Lightweight intelligent electric meter authentication method and system based on analog-to-digital grouping

Abstract

The invention discloses a lightweight intelligent electric meter authentication method and system based on analog-to-digital grouping, and the method achieves the revocation of a single intelligent electric meter user through issuing a secret random value bound with the identity of an intelligent electric meter. The specific authentication scheme comprises six stages of system initialization, key generation, intelligent electric meter registration, intelligent electric meter authentication, power consumption data charging and intelligent electric meter revocation. According to the method, the security of the power consumption data of the intelligent electric meter is protected through encryption, and identity attacks from inside and outside opponents are resisted by using the hash function and the timestamp, so that various attacks can be resisted more effectively, and the integrity and security of data transmission are guaranteed.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of power Internet of Things network information security, and in particular to a lightweight smart meter authentication method and system based on analog-to-digital grouping. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of smart grid technology, smart meters, as a key component of smart grids, are becoming increasingly important. Smart meters not only undertake the task of accurately measuring and recording power consumption data, but are also the key nodes for data transmission between the power grid and users. In the architecture of the smart grid, the security and reliability of smart meters are of great significance to ensuring the stable operation of the entire power grid. Power companies can plan the production and allocation of power resources based on the data of smart meters, which is conducive to the efficient use of power resources and ensures the stable operation of the power grid. In the process of data transmission between smart meters and power companies, illegal users often impersonate legitimate identities to steal power resources. Therefore, it is extremely important to effectively authenticate the identities of both parties. In addition, attackers may use users' personal habits and privacy to attack their electricity consumption data, so the security protection of electricity consumption data is also crucial.

[0003] In smart grids, the data collected and transmitted by smart meters involve the privacy of users and the economic interests of power companies. Therefore, ensuring the integrity and security of data transmission and preventing data from being tampered with or stolen are the core goals of smart meter authentication scheme design.

[0004] At present, most smart meter authentication schemes use complex encryption algorithms, such as RSA. These algorithms perform well in terms of security, but have high computational complexity. For resource-constrained devices such as smart meters, there are problems such as high energy consumption and slow response speed. In practical applications, these problems may cause smart meters to fail to work properly, and even threaten the stable operation of the entire smart grid. On the other hand, although some lightweight authentication schemes reduce computational complexity, they are insufficient in terms of security. These schemes are often vulnerable to various attacks, such as man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks, which lead to data leakage or tampering, causing losses to users and power companies.

[0005] The prior art document (CN11749447A) discloses a smart meter identity authentication method that resists collusion attacks. A smart meter authentication system consisting of a system authority trusted center TA, a data processing center OC, a regional manager RC and a smart meter SM is constructed. The process of implementing a smart meter identity authentication method that resists collusion attacks based on the smart meter authentication system is specifically divided into five stages: system initialization stage, registration stage, smart meter authentication stage, meter calculation and charging stage, and smart meter revocation stage.

[0006] However, existing technologies have high computational overhead, relatively long energy consumption and response time, and large storage requirements. There is only one regional manager, which faces the problem of authentication burden in large-scale smart grid environments. Although it can resist collusion attacks, it cannot resist passive attacks, replay attacks, and identity deception attacks. Moreover, when the trusted center TA fails or is attacked, the entire authentication system may be paralyzed or fail. Summary of the invention

[0007] In order to solve the deficiencies in the prior art, the purpose of the present invention is to provide a lightweight smart meter authentication method and system based on modular grouping, which can take into account the resource limitations of smart meters, adopt lightweight encryption algorithms, reduce computational complexity, reduce energy consumption and response time. At the same time, it has high security, can effectively resist various attacks, and ensure the integrity and security of data transmission.

[0008] The present invention adopts the following technical solution.

[0009] The first aspect of the present invention provides a lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping, comprising the following contents:

[0010] Construct a smart meter identity authentication system model, the system model includes a system initialization core SIC, a data processing center DPC, a regional coordinator RC and a smart meter SM, the SIC is used to inject the identity information of the SM into the DPC, RC and SM, the DPC is used to process the power consumption data forwarded by the RC and verify the identity of the SM, the RC is used to verify the identity of the SM in the RC area and forward the power consumption data of the SM to the DPC;

[0011] During the system initialization phase, SIC selects a set of mutually prime numbers n1, n2, …, n n 、A set of random numbers b1, b2, …, b n and a system preset value S;

[0012] During the key generation phase, DPC generates a DPC private key skey DPC and DPC public key pkey DPC , RC generates RC private key skey RC and RC public key pkey RC ; and generate authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ), where ID i is the i-th SM i identity information, is the encryption algorithm, pkey RC is the public key of RC, H is the hash function, and Y is based on q i 、ni The value calculated based on the modulus grouping, n i ∈{n1,n2,…,n n}, b i ∈{b1,b2,…,b n};

[0013] During the smart meter registration phase, when the i-th SM i When registering with SIC, if (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) exists in the SIC database, SIC will (Y,n i ,b i ) loaded into SM i Otherwise, SIC randomly selects (Y,n i ,b i ), and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is loaded into the smart meter SM i and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is sent secretly to DPC, and (Y,n i ) is secretly sent to the RC corresponding to the SM;

[0014] Smart meter certification stage, SM i Register the information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s )Use RC public key pkey RC Encrypted and sent to RC, RC uses RC private key skey RC After decryption, the registration information is obtained and the validity of the registration information is checked. If the check result is valid, the SM i Authentication is successful, otherwise, SM i Authentication failed;

[0015] During the electricity consumption data billing phase, in SM i If authentication is successful, SM i The power consumption data within the preset time period is stored using the RC public key pkey RC Encrypted and sent to RC, RC uses the private key skey RC After decryption, use the DPC public key pkey DPC The encrypted and signed data is sent to the DPC, which then performs a validity check on the power consumption data.

[0016] Smart meter cancellation stage, when bi Leakage or SM i When the system is logged off, DPC broadcasts i Revoke SM to RC i permissions.

[0017] Optionally, the key generation phase generates authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ),include:

[0018] SIC chooses an elliptic curve E:y 2 ≡x 3 +cx+d(mod p) and an elliptic curve group E p (c, d), and randomly select a generator J∈E p (c, d), the order of J is n;

[0019] SIC selects a hash function H{01} * →E p (c, d), the input data is mapped to the elliptic curve group using a hash function, and the public parameter pp = {E p (c, d), J, H, n}; wherein the input data includes the identity information of the SM;

[0020] SIC randomly selects a set of mutually prime numbers n1,n2,…,n n , a set of random numbers b1, b2, …, b n and a system preset value S, calculate Construct the following equation And use the modulus grouping to solve for Y;

[0021] According to the solution of Y, n i ∈{n1,n2,…,n n}、b i ∈{b1,b2,...,b n} and SM i Identity information ID i Generate authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ).

[0022] Optionally, during the key generation phase, the DPC generates a DPC private key skey DPC and DPC public key pkey DPC , RC generates RC private key skey RC and RC public key pkey RC ,include:

[0023] DPC randomly selects a number n from 1 to n-1 DPC ∈[1,n-1] as the DPC private key, and use the random number n DPC and generator J by pkey DPC =n DPC J calculates the DPC public key, and DPC outputs the DPC public key pkey to the smart meter identity authentication system DPC And the DPC private key skey DPC =n DPC Confidentiality;

[0024] RC randomly selects a number n from 1 to n-1 RC ∈[1,n-1] as the RC private key, and use the random number n RC and generator J by pkey RC =n RC J calculates the RC public key, and RC outputs the RC public key pkey to the smart meter identity authentication system RC And the RC private key skey RC =n RC Keep it confidential.

[0025] Optionally, smart meter certification includes:

[0026] SM i Register the information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ) is encoded as point Q m ∈E p (c, d), where Time s By SM i The timestamp of the selection;

[0027] SM i Randomly select a number k SM ∈[1,n-1], and press C i ={k SM J,Q m +k SM pkey RC}Calculate the ciphertext C i , and C i Send to RC;

[0028] RC receives the ciphertext C i Then, follow Q m =Q m +k SM pkey RC -skey RC k SM J calculates to obtain Qm and decoded by Q m Get(Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s );

[0029] RC check timestamp Time s Is it invalid? If invalid, return SM i If RC authentication fails, calculate q otherwise. i =Ymod n i and is the decryption algorithm, S and n respectively i The predicted value of

[0030] RC Comparison Is it equal to the system preset value S, and compare Is it equal to n i ,like is equal to S, and Equal to n i Then return to SM i Successfully authenticate RC, otherwise, return to SM i RC authentication failed.

[0031] Optionally, electricity data billing includes:

[0032] SM i Get the power consumption data EP within the preset time range ow , select a timestamp Time s And Time s and EP ow Encoded as point Q m ′∈E p (c, d), and calculate h = H (b i ,EP ow ,Time′ s ) Get the hash value h; randomly select a number k′ RM ∈[1,n-1] and calculate C′1={k′ SM J,Q′ m +k′ SM pkey RC}, and send (h,C′1) to RC;

[0033] After RC receives (h,C′1), it uses skey RC Calculate Q′ m =Q′ m +k′ SM pkeyRM -skey RM k′ SM J gets Q′ m , and by decoding Q′ m Get Time′ s , E.P. ow ;

[0034] RC check timestamp Time′ s Is it valid? If not, exit. Otherwise, send the message (Y,n i ,EP ow ,Time′ s ) is encoded as point Q″ m ∈E p (a,b), randomly select a number k RC ∈[1,n-1], and calculate C′2={k RC J,Q″ m +k RC pkey DPC}, and use the ECDSA signature algorithm to sign C′2, and get After that, (C′2, C′3, h) is sent to DPC;

[0035] After receiving (C′2, C′3, h), DPC verifies the validity of signature C′3. If it is invalid, it exits. Otherwise, it passes the DPC private key skey DPC Calculate Q″ m =Q″ m +k RM pkey DPC -skey DPC k RC J is obtained, and by decoding Q″ m Get Time′ s and (Y,n i ,EP ow ,Time′ s );

[0036] DPC check timestamp Time′ s Is it valid? If not, exit. Otherwise, execute the query in the local database that matches (Y,n i ) corresponding to b i , and calculate H(b i ,EP ow ,Time′ S ) is consistent with the hash value h. If they are consistent, it means that the power consumption data is valid. By using (Y,n i ,b i )Confirm SM i The real identity of the user is used to complete the billing of electricity consumption data.

[0037] Optionally, during the smart meter cancellation phase, if the revoked user SM i Register with RC, SM i Need to send registration information to RC (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ), after receiving the registration information, RC uses the revocation message b sent by DPC i and SM i Provide i Calculate the hash value H(n i ,b i ); If the calculated hash value is equal to SM i If the hash values ​​sent are equal, authentication is rejected, indicating that SM i Has been revoked.

[0038] Optionally, the method further comprises:

[0039] A threat model of a smart meter identity authentication system is constructed, wherein the threat model is used to simulate attacks from threat sources on the smart meter identity authentication system model.

[0040] Optionally, the threat sources include SM, dishonest regional coordinator RC and external attackers, and the attack includes at least one of the following: passive attack, replay attack, collusion attack, forged power ledger attack and identity deception attack.

[0041] A second aspect of the present invention provides a lightweight smart meter authentication system, the system comprising:

[0042] A construction module is used to construct a smart meter identity authentication system model, wherein the system model includes a system initialization core SIC, a data processing center DPC, a regional coordinator RC and a smart meter SM, wherein the SIC is used to inject the identity information of the SM into the DPC, the RC and the SM, the DPC is used to process the power consumption data forwarded by the RC and verify the identity of the SM, and the RC is used to verify the identity of the SM in the RC area and forward the power consumption data of the SM to the DPC;

[0043] System initialization module, used by SIC to select a set of mutually prime numbers n1, n2, ..., n n 、A set of random numbers b1, b2, …, b n and a system preset value S;

[0044] Key generation module, used by DPC to generate DPC private key skey DPC and DPC public key pkey DPC , RC generates RC private key skeyRC and RC public key pkey RC ; and generate authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ), where ID i is the i-th SM i identity information, is the encryption algorithm, pkey RC is the public key of RC, H is the hash function, n i ∈{n1,n2,…,n n}, b i ∈{b1,b2,…,b n}, Y is based on q i 、n i The value calculated based on the modulus grouping;

[0045] Smart meter registration module, used when the i-th SM i When registering with SIC, if (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) exists in the SIC database, SIC will (Y,n i ,b i ) loaded into SM i Otherwise, SIC randomly selects (Y,n i ,b i ), and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is loaded into the smart meter SM i and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is sent secretly to DPC, and (Y,n i ) is secretly sent to the RC corresponding to the SM;

[0046] Smart meter authentication module for SM i Register the information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s )Use RC public key pkey RC Encrypted and sent to RC, RC uses RC private key skey RC After decryption, the registration information is obtained and the validity of the registration information is checked. If the check result is valid, the SM i Authentication is successful, otherwise, SM i Authentication failed;

[0047] Electricity data billing module, used in SM i If authentication is successful, SM i The power consumption data within the preset time period is stored using the RC public key pkey RC Encrypted and sent to RC, RC uses the private key skey RC After decryption, use the DPC public key pkey DPC The encrypted and signed data is sent to the DPC, which then performs a validity check on the power consumption data.

[0048] Smart meter cancellation module, used when b i Leakage or SM i When the system is logged off, DPC broadcasts i Revoke SM to RC i permissions.

[0049] The third aspect of the present invention provides an electronic device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the computer program implements the above-mentioned lightweight smart meter authentication method based on digital-analog grouping when loaded into the processor.

[0050] A fourth aspect of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which implements the above-mentioned lightweight smart meter authentication method based on digital-analog grouping when executed by a processor.

[0051] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention include at least:

[0052] The present invention uses the mathematical principle of modulus grouping to transform the complex authentication process into a series of small problems with mutually prime moduli, which greatly reduces the computational complexity and reduces the energy consumption and response time of the smart meter. In addition, while reducing the computational complexity, the present invention uses hash functions and timestamps to resist identity attacks from internal and external adversaries, maintains high security, effectively resists various attacks, and ensures the integrity and security of data transmission.

[0053] The present invention adopts a lightweight encryption algorithm based on modulus grouping to reduce computational complexity, energy consumption and response time, improve authentication efficiency, and is more suitable for resource-constrained devices such as smart meters. It introduces a hierarchical structure of regional manager devices to reduce the burden on centralized authentication servers and improve the scalability of the system. It can resist passive attacks, replay attacks, collusion attacks, forged power ledger attacks, and identity deception attacks to ensure the integrity and security of data transmission. It establishes a system initialization core with high anti-attack capabilities to ensure that key information such as keys in the system initialization core will not be leaked.

[0054] During the electricity data billing stage of the present invention, users can obtain electricity data billing results and confirmation information more quickly; and the present invention ensures the accuracy of data transmission between the power grid and users by improving the security and reliability of smart meter authentication.

[0055] In the authentication of smart meters, the present invention can select appropriate moduli according to actual conditions to meet different security requirements. At the same time, the authentication scheme based on modulo grouping can be combined with other security technologies, such as physical security measures, secure storage, etc., to further improve the security of smart meters. Since modulo grouping has relatively complete mathematical principles and a wide range of application scenarios, the present invention can be easily extended to other fields, such as computer science, cryptography, coding theory, etc. This is not only conducive to the further development of smart meter technology, but also provides more technical support for the construction of smart grids. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0056] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for describing the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative labor. Among them:

[0057] Figure 1 A schematic flow chart of a lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0058] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a lightweight smart grid authentication system based on analog-to-digital grouping provided in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0059] In order to make the purpose, technical scheme and advantages of the present invention clearer, the technical scheme of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. The embodiments described in this application are only embodiments of a part of the present invention, rather than all embodiments. Based on the spirit of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative work belong to the protection scope of the present invention.

[0060] Combination Figure 1 As shown, embodiment 1 of the present invention provides a lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping, including the following contents:

[0061] S1. Construct a smart meter identity authentication system model, which includes SIC (System Initialization Core), DPC (Data Processing Center), RC (Regional Coordinator) and SM (Smart Meter). The number of RCs is multiple, which can be multi-layer, and the number of SMs is one or more. Each RC can manage one or more SMs. SIC is used to inject identity information into DPC, RC and SM. DPC is used to process the power consumption data forwarded by RC and verify the identity of SM. RC is used to verify the identity of SM in the area and forward the power consumption data of SM to DPC.

[0062] like Figure 2 As shown in the figure, the smart meter identity authentication system consists of four parts:

[0063] (1) System Initialization Core (SIC). There is only one SIC in the system, which is responsible for initializing the system and injecting identity information into the data processing center (DPC), regional coordinator (RC) and smart meter (SM). It also builds a special protection system and deploys advanced firewalls, intrusion detection systems and intrusion prevention systems to protect the SIC from attacks, prevent information leakage and attack time, and ensure the stable operation of the entire authentication system.

[0064] (2) Data Processing Center (DPC). There is only one DPC in the system, which is responsible for processing the power consumption data forwarded by the regional coordinator (RC) and verifying the identity of the smart meter (SM).

[0065] (3) Regional Coordinator (RC). The system includes multiple RCs. The number of RCs is set by the DPC according to actual needs. For example, it can be divided by region, with one RC in each region. And set up hierarchical RCs to further reduce the certification burden of a single RC certification system. The task of the RC is to verify the identity authentication of smart meters (SMs) in its region and forward their power consumption data to the DPC.

[0066] (4) Smart Meter (SM). The system contains multiple SMs, but each RC can manage up to multiple SMs. The SM authenticates itself with the RC and connects to the grid.

[0067] S2. Construct a threat model for the smart meter authentication system.

[0068] Specifically, in smart grids, security issues may arise due to system vulnerabilities or breaches. Threat sources include internal smart meters (SMs), dishonest regional coordinators (RCs), and external attackers. The following are threats related to smart meter authentication methods:

[0069] S2.1. Model and characterize each threat.

[0070] (1) Passive Attack. The attacker illegally monitors the data transmitted in the smart grid and endangers the confidentiality of the data. The goal of the passive attack is to monitor the data transmission to obtain sensitive information. The passive attack is expressed as follows:

[0071]

[0072] Among them, P a represents the amount of data acquired by the passive attacker, D(t) represents the amount of data transmitted at time t, and t0 and t1 are the monitored time ranges.

[0073] (2) Replay Attack. The attacker repeatedly sends data that the receiver has already received in an attempt to trick the receiver into accepting the message and destroy the identity authentication. Replay attack involves repeatedly sending previous messages. Replay attack is expressed as follows:

[0074] R m ={m i |m i ∈Mandt i <t current}

[0075] Among them, R m represents the set of messages to be replayed, M is the set of messages that have been accepted, and t i It is the message i The receiving time, t current is the current time.

[0076] (3) Collusion Attack. Internal smart meters (SM) collude with each other to attack the identities of other smart meters, and then use the identities to attack. Collusion attack refers to the cooperation between multiple internal smart meters. Collusion attack is expressed as follows:

[0077] C s ={SM i ,SM j |SM i andSM j collude}

[0078] Among them, C sRepresents the set of smart meters participating in the collusion.

[0079] (4) Forging Electricity Ledger Attack. A dishonest regional coordinator (RC) impersonates a smart meter and forges electricity consumption data to carry out an attack. A forgery attack involves a dishonest regional coordinator forging data. The forged electricity ledger attack is expressed as follows:

[0080] F d ={d i |d i ≠D actual}

[0081] Among them, F d Denote as a fake data set, D actual It is the actual power consumption data.

[0082] (5) Identity Spoofing Attack. The attacker pretends to be an authenticated identity to launch an attack. Identity spoofing attack involves impersonating an authenticated identity. Identity spoofing attack is expressed as follows:

[0083] S i ={ID j |ID j is spoofed}

[0084] Among them, S i Indicates the identity ID being impersonated j A collection of .

[0085] S2.2. Calculate the threat model of the smart meter authentication system and the impact of attacks on the smart meter authentication system.

[0086] Specifically, the impact of the threat model of the smart meter identity authentication system on the attack on the smart meter identity authentication system is calculated according to the following formula:

[0087]

[0088] I stage,i It represents the impact of the i-th attack on each stage, which can be specifically expressed as:

[0089] I stage,i =I init,i +I keygen,i +I reg,i +I auth,i +I billing,i +I revoke,i

[0090] I init,P=α1·D init

[0091] I auth,R =β2·M auth

[0092] I reg,C =γ3·S reg

[0093] I auth,S =ò4·ID auth

[0094] I billing,F =δ5·L billing

[0095] Among them, I init,i represents the impact of the ith attack on the system initialization phase, I keygen,i represents the impact of the ith attack on the key generation phase, I reg,i represents the impact of the ith attack on the smart meter registration phase,

[0096] I auth,i represents the impact of the ith attack on the smart meter authentication stage, I billing,i represents the impact of the ith attack on the electricity data billing stage, I revoke,i represents the impact of the ith attack on the smart meter revocation phase, D init is the amount of data in the initialization phase, M auth is the number of messages in the smart meter authentication phase, S reg is the number of smart meters in the registration phase, ID auth is the amount of identity data in the smart meter authentication phase, L billing is the amount of account book data in the electricity data billing stage, and α1, β2, γ3, ò4 and δ5 are influencing parameters. init,P represents the impact of passive attack on the system initialization phase, I auth,R represents the impact of replay attack on the smart meter authentication phase, I reg,C represents the impact of collusion attack on the smart meter registration phase, I auth,S represents the impact of identity deception attack on the smart meter authentication stage, I billing,F Represents the impact of the forged power ledger attack on the electricity data billing stage.

[0097] Specifically, passive attacks affect the confidentiality and integrity of data, especially during the system initialization and smart meter authentication phases, affecting system initialization. Replay attacks affect the validity of messages, especially during the smart meter registration and authentication phases, affecting smart meter authentication. Collusion attacks affect the trust relationship between smart meters, which may affect user identity authentication during the registration and authentication phases, affecting smart meter registration. Identity spoofing attacks affect the validity of identity authentication, mainly during the authentication phase, affecting smart meter authentication. Forged power ledger attacks affect the authenticity of data, especially during the electricity data billing phase, affecting electricity data billing.

[0098] S2.3. Determine the target of attack.

[0099] The attack target can be expressed by the following equation:

[0100] T d ={D transmitted ,ID SM ,K secret}

[0101] Among them, T d Represents the attack target data set, including the transmission data D transmitted , Smart meter ID SM and key K secret .

[0102] In this embodiment, a threat model is used to simulate attacks on attack targets in the smart meter identity authentication system model to verify whether the smart meter identity authentication system model can resist the impact of the above attacks.

[0103] S3. System initialization

[0104] System initialization is a critical stage in lightweight authentication systems, which ensures that all components can communicate and operate securely and efficiently. Specifically, SIC selects a set of mutually prime numbers n1, n2, …, n n 、A set of random numbers b1, b2, …, b n and a system preset value S. The system preset value is generated according to the public parameters and the input data, and the smart meter uses the system preset value and other parameters to generate authentication information.

[0105] S4, key generation phase

[0106] S4.1. SIC selects an elliptic curve: E:y 2 ≡x 3 +cx+d(mod p) and an elliptic curve group E p (c, d), and randomly select a generator J∈E p(c, d). Assume that the order of J is n. Randomly select a hash function H{01} * →E p (c, d), the hash function maps the input data, such as the identity ID, random number, timestamp, etc. of the smart meter, to the elliptic curve group to generate a unique hash value for the subsequent authentication process. Output public parameter pp = {E p (c,d),J,H,n}.

[0107] S4.2, SIC randomly selects coprime numbers n1, n2, ..., n n , a system preset value S, and the numbers b1, b2, …, b n ,calculate in, is the encryption algorithm, pkey RC is the public key and H is the hash function.

[0108] S4.3. Construct the following equation And use the modulus grouping to solve Y, where Y represents the component of the authentication information in the subsequent authentication process.

[0109] S4.4, DPC randomly selects a number n from 1 to n-1 DPC ∈[1,n-1] as its private key, and use the random number n DPC Calculate the DPC public key with generator J, and DPC outputs the public key pkey DPC Give the entire authentication system the private key skey DPC =n DPC Confidential. According to pkey DPC =n DPC J calculates the DPC public key.

[0110] S4.5, RC randomly selects a number n RC ∈[1,n-1] as its private key and calculate the RC public key. RC outputs the public key pkey RC Give the entire authentication system the private key skey RC =n RC Confidential. According to pkey RC =n RC J calculates the RC public key.

[0111] S5. Smart meter registration stage

[0112] When the i-th meter SM i When registering with the System Initialization Core (SIC), if (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) exists in the SIC database, where ID iis the i-th meter SM i The identity information of SIC will be (Y,n i ,b i ) loaded into SM i Otherwise, randomly select (Y,n i ,b i ), and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is loaded into the smart meter SM i Then (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is secretly sent to the data processing center (DPC), and finally (Y,n i ) is sent secretly to the corresponding regional coordinator (RC).

[0113] S6. Smart meter certification stage

[0114] Specifically, RC's SM i The identity verification process specifically includes:

[0115] S6.1, SM i Register the information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ) is encoded as point Q m ∈E p (c, d), where Time s By SM i The selected timestamp. Specifically, the registration information is mapped to the coordinates of the elliptic curve through a hash function.

[0116] S6.2, SM i Randomly select a number k SM ∈[1,n-1], calculate the ciphertext C i ={k SM J,Q m +k SM pkey RC}, pkey RC is the public key of RC, and C i Sent to the Regional Coordinator (RC).

[0117] S6.3, RC receives the ciphertext C i After that, through the RC private key skey RC Calculate Q m =Q m +k SM pkey RC -skeyRC k SM J, and by decoding Q m Get the plaintext (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ).

[0118] S6.4, RC check timestamp Time s Is it invalid? If invalid, it returns δ=0, indicating that SM fails to authenticate RC. If valid, it calculates q i =Ymodn i and is the decryption algorithm, S and n respectively i The predicted value of .

[0119] Specifically, checking whether the timestamp is invalid includes: determining whether the timestamp is within a preset time range, if not, the timestamp is considered invalid, otherwise the timestamp is considered valid. In this way, by checking the timestamp, it is possible to check whether the authentication message meets the prescribed timeliness requirements, thereby improving the authentication performance and efficiency of the system.

[0120] It should be noted that the preset time range can be set according to actual application requirements, and the embodiment of the present invention does not specifically limit the preset time range.

[0121] S6.5, RC comparison Is it equal to the system preset value S, and Is it equal to n i If both are equal, then return δ=1, indicating SM i RC has been successfully authenticated. Otherwise, return δ=0.

[0122] In this embodiment, by utilizing the mathematical principle of modulus grouping, the complex authentication process is transformed into a series of small problems with mutually prime modulus numbers, which greatly reduces the computational complexity, reduces the energy consumption and response time of the smart meter, and further improves the efficiency of authentication.

[0123] S7, electricity data billing stage:

[0124] Electricity usage data billing includes:

[0125] S7.1, SM i Summarize the power consumption data within a period of time (e.g. one month) and get EP ow .

[0126] S7.2, SM i Select a timestamp sAnd Time s and EP ow Encoded as point Q m ′∈E p (c,d).

[0127] S7.3, SM i Calculate h = H (b i ,EP ow ,Time′ s ).

[0128] S7.4, SM i Randomly select a number k′ RM ∈[1,n-1] and calculate C′1={k′ SM J,Q′ m +k′ SM pkey RC}.

[0129] S7.5, SM i Send (h,C′1) to RC.

[0130] S7.6, after RC receives (h, C′1), RC uses RC private key skey RC Calculate Q′ m =Q′ m +k′ SM pkey RC -skey RC k′ SM J, and by decoding Q′ m Get Time′ s , E.P. ow .

[0131] S7.7, RC check timestamp Time′ s Is it valid? If not, exit. Otherwise, execute the following S7.8.

[0132] S7.8, RC sends the message (Y,n i ,EP ow ,Time′ s ) is encoded as point Q″ m ∈E p (a,b).

[0133] S7.9, RC randomly selects a number k RC ∈[1,n-1], and calculate C′2={k RC J,Q″ m +k RC pkey DPC}.

[0134] S7.10. RC signs C′2 using ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) to obtain

[0135] S7.11. RC sends (C′2, C′3, h) to DPC.

[0136] S7.12. After receiving (C′2, C′3, h), DPC verifies the validity of signature C′3. If it is invalid, it exits. Otherwise, executes the following S7.13.

[0137] S7.13, DPC through D private key skey DPC Calculate Q″ m =Q″ m +k RM pkey DPC -skey DPC k RC J, and by decoding Q″ m Get Time′ s ,(Y,n i ,EP ow ,Time′ s ).

[0138] S7.14, DPC check timestamp Time′ s Is it valid? If not, exit. Otherwise, execute the following S7.15.

[0139] S7.15, DPC finds the same as (Y,n i ) corresponding to b i , and calculate H(b i ,EP ow ,Time′ S ) is consistent with h. If so, it indicates that the power consumption data is valid.

[0140] S7.16, DPC uses (Y,n i ,b i ), you can confirm SM i ’s true identity, thereby completing the billing structure for electricity consumption.

[0141] S8, Smart Meter Cancellation Stage

[0142] When b i Leakage or SM i When logging off the system, DPC can broadcast b i Give RC to revoke SM i If the revoked user SMi Register with RC, SM i Need to send registration information to RC (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s After receiving the registration information, the RC can use the revocation message sent by the DPC i and SM i Provide i Calculate the hash value H(n i ,b i ). If the calculated hash value is equal to SM i If the hash values ​​sent are equal, authentication is rejected, indicating that SM i Has been revoked.

[0143] In this embodiment, a single smart meter user is effectively revoked through the random number in the hash function, thereby improving the security of the system.

[0144] S9. Accuracy analysis

[0145] The correctness of the solution includes the correctness of smart meter authentication, the correctness of electricity consumption data billing, and the correctness of smart meter revocation. S9 includes:

[0146] S9.1. During the smart meter authentication phase, the smart meter sends the ciphertext C i ={k SM J,Q m +k SM pkey RC} gives RC. RC is calculated as follows:

[0147] Q m +k SM pkey RC -skey RC k SM J

[0148] =Q m +k SM pkey RC -k SM (skey RC J)

[0149] =Q m +k SM pkey RC -k SM (pkey RC )

[0150] =Q m

[0151] Therefore, RC can decode Qm Get(Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ), and calculate q i =Y mod n i .

[0152] because RC can be decrypted to get Then get Therefore, according to and S and and n i Are they equal to correctly output δ∈{0,1}? is equal to the system preset value S, and If ni is equal to ni, then the output is δ=1, indicating that the authentication is successful. Otherwise, the output is δ=0, indicating that the authentication fails.

[0153] S9.2. In the electricity consumption data billing stage, RC can similarly decrypt the ciphertext C′1 to obtain (Time′ S ,EP ow ). DPC can verify the validity of C′3 through the validity of the signature and decrypt to obtain (Y,n i ,EP ow ,Time′ S ). Since the hash function is collision-resistant, by verifying H(b i ,EP ow ,Time′ S ) is equal to h, the validity of the ledger and the smart meter SM can be determined. i The real identity of i Power consumption EP ow Billing.

[0154] S9.3, during the smart meter cancellation phase, the DPC can broadcast b i Give RC to revoke SM i In the smart meter authentication phase, RC can obtain (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ). RC passes b i and n i Calculate the hash value and compare it with H(n i ,b i ) to compare. If the hash values ​​are equal, the SM is rejected i , thereby revoking the SM i DPC deletes b from the local databasei relevant information, thereby revoking SM i .

[0155] S10. Safety Analysis

[0156] The smart meter authentication scheme is divided into six phases. Since the system initialization phase and the smart meter registration phase are completed offline or transmitted through a secure channel, there is no need to consider adversaries. The smart meter revocation phase is operated by the owners' corporation and does not require adversary considerations. In the remaining three phases, security analysis is required because the information is transmitted through an open network. The security of the constructed scheme is analyzed from two aspects: internal and external adversaries.

[0157] S10.1. In order to resist passive attacks from internal smart meters (SM), dishonest regional coordinators (RC) or external adversaries, during the smart meter authentication phase, the message sent by the smart meter is the ciphertext C i In the electricity consumption data billing stage, the messages transmitted through the open network are the hash value H and the ciphertext C′1, C′2, C′3. Due to the security of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) (based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem) and the characteristics of the hash value (one-way and collision resistance), it can be known that the adversary cannot obtain any useful information from the hash value and the ciphertext, so the authentication scheme is secure against passive attacks.

[0158] S10.2. In order to resist replay attacks from internal dishonest smart meters (SMs), dishonest regional coordinators (RCs), or external adversaries, during the smart meter authentication phase and the electricity consumption data billing phase, if the smart meter forwards the intercepted ciphertext C i ={k SM J,Q m +k SM pkey RC} and C′1={k′ SM J,Q′ m +k′ SM pkey RC} to RC, which can decode Q m and Q′ m Get the timestamp Time s and Time s ′, these times are decrypted by C i and C′1. Since RC needs to check the timestamp Time s and Time s ′, thus resisting replay attacks. If the timestamp is invalid, RC will reject the message, thus ensuring that the system is immune to replay attacks.

[0159] S10.3. In order to resist the collusion attack from internal dishonest smart meters (SM) and external adversaries, during the smart meter authentication phase, the smart meter SM i When performing authentication, you need to provide an additional hash value H(n i ,b i ). Because even if the smart meter users collude to attack and obtain n j , due to the one-way and collision-resistant properties of the hash function, they cannot guess b i Or the hash value H(n i ,b i ) Therefore, the authentication scheme can effectively resist collusion attacks. Even if attackers join forces to try to attack the system, they cannot infer the secret information of other smart meters and thus cannot undermine the security of the system.

[0160] S10.4. In order to resist the forged power ledger attack from the dishonest regional coordinator (RC), during the power consumption data billing stage, the dishonest RC impersonates the identity of the successfully authenticated smart meter and forges the power consumption data EP of the smart meter. ow And send it to the data processing center (DPC). Due to the one-way nature of the hash function, from h = H (b i ,EP ow ,Time′ S ) cannot calculate b i Therefore, the RC does not know the b of the successfully authenticated smart meter. i , and the corresponding hash value h cannot be calculated. Therefore, RC can only randomly select a hash value and send it to DPC. When DPC searches the local database for the value corresponding to (Y,n i ) records, H(b i ,EP ow ,Time′ S ) and h are not equal, thus rejecting the ledger and resisting the forged electricity ledger attack.

[0161] S10.5. To resist identity spoofing attacks from internal smart meters (SM) or external adversaries, unauthenticated smart meters impersonate the identities of successfully authenticated smart meters and forge the power consumption data EP of smart meters. ow And send it to the regional coordinator (RC). Since the uncertified smart meter does not know the b of the certified smart meter i , so it cannot calculate the true hash value h = H (b i ,EP ow ,Time′ S ). Similar to the forged power ledger attack, when the data processing center (DPC) searches the local database for the corresponding i )i When H(b i ,EP ow ,Time′ S ) and h are not equal, thus rejecting the ledger and resisting identity fraud attacks.

[0162] In the proposed scheme, when illegal users try to enter the system, they first need to perform identity authentication. In the identity authentication stage, the smart meter user needs to enter the registration information (Y, n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ) is sent to the Regional Coordinator (RC). However, during the transmission process, this information is sent in ciphertext form, so the adversary cannot obtain valid information (in this case, it is a passive attack, even if the attacker intercepts the ciphertext message, they cannot decrypt the valid information). If the adversary replays the intercepted message, according to the timestamp Time s , the system rejects the message (in this case, it is a replay attack).

[0163] If the adversary wants to impersonate another legitimate user for identity authentication, the adversary needs to know the legitimate user's secret random number b i or its corresponding hash value H(n i ,b i ). However, the user's i is hidden in the hash function, and the one-way and collision-resistant properties of the hash function indicate that it is impossible to find the secret random number b of other legitimate users i . Therefore, it is not possible to impersonate another user (in this case, it is an identity spoofing attack).

[0164] If the adversary colludes with some dishonest users to impersonate other legitimate users, then the adversary and the dishonest users also need to collude to calculate the secret random number b of other legitimate users i or its corresponding hash value H(n i ,b i ). Although there is a high probability that a coprime integer n can be calculated i , but the input to the hash function still contains a b i , and the random number b i is hidden in the hash function, and each user’s b i Independent of each other, this leads to the failure of collusion attacks.

[0165] Even if the adversary is very powerful and obtains all the registration information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s), that is, the adversary has obtained a valid hash value H(n i ,b i ) and passed the identity authentication (because the hash value is random, unless the attacker is a dishonest RC, this probability can be ignored). However, according to the one-way property of the hash function, the adversary cannot obtain the real b i , so it is impossible to calculate h=H(b i ,EP ow ,Time′ S ). Therefore, the adversary cannot falsify the electricity ledger and thus cause economic losses to users within the system (in this case, it is a falsified electricity ledger attack).

[0166] Embodiment 2 of the present invention provides a lightweight smart meter authentication system, which runs the method described in Embodiment 1, and the system includes: a construction module, a system initialization module, a key generation module, a smart meter registration module, a smart meter authentication module, an electricity consumption data billing module and a smart meter revocation module.

[0167] Among them, the construction module is used to construct a smart meter identity authentication system model, the system model includes a system initialization core SIC, a data processing center DPC, a regional coordinator RC and a smart meter SM, the SIC is used to inject the identity information of the SM into the DPC, RC and SM, the DPC is used to process the power consumption data forwarded by the RC and verify the identity of the SM, the RC is used to verify the identity of the SM in the RC area, and forward the power consumption data of the SM to the DPC;

[0168] System initialization module, used by SIC to select a set of mutually prime numbers n 1 ,n 2 ,…,n n 、A set of random numbers b1, b2, …, b n and a system preset value S, calculate And generate authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ), where ID i is the i-th SM i identity information, is the encryption algorithm, pkey RC is the public key of RC, H is the hash function, and Y is based on q i n i The value calculated based on the modulus grouping, n i ∈{n1,n2,…,n n}, b i ∈{b1,b2,…,b n};

[0169] Key generation module, used by DPC to generate DPC private key skey DPC and DPC public key pkey DPC , RC generates RC private key skey RC and RC public key pkey RC ;

[0170] Smart meter registration module, used when the i-th SM i When registering with SIC, if (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) exists in the SIC database, SIC will (Y,n i ,b i ) loaded into SM i Otherwise, SIC randomly selects (Y,n i ,b i ), and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is loaded into the smart meter SM i and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is sent secretly to DPC, and (Y,n i ) is secretly sent to the RC corresponding to the SM;

[0171] Smart meter authentication module for SM i Register the information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s )Use RC public key pkey RC Encrypted and sent to RC, RC uses RC private key skey RC After decryption, the registration information is obtained and the validity of the registration information is checked. If the check result is valid, the SM i Authentication is successful, otherwise, SM i Authentication failed;

[0172] Electricity data billing module, used in SM i If authentication is successful, SM i The power consumption data within the preset time period is stored using the RC public key pkey RC Encrypted and sent to RC, RC uses the private key skey RC After decryption, use the DPC public key pkey DPC The encrypted and signed data is sent to the DPC, which then performs a validity check on the power consumption data.

[0173] Smart meter cancellation module, used when b i Leakage or SM i When the system is logged off, DPC broadcasts i Revoke SM to RC i permissions.

[0174] In one embodiment, the system further comprises a simulation module, wherein the simulation module is used to construct a threat model of the smart meter identity authentication system, wherein the threat model is used to simulate an attack by a threat source on the smart meter identity authentication system model.

[0175] Embodiment 3 of the present invention provides an electronic device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the computer program implements the method described in Embodiment 1 when loaded into the processor.

[0176] Embodiment 4 of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the method according to embodiment 1 is implemented.

[0177] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention include at least:

[0178] The present invention uses the mathematical principle of modulus grouping to transform the complex authentication process into a series of small problems with mutually prime moduli, which greatly reduces the computational complexity and reduces the energy consumption and response time of the smart meter. In addition, while reducing the computational complexity, the present invention uses hash functions and timestamps to resist identity attacks from internal and external adversaries, maintains high security, effectively resists various attacks, and ensures the integrity and security of data transmission.

[0179] The present invention adopts a lightweight encryption algorithm based on modulus grouping to reduce computational complexity, energy consumption and response time, improve authentication efficiency, and is more suitable for resource-constrained devices such as smart meters. It introduces a hierarchical structure of regional manager devices to reduce the burden on centralized authentication servers and improve the scalability of the system. It can resist passive attacks, replay attacks, collusion attacks, forged power ledger attacks, and identity deception attacks to ensure the integrity and security of data transmission. It establishes a system initialization core with high anti-attack capabilities to ensure that key information such as keys in the system initialization core will not be leaked.

[0180] During the electricity data billing stage of the present invention, users can obtain electricity data billing results and confirmation information more quickly; and the present invention ensures the accuracy of data transmission between the power grid and users by improving the security and reliability of smart meter authentication.

[0181] In the authentication of smart meters, the present invention can select appropriate moduli according to actual conditions to meet different security requirements. At the same time, the authentication scheme based on modulo grouping can be combined with other security technologies, such as physical security measures, secure storage, etc., to further improve the security of smart meters. Since modulo grouping has relatively complete mathematical principles and a wide range of application scenarios, the present invention can be easily extended to other fields, such as computer science, cryptography, coding theory, etc. This is not only conducive to the further development of smart meter technology, but also provides more technical support for the construction of smart grids.

[0182] It should be understood that the order of execution of the steps in the above embodiment does not necessarily mean the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiment of the present invention.

[0183] The present disclosure may be a system, a method and / or a computer program product. The computer program product may include a computer-readable storage medium carrying computer-readable program instructions for causing a processor to implement various aspects of the present disclosure.

[0184] A computer-readable storage medium may be a tangible device that can hold and store instructions used by an instruction execution device. A computer-readable storage medium may be, for example, but not limited to, an electrical storage device, a magnetic storage device, an optical storage device, an electromagnetic storage device, a semiconductor storage device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. More specific examples of computer-readable storage media (a non-exhaustive list) include: a portable computer disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), a static random access memory (SRAM), a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), a digital versatile disk (DVD), a memory stick, a floppy disk, a mechanical encoding device, such as a punch card or a raised structure in a groove on which instructions are stored, and any suitable combination of the foregoing. As used herein, a computer-readable storage medium is not to be interpreted as a transient signal per se, such as a radio wave or other freely propagating electromagnetic wave, an electromagnetic wave propagating through a waveguide or other transmission medium (e.g., a light pulse through a fiber optic cable), or an electrical signal transmitted through a wire.

[0185] The computer-readable program instructions described herein can be downloaded from a computer-readable storage medium to each computing / processing device, or downloaded to an external computer or external storage device via a network, such as the Internet, a local area network, a wide area network, and / or a wireless network. The network can include copper transmission cables, optical fiber transmissions, wireless transmissions, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers, and / or edge servers. The network adapter card or network interface in each computing / processing device receives the computer-readable program instructions from the network and forwards the computer-readable program instructions for storage in the computer-readable storage medium in each computing / processing device.

[0186] The computer program instructions for performing the operation of the present disclosure may be assembly instructions, instruction set architecture (ISA) instructions, machine instructions, machine-related instructions, microcode, firmware instructions, state setting data, or source code or object code written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including object-oriented programming languages, such as Smalltalk, C++, etc., and conventional procedural programming languages, such as "C" language or similar programming languages. Computer-readable program instructions may be executed completely on a user's computer, partially on a user's computer, as an independent software package, partially on a user's computer, partially on a remote computer, or completely on a remote computer or server. In the case of a remote computer, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer via any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or may be connected to an external computer (e.g., using an Internet service provider to connect via the Internet). In some embodiments, an electronic circuit, such as a programmable logic circuit, a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or a programmable logic array (PLA), may be customized by utilizing the state information of the computer-readable program instructions, and the electronic circuit may execute the computer-readable program instructions, thereby realizing various aspects of the present disclosure.

[0187] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, ordinary technicians in the relevant field should understand that the specific implementation methods of the present invention can still be modified or replaced by equivalents, and any modifications or equivalent replacements that do not depart from the spirit and scope of the present invention should be covered within the scope of protection of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping, characterized in that: Includes the following: Construct a smart meter identity authentication system model, the system model includes a system initialization core SIC, a data processing center DPC, a regional coordinator RC and a smart meter SM, the SIC is used to inject the identity information of the SM into the DPC, RC and SM, the DPC is used to process the power consumption data forwarded by the RC and verify the identity of the SM, the RC is used to verify the identity of the SM in the RC area and forward the power consumption data of the SM to the DPC; During the system initialization phase, SIC selects a set of mutually prime numbers n1, n2, …, n n 、A set of random numbers b1, b2, …, b n and a system preset value S; During the key generation phase, DPC generates a DPC private key skey DPC and DPC public key pkey DPC , RC generates RC private key skey RC and RC public key pkey RC ; and generate authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ), where ID i is the i-th SM i identity information, is the encryption algorithm, pkey RC is the public key of RC, H is the hash function, and Y is based on q i 、n i The value calculated based on the modulus grouping, n i ∈{n1,n2,…,n n }, b i ∈{b1,b2,…,b n }; During the smart meter registration phase, when the i-th SM i When registering with SIC, if SM i Authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) exists in the SIC database, SIC will (Y,n i ,b i ) loaded into SM i Otherwise, SIC randomly selects a set (Y,n i ,b i ), combined with ID i , and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is loaded into the smart meter SM i and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is sent secretly to DPC, and (Y,n i ) is secretly sent to the RC corresponding to the SM; Smart meter certification stage, SM i Register the information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s )Use RC public key pkey RC Encrypted and sent to RC, RC uses RC private key skey RC After decryption, the registration information is obtained and the validity of the registration information is checked. If the check result is valid, the SM i Authentication is successful, otherwise, SM i Authentication failed; Time s For SM i The timestamp of H(n i ,b i ) is n i and b i The hash value of During the electricity consumption data billing phase, in SM i If authentication is successful, SM i The power consumption data within the preset time period is stored using the RC public key pkey RC Encrypted and sent to RC, RC uses the private key skey RC After decryption, use the DPC public key pkey DPC The encrypted and signed data is sent to the DPC, which then performs a validity check on the power consumption data. Smart meter cancellation stage, when b i Leakage or SM i When the system is logged off, DPC broadcasts i Revoke SM to RC i permissions.

2. The lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The key generation phase generates authentication information (Y, n i ,b i ,ID i ),include: SIC chooses an elliptic curve E:y 2 ≡x 3 +cx+d(mod p) and an elliptic curve group E p (c, d), and randomly select a generator J∈E p (c, d), the order of J is n; SIC chooses a hash function H{01} * →E p (c, d), the input data is mapped to the elliptic curve group using a hash function, and the public parameter pp = {E p (c, d), J, H, n}; wherein the input data includes the identity information of the SM; SIC randomly selects a set of mutually prime numbers n1,n2,…,n n , a set of random numbers b1, b2, …, b n and a system preset value S, calculate Construct the following equation And use the modulus grouping to solve for Y; According to the obtained Y, n i ∈{n1,n2,...,n n }、b i ∈{b1,b2,...,b n } and SM i Identity information ID i Generate authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ).

3. The lightweight smart meter authentication method based on digital-analog grouping according to claim 2 is characterized in that: During the key generation phase, DPC generates a DPC private key skey DPC and DPC public key pkey DPC , RC generates RC private key skey RC and RC public key pkey RC ,include: DPC randomly selects a number n from 1 to n-1 DPC ∈[1,n-1] as the DPC private key, and use the random number n DPC and generator J by pkey DPC =n DPC J calculates the DPC public key, and DPC outputs the DPC public key pkey to the smart meter identity authentication system DPC And the DPC private key skey DPC =n DPC Confidentiality; RC randomly selects a number n from 1 to n-1 RC ∈[1,n-1] as the RC private key, and use the random number n RC and generator J by pkey RC =n RC J calculates the RC public key, and RC outputs the RC public key pkey to the smart meter identity authentication system RC And the RC private key skey RC =n RC Keep it confidential.

4. The lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping according to claim 3 is characterized in that: Smart meter certification includes: SM i Register the information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ) is encoded as point Q m ∈E p (c, d), where Time s By SM i The timestamp of the selection; SM i Randomly select a number k SM ∈[1,n-1], and press C i ={k SM J,Q m +k SM pkey RC }Calculate the ciphertext C i , and C i Send to RC; RC receives the ciphertext C i Then, follow Q m =Q m +k SM pkey RC -skey RC k SM J calculates to obtain Q m and decoded by Q m Get(Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ); RC check timestamp Time s Is it invalid? If invalid, return SM i If RC authentication fails, calculate q otherwise. i =Ymodn i and is the decryption algorithm, S and n respectively i The predicted value of RC Comparison Is it equal to the system preset value S, and compare Is it equal to n i ,like is equal to S, and Equal to n i Then return to SM i Successfully authenticate RC, otherwise, return to SM i Authentication to RC failed.

5. The lightweight smart meter authentication method of modular grouping according to claim 4 is characterized in that: Electricity data billing includes: SM i Get the power consumption data EP within the preset time range ow , select a timestamp Time s And Time s and EP ow Encoded as point Q m ′∈E p (c, d), and calculate h = H (b i ,EP ow ,Time′ s ) Get the hash value h; randomly select a number k′ RM ∈[1,n-1] and calculate C′1={k′ SM J,Q′ m +k′ SM pkey RC }, and send (h,C′1) to RC; After RC receives (h,C′1), it uses skey RC Calculate Q′ m =Q′ m +k′ SM pkey RM -skey RM k′ SM J gets Q′ m , and by decoding Q′ m Get Time′ s , E.P. ow ; RC check timestamp Time′ s Is it valid? If not, exit. Otherwise, send the message (Y,n i ,EP ow ,Time′ s ) is encoded as point Q″ m ∈E p (a,b), randomly select a number k RC ∈[1,n-1], and calculate C′2={k RC J,Q″ m +k RC pkey DPC }, and use the ECDSA signature algorithm to sign C′2, and get After that, (C′2, C′3, h) is sent to DPC; After receiving (C′2, C′3, h), DPC verifies the validity of signature C′3. If it is invalid, it exits. Otherwise, it passes the DPC private key skey DPC Calculate Q″ m =Q″ m +k RM pkey DPC -skey DPC k RC J is obtained, and by decoding Q″ m Get Time′ s and (Y,n i ,EP ow ,Time′ s ); DPC check timestamp Time′ s Is it valid? If not, exit. Otherwise, execute the query in the local database that matches (Y,n i ) corresponding to b i , and calculate H(b i ,EP ow ,Time' S ) is consistent with the hash value h. If they are consistent, it means that the power consumption data is valid. By using (Y,n i ,b i )Confirm SM i The real identity of the user is used to complete the billing of electricity consumption data.

6. The lightweight smart meter authentication method based on digital-analog grouping according to claim 5 is characterized in that: During the smart meter withdrawal phase, If the revoked user SM i Register with RC, SM i Need to send registration information to RC (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ), after receiving the registration information, RC uses the revocation message b sent by DPC i and SM i Provide i Calculate the hash value H(n i ,b i ); If the calculated hash value is equal to SM i If the hash values ​​sent are equal, authentication is rejected, indicating that SM i Has been revoked.

7. The lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that: The method further comprises: A threat model of a smart meter identity authentication system is constructed, wherein the threat model is used to simulate attacks from threat sources on the smart meter identity authentication system model.

8. The lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping according to claim 7 is characterized in that: The threat sources include SM, dishonest regional coordinator RC and external attackers, and the attacks include at least one of the following: passive attack, replay attack, collusion attack, forged power ledger attack and identity deception attack.

9. A lightweight smart meter authentication system using the lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping according to any one of claims 1 to 8, the system comprising: A construction module is used to construct a smart meter identity authentication system model, wherein the system model includes a system initialization core SIC, a data processing center DPC, a regional coordinator RC and a smart meter SM, wherein the SIC is used to inject the identity information of the SM into the DPC, the RC and the SM, the DPC is used to process the power consumption data forwarded by the RC and verify the identity of the SM, and the RC is used to verify the identity of the SM in the RC area and forward the power consumption data of the SM to the DPC; System initialization module, used by SIC to select a set of mutually prime numbers n1, n2, ..., n n 、A set of random numbers b1, b2, …, b n and a system preset value S; Key generation module, used by DPC to generate DPC private key skey DPC and DPC public key pkey DPC , RC generates RC private key skey RC and RC public key pkey RC ; and generate authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ), where ID i is the i-th SM i identity information, is the encryption algorithm, pkey RC is the public key of RC, H is the hash function, n i ∈{n1,n2,…,n n }, b i ∈{b1,b2,…,b n }, Y is based on q i 、n i The value calculated based on the modulus grouping; Smart meter registration module, used when the i-th SM i When registering with SIC, if (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) exists in the SIC database, SIC will (Y,n i ,b i ) loaded into SM i Otherwise, SIC randomly selects (Y,n i ,b i ), and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is loaded into the smart meter SM i and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is sent secretly to DPC, and (Y,n i ) is secretly sent to the RC corresponding to the SM; Smart meter authentication module for SM i Register the information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s )Use RC public key pkey RC Encrypted and sent to RC, RC uses RC private key skey RC After decryption, the registration information is obtained and the validity of the registration information is checked. If the check result is valid, the SM i Authentication is successful, otherwise, SM i Authentication failed; Electricity data billing module, used in SM i If authentication is successful, SM i The power consumption data within the preset time period is stored using the RC public key pkey RC Encrypted and sent to RC, RC uses the private key skey RC After decryption, use the DPC public key pkey DPC The encrypted and signed data is sent to the DPC, which then performs a validity check on the power consumption data. Smart meter cancellation module, used when b i Leakage or SM i When the system is logged off, DPC broadcasts i Revoke SM to RC i permissions.

10. An electronic device, comprising a processor and a storage medium; characterized in that: The storage medium is used to store instructions; The processor is configured to operate according to the instructions to execute the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.

11. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8 are implemented.

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