Communication method and device, electronic equipment, storage medium and product

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of communication, and particularly provides a communication method and device, electronic equipment, a storage medium and a product. The method comprises the following steps: receiving first information from a first application, wherein the first information is obtained by encrypting a temporary key and a first PIN by using an SIM card public key; decrypting the first information by using the SIM card private key to obtain the temporary key and the first PIN; and when the identity verification of the first PIN is passed, communicating with the first application by using the temporary key. According to the method and the device, the secure communication between the first application and the SIM card in the offline state can be realized under the condition that a preset key is not needed. And meanwhile, the temporary key only takes effect in the validity period of the verification, so that the method can flexibly adapt to a dynamically changing environment, the security risk caused by the fact that the key is not changed for a long time is avoided, and the security of the interaction process is further improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present disclosure relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a communication method and device, electronic equipment, storage medium and product. Background Art

[0002] Currently, the transmission method between the SIM card and the application in the same terminal is to encrypt sensitive data through a negotiated key or a key provided by the application. However, in an offline state, the SIM card cannot verify the legitimacy of the key provided by the application, which reduces the security of the communication between the SIM card and the application. Summary of the invention

[0003] In view of the above problems, the present disclosure is proposed. The present disclosure provides a communication method and device, an electronic device, a storage medium and a product.

[0004] According to one aspect of the present disclosure, a communication method is provided, including: receiving first information from a first application, the first information being obtained by encrypting a temporary key and a first PIN using a SIM card public key; decrypting the first information using a SIM card private key to obtain the temporary key and the first PIN; when the identity authentication of the first PIN passes, communicating with the first application using the temporary key; wherein the first application and the SIM card are set in the same terminal.

[0005] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, a communication method is provided, including: using a SIM card public key to encrypt a temporary key and a first PIN to obtain first information; wherein the first PIN is used for the SIM card to authenticate the identity of the first application; sending the first information to the SIM card; using the temporary key to communicate with the SIM card; wherein the first application and the SIM card are set in the same terminal.

[0006] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, a communication device is provided, including: a receiving module, used to receive first information from a first application, the first information being obtained by encrypting a temporary key and a first PIN using a SIM card public key; a decryption module, used to decrypt the first information using a SIM card key to obtain the temporary key and the first PIN; and a verification module, used to communicate with the first application using the temporary key when the identity authentication of the first PIN passes; wherein the first application and the SIM card are set in the same terminal.

[0007] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, a communication device is provided, including: an encryption module, which uses a SIM card public key to encrypt a temporary key and a first PIN to obtain first information; wherein the first PIN is used for the SIM card to authenticate the identity of the first application; a sending module, which sends the first information to the SIM card; and a communication module, which uses the temporary key to communicate with the SIM card; wherein the first application and the SIM card are set in the same terminal.

[0008] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, an electronic device is provided, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the method described in any one of the above embodiments.

[0009] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program / instruction is stored. When the computer program / instruction is executed by a processor, the method described in any of the above embodiments is implemented.

[0010] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, a computer program product is provided, including a computer program / instruction, which implements the method described in any of the above embodiments when the computer program / instruction is executed by a processor.

[0011] As will be described in detail below, a communication method and device, electronic device, storage medium and product according to an embodiment of the present disclosure are described. The present disclosure sends a first message to a SIM card through a first application. The first message is obtained by encrypting a temporary key and a first PIN using a public key of the SIM card. After the SIM card verifies the first PIN, the SIM card can communicate with the first application using the temporary key. In this way, the present disclosure verifies the legitimacy of the temporary key generated by the first application using the first PIN. When the verification is passed, it means that the legitimacy of the temporary key is confirmed, and it can be used to encrypt sensitive information in subsequent interactions between the first application and the SIM card. In this way, secure communication between the first application and the SIM card in an offline state can be achieved without the need for pre-setting the key. At the same time, the temporary key is only effective during the validity period of this verification, can flexibly adapt to dynamically changing environments, and also avoids security risks caused by the long-term invariance of the key, further improving the security of the interaction process.

[0012] It is to be understood that both the foregoing general description and the following detailed description are exemplary, and are intended to provide further explanation of the technology as claimed. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0013] The above and other purposes, features and advantages of the present disclosure will become more apparent by describing the embodiments of the present disclosure in more detail in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. The accompanying drawings are used to provide a further understanding of the embodiments of the present disclosure and constitute a part of the specification. Together with the embodiments of the present disclosure, they are used to explain the present disclosure and do not constitute a limitation of the present disclosure. In the accompanying drawings, the same reference numerals generally represent the same components or steps.

[0014] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a communication system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0015] Figure 2 It is an interaction diagram illustrating a communication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0016] Figure 3 is an interaction diagram illustrating a signing method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0017] Figure 4 is an interaction diagram illustrating PIN acquisition according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0018] Figure 5 is an interaction diagram illustrating data transmission according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0019] Figure 6 is an interaction diagram illustrating verification status logout according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0020] Figure 7 is a block diagram illustrating a communication device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0021] Figure 8 is a block diagram illustrating another communication device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0022] Fig. 9 is a hardware block diagram illustrating an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0023] Fig.10 is a schematic diagram illustrating a computer program product according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0024] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present disclosure more obvious, the exemplary embodiments according to the present disclosure will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present disclosure, rather than all the embodiments of the present disclosure, and it should be understood that the present disclosure is not limited to the exemplary embodiments described here.

[0025] At present, in the prior art, there are mainly the following secure communication methods between the SIM card and the application in the same terminal:

[0026] 1. The data transmitted between the SIM card and the application is not encrypted and is transmitted directly in plain text.

[0027] 2. During the interaction process, the key provided by the application is directly used to encrypt the transmitted sensitive data.

[0028] 3. The SIM card negotiates a key with the application to obtain a session key, and uses the session key to encrypt sensitive data.

[0029] However, in solution 1, not performing encryption may lead to the leakage of user sensitive information, thus causing serious business risks.

[0030] In Solution 2 and Solution 3, since the key verification needs to be done online, for some offline applications, it is impossible to obtain reliable keys online to encrypt sensitive data, nor is it possible to obtain key signatures to verify and encrypt sensitive information. If the preset key agreed upon in advance by the SIM card and the application is used, it is difficult to update the preset key in a timely manner in practice, since the update usually requires physical access to the device or complex configuration changes, which increases the risk and cost of leakage.

[0031] In order to solve the above problems, the present disclosure provides a communication method, which can be applied to a communication system, the system at least comprising: a first application and a SIM card. Further, it can also include a communication module and a security management platform. For example, it can refer to Figure 1 , Figure 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating a communication system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. Figure 1 As shown, the first application, the SIM card and the security management platform can interact through the communication module.

[0032] The present disclosure performs PIN verification on the first application before communication, and then uses the key provided by the first application for encryption after the verification is passed. Figure 2 is an interactive diagram illustrating a communication method of an embodiment of the present disclosure, such as Figure 2 As shown, the method may include:

[0033] S201, a first application encrypts a temporary key and a first PIN using a SIM card public key to obtain first information.

[0034] S202: The first application sends the first information to the SIM card.

[0035] S203: The SIM card receives first information from the first application.

[0036] S204: The SIM card decrypts the first information using the SIM card private key to obtain the temporary key and the first PIN.

[0037] S205: When the identity authentication of the first PIN is passed, the SIM card communicates with the first application using the temporary key.

[0038] In this embodiment, the first application may include, but is not limited to, at least one of the following: a mobile application (eg, a terminal APP), a desktop application, and a browser application.

[0039] The first application and the SIM card are arranged in the same terminal.

[0040] Before communication, the SIM card may generate a SIM card public key and a SIM card private key for encryption, send the SIM card public key to the first application, and store the SIM card private key locally on the SIM card.

[0041] After verifying the integrity and security of the SIM card public key, the first application can generate at least one temporary key for further encrypting information. The temporary key can further encrypt the subsequent interaction process based on the preset SIM card public and private keys, thereby ensuring the security of the interaction information to a certain extent.

[0042] The temporary key is only valid during the validity period of this verification, thereby reducing the exposure of sensitive information and the risk of malicious use.

[0043] The number and type of temporary keys are not specifically limited here and can be determined according to actual conditions. The types of temporary keys include but are not limited to at least one of the following: symmetric key, MAC key, asymmetric key, session key.

[0044] Exemplarily, the temporary key may include an encryption key and a MAC key, wherein the encryption key is used to encrypt the sensitive information to obtain a ciphertext, and then the MAC key is used to determine the MAC value of the ciphertext, thereby realizing the integrity check of the sensitive information.

[0045] When the first application generates a temporary key and sends the temporary key to the SIM card, it is necessary to send the first PIN to the SIM card at the same time to verify the legitimacy of the temporary key. Furthermore, the SIM card public key can be used to encrypt the temporary key and the first PIN to obtain the first information, thereby preventing the leakage of the temporary key and the first PIN to a certain extent, thereby improving the security of the subsequent interaction process.

[0046] The first information may be in any form, including but not limited to: instructions (such as APDU instructions) and messages.

[0047] The first PIN can be used to verify the identity of the user and needs to be re-entered each time a verification is performed.

[0048] After receiving the first information, the SIM card may use the locally stored SIM card private key to decrypt the first information to obtain a temporary key and a first PIN.

[0049] Next, the SIM card can authenticate the first PIN. When the authentication is successful, it is confirmed that the incoming temporary key is generated by a legitimate first application. The SIM card can store the temporary key for subsequent interactive encryption.

[0050] In summary, the present disclosure uses the first PIN to verify the legitimacy of the temporary key generated by the first application. When the verification is successful, it means that the legitimacy of the temporary key is confirmed, and it can be used to encrypt sensitive information in the subsequent interaction between the first application and the SIM card. In this way, secure communication between the first application and the SIM card can be achieved in an offline state without the need for pre-setting keys. At the same time, the temporary key is only effective within the validity period of this verification, can flexibly adapt to dynamically changing environments, and avoids security risks caused by the long-term unchanged key, further improving the security of the interaction process.

[0051] Before step S201, in order to ensure the security of the SIM card public key during transmission, the SIM card public key can be signed using a signature key to obtain signature information. The first application can decrypt the signature information using the signature key to obtain a safe and reliable SIM card public key. The signature information includes at least a signature and a SIM card public key.

[0052] Exemplarily, the signature key may be generated by a security management platform or by a SIM card itself.

[0053] The signature key can be a preset key or generated offline, which can be determined based on actual conditions.

[0054] The following will explain in conjunction with specific embodiments.

[0055] In an illustrative embodiment, the security management platform can generate a signature public key and a signature private key. The signature private key can be used to sign the SIM card public key, and the signature public key is used for verification. The security management platform can send the signature public key to the first application and store it locally in the first application. After receiving the signature information, the first application can use the local signature public key for verification, and if the verification passes, the SIM card public key is saved locally.

[0056] The step of signing the SIM card public key may be completed by the security management platform or by the SIM card.

[0057] When this step is completed by the security management platform, the SIM card needs to send the SIM card public key to the security management platform, and the security management platform uses the signature private key to sign the SIM card public key to obtain the signature information, and in response to receiving the signature acquisition request from the first application, sends it to the first application, thereby realizing the security management platform's comprehensive monitoring and management of the terminal, and improving management efficiency to a certain extent.

[0058] When this step is completed by the SIM card, the security management platform needs to send the signature private key to the SIM card, and the SIM card uses the signature private key to self-sign the SIM card public key to obtain the signature information, and in response to receiving the signature acquisition request from the first application, send it to the first application. In this way, the SIM card public key can be prevented from being leaked during the interaction between the security management platform and the SIM card to a certain extent, thereby improving the security of the subsequent communication process. For details, please refer to Figure 3 , Figure 3 is an interaction diagram illustrating a signing method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0059] When the first application interacts with the SIM card for the first time, there is no known PIN set in the SIM card. If the first application has obtained the SIM card public key, the first application can use the SIM card public key to encrypt the obtained second PIN to obtain the fourth information, and send the fourth information to the SIM card. The SIM card decrypts the fourth information to obtain the second PIN, and stores the second PIN locally.

[0060] The second PIN is the PIN code initially set by the user, and the first PIN is the PIN code entered by the user when logging in. If the two are the same, the verification is passed, and if they are different, the verification fails.

[0061] Optionally, after obtaining the second PIN, the SIM card may also send a response message to the first application, the response message being used to indicate the reception of the third message. The response message may be in any form, including but not limited to at least one of the following: a pop-up window, a text message, or a status code.

[0062] For example, please refer to Figure 4 , Figure 4 is an interactive diagram illustrating PIN acquisition in an embodiment of the present disclosure, such as Figure 4 As shown, in the initial stage, the second PIN is set by the user, the first application obtains the second PIN, encrypts it using the SIM card public key, and encapsulates it into APDU (i.e., the fourth information). Next, the APDU is sent to the SIM card, which decrypts it using the SIM card private key to obtain the second PIN and stores it locally. Finally, the SIM card sends a response message to the first application.

[0063] When the SIM card has a locally stored second PIN, and the user has not logged in to verify the PIN or when the secondary PIN verification fails, in step S205, the verification process of the first PIN may be: after receiving the first PIN, the SIM card may use the second PIN to authenticate the first PIN. When the second PIN is the same as the first PIN, it means that the authentication of the first PIN is passed, and the SIM card may store a temporary key and use the temporary key to communicate with the first application.

[0064] Optionally, when the first PIN is verified, the SIM card may mark the first application with a verification pass identifier. The identifier may be in any form, including but not limited to text, numbers, and characters.

[0065] The SIM card needs to update the temporary key every time it obtains the temporary key. This prevents the key from being cracked due to the key remaining unchanged for a long time. In addition, compared with the preset key, the update of the temporary key is more convenient and faster, and the update cost is lower.

[0066] The SIM card can store temporary keys in a preset location to facilitate tracing operations within a certain period of time.

[0067] or,

[0068] The temporary key replaces the stored position in the preset position, thereby saving storage space and reducing the possibility of leakage of historical temporary keys to a certain extent, thereby improving security.

[0069] After the first PIN is verified and within the verification validity period, the first application and the SIM card can communicate using the temporary key.

[0070] The temporary key can be used to encrypt all information or only sensitive information.

[0071] The sensitive information here may include but is not limited to at least one of the following: name, gender, age, ID number, telephone number, email address, home address, and account information.

[0072] The sender of the sensitive information may be the first application or a SIM card.

[0073] In an illustrative embodiment, when the sender of the sensitive information is the first application, the specific steps may include: when the first application obtains the first sensitive information, the first application may encrypt the first sensitive information using the temporary key to obtain the second information, and send the second information to the SIM card. After receiving the second information, the SIM card may decrypt the second information using the temporary key to obtain the first sensitive information.

[0074] Please refer to Figure 5 , Figure 5 is an interactive diagram illustrating data transmission according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, such as Figure 5 As shown in 501, after obtaining the sensitive information (i.e., the first sensitive information), the first application uses the symmetric key and the MAC key (i.e., the temporary key) to encrypt and encapsulate the sensitive information in turn to obtain an APDU instruction (i.e., the second information). At this time, the APDU instruction carries at least the encrypted first sensitive information and the MAC value of the first sensitive information. After the MAC is verified by the SIM card, the symmetric key is used to decrypt it to obtain the first sensitive information.

[0075] and / or,

[0076] In another exemplary embodiment, when the sender of the sensitive information is a SIM card, the specific steps may include: after obtaining the initial information, the SIM card may optionally perform data processing on the initial information according to actual conditions. The SIM card may encrypt the second sensitive information using the temporary key to obtain the third information; and send the third information to the first application. After receiving the third information, the first application may decrypt the third information using the temporary key to obtain the second sensitive information.

[0077] For example, Figure 5 As shown in 502, after the SIM card calculates and stores the data (i.e., the second sensitive information) (i.e., the above-mentioned data processing), it uses a symmetric key to encrypt, uses a MAC key to calculate the ciphertext MAC, and encapsulates it into an APDU (i.e., the third information). At this time, the APDU instruction carries at least the encrypted second sensitive information and the MAC value of the second sensitive information. After the first application verifies the MAC, it uses the symmetric key to decrypt it to obtain the first sensitive information.

[0078] When the first application meets the preset condition, the first application may send a deregistration instruction to the SIM card.

[0079] The preset conditions include but are not limited to at least one of the following: reaching a first preset time, switching the screen, and no operation time reaching a second preset time. The first preset time and the second preset time can be determined according to actual conditions and are not limited here.

[0080] After receiving the deregistration instruction, the SIM card can deregister the identification of the first application verification. Further, the temporary key stored locally can be deleted, thereby avoiding leakage of the temporary key and improving security.

[0081] Optionally, after the deregistration is completed, the SIM card may send a feedback instruction to the first application, the feedback instruction being used to indicate the completion status of the deregistration instruction. Further, the feedback instruction may also be used to instruct the first application to delete the temporary key stored locally, thereby avoiding leakage of the temporary key and improving security.

[0082] For easier understanding, please refer to Figure 6 , Figure 6 is an interactive diagram illustrating verification status cancellation of an embodiment of the present disclosure, such as Figure 6 As shown, when the first application detects that the screen is switched or not used for a long time, it can send a deregistration verification status APDU (i.e., deregistration instruction) to the SIM card, the SIM card deregistration verification success status, and delete the MAC key and symmetric key (i.e., temporary key). After completing the operation, the SIM card can inform the first application of the success or failure of the deregistration (i.e., feedback instruction). When the feedback is that the deregistration is successful, the first application can delete the MAC key and symmetric key stored locally.

[0083] The above is a communication method provided by the present disclosure. The above embodiments can be combined according to actual conditions and are not specifically limited here.

[0084] In addition, the present disclosure also provides a communication device. Figure 7 A structural block diagram of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present disclosure, such as Figure 7 As shown, the communication device 700 includes:

[0085] The receiving module 701 is used to receive first information from a first application, where the first information is obtained by encrypting a temporary key and a first PIN using a SIM card public key.

[0086] The decryption module 702 is used to decrypt the first information using the SIM card key to obtain the temporary key and the first PIN.

[0087] The verification module 703 is used to communicate with the first application using the temporary key when the identity authentication of the first PIN is passed; wherein the first application and the SIM card are set in the same terminal.

[0088] In an exemplary embodiment, the communication device 700 is also configured to authenticate the first PIN using a pre-stored second PIN; store the temporary key when the second PIN is the same as the first PIN; and communicate with the first application using the temporary key.

[0089] In an exemplary embodiment, the communication device 700 is further configured to receive fourth information from the first application, where the fourth information is obtained by encrypting the second PIN using the SIM card public key; and store the second PIN.

[0090] In an exemplary embodiment, the communication device 700 is further configured to store the temporary key in a preset location, or to replace the data stored in the preset location with the temporary key.

[0091] In an exemplary embodiment, the communication device 700 is further configured to receive second information from the first application, where the second information is obtained by encrypting the first sensitive information using the temporary key; and decrypting the second information using the temporary key to obtain the first sensitive information;

[0092] and / or,

[0093] The second sensitive information is encrypted using the temporary key to obtain third information; and the third information is sent to the first application.

[0094] In an exemplary embodiment, the communication device 700 is further configured such that the temporary key includes: an encryption key and a MAC key; wherein the encryption key is used to encrypt sensitive information to obtain a ciphertext; and the MAC key is used to determine a MAC value of the ciphertext.

[0095] In an exemplary embodiment, the communication device 700 is further configured to receive a deregistration instruction from the first application; deregister the verification pass identifier, and delete the temporary key.

[0096] In an exemplary embodiment, the communication device 700 is also configured to generate a key pair, the key pair comprising: a SIM card public key and a SIM card private key; use the signature private key to sign the SIM card public key to obtain signature information; and in response to receiving a signature acquisition request from the first application, send the signature information to the first application.

[0097] In addition, the present disclosure also provides a communication device. Figure 8 A structural block diagram of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present disclosure, such as Figure 8 As shown, the communication device 800 includes:

[0098] The encryption module 801 is used to encrypt the temporary key and the first PIN using the SIM card public key to obtain the first information; wherein the first PIN is used for the SIM card to authenticate the identity of the first application.

[0099] The sending module 802 is configured to send the first information to the SIM card.

[0100] The communication module 803 is used to communicate with the SIM card using the temporary key; wherein the first application and the SIM card are set in the same terminal.

[0101] In an exemplary embodiment, the communication device 800 is further configured to encrypt the first sensitive information using the temporary key to obtain the second information; and send the second information to the SIM card;

[0102] and / or,

[0103] The third information is received, where the third information is obtained by encrypting the second sensitive information using the temporary key.

[0104] In an exemplary embodiment, the communication device 800 is further configured such that the temporary key includes: an encryption key and a MAC key; wherein the encryption key is used to encrypt sensitive information to obtain a ciphertext; and the MAC key is used to determine a MAC value of the ciphertext.

[0105] In an exemplary embodiment, the communication device 800 is further configured to send a deregistration instruction to the SIM card; the deregistration instruction is used to instruct the SIM card to deregister the verification pass identifier and delete the temporary key.

[0106] In an exemplary embodiment, the communication device 800 is further configured to send a signature acquisition request to the SIM card; and receive the signature information from the SIM card.

[0107] In an exemplary embodiment, the communication device 800 is further configured to encrypt the second PIN using the SIM card public key to obtain fourth information; and send the fourth information to the SIM card.

[0108] Fig. 9 The electronic device 900 according to the embodiment of the present disclosure includes at least a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory, and the processor executes the computer program to implement the signal transmission method described in any of the above embodiments.

[0109] Fig. 9The electronic device 900 shown specifically includes: a central processing unit (CPU) 901, a graphics processing unit (GPU) 902 and a memory 903. These units are interconnected via a bus 904. The central processing unit (CPU) 901 and / or the graphics processing unit (GPU) 902 can be used as the above-mentioned processor, and the memory 903 can be used as the above-mentioned memory for storing computer-readable instructions. In addition, the electronic device 900 may also include a communication unit 905, a storage unit 906, an output unit 907, an input unit 908 and an external device 909, which are also connected to the bus 904.

[0110] Fig.10 A schematic diagram of a computer-readable storage medium provided in an embodiment of the present disclosure. Fig.10 As shown, a computer-readable storage medium 1000 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure has a computer-readable program / instruction 1001 stored thereon. When the computer-readable program / instruction 1001 is executed by a processor, the signal transmission method described in any of the foregoing embodiments of the present disclosure is implemented. The computer-readable storage medium includes, but is not limited to, for example, volatile memory and / or non-volatile memory. Volatile memory may include, for example, random access memory (RAM) and / or cache memory (cache), etc. Non-volatile memory may include, for example, read-only memory (ROM), hard disk, flash memory, optical disk, magnetic disk, etc.

[0111] The present disclosure further provides a computer program product, including a computer program / instruction, which implements the communication method described in any of the foregoing embodiments of the present disclosure when executed by a processor.

[0112] The basic principles of the present disclosure are described above in conjunction with specific embodiments. However, it should be noted that the advantages, strengths, effects, etc. mentioned in the present disclosure are only examples and not limitations, and it cannot be considered that these advantages, strengths, effects, etc. are required by each embodiment of the present disclosure. In addition, the specific details disclosed above are only for the purpose of illustration and ease of understanding, and are not limitations. The above details do not limit the present disclosure to the necessity of adopting the above specific details to be implemented.

[0113] The block diagrams of the devices, apparatuses, equipment, and systems involved in this disclosure are only illustrative examples and are not intended to require or imply that they must be connected, arranged, and configured in the manner shown in the block diagrams. As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, these devices, apparatuses, equipment, and systems can be connected, arranged, and configured in any manner. Words such as "including," "comprising," "having," and the like are open words, referring to "including but not limited to," and can be used interchangeably therewith. The words "or" and "and" used herein refer to the words "and / or," and can be used interchangeably therewith, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. The word "such as" used herein refers to the phrase "such as but not limited to," and can be used interchangeably therewith.

[0114] Additionally, as used herein, "or" used in a list of items beginning with "at least one" indicates a separate list, so that, for example, a list of "at least one of A, B, or C" means A or B or C, or AB or AC or BC, or ABC (i.e., A and B and C). Furthermore, the word "exemplary" does not mean that the example described is preferred or better than other examples.

[0115] It should also be noted that in the system and method of the present disclosure, each component or each step can be decomposed and / or recombined. Such decomposition and / or recombination should be regarded as equivalent solutions of the present disclosure.

[0116] Various changes, substitutions, and modifications of the techniques described herein may be made without departing from the teachings defined by the appended claims. Furthermore, the scope of the claims of the present disclosure is not limited to the specific aspects of the processes, machines, manufactures, compositions of events, means, methods, and actions described above. Currently existing or later to be developed processes, machines, manufactures, compositions of events, means, methods, or actions that perform substantially the same functions or achieve substantially the same results as the corresponding aspects described herein may be utilized. Thus, the appended claims include such processes, machines, manufactures, compositions of events, means, methods, or actions within their scope.

[0117] The above description of the disclosed aspects is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to make or use the present disclosure. Various modifications to these aspects will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be applied to other aspects without departing from the scope of the present disclosure. Therefore, the present disclosure is not intended to be limited to the aspects shown herein, but rather to the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

[0118] The above description has been given for the purpose of illustration and description. In addition, this description is not intended to limit the embodiments of the present disclosure to the forms disclosed herein. Although multiple example aspects and embodiments have been discussed above, those skilled in the art will recognize certain variations, modifications, changes, additions and sub-combinations thereof.

Claims

1. A communication method, characterized in that: Applied to a SIM card, the method comprises: Receiving first information from a first application, where the first information is obtained by encrypting a temporary key and a first PIN using a SIM card public key; Decrypting the first information using the SIM card private key to obtain the temporary key and the first PIN; When the identity authentication of the first PIN is passed, communicating with the first application using the temporary key; The first application and the SIM card are arranged in the same terminal.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that When the identity authentication of the PIN is passed, communicating with the first application using the temporary key includes: authenticating the first PIN using a pre-stored second PIN; When the second PIN is the same as the first PIN, storing the temporary key; Communicate with the first application using the temporary key.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that Before using the pre-stored second PIN to authenticate the first PIN, the method further includes: receiving fourth information from the first application, where the fourth information is obtained by encrypting the second PIN using the SIM card public key; The second PIN is stored.

4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The storing of the temporary key comprises: The temporary key is stored in a preset location, or the temporary key is used to replace the data stored in the preset location.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The communicating with the first application using the temporary key includes: receiving second information from the first application, where the second information is obtained by encrypting the first sensitive information using the temporary key; and decrypting the second information using the temporary key to obtain the first sensitive information; and / or, The second sensitive information is encrypted using the temporary key to obtain third information; and the third information is sent to the first application.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The temporary key includes: an encryption key and a MAC key; Wherein, the encryption key is used to encrypt sensitive information to obtain ciphertext; The MAC key is used to determine the MAC value of the ciphertext.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: receiving a logout instruction from the first application; The verification pass identifier is deregistered and the temporary key is deleted.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: Generate a key pair, the key pair comprising: a SIM card public key and a SIM card private key; The SIM card public key is signed using the signature private key to obtain signature information; In response to receiving the signature acquisition request from the first application, sending the signature information to the first application.

9. A communication method, characterized in that: Applied to the first application, the method comprises: Using the SIM card public key to encrypt the temporary key and the first PIN to obtain first information; wherein the first PIN is used for the SIM card to authenticate the identity of the first application; Sending the first information to the SIM card; Communicating with the SIM card using the temporary key; The first application and the SIM card are arranged in the same terminal.

10. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that The using the temporary key to communicate with the SIM card includes: Encrypting the first sensitive information using the temporary key to obtain second information; and sending the second information to the SIM card; and / or, The third information is received, where the third information is obtained by encrypting the second sensitive information using the temporary key.

11. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that The temporary key includes: an encryption key and a MAC key; Wherein, the encryption key is used to encrypt sensitive information to obtain ciphertext; The MAC key is used to determine the MAC value of the ciphertext.

12. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that The method further comprises: Sending a deregistration instruction to the SIM card; The deregistration instruction is used to instruct the SIM card to deregister the verification pass identifier and delete the temporary key.

13. The method according to claim 12, characterized in that The method further comprises: Sending a signature acquisition request to the SIM card; Receiving the signature information from the SIM card; the signature information is obtained by signing the SIM card public key using the signature private key; The signature information is decrypted using the signature public key to obtain the SIM card public key.

14. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that The method further comprises: Encrypting the second PIN using the SIM card public key to obtain fourth information; The fourth information is sent to the SIM card.

15. A communication device, characterized in that: The device comprises: A receiving module, used to receive first information from a first application, where the first information is obtained by encrypting a temporary key and a first PIN using a SIM card public key; A decryption module, used to decrypt the first information using a SIM card key to obtain the temporary key and the first PIN; a verification module, configured to communicate with the first application using the temporary key when the identity authentication of the first PIN is passed; The first application and the SIM card are arranged in the same terminal.

16. A communication device, characterized in that: The device comprises: An encryption module, used to encrypt the temporary key and the first PIN using the SIM card public key to obtain the first information; wherein the first PIN is used for the SIM card to authenticate the identity of the first application; A sending module, used for sending the first information to the SIM card; A communication module, used to communicate with the SIM card using the temporary key; The first application and the SIM card are arranged in the same terminal.

17. A computer device / equipment / system comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory, characterized in that: The processor executes the computer program to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 14.

18. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program / instruction stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program / instructions are executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 14 is implemented.

19. A computer program product comprising a computer program / instructions, characterized in that When the computer program / instructions are executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 14 is implemented.

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