A method for identity authentication and key negotiation in Internet of Vehicles

Abstract

The present invention provides a vehicle networking identity authentication and key negotiation method, including: the vehicle networking system is initialized and system parameters are generated; the vehicle and the roadside unit are registered in a trusted institution and share authentication keys; the vehicle generates a vehicle authentication request message based on an elliptic curve and sends the vehicle authentication request message to the roadside unit; the roadside unit calculates the roadside unit authentication request message based on the elliptic curve and sends the roadside unit authentication request message to the trusted institution; the trusted institution authenticates the vehicle and the roadside unit; the trusted institution negotiates a session key for the vehicle and the roadside unit. The present invention can solve the problems of high resource consumption in the prior art and security threats brought by quantum computers.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of vehicle networking, and in particular to a vehicle networking identity authentication and key negotiation method. Background Art

[0002] The Internet of Vehicles plays a vital role in improving road safety and traffic efficiency through vehicle-to-vehicle communication and vehicle-to-roadside unit communication. However, the open communication environment also brings challenges in security and privacy. Potential illegal or malicious vehicles may carry out active attacks such as impersonation attacks and replay attacks by eavesdropping on wireless communications and tampering with information. These attacks not only cause traffic congestion and driver privacy leakage, but also threaten life safety.

[0003] IoV authentication and key negotiation can effectively prevent illegal or malicious nodes from impersonating legitimate vehicles and ensure the confidentiality and integrity of communications by authenticating the identities of both communicating parties (vehicles and roadside units) and securely negotiating session keys. However, existing IoV authentication and key negotiation methods use classical cryptographic operations and face the problem of high resource consumption. In addition, existing IoV authentication and key negotiation methods rely on difficult mathematical problems. With the improvement of computing power and the emergence of quantum computers, these methods will become very fragile. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a method for identity authentication and key negotiation in an Internet of Vehicles to solve the problems of high resource consumption in the prior art and the security threats brought by quantum computers.

[0005] A vehicle networking identity authentication and key negotiation method is applied to a vehicle networking system, wherein the vehicle networking system includes a vehicle, a roadside unit, and a trusted institution. The method includes the following steps:

[0006] Step S1, the Internet of Vehicles system is initialized and system parameters are generated;

[0007] Step S2, the vehicle and the roadside unit register with a trusted institution and share an authentication key;

[0008] Step S3, the vehicle generates a vehicle authentication request message based on the elliptic curve, and sends the vehicle authentication request message to the roadside unit. After receiving the vehicle authentication request message, the roadside unit calculates the roadside unit authentication request message based on the elliptic curve, and sends the roadside unit authentication request message to the trusted institution;

[0009] Step S4, the trusted institution authenticates the vehicle and the roadside unit, wherein the trusted institution parses the real identity information and authentication key of the vehicle and the roadside unit, and then the trusted institution authenticates the authentication key of the vehicle and the roadside unit using the continuous variable quantum state;

[0010] Step S5: The trusted institution negotiates a session key for the vehicle and the roadside unit, wherein the trusted institution selects the session key, and the vehicle and the roadside unit parse the session key.

[0011] According to the vehicle network identity authentication and key negotiation method provided by the present invention, elliptic curve cryptography and secure hash functions are used to achieve conditional privacy protection and session key negotiation; the quantum teleportation characteristics of continuous variable quantum states (i.e., only local operations are required, and no ciphertext needs to be sent) are used to authenticate the vehicle and the roadside unit; the quantum teleportation characteristics of continuous variable quantum states minimize the transmission of sensitive information and reduce the number of information interactions; in addition, the quantum mechanical properties of continuous variable quantum states provide security for the authentication process and session key negotiation process in the method; compared with methods based on classical cryptography, the communication overhead of the present invention is lower; in addition, compared with existing methods based on quantum cryptography, the present invention uses continuous variable quantum states that are easier to prepare. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0012] Figure 1 The figure is a flow chart of the vehicle networking identity authentication and key negotiation method of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0013] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0014] See also Figure 1 The vehicle networking identity authentication and key negotiation method provided by the embodiment of the present invention is applied to a vehicle networking system, wherein the vehicle networking system includes a vehicle, a roadside unit and a trusted institution, and the method includes the following steps:

[0015] Step S1, the Internet of Vehicles system is initialized and system parameters are generated.

[0016] Wherein, step S1 specifically includes:

[0017] Trusted Authority from Elliptic Curve E Select a generator P , then, with prime numbers q Generate an elliptic curve cyclic additive group for order G ;

[0018] Trusted authority selects random numbers sAs the system master key, the trusted institution selects five one-way hash functions, namely the first one-way hash function h 1. Second one-way hash function h 2. The third one-way hash function h 3. The fourth one-way hash function h 4. The fifth one-way hash function h 5;

[0019] Trusted institutions for vehicle cuckoo filters ICF v and roadside unit cuckoo filter ICF r Initialize;

[0020] The trusted institution operates the system master key and generator based on the elliptic curve to obtain the system public key ;

[0021] Trusted authority generates system parameters para :

[0022] para ={ E , q , G , P pub , h 1, h 2, h 3, h 4, h 5}.

[0023] In step S2, the vehicle and the roadside unit register with a trusted institution and share an authentication key.

[0024] Wherein, step S2 specifically includes:

[0025] Vehicle will be the real identity of the vehicle RID v Sent to a trusted institution, which uses the first one-way hash function h 1Calculate the vehicle's authentication key k v , k v = h 1( RID v ), then the trusted authority sends the vehicle’s authentication key k v Insert vehicle cuckoo filter ICF v and will k v Sent to the vehicle through a secret channel, the vehicle will k vStored confidentially in a tamper-proof device;

[0026] The roadside unit will RID r Sent to a trusted institution, which uses the first one-way hash function h 1 Calculate the authentication key of the drive test unit k r , k r = h 1( RID r ), then the trusted authority sends the authentication key of the drive test unit k r Insert RSU Cuckoo Filter ICF r and will k r It is sent to the roadside unit through a secret channel, and the roadside unit stores it secretly. k r .

[0027] Step S3, the vehicle generates a vehicle authentication request message based on the elliptic curve and sends the vehicle authentication request message to the roadside unit. After receiving the vehicle authentication request message, the roadside unit calculates the roadside unit authentication request message based on the elliptic curve and sends the roadside unit authentication request message to the trusted organization.

[0028] Wherein, step S3 specifically includes:

[0029] Step S301, the vehicle generates a vehicle authentication request message:

[0030] Vehicle selection random number , and with the generator P Perform elliptic curve calculation to obtain the vehicle public key P v , ;

[0031] The vehicle will be randomized With the system public key P pub Perform elliptic curve operations and then pass through a second one-way hash function h 2 Calculate and obtain the anonymous identity of the vehicle ;

[0032] Vehicle will be the real identity of the vehicle RID v Partial anonymity with vehicle identity Perform XOR operation to obtain the anonymous identity of the vehicle PID v , ,in, Is the exclusive OR operator symbol;

[0033] The vehicle uses a third one-way hash function h 3 pairs of anonymous vehicle identities PID v , vehicle public key P v Perform hash operation to obtain vehicle signature , ;

[0034] Vehicles will be anonymous PID v , vehicle public key P v , Vehicle Signature Combined into a vehicle authentication request message M 1, , and M 1 is sent to the roadside unit;

[0035] Step S302: The roadside unit generates a roadside unit authentication request message:

[0036] The roadside unit receives the vehicle authentication request message M 1, calculate the vehicle signature verification message , , and Signature with the vehicle received Compare, if and If they are consistent, the roadside unit selects a random number , and with the generator P Perform elliptic curve calculation to obtain the roadside unit public key P r , ;

[0037] The roadside unit will be random number With the system public key P pub After performing elliptic curve operations, the second one-way hash function is used h 2 Calculate and obtain the anonymous identity of the roadside unit ;

[0038] The roadside unit will RID r Partial anonymity with roadside units Perform XOR operation to obtain the anonymous identity of the roadside unit PID r , ;

[0039] The roadside unit uses the fourth one-way hash functionh 4 pairs of vehicles with anonymous identities PID v , vehicle public key P v , anonymous identity of roadside unit PID r , RSU public key P r Perform calculations to obtain the roadside unit signature , ;

[0040] The roadside unit will anonymize the vehicle's identity PID v , vehicle public key P v , anonymous identity of roadside unit PID r , RSU public key P r , Roadside Unit Signature Combined into a roadside unit authentication request message M 2, , and M 2Send to a trusted authority.

[0041] In step S4, the trusted institution authenticates the vehicle and the roadside unit, wherein the trusted institution parses the real identity information and authentication key of the vehicle and the roadside unit, and then the trusted institution authenticates the authentication key of the vehicle and the roadside unit using the continuous variable quantum state.

[0042] Among them, in step S4, the trusted institution parses the real identity information and authentication key of the vehicle, specifically including:

[0043] The trusted institution receives the roadside unit authentication request message M 2, calculate the roadside unit signature verification message , , and the received roadside unit signature For comparison, if and Inconsistency indicates M 2 is changed, the message reception will stop.

[0044] like and If the trustworthy institution M In 2, the real identities of the vehicle and the roadside unit and the corresponding authentication keys are calculated. The calculation process is as follows:

[0045] The trusted institution performs elliptic curve operations on the system master key and the vehicle public key, and then uses a second one-way hash function h 2 Calculate and obtain partial vehicle identity information ; Then, the vehicle’s anonymous identity PID v Partial vehicle identity information Perform XOR operation to obtain the identity of the vehicle to be authenticated , , the trusted institution uses the first one-way hash function h 1. Treat the vehicle identity verification Perform calculations to obtain the vehicle authentication key to be authenticated , ;

[0046] The trusted authority will use the system master key and the roadside unit public key P r After performing elliptic curve operations, the second one-way hash function is used h 2 Calculate and obtain partial identity information of the roadside unit ; Then, the anonymous identity of the roadside unit PID r Partial identity information of the roadside unit Perform XOR operation to obtain the identity of the roadside unit to be authenticated , , the trusted institution uses the first one-way hash function h 1. Authentication of roadside unit identity Perform calculations to obtain the roadside unit authentication key to be authenticated , ;

[0047] Subsequently, the trusted institutions respectively ICF v and roadside unit cuckoo filter ICF r Check if it exists in and If the vehicle cuckoo filter ICF v Existence , and the roadside unit cuckoo filter ICF r Existence , then the trusted authority uses the continuous variable quantum state to authenticate the authentication key of the vehicle and the roadside unit. ICF v Does not exist , or roadside unit cuckoo filter ICF r Does not exist , it indicates that the vehicle or roadside unit is illegal and the communication is terminated.

[0048] In step S4, the trusted institution uses the continuous variable quantum state to authenticate the authentication keys of the vehicle and the roadside unit, specifically including:

[0049] The trusted mechanism generates a linear 4-mode continuous variable quantum state, and the position and momentum of each quantum mode generated are:

[0050] ; ;

[0051] ; ;

[0052] ; ;

[0053] ; ;

[0054] in, , , , Respectively represent the positions of the first, second, third, and fourth quantum modes, , , , They represent the momentum of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quantum modes respectively; , , , Respectively represent the initial positions of the first, second, third, and fourth quantum modes, , , , Respectively represent the initial momentum of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quantum modes; e is an exponential function, r is the compression parameter. , , , , , , , The values ​​of are all in accordance with normal distribution.

[0055] The trusted institution performs an inverse Fourier transform on the second quantum mode and the fourth quantum mode and obtains the following formula:

[0056] ; ;

[0057] ; ;

[0058] when , the four quantum modes have strong correlation. After inverse Fourier transform, the positions and momentums of the four quantum modes satisfy the following equations:

[0059] ; ;

[0060] ; ;

[0061] The trusted institution sends the first quantum mode and the third quantum mode to the vehicle and the roadside unit respectively, and keeps the second quantum mode and the fourth quantum mode locally;

[0062] Vehicle selection random number m , the locally stored vehicle authentication key k v Convert to binary , perform a permutation operation on the first quantum mode, and in the quantum mode i Permutation operation on is defined as:

[0063] ;

[0064] in, represents the position of the quantum mode, represents the momentum of the quantum mode, represents the positional permutation parameter, represents the momentum displacement parameter.

[0065] After permuting the first quantum mode, we get the following formula:

[0066] ;

[0067] ;

[0068] The vehicle then returns the first quantum mode to the trusted institution;

[0069] RSU selection random number n , the locally stored authentication key of the drive test unit k r Convert to binary , then, the roadside unit performs a permutation operation on the third quantum mode and obtains the following formula:

[0070] ;

[0071] ;

[0072] Subsequently, the RSU returns the third quantum mode to the trusted institution;

[0073] The trusted authority will authenticate the vehicle authentication key and the roadside unit authentication key to be authenticated Converted into the binary number of the vehicle authentication key to be authenticated and the authentication key binary number of the roadside unit to be authenticated , the trusted institution measures the momentum of the four quantum modes and obtains the momentum measurement results of the first quantum mode , the momentum measurement results of the second quantum mode , the momentum measurement results of the third quantum mode , the momentum measurement results of the fourth quantum mode , trusted institutions use , , , , , , calculate the vehicle identity authentication formula T v and roadside unit identity determination formula T r , the expression is:

[0074] ;

[0075] ;

[0076] like T v If it is equal to 0, it means that the vehicle is legal; if T v If it is not equal to 0, it means that the vehicle is illegal;

[0077] like T r is equal to 0, it indicates that the identity of the roadside unit is legal; if T r If it is not equal to 0, it means that the roadside unit is illegal;

[0078] when T v =0 and T r =0 are both true, the trusted institution proceeds to the next step, otherwise, the communication is terminated.

[0079] Step S5: The trusted institution negotiates a session key for the vehicle and the roadside unit, wherein the trusted institution selects the session key, and the vehicle and the roadside unit parse the session key.

[0080] Wherein, step S5 specifically includes:

[0081] Trusted authority selects random numbers k As a session key, the trusted authority treats the vehicle authentication key , random numbers m XOR operation is performed with the session key to obtain vehicle confirmation information ACK v , , then, use the fifth one-way hash function h 5. Treat vehicle identity verification and vehicle confirmation information ACK v Perform calculations and obtain vehicle confirmation signature , ;

[0082] Trusted authority authenticates the roadside unit authentication key , random numbers n , and the session key to perform an XOR operation to obtain the roadside unit confirmation information ACK r , , then, use the fifth one-way hash function h 5. Authentication of roadside unit identity Confirm information with the roadside unit ACK r Perform calculations and obtain the roadside unit confirmation signature , ;

[0083] Trusted institutions will , , ACK r , ACK v Combine into confirmation message M 3. , and M 3. Send to the roadside unit;

[0084] Roadside unit receives confirmation message M 3, the fifth one-way hash function is used h 5. The true identity of the roadside unit RID r And the received roadside unit confirmation information ACK r Calculate and obtain the confirmation signature of the roadside unit to be authenticated , , the roadside unit verifies the signature of the roadside unit to be authenticated Is it equal to the received roadside unit confirmation signature? ,like and If they are equal, the roadside unit will confirm the information ACK r , random number n and the stored authentication key of the drive test unit k r Perform XOR operation to obtain the session key of the roadside unit sk 1, , then the roadside unit will feedback the message M 4 sent to the vehicle, ;

[0085] The vehicle receives feedback message M 4, the fifth one-way hash function is used h 5. The real identity of the vehicle RID v and received vehicle confirmation information ACK v Perform calculations to obtain the confirmation signature of the vehicle to be authenticated , , vehicle verification awaiting vehicle confirmation signature Is it equal to the received vehicle confirmation signature? ;like and If they are equal, the vehicle will confirm the information ACK v , random numbers m and the stored vehicle authentication key k v Perform XOR operation to obtain the vehicle's session key sk 2, ,and sk 1= sk 2.

[0086] In summary, according to the vehicle network identity authentication and key negotiation method provided by the present invention, elliptic curve cryptography and secure hash functions are used to achieve conditional privacy protection and session key negotiation; the quantum teleportation characteristics of continuous variable quantum states (that is, only local operations are required, and no ciphertext needs to be sent) are used to authenticate the vehicle and the roadside unit; the quantum teleportation characteristics of continuous variable quantum states minimize the transmission of sensitive information and reduce the number of information interactions; in addition, the quantum mechanical properties of continuous variable quantum states provide security for the authentication process and session key negotiation process in this method; compared with methods based on classical cryptography, the communication overhead of the present invention is lower; in addition, compared with existing methods based on quantum cryptography, the present invention uses continuous variable quantum states that are easier to prepare.

[0087] In the description of this specification, the description with reference to the terms "one embodiment", "some embodiments", "example", "specific example", or "some examples" means that the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present invention. In this specification, the schematic representation of the above terms does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described can be combined in any one or more embodiments or examples in a suitable manner.

[0088] Although the embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions and variations may be made to the embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the present invention, and that the scope of the present invention is defined by the claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A method for identity authentication and key negotiation in an Internet of Vehicles, characterized in that: Applied to a vehicle networking system, the vehicle networking system includes a vehicle, a roadside unit and a trusted institution, and the method includes the following steps: Step S1, the Internet of Vehicles system is initialized and system parameters are generated; Step S2, the vehicle and the roadside unit register with a trusted institution and share an authentication key; Step S3, the vehicle generates a vehicle authentication request message based on the elliptic curve, and sends the vehicle authentication request message to the roadside unit. After receiving the vehicle authentication request message, the roadside unit calculates the roadside unit authentication request message based on the elliptic curve, and sends the roadside unit authentication request message to the trusted institution; Step S4, the trusted institution authenticates the vehicle and the roadside unit, wherein the trusted institution parses the real identity information and authentication key of the vehicle and the roadside unit, and then the trusted institution authenticates the authentication key of the vehicle and the roadside unit using the continuous variable quantum state; Step S5, the trusted institution negotiates a session key for the vehicle and the roadside unit, wherein the trusted institution selects the session key, and the vehicle and the roadside unit parse the session key; In step S4, the trusted institution uses the continuous variable quantum state to authenticate the authentication keys of the vehicle and the roadside unit, specifically including: The trusted mechanism generates a linear 4-mode continuous variable quantum state, and the position and momentum of each quantum mode generated are: ； ； ； ； ； ； ； ； in, , , , Respectively represent the positions of the first, second, third, and fourth quantum modes, , , , They represent the momentum of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quantum modes respectively; , , , Respectively represent the initial positions of the first, second, third, and fourth quantum modes, , , , Respectively represent the initial momentum of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quantum modes; e is an exponential function, r is the compression parameter; The trusted institution performs an inverse Fourier transform on the second quantum mode and the fourth quantum mode and obtains the following formula: ； ； ； ； After the inverse Fourier transform, the positions and momentums of the four quantum modes satisfy the following equations: ； ； ； ； The trusted institution sends the first quantum mode and the third quantum mode to the vehicle and the roadside unit respectively, and keeps the second quantum mode and the fourth quantum mode locally; Vehicle selection random number m , the locally stored vehicle authentication key k v Convert to binary , perform a permutation operation on the first quantum mode and obtain the following formula: ； ； The vehicle then returns the first quantum mode to the trusted institution; RSU selection random number n , the locally stored authentication key of the drive test unit k r Convert to binary , then, the roadside unit performs a permutation operation on the third quantum mode and obtains the following formula: ； ； Subsequently, the RSU returns the third quantum mode to the trusted institution; The trusted authority will authenticate the vehicle authentication key and the roadside unit authentication key to be authenticated Converted into the binary number of the vehicle authentication key to be authenticated and the authentication key binary number of the roadside unit to be authenticated , the trusted institution measures the momentum of the four quantum modes and obtains the momentum measurement results of the first quantum mode , the momentum measurement results of the second quantum mode , the momentum measurement results of the third quantum mode , the momentum measurement results of the fourth quantum mode , trusted institutions use , , , , , , calculate the vehicle identity authentication formula T v and roadside unit identity determination formula T r , the expression is: ； ； like T v If it is equal to 0, it means that the vehicle is legal; if T v If it is not equal to 0, it means that the vehicle is illegal; like T r is equal to 0, it indicates that the identity of the roadside unit is legal; if T r If it is not equal to 0, it means that the roadside unit is illegal; when T v =0 and T r =0 are both true, the trusted institution proceeds to the next step, otherwise, the communication is terminated.

2. The vehicle networking identity authentication and key negotiation method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S1 specifically includes: Trusted Authority from Elliptic Curve E Select a generator P , then, with prime numbers q Generate an elliptic curve cyclic additive group for order G ; Trusted authority selects random numbers s As the system master key, the trusted institution selects five one-way hash functions, namely the first one-way hash function h 1. Second one-way hash function h 2. The third one-way hash function h 3. The fourth one-way hash function h 4. The fifth one-way hash function h 5; Trusted institutions for vehicle cuckoo filters ICF v and roadside unit cuckoo filter ICF r Initialize; The trusted institution operates the system master key and generator based on the elliptic curve to obtain the system public key ; Trusted authority generates system parameters para : para ={ E , q , G , P pub , h 1, h 2, h 3, h 4, h 5}。 3. The vehicle networking identity authentication and key negotiation method according to claim 2, characterized in that: Step S2 specifically includes: Vehicle will be the real identity of the vehicle RID v Sent to a trusted institution, which uses the first one-way hash function h 1Calculate the vehicle's authentication key k v , k v = h 1( RID v ), then the trusted authority sends the vehicle’s authentication key k v Insert vehicle cuckoo filter ICF v and will k v Sent to the vehicle through a secret channel, the vehicle will k v Stored confidentially in a tamper-proof device; The roadside unit will RID r Sent to a trusted institution, which uses the first one-way hash function h 1 Calculate the authentication key of the drive test unit k r , k r = h 1( RID r ), then the trusted authority sends the authentication key of the drive test unit k r Insert RSU Cuckoo Filter ICF r and will k r It is sent to the roadside unit through a secret channel, and the roadside unit stores it secretly. k r .

4. The vehicle networking identity authentication and key negotiation method according to claim 3, characterized in that: Step S3 specifically includes: Step S301, the vehicle generates a vehicle authentication request message: Vehicle selection random number , and with the generator P Perform elliptic curve calculation to obtain the vehicle public key P v , ; The vehicle will be randomized With the system public key P pub Perform elliptic curve operations and then pass through a second one-way hash function h 2 Calculate and obtain the anonymous identity of the vehicle ; Vehicle will be the real identity of the vehicle RID v Partial anonymity with vehicle identity Perform XOR operation to obtain the anonymous identity of the vehicle PID v , ,in, Is the exclusive OR operator symbol; The vehicle uses a third one-way hash function h 3 pairs of anonymous vehicle identities PID v , vehicle public key P v Perform hash operation to obtain vehicle signature , ; Vehicles will be anonymous PID v , vehicle public key P v , Vehicle Signature Combined into a vehicle authentication request message M 1, , and M 1 is sent to the roadside unit; Step S302: The roadside unit generates a roadside unit authentication request message: The roadside unit receives the vehicle authentication request message M 1, calculate the vehicle signature verification message , , and Signature with the vehicle received Compare, if and If they are consistent, the roadside unit selects a random number , and with the generator P Perform elliptic curve calculation to obtain the roadside unit public key P r , ; The roadside unit will be random number With the system public key P pub After performing elliptic curve operations, the second one-way hash function is used h 2 Calculate and obtain the anonymous identity of the roadside unit ; The roadside unit will RID r Partial anonymity with roadside units Perform XOR operation to obtain the anonymous identity of the roadside unit PID r , ; The roadside unit uses the fourth one-way hash function h 4 pairs of vehicles with anonymous identities PID v , vehicle public key P v , anonymous identity of roadside unit PID r , RSU public key P r Perform calculations to obtain the roadside unit signature , ; The roadside unit will anonymize the vehicle's identity PID v , vehicle public key P v , anonymous identity of roadside unit PID r , RSU public key P r , Roadside unit signature Combined into a roadside unit authentication request message M 2, , and M 2Send to a trusted authority.

5. The vehicle networking identity authentication and key negotiation method according to claim 4, characterized in that: In step S4, the trusted institution parses the real identity information and authentication key of the vehicle, specifically including: The trusted institution receives the roadside unit authentication request message M 2, calculate the roadside unit signature verification message , , and the received roadside unit signature For comparison, if and If the trustworthy institution M In 2, the real identities of the vehicle and the roadside unit and the corresponding authentication keys are calculated. The calculation process is as follows: The trusted institution performs elliptic curve operations on the system master key and the vehicle public key, and then uses a second one-way hash function h 2 Calculate and obtain partial vehicle identity information ; Then, the vehicle’s anonymous identity PID v Partial vehicle identity information Perform XOR operation to obtain the identity of the vehicle to be authenticated , , the trusted institution uses the first one-way hash function h 1. Treat the vehicle identity verification Perform calculations to obtain the vehicle authentication key to be authenticated , ; The trusted authority will use the system master key and the roadside unit public key P r After performing elliptic curve operations, the second one-way hash function is used h 2 Calculate and obtain partial identity information of the roadside unit ; Then, the anonymous identity of the roadside unit PID r Partial identity information of the roadside unit Perform XOR operation to obtain the identity of the roadside unit to be authenticated , , the trusted institution uses the first one-way hash function h 1. Authentication of roadside unit identity Perform calculations to obtain the roadside unit authentication key to be authenticated , ; Subsequently, the trusted institutions respectively ICF v and roadside unit cuckoo filter ICF r Check if it exists in and If the vehicle cuckoo filter ICF v Existence , and the roadside unit cuckoo filter ICF r Existence , the trusted authority uses the continuous variable quantum state to authenticate the authentication keys of the vehicle and the roadside unit.

6. The vehicle network identity authentication and key negotiation method according to claim 5, characterized in that: Step S5 specifically includes: Trusted authority selects random numbers k As a session key, the trusted authority treats the vehicle authentication key , random numbers m XOR operation is performed with the session key to obtain vehicle confirmation information ACK v , , then, use the fifth one-way hash function h 5. Treat vehicle identity verification and vehicle confirmation information ACK v Perform calculations and obtain vehicle confirmation signature , ; Trusted authority authenticates the roadside unit authentication key , random numbers n , and the session key to perform an XOR operation to obtain the roadside unit confirmation information ACK r , , then, use the fifth one-way hash function h 5. Authentication of roadside unit identity Confirm information with the roadside unit ACK r Perform calculations and obtain the roadside unit confirmation signature , ; Trusted institutions will , , ACK r , ACK v Combine into confirmation message M 3. , and M 3. Send to the roadside unit; Roadside unit receives confirmation message M 3, the fifth one-way hash function is used h 5. The true identity of the roadside unit RID r And the received roadside unit confirmation information ACK r Calculate and obtain the confirmation signature of the roadside unit to be authenticated , , the roadside unit verifies the signature of the roadside unit to be authenticated Is it equal to the received roadside unit confirmation signature? ,like and If they are equal, the roadside unit will confirm the information ACK r , random number n and the stored authentication key of the drive test unit k r Perform XOR operation to obtain the session key of the roadside unit sk 1, , then the roadside unit will feedback the message M 4 sent to the vehicle, ; The vehicle receives feedback message M 4, the fifth one-way hash function is used h 5. The real identity of the vehicle RID v and received vehicle confirmation information ACK v Perform calculations to obtain the confirmation signature of the vehicle to be authenticated , , vehicle verification awaiting vehicle confirmation signature Is it equal to the received vehicle confirmation signature? ;like and If they are equal, the vehicle will confirm the information ACK v , random numbers m and the stored vehicle authentication key k v Perform XOR operation to obtain the vehicle's session key sk 2, ,and sk 1= sk 2.

Images