Method and device for optimizing power supply and demand collaborative policy based on evolutionary game

Abstract

The invention belongs to the technical field of power consumption management, and particularly relates to an evolutionary game-based power supply and demand cooperation policy optimization method and device, and the method comprises the steps: determining a revenue function of each game main body in a power supply and demand cooperation policy through employing an evolutionary game model; constructing a replication dynamic equation of each game main body by utilizing the revenue function of each game main body; calculating by using the replicated dynamic equations of the game subjects to obtain an equilibrium point of the power supply-demand coordination policy, and determining a stability condition for improving the stability of the power supply-demand coordination policy according to the equilibrium point of the power supply-demand coordination policy; optimizing a power supply and demand cooperation policy by using a stable condition; the evolutionary game model is constructed by using data in a power supply and demand cooperation policy. According to the method, quantitative analysis of strategy implementation effects of the game subjects in the power supply and demand cooperation process is realized, benefit games among the game subjects are considered, the reliability and stability of the power supply and demand cooperation policy are improved, and reference is provided for making and implementation of related strategies.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of electricity management, and specifically relates to an optimization method and device for an electricity supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game. Background Art

[0002] As the penetration rate of new energy sources continues to increase, the traditional "source follows load" model is unsustainable. Load follows source and source-load interaction will become an important means for the power system to ensure power balance. Studying the interest game of various parties in the process of supply and demand coordination and analyzing the implementation effect of power supply and demand coordination policies are of great significance for guiding the formulation of relevant policies and promoting the benign interaction of "source-load". Existing research on supply and demand coordination policies often analyzes the impact of a single policy on electricity demand and makes relevant suggestions based on the electricity supply and demand situation. There is a lack of quantitative analysis of the policy implementation effects of various participating parties in the process of power supply and demand coordination. The supply and demand coordination game model under the new power system is mainly based on traditional game theory. When analyzing the interest game between subjects, it ignores the limited rationality of all parties in reality. Summary of the invention

[0003] In order to overcome the problems existing in the above-mentioned related technologies, the present application provides an optimization method and device for power supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game.

[0004] According to a first aspect of an embodiment of the present application, a method for optimizing a power supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game is provided, comprising:

[0005] The evolutionary game model is used to determine the profit function of each game player in the electricity supply and demand coordination policy;

[0006] Using the profit function of each game subject, construct the replication dynamic equation of each game subject;

[0007] The equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy is calculated using the replicated dynamic equations of the game entities, and the stability conditions for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy are determined according to the equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy;

[0008] Utilizing the stable conditions to optimize the electricity supply and demand coordination policy;

[0009] The evolutionary game model is constructed using data from electricity supply and demand coordination policies.

[0010] Preferably, the game subjects in the evolutionary game include: user subjects, regulatory subjects and policy promotion subjects.

[0011] Preferably, the process of constructing the evolutionary game model includes:

[0012] Analyze the game relationship of each game subject in the power supply and demand coordination policy to determine the optional strategy set of each game subject, the probability set of the optional strategy of each game subject and the execution cost of each game subject under different optional strategy combinations;

[0013] The evolutionary game model is constructed by using the optional strategy set of each game subject, the probability set of the optional strategy of each game subject and the execution cost of each game subject under different optional strategy combinations.

[0014] Preferably, the evolutionary game model includes:

[0015] ES={P,S,SP,I}

[0016] In the above formula, ES is the evolutionary game model, P is the game subject in the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, S is the strategy space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, SP is the strategy probability space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, and I is the benefit space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy;

[0017] Where P = {P A ,P B ,P C}, P A is the user subject, P B As the regulatory body, P C As the policy promotion subject; S = {S A ,S B ,S C},S A is a collection of optional policies for the user principal. is the i-th optional strategy of the user subject, S B is a set of optional strategies for the regulatory body, is the jth optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S C is a set of optional strategies for policy promotion entities. is the kth optional strategy of the policy promotion subject; SP = {SP A ,SP B ,SP C}, SP A is the probability set of optional strategies of the user subject, is the probability of the user subject choosing the i-th strategy, SP B is the probability set of the regulatory subject’s optional strategies, is the probability of the regulatory body choosing the jth strategy, is the probability of the policy promotion subject choosing the kth strategy; I = {I A ,I B ,I C}, I Ais the execution cost of the user subject under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the user subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy, I B is the execution cost of the regulatory body under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy, I C is the execution cost of the regulatory body under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy; i∈[1,M], M is the total number of optional strategies of the user subject, j∈[1,N], N is the total number of optional strategies of the regulatory subject, SP C is the probability set of optional strategies of the policy promotion subject, k∈[1,L], and L is the total number of optional strategies of the policy promotion subject.

[0018] Preferably, the use of the profit function of each game subject to construct the replication dynamic equation of each game subject includes:

[0019] Performing calculus on the revenue function of the user subject to obtain the replication dynamic equation of the user subject;

[0020] Performing calculus on the revenue function of the regulatory subject to obtain a replication dynamic equation of the regulatory subject;

[0021] The benefit function of the policy promotion subject is calculus-integrated to obtain the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject.

[0022] Preferably, the equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy is calculated by using the replicated dynamic equation of each game subject, and the stability condition for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy is determined according to the equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy, including:

[0023] Establishing a Jacobian matrix based on the replication dynamic equations of each game subject;

[0024] The replication dynamic equation of the user subject, the replication dynamic equation of the regulatory subject and the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject are all set to 0, and the equilibrium points of the plurality of power supply and demand coordination policies are obtained;

[0025] Substituting each equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy into the Jacobian matrix, and solving to obtain the matrix eigenvalues ​​at each equilibrium point;

[0026] The stability conditions for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy corresponding to each equilibrium point are determined according to the matrix eigenvalues.

[0027] Preferably, the calculation formula of the user subject's benefit function includes:

[0028]

[0029] In the above formula, is the user's payoff function, x is the probability of the user's first optional strategy, (1-x) is the probability of the user's second optional strategy, U1 is the expected payoff when the user chooses the first optional strategy, and U2 is the expected payoff when the user chooses the second optional strategy.

[0030] Preferably, the calculation formula for the expected benefit when the user subject selects the first optional strategy of the user subject includes:

[0031] U1=-C1+z×R1+R2

[0032] The calculation formula for the expected benefit when the user subject selects the second optional strategy of the user subject includes:

[0033] U2=-C2+y×R2+(1-y)R3-y×0.5C E

[0034] In the above formula, C1 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, C2 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject, R1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R2 is the execution cost of the supervision subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R3 is the execution cost of the supervision subject when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject and the supervision subject chooses the first optional strategy of the supervision subject, C E is the additional invitation cost of the regulatory subject, y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, (1-y) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, and z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject.

[0035] Preferably, the calculation formula of the profit function of the regulatory subject includes:

[0036]

[0037] In the above formula, is the payoff function of the regulatory subject, y is the probability of the regulatory subject’s first optional strategy, (1-y) is the probability of the regulatory subject’s second optional strategy, A1 is the expected payoff when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy, and A2 is the expected payoff when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy.

[0038] Preferably, the calculation formula for the expected return when the regulatory subject selects the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject includes:

[0039] A1=-C3+xzS1+(1-z)xS2-xR2-(1-x)(R3+0.5C E )

[0040] The calculation formula for the expected return when the regulatory subject selects the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject includes:

[0041] A2=-C4-(1-x)zP1-(1-x)(1-z)P2-R2

[0042] In the above formula, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, (1-x) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the user subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, and (1-z) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject; C3 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C4 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject The execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, R2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R3 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C E Additional invitation costs for regulatory bodies.

[0043] Preferably, the calculation formula of the benefit function of the policy promotion subject includes:

[0044]

[0045] In the above formula, is the profit function of the policy promotion subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, (1-z) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, G1 is the expected profit of the policy promotion subject when choosing the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, and G2 is the expected profit of the policy promotion subject when choosing the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject.

[0046] Preferably, the calculation formula for the expected benefit when the policy promotion subject selects the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject includes:

[0047] G1=-C5-xyS1+xR4+(1-x)P1

[0048] The calculation formula for the expected return when the policy promotion subject selects the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject includes:

[0049] G2=-C6-xyS2+xR5+(1-x)P2

[0050] In the above formula, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, (1-x) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the user subject, and y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject; C5 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when it chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, C6 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when it chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, R4 is the credibility improvement benefit obtained by the policy promotion subject when it chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, and R5 is the credibility improvement benefit obtained by the policy promotion subject when it chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject.

[0051] Preferably, the calculation formula of the replication dynamic equation of the user subject includes:

[0052]

[0053] In the above formula, F(x) is the replication dynamic equation of the user subject, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, t is the time, is the user subject’s benefit function, U1 is the expected benefit when the user subject chooses the user subject’s first optional strategy, C1 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the user subject’s first optional strategy, C2 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the user subject’s second optional strategy, R1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the user subject chooses the user subject’s first optional strategy, R2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the user subject’s first optional strategy, R3 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the user subject’s second optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses the regulatory subject’s first optional strategy, C E Additional invitation costs for regulatory bodies.

[0054] Preferably, the calculation formula of the replication dynamic equation of the regulatory subject includes:

[0055]

[0056] In the above formula, F(y) is the replication dynamic equation of the regulatory subject, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, t is time, A is the benefit function of the regulatory subject, A1 is the expected benefit when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C3 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C4 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, R2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R3 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C E is the additional invitation cost of the regulatory body, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the policy promotion body chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion body and the regulatory body chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory body, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the policy promotion body chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion body and the regulatory body chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory body, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the policy promotion body chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion body and the regulatory body chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory body, and P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the policy promotion body chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion body and the regulatory body chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory body.

[0057] Preferably, the calculation formula of the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject includes:

[0058]

[0059] In the above formula, F(z) is the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, t is the time, is the benefit function of the policy promotion subject, G1 is the expected benefit of the policy promotion subject when it chooses its first optional strategy, C5 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when it chooses its first optional strategy, C6 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when it chooses its second optional strategy, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses its first optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses its first optional strategy, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses its second optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses its first optional strategy, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses its first optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses its second optional strategy, P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses its second optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses its second optional strategy, R4 is the credibility enhancement benefit obtained by the policy promotion subject when it chooses its first optional strategy, and R5 is the credibility enhancement benefit obtained by the policy promotion subject when it chooses its second optional strategy.

[0060] According to a second aspect of an embodiment of the present application, there is provided an optimization device for a power supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game, comprising:

[0061] The first determination unit is used to determine the profit function of each game subject in the power supply and demand coordination policy by using an evolutionary game model;

[0062] A first construction unit is used to construct a replication dynamic equation of each game subject using the profit function of each game subject;

[0063] The second determination unit calculates the equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy using the replicated dynamic equations of the game entities, and determines the stability conditions for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy according to the equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy;

[0064] An optimization unit, configured to optimize the power supply and demand coordination policy by utilizing the stable condition;

[0065] The evolutionary game model is constructed using data from electricity supply and demand coordination policies.

[0066] Preferably, the game subjects in the evolutionary game include: user subjects, regulatory subjects and policy promotion subjects.

[0067] Preferably, the device further comprises: a second construction unit, used to construct the evolutionary game model; the second construction unit comprises:

[0068] The first determination module is used to analyze the game relationship of each game subject in the power supply and demand coordination policy to determine the optional strategy set of each game subject, the probability set of the optional strategy of each game subject and the execution cost of each game subject under different optional strategy combinations;

[0069] A construction module is used to construct the evolutionary game model by using the optional strategy set of each game subject, the probability set of the optional strategy of each game subject and the execution cost of each game subject under different optional strategy combinations.

[0070] Preferably, the evolutionary game model includes:

[0071] ES={P,S,SP,I}

[0072] In the above formula, ES is the evolutionary game model, P is the game subject in the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, S is the strategy space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, SP is the strategy probability space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, and I is the benefit space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy;

[0073] Where P = {P A ,P B ,P C}, P A is the user subject, P B As the regulatory body, P C As the policy promotion subject; S = {S A ,S B ,S C},S A is a collection of optional policies for the user principal. is the i-th optional strategy of the user subject, S B is a set of optional strategies for the regulatory body, is the jth optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S C is a set of optional strategies for policy promotion entities. is the kth optional strategy of the policy promotion subject; SP = {SP A ,SP B ,SP C}, SP Ais the probability set of optional strategies of the user subject, is the probability of the user subject choosing the i-th strategy, SP B is the probability set of the regulatory subject’s optional strategies, is the probability of the regulatory body choosing the jth strategy, is the probability of the policy promotion subject choosing the kth strategy; I = {I A ,I B ,I C}, I A is the execution cost of the user subject under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the user subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy, I B is the execution cost of the regulatory body under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy, I C is the execution cost of the regulatory body under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy; i∈[1,M], M is the total number of optional strategies of the user subject, j∈[1,N], N is the total number of optional strategies of the regulatory subject, SP C is the probability set of optional strategies of the policy promotion subject, k∈[1,L], and L is the total number of optional strategies of the policy promotion subject.

[0074] Preferably, the first building block comprises:

[0075] A first acquisition module is used to perform calculus on the revenue function of the user subject to obtain a replication dynamic equation of the user subject;

[0076] A second acquisition module is used to perform calculus on the revenue function of the regulatory subject to obtain a replication dynamic equation of the regulatory subject;

[0077] The third acquisition module is used to perform calculus on the benefit function of the policy promotion subject to obtain the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject.

[0078] Preferably, the second determining unit includes:

[0079] An establishment module is used to establish a Jacobian matrix based on the replication dynamic equations of each game subject;

[0080] A fourth acquisition module, used to make the replicated dynamic equation of the user subject, the replicated dynamic equation of the regulatory subject and the replicated dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject all equal to 0, so as to obtain equilibrium points of the plurality of power supply and demand coordination policies;

[0081] A solution module, used for substituting the equilibrium point of each of the power supply and demand coordination policies into the Jacobian matrix, and solving to obtain the matrix eigenvalues ​​at each equilibrium point;

[0082] The second determination module is used to determine the stability conditions for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy corresponding to each equilibrium point according to the matrix eigenvalues.

[0083] According to a third aspect of an embodiment of the present application, there is provided an electronic device, comprising: at least one processor and a memory; the memory and the processor are connected via a bus;

[0084] The memory is used to store one or more programs;

[0085] When the one or more programs are executed by the at least one processor, the optimization method of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game is implemented.

[0086] According to a fourth aspect of an embodiment of the present application, a readable storage medium is provided, on which an execution program is stored. When the execution program is executed, the optimization method of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game is implemented.

[0087] The technical solution provided by the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0088] An optimization method for power supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game,

[0089] The present invention provides an optimization method and device for an electricity supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game. The method and device determine the profit function of each game subject in the electricity supply and demand coordination policy by utilizing the evolutionary game model, construct the replication dynamic equation of each game subject by utilizing the profit function of each game subject, calculate the equilibrium point of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy by utilizing the replication dynamic equation of each game subject, and determine the stability conditions for improving the stability of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy according to the equilibrium point of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy. The stability conditions are utilized to optimize the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, thereby realizing the quantitative analysis of the strategy implementation effect by each game subject in the electricity supply and demand coordination process, taking into account the interest game among each game subject, improving the reliability and stability of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, and thus providing a reference for the formulation and implementation of relevant strategies. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0090] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0091] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of an optimization method of power supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0092] Figure 2 It is a flow chart of an optimization method of power supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0093] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the game relationship between various game entities in the power supply and demand coordination process provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0094] Figure 4 It is a structural block diagram of an optimization device for power supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0095] Figure 5 It is a structural block diagram of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0096] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention clearer, the technical solution of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the following embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, rather than all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0097] Embodiment 1

[0098] The present invention provides an optimization method for power supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game, such as Figure 1 As shown, the following steps are included:

[0099] Step 11: Use the evolutionary game model to determine the profit function of each game player in the power supply and demand coordination policy;

[0100] Step 12: Use the payoff function of each game subject to construct the replication dynamic equation of each game subject;

[0101] Step 13: Calculate the equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy using the replicated dynamic equation of each game subject, and determine the stability conditions for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy based on the equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy;

[0102] Step 14: Optimize electricity supply and demand coordination policies using stable conditions;

[0103] Among them, the evolutionary game model is constructed using data from the electricity supply and demand coordination policy.

[0104] Furthermore, the game players in the evolutionary game include: user players, regulatory players and policy promoters.

[0105] In some embodiments, the regulatory body may be but is not limited to an aggregator, and the policy promotion body may be but is not limited to the government.

[0106] Further, step 11 includes:

[0107] Step 111: Analyze the game relationship of each game subject in the power supply and demand coordination policy, determine the optional strategy set of each game subject, the probability set of the optional strategy of each game subject, and the execution cost of each game subject under different optional strategy combinations;

[0108] Step 112: construct an evolutionary game model using the optional strategy set of each game subject, the probability set of the optional strategy of each game subject, and the execution cost of each game subject under different optional strategy combinations.

[0109] Furthermore, the evolutionary game model includes:

[0110] ES={P,S,SP,I}

[0111] In the above formula, ES is the evolutionary game model, P is the game subject in the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, S is the strategy space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, SP is the strategy probability space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, and I is the benefit space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy;

[0112] Where P = {P A ,P B ,P C}, P A is the user subject, P B As the regulatory body, P C As the policy promotion subject; S = {S A ,S B ,S C},S A is a collection of optional policies for the user principal. is the i-th optional strategy of the user subject, S B is a set of optional strategies for the regulatory body, is the jth optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S C is a set of optional strategies for policy promotion entities. is the kth optional strategy of the policy promotion subject; SP = {SP A ,SP B ,SP C}, SP A is the probability set of optional strategies of the user subject, is the probability of the user subject choosing the i-th strategy, SP B is the probability set of the regulatory subject’s optional strategies, is the probability of the regulatory body choosing the jth strategy, is the probability of the policy promotion subject choosing the kth strategy; I = {I A ,I B ,I C}, I A is the execution cost of the user subject under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the user subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy, I B is the execution cost of the regulatory body under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy, I C is the execution cost of the regulatory body under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy; i∈[1,M], M is the total number of optional strategies of the user subject, j∈[1,N], N is the total number of optional strategies of the regulatory subject, SP C is the probability set of optional strategies of the policy promotion subject, k∈[1,L], and L is the total number of optional strategies of the policy promotion subject.

[0113] Further, step 13 includes:

[0114] Step 131: Perform calculus on the user subject's benefit function to obtain the user subject's replication dynamic equation;

[0115] Step 132: Perform calculus on the revenue function of the regulatory subject to obtain the replication dynamic equation of the regulatory subject;

[0116] Step 133: Perform calculus on the benefit function of the policy promotion subject to obtain the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject.

[0117] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the user's profit function includes:

[0118]

[0119] In the above formula, is the user's payoff function, x is the probability of the user's first optional strategy, (1-x) is the probability of the user's second optional strategy, U1 is the expected payoff when the user chooses the first optional strategy, and U2 is the expected payoff when the user chooses the second optional strategy.

[0120] Furthermore, the calculation formula for the expected return when the user subject selects the first optional strategy of the user subject includes:

[0121] U1=-C1+z×R1+R2

[0122] The calculation formula for the expected return when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject includes:

[0123] U2=-C2+y×R2+(1-y)R3-y×0.5C E

[0124] In the above formula, C1 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, C2 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject, R1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R2 is the execution cost of the supervision subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R3 is the execution cost of the supervision subject when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject and the supervision subject chooses the first optional strategy of the supervision subject, C E is the additional invitation cost of the regulatory subject, y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, (1-y) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, and z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject.

[0125] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the regulatory body's profit function includes:

[0126]

[0127] In the above formula, is the payoff function of the regulatory subject, y is the probability of the regulatory subject’s first optional strategy, (1-y) is the probability of the regulatory subject’s second optional strategy, A1 is the expected payoff when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy, and A2 is the expected payoff when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy.

[0128] Furthermore, the calculation formula for the expected return when the regulatory subject selects the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject includes:

[0129] A1=-C3+xzS1+(1-z)xS2-xR2-(1-x)(R3+0.5C E )

[0130] The calculation formula for the expected return when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject includes:

[0131] A2=-C4-(1-x)zP1-(1-x)(1-z)P2-R2

[0132] In the above formula, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, (1-x) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the user subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, and (1-z) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject; C3 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C4 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject The execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, R2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R3 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C E Additional invitation costs for regulatory bodies.

[0133] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the benefit function of the policy promotion subject includes:

[0134]

[0135] In the above formula, is the profit function of the policy promotion subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, (1-z) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, G1 is the expected profit of the policy promotion subject when choosing the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, and G2 is the expected profit of the policy promotion subject when choosing the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject.

[0136] Furthermore, the calculation formula for the expected return when the policy promotion subject selects the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject includes:

[0137] G1=-C5-xyS1+xR4+(1-x)P1

[0138] The calculation formula for the expected return when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject includes:

[0139] G2=-C6-xyS2+xR5+(1-x)P2

[0140] In the above formula, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, (1-x) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the user subject, and y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject; C5 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when it chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, C6 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when it chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, R4 is the credibility improvement benefit obtained by the policy promotion subject when it chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, and R5 is the credibility improvement benefit obtained by the policy promotion subject when it chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject.

[0141] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the replication dynamic equation of the user subject includes:

[0142]

[0143] In the above formula, F(x) is the replication dynamic equation of the user subject, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, t is time, U is the payoff function of the user subject, U1 is the expected payoff when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, C1 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, C2 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject, R1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R3 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C E Additional invitation costs for regulatory bodies.

[0144] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the replication dynamic equation of the regulatory body includes:

[0145]

[0146] In the above formula, F(y) is the replication dynamic equation of the regulatory subject, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, t is time, A is the benefit function of the regulatory subject, A1 is the expected benefit when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C3 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C4 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, R2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R3 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C E is the additional invitation cost of the regulatory body, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the policy promotion body chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion body and the regulatory body chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory body, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the policy promotion body chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion body and the regulatory body chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory body, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the policy promotion body chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion body and the regulatory body chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory body, and P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the policy promotion body chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion body and the regulatory body chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory body.

[0147] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject includes:

[0148]

[0149] In the above formula, F(z) is the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, t is time, G is the benefit function of the policy promotion subject, G1 is the expected benefit of the policy promotion subject when it chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, C5 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when it chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, C6 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when it chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject. S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses its second optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses its first optional strategy, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses its first optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses its second optional strategy, P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses its second optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses its second optional strategy, R4 is the credibility enhancement benefit obtained when the policy promotion subject chooses its first optional strategy, and R5 is the credibility enhancement benefit obtained when the policy promotion subject chooses its second optional strategy.

[0150] Further, step 14 includes:

[0151] Step 141: Establishing a Jacobian matrix based on the replication dynamic equation of each game subject;

[0152] Step 142: setting the replication dynamic equation of the user subject, the replication dynamic equation of the regulatory subject and the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject to 0, and obtaining the equilibrium points of multiple power supply and demand coordination policies;

[0153] Step 143: Substitute the equilibrium point of each power supply and demand coordination policy into the Jacobian matrix, and solve to obtain the matrix eigenvalues ​​at each equilibrium point;

[0154] Step 144: Determine the stability conditions for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy corresponding to each equilibrium point based on the matrix eigenvalues.

[0155] Furthermore, the equilibrium points of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy include: (0,0,0), (0,0,1), (0,1,0), (0,1,1), (1,0,0), (1,0,1), (1,1,0), and (1,1,1).

[0156] Furthermore, the eigenvalues ​​corresponding to the equilibrium point (0,0,0) include: λ1, λ2, and λ3;

[0157] The eigenvalues ​​corresponding to the equilibrium point (0,0,1) include: λ4, λ5, and λ6;

[0158] The eigenvalues ​​corresponding to the equilibrium point (0,1,0) include: λ7, λ8, and λ9;

[0159] The eigenvalues ​​corresponding to the equilibrium point (0,1,1) include: 10 , 11 and λ 12 ;

[0160] The eigenvalues ​​corresponding to the equilibrium point (1,0,0) include: 13 , 14 and λ 15 ;

[0161] The eigenvalues ​​corresponding to the equilibrium point (1,0,1) include: 16 , 17 and λ 18 ;

[0162] The eigenvalues ​​corresponding to the equilibrium point (1,1,0) include: 19 , 20 and λ 21 ;

[0163] The eigenvalues ​​corresponding to the equilibrium point (1,1,1) include: 22 , 23 and λ 24 .

[0164] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the eigenvalue λ1 includes:

[0165] λ1=C2-C1+R2-R3

[0166] The calculation formula of the eigenvalue λ2 includes:

[0167] λ2=C4-C3-0.5C E +P2+R2-R3

[0168] The calculation formula of the eigenvalue λ3 includes:

[0169] λ3=C6-C5+P1-P2

[0170] The calculation formula of eigenvalue λ4 includes:

[0171] λ4=C2-C1+R1+R2-R3

[0172] The calculation formula of eigenvalue λ5 includes:

[0173] λ5=C4-C3-0.5C E +P1+R2-R3

[0174] The calculation formula of the eigenvalue λ6 includes:

[0175] λ6=C5-C6-P1+P2

[0176] The calculation formula of the eigenvalue λ7 includes:

[0177] λ7=C2-C1+0.5C E

[0178] The calculation formula of the eigenvalue λ8 includes:

[0179] λ8=C3-C4+0.5C E -P2-R2+R3

[0180] The calculation formula of the eigenvalue λ9 includes:

[0181] λ9=C6-C5+P1-P2

[0182] Eigenvalue λ 10 The calculation formula includes:

[0183] λ 10 =C2-C1+0.5C E +R1

[0184] Eigenvalue λ 11 The calculation formula includes:

[0185] λ 11 =C3-C4+0.5C E -P1-R2+R3

[0186] Eigenvalue λ 12 The calculation formula includes:

[0187] λ 12 =C5-C6-P1+P2

[0188] Eigenvalue λ 13 The calculation formula includes:

[0189] λ 13 =C1-C2-R2+R3

[0190] Eigenvalue λ 14The calculation formula includes:

[0191] λ 14 =C4-C3+S2

[0192] Eigenvalue λ 15 The calculation formula includes:

[0193] λ 15 =C6-C5+R4-R5

[0194] Eigenvalue λ 16 The calculation formula includes:

[0195] λ 16 =C1-C2-R1-R2+R3

[0196] Eigenvalue λ 17 The calculation formula includes:

[0197] λ 17 =C4-C3+S1

[0198] Eigenvalue λ 18 The calculation formula includes:

[0199] λ 18 =C5-C6-R4+R5

[0200] Eigenvalue λ 19 The calculation formula includes:

[0201] λ 19 =C1-C2-0.5C E

[0202] Eigenvalue λ 20 The calculation formula includes:

[0203] λ 20 =C3-C4-S2

[0204] Eigenvalue λ 21 The calculation formula includes:

[0205] λ 21 =C6-C5+R4-R5-S1+S2

[0206] Eigenvalue λ 22 The calculation formula includes:

[0207] λ 22 =C1-C2-0.5C E -R1

[0208] Eigenvalue λ 23 The calculation formula includes:

[0209] λ 23=C3-C4-S1

[0210] Eigenvalue λ 24 The calculation formula includes:

[0211] λ 24 =C5-C6-R4+R5+S1-S2

[0212] In the above formula, C1 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, C2 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject, C3 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C4 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C5 is the execution cost when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, C6 is the execution cost when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, and C E is the additional invitation cost of the regulatory body, R1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the user body chooses the user body’s first optional strategy, R2 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the user body chooses the user body’s first optional strategy, R3 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the user body chooses the user body’s second optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s first optional strategy, R4 is the credibility enhancement benefit obtained when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s first optional strategy, R5 is the credibility enhancement benefit obtained when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s second optional strategy, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s first optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s first optional strategy, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s second optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s first optional strategy, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s first optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s second optional strategy, and P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s second optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s second optional strategy.

[0213] Furthermore, the stability conditions for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy corresponding to the equilibrium point (0,0,0) include: C1-C2>R2-R3, C3-C4+0.5C E >P2+R2-R3 and C5-C6>P1-P2;

[0214] The stability conditions for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy corresponding to the equilibrium point (0,0,1) include: C1-C2>R2-R3+R1, C3-C4+0.5C E>P1 + R2 - R3 and C5 - C6 < P1 - P2;

[0215] The stability conditions for enhancing the stability of the power supply - demand coordination policy corresponding to the equilibrium point (0, 1, 0) include: C1 - C2 > 0.5C E 、C3 - C4 + 0.5C E <P2 + R2 - R3 and C5 - C6 > P1 - P2;

[0216] The stability conditions for enhancing the stability of the power supply - demand coordination policy corresponding to the equilibrium point (0, 1, 1) include: C1 - C2 > R1 + 0.5C E 、C3 - C4 + 0.5C E <P1 + R2 - R3 and C5 - C6 < P1 - P2;

[0217] The stability conditions for enhancing the stability of the power supply - demand coordination policy corresponding to the equilibrium point (1, 0, 0) include: C1 - C2 < R2 - R3, C3 - C4 > S2, and C5 - C6 > R4 - R5;

[0218] The stability conditions for enhancing the stability of the power supply - demand coordination policy corresponding to the equilibrium point (1, 0, 1) include: C1 - C2 < R1 + R2 - R3, C3 - C4 > S1, and C5 - C6 < R4 - R5;

[0219] The stability conditions for enhancing the stability of the power supply - demand coordination policy corresponding to the equilibrium point (1, 1, 0) include: C1 - C2 < 0.5C E 、C3 - C4 < S2, and C5 - C6 + S1 - S2 > R4 - R5;

[0220] The stability conditions for enhancing the stability of the power supply - demand coordination policy corresponding to the equilibrium point (1, 1, 1) include: C1 - C2 < 0.5C E + R1, C3 - C4 < S1, and C5 - C6 + S1 - S2 < R4 - R5;

[0221] Among them, C1 is the execution cost when the user entity selects the first optional strategy of the user entity, C2 is the execution cost when the user entity selects the second optional strategy of the user entity, C3 is the execution cost when the regulatory entity selects the first optional strategy of the regulatory entity, C4 is the execution cost when the regulatory entity selects the second optional strategy of the regulatory entity, C5 is the execution cost when the policy - promoting entity selects the first optional strategy of the policy - promoting entity, C6 is the execution cost when the policy - promoting entity selects the second optional strategy of the policy - promoting entity, C Eis the additional invitation cost of the regulatory body, R1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the user body chooses the user body’s first optional strategy, R2 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the user body chooses the user body’s first optional strategy, R3 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the user body chooses the user body’s second optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s first optional strategy, R4 is the credibility enhancement benefit obtained when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s first optional strategy, R5 is the credibility enhancement benefit obtained when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s second optional strategy, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s first optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s first optional strategy, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s second optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s first optional strategy, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s first optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s second optional strategy, and P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s second optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s second optional strategy.

[0222] The present invention can also analyze the strategy stability of each subject based on the replication dynamic equation of each subject, including:

[0223] Step 1: Calculate the first-order derivative of the user subject's replication dynamic equation to obtain the first-order derivative of the user subject's replication dynamic equation

[0224] [C2-C1+R2+0.5yC E -yR2+zR1+(y-1)R3] is recorded as F1(z), because F1(z) is an increasing function with respect to z;

[0225] Step 2: Let F1(z1*)=0, and Analyze the stability of adjustable resource user strategies under different decision-making scenarios of regulatory entities and policy promoters:

[0226] Known 0.5C E >R2-R3, we can get z1* as a decreasing function with respect to y;

[0227] If y>y1*, then Then F1(z)>F1(z1*)=0,(0≤z≤1), we can get F(1)=0 and That is, x = 1 is an evolutionary stable strategy;

[0228] If y≤y1*, there are three cases: (1) When z=z1*, F1(z)=0, then F(x)=0 and That is, x is in a stable state, and the stable strategy depends on the initial value; (2) When z>z1*, F1(z)>0, then F(1)=0 and That is, x = 1 is an evolutionary stable strategy; (3) When z < z1*, F1(z) < 0, then F(0) = 0 and That is, x=0 is an evolutionarily stable strategy.

[0229] The above analysis shows that: if the probability of the regulatory subject adopting its corresponding second optional strategy is high, then no matter what strategy the policy promotion subject adopts, the user subject tends to choose its corresponding first optional strategy; if the probability of the regulatory subject adopting its corresponding second optional strategy is low, the user subject will make a decision based on the policy promotion situation of the policy promotion subject: (1) When the probability of the first optional strategy corresponding to the policy promotion subject is a certain value, the user subject's strategy remains in the initial state; (2) When the probability of the first optional strategy corresponding to the policy promotion subject is high, the user subject tends to choose its corresponding first optional strategy; (3) When the probability of the first optional strategy corresponding to the policy promotion subject is low, the user subject tends to choose its corresponding second optional strategy.

[0230] To further illustrate the optimization method of the power supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game, the present invention provides a specific example, where the user subject is the user, the regulatory subject is the aggregator, and the policy promotion subject is the government. Figure 2 As shown, the following steps are included:

[0231] Step S1: Analyze the game relationship of various entities in the implementation of the power supply and demand coordination policy, set the optional strategy set of each entity, and propose the basic assumptions of the evolutionary game model;

[0232] Among them, the game relationship between the three game players in the process of power supply and demand coordination is as follows: Figure 3 As shown;

[0233] Step S2: Determine the payoff function of each subject and propose the replication dynamic equation of each subject in the game process;

[0234] Step S3: Based on the replication dynamic equations of each subject, analyze the stability of each subject and the game system strategy.

[0235] Step S1 includes the following steps:

[0236] S101: Users are the owners of resources. They can obtain economic incentives from aggregators and spiritual incentives from the government by participating in the coordination of power supply and demand. The strategies they can adopt include serious participation and random adjustment, and the corresponding probabilities are x (0≤x≤1) and (1-x) respectively.

[0237] S102: Aggregators guide adjustable resource users to participate in the coordination of power supply and demand, and are rewarded and punished by the government based on actual results and strategic behaviors. The strategies that can be adopted are strong supervision and weak supervision, with corresponding probabilities y(0≤y≤1) and (1-y) respectively;

[0238] S103: The government manages aggregators through economic incentives and economic penalties. It can also use education, honors and other methods to encourage adjustable resource users to participate in the coordination of power supply and demand. At the same time, when the coordination of power supply and demand is good, the users will gain benefits due to the improvement of their credibility. The strategies that can be adopted are active promotion of policy implementation and passive promotion of policy implementation, and the corresponding probabilities are z (0≤z≤1) and (1-z) respectively.

[0239] S104: Based on the analysis of the game relationship between the various entities, the following basic assumptions are established:

[0240] Assumption 1: All game participants are of limited rationality, unable to grasp the overall information and accurately analyze the consequences. They make decisions based on the current limited information and consciously adjust their strategies according to the behavior of other players in the game.

[0241] Assumption 2: Assuming that when users seriously participate in the supply and demand coordination, the cost they need to pay is C1. At this time, the power supply and demand coordination effect is relatively good. Users can obtain honors issued by the government, thereby obtaining spiritual incentives R1, and can also obtain economic incentives R2 from aggregators; Assuming that users participate in the supply and demand coordination casually, the cost they need to pay is C2. At this time, the power supply and demand coordination effect is poor, and users only obtain economic incentives from aggregators. If aggregators adopt strong supervision at this time, the economic incentives obtained by users are R3, otherwise it is still R2; Obviously, C1>C2>0, R1>0, R2>R3>0;

[0242] Assumption 3: If the aggregator adopts strong supervision, the execution cost to be paid is C3. If the supply and demand synergy effect is not good at this time, the aggregator will report to the management center and invite other users to supplement, which requires additional costs; if the aggregator adopts weak supervision, it will not distinguish and adjust the supply and demand synergy effect of users, and the execution cost at this time is C4; Obviously, C3>C4>0;

[0243] Hypothesis 4: Assuming that the government actively promotes the implementation of the policy, the execution cost to be paid is C5. The government provides economic subsidies S1 to aggregators that are carefully regulated, imposes economic penalties P1 on aggregators with poor power supply and demand coordination and orders them to make rectifications. It encourages users who seriously participate in the power supply and demand coordination by awarding honors. If the power supply and demand coordination effect is good at this time, the government will obtain credibility enhancement benefits R4; Assuming that the government passively promotes the implementation of the policy, the government only uses economic subsidies S2 and economic penalties P2 to manage aggregators. If the power supply and demand coordination effect is good, the government will obtain credibility enhancement benefits R5, and the cost at this time is C6; Obviously, C5>C6>0, S1>S2>0, P1>P2>0, R4>R5>0;

[0244] Assumption 5: The additional invitation cost C of the aggregator to other users E The additional cost will be shared by the aggregator and the current users, and the shared additional cost is greater than the difference in user incentives under different supply and demand synergies, that is, C E >0,0.5C E >R2-R3;

[0245] S2 includes the following steps:

[0246] S201: Based on the S1 strategy set and assumptions, establish the three-party game payoff matrix shown in Table 1;

[0247] Table 1 Three-party game payoff matrix

[0248]

[0249] S202: Based on the three-party game payoff matrix, the expected payoff and replication dynamic equation of the adjustable resource user are obtained.

[0250] When the user chooses to seriously participate in the strategy, his expected return U1 is:

[0251] U1=-C1+z×R1+R2 (1)

[0252] When the user chooses to adjust the strategy at will, the expected return U2 is:

[0253] U2=-C2+y×R2+(1-y)R3-y×0.5C E (2)

[0254] Therefore, the average expected benefit of adjustable resource users is:

[0255]

[0256] Then the replication dynamic equation of adjustable resource users is obtained as follows:

[0257]

[0258] S203: Based on the three-party game payoff matrix, the expected payoff and replication dynamic equation of the aggregator are obtained.

[0259] When the aggregator chooses a strong regulatory strategy, its expected return A1 is:

[0260] A1=-C3+ xzS1+(1-z)xS2-xR2-(1-x)(R3+0.5C E ) (5)

[0261] When the aggregator chooses a weak regulation strategy, its expected return A2 is:

[0262] A2=-C4-(1-x)zP1-(1-x)(1-z)P2-R2 (6)

[0263] Therefore, the average expected return of the aggregator is:

[0264]

[0265] Then the replication dynamic equation of the aggregator is obtained as:

[0266]

[0267] S204: Based on the three-party game payoff matrix, the government’s expected payoff and replication dynamic equation are obtained.

[0268] When the government chooses to actively promote the strategy, its expected benefit G1 is:

[0269] G1=-C5-xyS1+xR4+(1-x)P1 (9)

[0270] When the government chooses a passive promotion strategy, its expected benefit G2 is:

[0271] G2=-C6-xyS2+xR5+(1-x)P2 (10)

[0272] Therefore, the average expected revenue of the government is:

[0273]

[0274] Then the replication dynamic equation of the aggregator is obtained as:

[0275]

[0276] S3 includes the following steps:

[0277] S301: Analyze the strategy stability of each subject based on the replication dynamic equation of each subject.

[0278] The following takes the policy stability of adjustable resource users as an example.

[0279] (1) Calculate the first-order derivative of F(x) with respect to x:

[0280]

[0281] C2-C1+R2+0.5yC E -yR2+zR1+(y-1)R3 is recorded as F1(z). F1(z) is an increasing function with respect to z.

[0282] (2) Order and Analyze the stability of adjustable resource user strategies under different decision scenarios of aggregators and governments.

[0283] Known 0.5C E >R2-R3, we can get z1* as a decreasing function about y. If y>y1*, then Then F1(z)>F1(z1*)=0,(0≤z≤1), we can get F(1)=0 and That is, x = 1 is an evolutionary stable strategy. If y ≤ y1*, it can be divided into three cases: (1) When z = z1*, F1(z) = 0, then F(x) = 0 and That is, x is in a stable state, and the stable strategy depends on the initial value; (2) When z>z1*, F1(z)>0, then F(1)=0 and That is, x = 1 is an evolutionary stable strategy; (3) When z < z1*, F1(z) < 0, then F(0) = 0 and That is, x=0 is an evolutionarily stable strategy.

[0284] The above analysis shows that if the probability of aggregators adopting strong regulation is high, users tend to participate seriously regardless of the strategy adopted by the government; if the probability of aggregators adopting strong regulation is low, users will make decisions based on the government's policy implementation: (1) When the probability of the government actively promoting the policy is a certain value, the user's strategy remains in the initial state; (2) When the probability of the government actively promoting the policy is high, the user's strategy tends to participate seriously; (3) When the probability of the government actively promoting the policy is low, the user's strategy tends to participate casually.

[0285] S302: Establish the Jacobian matrix based on the replication dynamic equation of each subject and analyze the strategic stability of the game system.

[0286] The Jacobian matrix Jacobian is established as follows:

[0287]

[0288] Let F(x)=0, F(y)=0, F(z)=0, and we can obtain 8 pure strategy equilibrium points of the evolutionary game system, namely (0,0,0), (0,0,1), (0,1,0), (0,1,1), (1,0,0), (1,0,1), (1,1,0) and (1,1,1).

[0289] Substitute each pure strategy equilibrium point into the Jacobian matrix to obtain the eigenvalues ​​of the matrix at different equilibrium points, and obtain the stability conditions of different equilibrium points from the eigenvalues, as shown in Table 2.

[0290] Table 2 Matrix eigenvalues ​​at different equilibrium points

[0291]

[0292]

[0293] In order to study the interest game of various parties in the process of supply and demand coordination and analyze the implementation effect of the power supply and demand coordination policy, this paper analyzes the game relationship of various game subjects in the implementation of the power supply and demand coordination policy, and establishes an evolutionary game model for the implementation of the power supply and demand coordination policy; through the profit function of each subject in the game process and its replication dynamic equation, the stability of the game subject and system strategy selection is analyzed. By changing the intensity of the government's use of policy tools such as incentives and penalties, the impact of policy input parameters on users' participation in power supply and demand coordination is analyzed, providing a reference for the formulation and implementation of relevant policies and promoting benign interaction between sources and loads.

[0294] Embodiment 2

[0295] The present invention also provides an optimization device for power supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game, such as Figure 4 As shown, including:

[0296] The first determination unit is used to determine the profit function of each game subject in the power supply and demand coordination policy by using an evolutionary game model;

[0297] The first construction unit is used to construct the replication dynamic equation of each game subject by using the profit function of each game subject;

[0298] The second determination unit calculates the equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy using the replicated dynamic equation of each game subject, and determines the stability conditions for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy based on the equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy;

[0299] An optimization unit for optimizing the electricity supply and demand coordination policy using stable conditions;

[0300] The evolutionary game model is constructed to utilize data from the electricity supply and demand coordination policy.

[0301] Furthermore, the game players in the evolutionary game include: user players, regulatory players and policy promoters.

[0302] Furthermore, it also includes: a second construction unit for constructing an evolutionary game model; the second construction unit includes:

[0303] The first determination module is used to analyze the game relationship of each game subject in the power supply and demand coordination policy to determine the optional strategy set of each game subject, the probability set of the optional strategy of each game subject and the execution cost of each game subject under different optional strategy combinations;

[0304] The construction module is used to construct an evolutionary game model by using the optional strategy set of each game subject, the probability set of the optional strategy of each game subject and the execution cost of each game subject under different optional strategy combinations.

[0305] Furthermore, the evolutionary game model includes:

[0306] ES={P,S,SP,I}

[0307] In the above formula, ES is the evolutionary game model, P is the game subject in the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, S is the strategy space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, SP is the strategy probability space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, and I is the benefit space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy;

[0308] Where P = {P A ,P B ,P C}, P A is the user subject, P B As the regulatory body, P C As the policy promotion subject; S = {S A ,S B ,S C},S A is a collection of optional policies for the user principal. is the i-th optional strategy of the user subject, S B is a set of optional strategies for the regulatory body, is the jth optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S C is a set of optional strategies for policy promotion entities. is the kth optional strategy of the policy promotion subject; SP = {SP A ,SP B ,SP C}, SP A is the probability set of optional strategies of the user subject, is the probability of the user subject choosing the i-th strategy, SP B is the probability set of the regulatory subject’s optional strategies, is the probability of the regulatory body choosing the jth strategy, is the probability of the policy promotion subject choosing the kth strategy; I = {I A ,I B ,I C}, I A is the execution cost of the user subject under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the user subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy, I B is the execution cost of the regulatory body under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy, I C is the execution cost of the regulatory body under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy; i∈[1,M], M is the total number of optional strategies of the user subject, j∈[1,N], N is the total number of optional strategies of the regulatory subject, SP C is the probability set of optional strategies of the policy promotion subject, k∈[1,L], and L is the total number of optional strategies of the policy promotion subject.

[0309] Furthermore, the first building block comprises:

[0310] The first acquisition module is used to perform calculus on the user subject's benefit function to obtain the user subject's replication dynamic equation;

[0311] The second acquisition module is used to perform calculus on the revenue function of the regulatory subject to obtain the replication dynamic equation of the regulatory subject;

[0312] The third acquisition module is used to perform calculus on the benefit function of the policy promotion subject to obtain the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject.

[0313] Furthermore, the second determining unit includes:

[0314] Establish a module for establishing the Jacobian matrix based on the replication dynamic equations of each game player;

[0315] A fourth acquisition module is used to make the replication dynamic equation of the user subject, the replication dynamic equation of the regulatory subject and the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject all equal to 0, so as to obtain the equilibrium points of multiple power supply and demand coordination policies;

[0316] A solution module is used to substitute the equilibrium point of each power supply and demand coordination policy into the Jacobian matrix and solve the matrix eigenvalues ​​at each equilibrium point;

[0317] The second determination module is used to determine the stability conditions for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy corresponding to each equilibrium point according to the matrix eigenvalues.

[0318] Furthermore, the equilibrium points of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy include: (0,0,0), (0,0,1), (0,1,0), (0,1,1), (1,0,0), (1,0,1), (1,1,0), and (1,1,1).

[0319] Furthermore, the eigenvalues ​​corresponding to the equilibrium point (0,0,0) include: λ1, λ2, and λ3;

[0320] The eigenvalues ​​corresponding to the equilibrium point (0,0,1) include: λ4, λ5, and λ6;

[0321] The eigenvalues ​​corresponding to the equilibrium point (0,1,0) include: λ7, λ8, and λ9;

[0322] The eigenvalues ​​corresponding to the equilibrium point (0,1,1) include: 10 , 11 and λ 12 ;

[0323] The eigenvalues ​​corresponding to the equilibrium point (1,0,0) include: 13 , 14 and λ 15 ;

[0324] The eigenvalues ​​corresponding to the equilibrium point (1,0,1) include: 16 , 17 and λ 18 ;

[0325] The eigenvalues ​​corresponding to the equilibrium point (1,1,0) include: 19 , 20 and λ 21 ;

[0326] The eigenvalues ​​corresponding to the equilibrium point (1,1,1) include: 22 , 23 and λ 24 .

[0327] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the eigenvalue λ1 includes:

[0328] λ1=C2-C1+R2-R3

[0329] The calculation formula of the eigenvalue λ2 includes:

[0330] λ2=C4-C3-0.5C E +P2+R2-R3

[0331] The calculation formula of the eigenvalue λ3 includes:

[0332] λ3=C6-C5+P1-P2

[0333] The calculation formula of eigenvalue λ4 includes:

[0334] λ4=C2-C1+R1+R2-R3

[0335] The calculation formula of eigenvalue λ5 includes:

[0336] λ5=C4-C3-0.5C E +P1+R2-R3

[0337] The calculation formula of the eigenvalue λ6 includes:

[0338] λ6=C5-C6-P1+P2

[0339] The calculation formula of the eigenvalue λ7 includes:

[0340] λ7=C2-C1+0.5C E

[0341] The calculation formula of the eigenvalue λ8 includes:

[0342] λ8=C3-C4+0.5C E -P2-R2+R3

[0343] The calculation formula of the eigenvalue λ9 includes:

[0344] λ9=C6-C5+P1-P2

[0345] Eigenvalue λ 10 The calculation formula includes:

[0346] λ 10 =C2-C1+0.5C E +R1

[0347] Eigenvalue λ 11 The calculation formula includes:

[0348] λ 11 =C3-C4+0.5C E -P1-R2+R3

[0349] Eigenvalue λ 12 The calculation formula includes:

[0350] λ 12 =C5-C6-P1+P2

[0351] Eigenvalue λ 13 The calculation formula includes:

[0352] λ 13 =C1-C2-R2+R3

[0353] Eigenvalue λ 14 The calculation formula includes:

[0354] λ 14 =C4-C3+S2

[0355] Eigenvalue λ 15 The calculation formula includes:

[0356] λ 15 =C6-C5+R4-R5

[0357] Eigenvalue λ 16 The calculation formula includes:

[0358] λ 16 =C1-C2-R1-R2+R3

[0359] Eigenvalue λ 17 The calculation formula includes:

[0360] λ 17 =C4-C3+S1

[0361] Eigenvalue λ 18 The calculation formula includes:

[0362] λ 18 =C5-C6-R4+R5

[0363] Eigenvalue λ 19 The calculation formula includes:

[0364] λ 19 =C1-C2-0.5C E

[0365] Eigenvalue λ 20 The calculation formula includes:

[0366] λ 20 =C3-C4-S2

[0367] Eigenvalue λ 21 The calculation formula includes:

[0368] λ 21 =C6-C5+R4-R5-S1+S2

[0369] Eigenvalue λ 22 The calculation formula includes:

[0370] λ 22 =C1-C2-0.5C E -R1

[0371] Eigenvalue λ 23 The calculation formula includes:

[0372] λ 23 =C3-C4-S1

[0373] Eigenvalue λ 24 The calculation formula includes:

[0374] λ 24 =C5-C6-R4+R5+S1-S2

[0375] In the above formula, C1 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, C2 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject, C3 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C4 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C5 is the execution cost when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, C6 is the execution cost when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, and C E is the additional invitation cost of the regulatory body, R1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the user body chooses the user body’s first optional strategy, R2 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the user body chooses the user body’s first optional strategy, R3 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the user body chooses the user body’s second optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s first optional strategy, R4 is the credibility enhancement benefit obtained when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s first optional strategy, R5 is the credibility enhancement benefit obtained when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s second optional strategy, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s first optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s first optional strategy, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s second optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s first optional strategy, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s first optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s second optional strategy, and P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s second optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s second optional strategy.

[0376] Furthermore, the stability conditions for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy corresponding to the equilibrium point (0,0,0) include: C1-C2>R2-R3, C3-C4+0.5CE >P2 + R2 - R3 and C5 - C6 > P1 - P2;

[0377] The stability conditions for enhancing the stability of the power supply - demand coordination policy corresponding to the equilibrium point (0, 0, 1) include: C1 - C2 > R2 - R3 + R1, C3 - C4 + 0.5C E >P1 + R2 - R3 and C5 - C6 < P1 - P2;

[0378] The stability conditions for enhancing the stability of the power supply - demand coordination policy corresponding to the equilibrium point (0, 1, 0) include: C1 - C2 > 0.5C E 、C3 - C4 + 0.5C E <P2 + R2 - R3 and C5 - C6 > P1 - P2;

[0379] The stability conditions for enhancing the stability of the power supply - demand coordination policy corresponding to the equilibrium point (0, 1, 1) include: C1 - C2 > R1 + 0.5C E 、C3 - C4 + 0.5C E <P1 + R2 - R3 and C5 - C6 < P1 - P2;

[0380] The stability conditions for enhancing the stability of the power supply - demand coordination policy corresponding to the equilibrium point (1, 0, 0) include: C1 - C2 < R2 - R3, C3 - C4 > S2 and C5 - C6 > R4 - R5;

[0381] The stability conditions for enhancing the stability of the power supply - demand coordination policy corresponding to the equilibrium point (1, 0, 1) include: C1 - C2 < R1 + R2 - R3, C3 - C4 > S1 and C5 - C6 < R4 - R5;

[0382] The stability conditions for enhancing the stability of the power supply - demand coordination policy corresponding to the equilibrium point (1, 1, 0) include: C1 - C2 < 0.5C E 、C3 - C4 < S2 and C5 - C6 + S1 - S2 > R4 - R5;

[0383] The stability conditions for enhancing the stability of the power supply - demand coordination policy corresponding to the equilibrium point (1, 1, 1) include: C1 - C2 < 0.5C E +R1, C3 - C4 < S1 and C5 - C6 + S1 - S2 < R4 - R5;

[0384] Among them, C1 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, C2 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject, C3 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C4 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C5 is the execution cost when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, C6 is the execution cost when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, and C E is the additional invitation cost of the regulatory body, R1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the user body chooses the user body’s first optional strategy, R2 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the user body chooses the user body’s first optional strategy, R3 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the user body chooses the user body’s second optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s first optional strategy, R4 is the credibility enhancement benefit obtained when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s first optional strategy, R5 is the credibility enhancement benefit obtained when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s second optional strategy, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s first optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s first optional strategy, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s second optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s first optional strategy, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s first optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s second optional strategy, and P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the policy promotion body chooses the policy promotion body’s second optional strategy and the regulatory body chooses the regulatory body’s second optional strategy.

[0385] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the user's profit function includes:

[0386]

[0387] In the above formula, is the user's payoff function, x is the probability of the user's first optional strategy, (1-x) is the probability of the user's second optional strategy, U1 is the expected payoff when the user chooses the first optional strategy, and U2 is the expected payoff when the user chooses the second optional strategy.

[0388] Furthermore, the calculation formula for the expected return when the user subject selects the first optional strategy of the user subject includes:

[0389] U1=-C1+z×R1+R2

[0390] The calculation formula for the expected return when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject includes:

[0391] U2=-C2+y×R2+(1-y)R3-y×0.5C E

[0392] In the above formula, C1 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, C2 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject, R1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R2 is the execution cost of the supervision subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R3 is the execution cost of the supervision subject when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject and the supervision subject chooses the first optional strategy of the supervision subject, C E is the additional invitation cost of the regulatory subject, y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, (1-y) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, and z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject.

[0393] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the regulatory body's profit function includes:

[0394]

[0395] In the above formula, is the payoff function of the regulatory subject, y is the probability of the regulatory subject’s first optional strategy, (1-y) is the probability of the regulatory subject’s second optional strategy, A1 is the expected payoff when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy, and A2 is the expected payoff when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy.

[0396] Furthermore, the calculation formula for the expected return when the regulatory subject selects the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject includes:

[0397] A1=-C3+xzS1+(1-z)xS2-xR2-(1-x)(R3+0.5C E )

[0398] The calculation formula for the expected return when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject includes:

[0399] A2=-C4-(1-x)zP1-(1-x)(1-z)P2-R2

[0400] In the above formula, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, (1-x) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the user subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, and (1-z) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject; C3 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C4 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject The execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, R2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R3 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C E Additional invitation costs for regulatory bodies.

[0401] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the benefit function of the policy promotion subject includes:

[0402]

[0403] In the above formula, is the profit function of the policy promotion subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, (1-z) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, G1 is the expected profit of the policy promotion subject when choosing the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, and G2 is the expected profit of the policy promotion subject when choosing the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject.

[0404] Furthermore, the calculation formula for the expected return when the policy promotion subject selects the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject includes:

[0405] G1=-C5-xyS1+xR4+(1-x)P1

[0406] The calculation formula for the expected return when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject includes:

[0407] G2=-C6-xyS2+xR5+(1-x)P2

[0408] In the above formula, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, (1-x) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the user subject, and y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject; C5 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when it chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, C6 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when it chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, R4 is the credibility improvement benefit obtained by the policy promotion subject when it chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, and R5 is the credibility improvement benefit obtained by the policy promotion subject when it chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject.

[0409] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the replication dynamic equation of the user subject includes:

[0410]

[0411] In the above formula, F(x) is the replication dynamic equation of the user subject, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, t is the time, is the user subject’s benefit function, U1 is the expected benefit when the user subject chooses the user subject’s first optional strategy, C1 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the user subject’s first optional strategy, C2 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the user subject’s second optional strategy, R1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the user subject chooses the user subject’s first optional strategy, R2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the user subject’s first optional strategy, R3 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the user subject’s second optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses the regulatory subject’s first optional strategy, C E Additional invitation costs for regulatory bodies.

[0412] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the replication dynamic equation of the regulatory body includes:

[0413]

[0414] In the above formula, F(y) is the replication dynamic equation of the regulatory subject, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, t is the time, is the payoff function of the regulatory subject, A1 is the expected payoff when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C3 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C4 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, R2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R3 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C E is the additional invitation cost of the regulatory body, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the policy promotion body chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion body and the regulatory body chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory body, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the policy promotion body chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion body and the regulatory body chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory body, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the policy promotion body chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion body and the regulatory body chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory body, and P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the policy promotion body chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion body and the regulatory body chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory body.

[0415] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject includes:

[0416]

[0417] In the above formula, F(z) is the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, t is the time, is the benefit function of the policy promotion subject, G1 is the expected benefit of the policy promotion subject when it chooses its first optional strategy, C5 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when it chooses its first optional strategy, C6 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when it chooses its second optional strategy, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses its first optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses its first optional strategy, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses its second optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses its first optional strategy, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses its first optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses its second optional strategy, P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses its second optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses its second optional strategy, R4 is the credibility enhancement benefit obtained by the policy promotion subject when it chooses its first optional strategy, and R5 is the credibility enhancement benefit obtained by the policy promotion subject when it chooses its second optional strategy.

[0418] It can be understood that the device embodiment provided above corresponds to the method embodiment described above, and the corresponding specific contents can be referenced to each other and will not be repeated here.

[0419] It can be understood that the same or similar parts of the above embodiments can be referenced to each other, and the contents not described in detail in some embodiments can refer to the same or similar contents in other embodiments.

[0420] Embodiment 3

[0421] like Figure 5 As shown, the present invention also provides an electronic device, which may be a computer device, a single-chip device, an intelligent mobile device, etc. The electronic device in this embodiment may include a processor, a memory, a transceiver component, etc. The memory, the processor, and the transceiver component are connected via a bus; the memory may be used to store an execution program, and an exemplary execution program may include instructions; the processor is used to execute the instructions stored in the memory. The memory may also be used to store data, which may be called and / or modified when the instructions are executed.

[0422] The processor may be a central processing unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gates or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. It is the computing core and control core of the terminal, which is suitable for implementing one or more instructions, specifically suitable for loading and executing one or more instructions in a storage medium to implement corresponding method flows or corresponding functions, so as to implement the steps of an optimization method for an electricity supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game in the above-mentioned embodiment.

[0423] Embodiment 4

[0424] Based on the same inventive concept, the present invention also provides a readable storage medium, specifically an electronic device readable storage medium (Memory), which is a memory device in an electronic device for storing programs and data. It can be understood that the storage medium here can include both built-in storage media in electronic devices and, of course, extended storage media supported by electronic devices. The storage medium provides a storage space, which stores the operating system of the terminal. In addition, one or more instructions suitable for being loaded and executed by a processor are also stored in the storage space, and these instructions can be one or more execution programs (including program codes). It should be noted that the storage medium here can be a high-speed RAM memory or a non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk memory. The processor loads and executes one or more instructions stored in the storage medium, which can implement the steps of an optimization method for a power supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game in the above embodiment.

[0425] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that embodiments of the present invention may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention may take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Moreover, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0426] The present invention is described with reference to flowcharts and / or block diagrams of methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that each process and / or block in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of processes and / or blocks in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.

[0427] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer readable memory produce an article of manufacture including an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.

[0428] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process in the computer or other programmable device. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps for the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0429] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, ordinary technicians in the relevant field should understand that the specific implementation methods of the present invention can still be modified or replaced by equivalents. Any modification or equivalent replacement that does not depart from the spirit and scope of the present invention should be covered within the scope of protection of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. An optimization method for power supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game, characterized in that: include: The evolutionary game model is used to determine the profit function of each game player in the electricity supply and demand coordination policy; Using the profit function of each game subject, construct the replication dynamic equation of each game subject; The equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy is calculated using the replicated dynamic equations of the game entities, and the stability conditions for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy are determined according to the equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy; Utilizing the stable conditions to optimize the electricity supply and demand coordination policy; The evolutionary game model is constructed using data from electricity supply and demand coordination policies.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The game players in the evolutionary game include: user players, regulatory players and policy promotion players.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The construction process of the evolutionary game model includes: Analyze the game relationship of each game subject in the power supply and demand coordination policy to determine the optional strategy set of each game subject, the probability set of the optional strategy of each game subject and the execution cost of each game subject under different optional strategy combinations; The evolutionary game model is constructed by using the optional strategy set of each game subject, the probability set of the optional strategy of each game subject and the execution cost of each game subject under different optional strategy combinations.

4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The evolutionary game model comprises: ES={P,S,SP,I} In the above formula, ES is the evolutionary game model, P is the game subject in the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, S is the strategy space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, SP is the strategy probability space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, and I is the benefit space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy; Where P = {P A ,P B ,P C }, P A is the user subject, P B As the regulatory body, P C As the policy promotion subject; S = {S A ,S B ,S C },S A is a collection of optional policies for the user principal. is the i-th optional strategy of the user subject, S B is a set of optional strategies for the regulatory body, is the jth optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S C is a set of optional strategies for policy promotion entities. is the kth optional strategy of the policy promotion subject; SP = {SP A ,SP B ,SP C }, SP A is the probability set of optional strategies of the user subject, is the probability of the user subject choosing the i-th strategy, SP B is the probability set of the regulatory subject’s optional strategies, is the probability of the regulatory body choosing the jth strategy, is the probability of the policy promotion subject choosing the kth strategy; I = {I A ,I B ,I C }, I A is the execution cost of the user subject under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the user subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy, I B is the execution cost of the regulatory body under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy, I C is the execution cost of the regulatory body under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy; i∈[1,M], M is the total number of optional strategies of the user subject, j∈[1,N], N is the total number of optional strategies of the regulatory subject, SP C is the probability set of optional strategies of the policy promotion subject, k∈[1,L], and L is the total number of optional strategies of the policy promotion subject.

5. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The method of constructing the replication dynamic equation of each game subject by using the profit function of each game subject includes: Performing calculus on the revenue function of the user subject to obtain the replication dynamic equation of the user subject; Performing calculus on the revenue function of the regulatory subject to obtain a replication dynamic equation of the regulatory subject; The benefit function of the policy promotion subject is calculus-integrated to obtain the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject.

6. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The method of calculating the equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy by using the replicated dynamic equation of each game subject, and determining the stability conditions for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy according to the equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy, includes: Establishing a Jacobian matrix based on the replication dynamic equations of each game subject; The replication dynamic equation of the user subject, the replication dynamic equation of the regulatory subject and the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject are all set to 0, and the equilibrium points of the plurality of power supply and demand coordination policies are obtained; Substituting each equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy into the Jacobian matrix, and solving to obtain the matrix eigenvalues ​​at each equilibrium point; The stability conditions for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy corresponding to each equilibrium point are determined according to the matrix eigenvalues.

7. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The calculation formula of the user subject's benefit function includes: In the above formula, is the user's payoff function, x is the probability of the user's first optional strategy, (1-x) is the probability of the user's second optional strategy, U1 is the expected payoff when the user chooses the first optional strategy, and U2 is the expected payoff when the user chooses the second optional strategy.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that The calculation formula for the expected benefit when the user subject selects the first optional strategy of the user subject includes: U1=-C1+z×R1+R2 The calculation formula for the expected benefit when the user subject selects the second optional strategy of the user subject includes: <h2 style=";text-align:left;direction:ltr">U2 = - C2 + y × R2 + (1 - y) R3 - y × 0.5 C<h2 style=";text-align:left;direction:ltr"> E In the above formula, C1 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, C2 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject, R1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R2 is the execution cost of the supervision subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R3 is the execution cost of the supervision subject when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject and the supervision subject chooses the first optional strategy of the supervision subject, C E is the additional invitation cost of the regulatory subject, y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, (1-y) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, and z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject.

9. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The calculation formula of the profit function of the regulatory subject includes: In the above formula, is the payoff function of the regulatory subject, y is the probability of the regulatory subject’s first optional strategy, (1-y) is the probability of the regulatory subject’s second optional strategy, A1 is the expected payoff when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy, and A2 is the expected payoff when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy.

10. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that The calculation formula for the expected return when the regulatory subject selects the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject includes: A1=-C3+xzS1+(1-z)xS2-xR2-(1-x)(R3+0.5C E ) The calculation formula for the expected return when the regulatory subject selects the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject includes: A2=-C4-(1-x)zP1-(1-x)(1-z)P2-R2 In the above formula, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, (1-x) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the user subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, and (1-z) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject; C3 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C4 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject The execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, R2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R3 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C E Additional invitation costs for regulatory bodies.

11. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The calculation formula of the benefit function of the policy promotion subject includes: In the above formula, is the profit function of the policy promotion subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, (1-z) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, G1 is the expected profit of the policy promotion subject when choosing the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, and G2 is the expected profit of the policy promotion subject when choosing the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The calculation formula for the expected return when the policy promotion subject selects the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject includes: G1=-C5-xyS1+xR4+(1-x)P1 The calculation formula for the expected return when the policy promotion subject selects the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject includes: G2=-C6-xyS2+xR5+(1-x)P2 In the above formula, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, (1-x) is the probability of the second optional strategy of the user subject, and y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject; C5 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when it chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, C6 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when it chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject and the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, R4 is the credibility improvement benefit obtained by the policy promotion subject when it chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, and R5 is the credibility improvement benefit obtained by the policy promotion subject when it chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion subject.

13. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The calculation formula of the replication dynamic equation of the user subject includes: In the above formula, F(x) is the replication dynamic equation of the user subject, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, t is time, U is the payoff function of the user subject, U1 is the expected payoff when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, C1 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, C2 is the execution cost when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject, R1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R3 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C E Additional invitation costs for regulatory bodies.

14. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The calculation formula of the replication dynamic equation of the regulatory subject includes: In the above formula, F(y) is the replication dynamic equation of the regulatory subject, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, t is the time, is the payoff function of the regulatory subject, A1 is the expected payoff when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C3 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C4 is the execution cost when the regulatory subject chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory subject, R2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the first optional strategy of the user subject, R3 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject chooses the second optional strategy of the user subject and the regulatory subject chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, C E is the additional invitation cost of the regulatory body, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the policy promotion body chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion body and the regulatory body chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory body, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion body when the policy promotion body chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion body and the regulatory body chooses the first optional strategy of the regulatory body, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the policy promotion body chooses the first optional strategy of the policy promotion body and the regulatory body chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory body, and P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory body when the policy promotion body chooses the second optional strategy of the policy promotion body and the regulatory body chooses the second optional strategy of the regulatory body.

15. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The calculation formula of the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject includes: In the above formula, F(z) is the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject, x is the probability of the first optional strategy of the user subject, y is the probability of the first optional strategy of the regulatory subject, z is the probability of the first optional strategy of the policy promotion subject, t is the time, is the benefit function of the policy promotion subject, G1 is the expected benefit of the policy promotion subject when it chooses its first optional strategy, C5 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when it chooses its first optional strategy, C6 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when it chooses its second optional strategy, S1 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses its first optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses its first optional strategy, S2 is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the policy promotion subject chooses its second optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses its first optional strategy, P1 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses its first optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses its second optional strategy, P2 is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the policy promotion subject chooses its second optional strategy and the regulatory subject chooses its second optional strategy, R4 is the credibility enhancement benefit obtained by the policy promotion subject when it chooses its first optional strategy, and R5 is the credibility enhancement benefit obtained by the policy promotion subject when it chooses its second optional strategy.

16. An optimization device for power supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game, characterized in that: include: The first determination unit is used to determine the profit function of each game subject in the power supply and demand coordination policy by using an evolutionary game model; A first construction unit is used to construct a replication dynamic equation of each game subject using the profit function of each game subject; The second determination unit calculates the equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy using the replicated dynamic equations of the game entities, and determines the stability conditions for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy according to the equilibrium point of the power supply and demand coordination policy; An optimization unit, configured to optimize the power supply and demand coordination policy by utilizing the stable condition; The evolutionary game model is constructed using data from electricity supply and demand coordination policies.

17. The device according to claim 16, characterized in that The game players in the evolutionary game include: user players, regulatory players and policy promotion players.

18. The device according to claim 17, characterized in that Also includes: A second construction unit, used to construct the evolutionary game model; The second building unit comprises: The first determination module is used to analyze the game relationship of each game subject in the power supply and demand coordination policy to determine the optional strategy set of each game subject, the probability set of the optional strategy of each game subject and the execution cost of each game subject under different optional strategy combinations; A construction module is used to construct the evolutionary game model by using the optional strategy set of each game subject, the probability set of the optional strategy of each game subject and the execution cost of each game subject under different optional strategy combinations.

19. The device according to claim 17, characterized in that The evolutionary game model comprises: ES={P,S,SP,I} In the above formula, ES is the evolutionary game model, P is the game subject in the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, S is the strategy space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, SP is the strategy probability space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy, and I is the benefit space of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy; Where P = {P A ,P B ,P C }, P A is the user subject, P B As the regulatory body, P C As the policy promotion subject; S = {S A ,S B ,S C },S A is a collection of optional policies for the user principal. is the i-th optional strategy of the user subject, S B is a set of optional strategies for the regulatory body, is the jth optional strategy of the regulatory subject, S C is a set of optional strategies for policy promotion entities. is the kth optional strategy of the policy promotion subject; SP = {SP A ,SP B ,SP C }, SP A is the probability set of optional strategies of the user subject, is the probability of the user subject choosing the i-th strategy, SP B is the probability set of the regulatory subject’s optional strategies, is the probability of the regulatory body choosing the jth strategy, is the probability of the policy promotion subject choosing the kth strategy; I = {I A ,I B ,I C }, I A is the execution cost of the user subject under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the user subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy, I B is the execution cost of the regulatory body under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the regulatory subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy, I C is the execution cost of the regulatory body under different optional strategy combinations, is the execution cost of the policy promotion subject when the user subject selects the i-th strategy, the regulatory subject selects the j-th strategy, and the policy promotion subject selects the k-th strategy; i∈[1,M], M is the total number of optional strategies of the user subject, j∈[1,N], N is the total number of optional strategies of the regulatory subject, SP C is the probability set of optional strategies of the policy promotion subject, k∈[1,L], and L is the total number of optional strategies of the policy promotion subject.

20. The device according to claim 17, characterized in that The first building block comprises: A first acquisition module is used to perform calculus on the revenue function of the user subject to obtain a replication dynamic equation of the user subject; A second acquisition module is used to perform calculus on the revenue function of the regulatory subject to obtain a replication dynamic equation of the regulatory subject; The third acquisition module is used to perform calculus on the benefit function of the policy promotion subject to obtain the replication dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject.

21. The device according to claim 17, characterized in that The second determining unit includes: An establishment module is used to establish a Jacobian matrix based on the replication dynamic equations of each game subject; A fourth acquisition module, used to make the replicated dynamic equation of the user subject, the replicated dynamic equation of the regulatory subject and the replicated dynamic equation of the policy promotion subject all equal to 0, so as to obtain equilibrium points of the plurality of power supply and demand coordination policies; A solution module, used for substituting the equilibrium point of each of the power supply and demand coordination policies into the Jacobian matrix, and solving to obtain the matrix eigenvalues ​​at each equilibrium point; The second determination module is used to determine the stability conditions for improving the stability of the power supply and demand coordination policy corresponding to each equilibrium point according to the matrix eigenvalues.

22. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: at least one processor and memory; The memory and the processor are connected via a bus; The memory is used to store one or more programs; When the one or more programs are executed by the at least one processor, the optimization method of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game as described in any one of claims 1 to 15 is implemented.

23. A readable storage medium, characterized in that: An execution program is stored thereon, and when the execution program is executed, the optimization method of the electricity supply and demand coordination policy based on evolutionary game as described in any one of claims 1 to 15 is implemented.

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