computer programs) for executing the security protection method of the above-mentioned terminal device, which can solve the technical problem of how to effectively perform data security protection on the terminal device and prevent data leakage under abnormal conditions. Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the computer-readable storage medium provided by the present application are the same as the beneficial effects of the security protection method of the terminal device provided by the above-mentioned embodiment, and will not be repeated here.

[0146] In addition, an embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program product, including a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the security protection method for a terminal device as in the above embodiment.

[0147] The computer program product provided by the present application can solve the technical problem of how to effectively protect the data security of the terminal device and prevent data leakage under abnormal conditions. Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the computer program product provided by the embodiment of the present application are the same as the beneficial effects of the security protection method of the terminal device provided by the above embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0148] The above descriptions are only some embodiments of the present application, and are not intended to limit the patent scope of the present application. All equivalent structural changes made using the contents of the present application specification and drawings under the technical concept of the present application, or direct / indirect applications in other related technical fields are included in the patent protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A security protection method for a terminal device, comprising: When it is detected that the state of the terminal device is in a target abnormal state, a preset protection operation is performed through a target interface of the non-volatile NAND flash memory; The preset protection operation is used to prevent the terminal device from being turned on and flashed, and the target interface is a private CMD interface.

2. The security protection method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The preset protection operation includes at least one of the following: Erasing firmware data of a firmware unit of the nonvolatile NAND flash memory; A firmware mapping table of the non-volatile NAND flash memory is changed.

3. The security protection method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Through the target interface of the non-volatile NAND flash memory, the preset protection operations are performed, including: Sending a target command to a control unit of the non-volatile NAND flash memory via a target interface of the non-volatile NAND flash memory; The target instruction is used to trigger the control unit to perform a preset protection operation.

4. The security protection method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The detection method of the target abnormal state includes at least one of the following: In the case of identifying that an illegal flashing operation is performed on the terminal device, determining that the state of the terminal device is in a target abnormal state; In the case where it is identified that an illegal disassembly operation has been performed on the terminal device, it is determined that the state of the terminal device is in a target abnormal state.

5. The security protection method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The identification method of the illegal flashing operation includes at least one of the following: Verifying the flashing version signature information indicated by the current flashing instruction of the terminal device, and if the verification of the flashing version signature information fails, determining that an illegal flashing operation is performed on the terminal device; Determine the flashing version number indicated by the current flashing instruction of the terminal device, and if it is determined based on the flashing version number that the current flashing is a version rollback, determine that an illegal flashing operation is performed on the terminal device; Determine the flashing mode indicated by the current flashing instruction of the terminal device. When the flashing mode is fastboot flashing, determine that an illegal flashing operation is performed on the terminal device.

6. The security protection method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The identification method of the illegal disassembly operation includes: In the case of triggering the generation of a target interrupt signal, performing a first identity authentication, wherein the target interrupt signal is generated based on the target Hall switch of the terminal device detecting that the housing of the terminal device is disassembled; When the first identity authentication fails, it is determined that an illegal disassembly operation has been performed on the terminal device.

7. The security protection method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The identification method of the illegal disassembly operation includes: In the case of triggering a change in the target GPIO level, performing a second identity authentication, wherein the target GPIO level changes based on the target spring of the terminal device detecting that the housing of the terminal device is disassembled; When the second identity authentication fails, it is determined that an illegal disassembly operation has been performed on the terminal device.

8. The security protection method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The identification method of the illegal disassembly operation includes: In the case of triggering a change in target magnetic field information, performing a third identity authentication, wherein the target magnetic field information changes based on the magnetic sensing element of the terminal device detecting that the housing of the terminal device is disassembled; When the third identity authentication fails, it is determined that an illegal disassembly operation has been performed on the terminal device.

9. The security protection method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The identification method of the illegal disassembly operation includes: In the case of triggering a change in target illumination information, performing a fourth identity authentication, wherein the target illumination information changes based on a light sensor of the terminal device detecting that a housing of the terminal device is disassembled; When the fourth identity authentication fails, it is determined that an illegal disassembly operation has been performed on the terminal device.

10. The security protection method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that: The non-volatile NAND flash memory is an eMMC memory, a UFS flash memory or an NVMe SSD memory.

11. A terminal device, characterized in that: include: A memory, a processor, and a security protection program for a terminal device stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the security protection program for the terminal device implements the security protection method for the terminal device as described in any one of claims 1 to 10 when executed by the processor.

12. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a security protection program for a terminal device, and when the security protection program for the terminal device is executed by a processor, the security protection method for a terminal device according to any one of claims 1 to 10 is implemented.

13. A computer program product, characterized in that The computer program product comprises a security protection program for a terminal device, and when the security protection program for the terminal device is executed by a processor, the steps of the security protection method for a terminal device as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 10 are implemented.

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