Malicious message detection method and system based on batch authentication in Internet of Vehicles

Abstract

The invention relates to a malicious message detection method and system based on batch authentication in the Internet of Vehicles, and the method comprises the steps: receiving a message sent by a vehicle and the signature information of the vehicle for the message, and putting the message sent by the vehicle into a corresponding message list according to the trust level of the vehicle, the messages in all the message lists are verified through a batch verification algorithm, and if verification is not passed, batch authentication is sequentially conducted on the message lists according to the trust levels from high to low; the process of carrying out batch authentication on the message list comprises the following steps of: carrying out batch authentication on messages in the message list by utilizing a batch verification algorithm; if verification is not passed, the messages in the message list are equally divided into two parts, and the messages of the two parts are subjected to batch verification through a batch verification algorithm; and repeating the above steps for partial messages which do not pass the batch verification until all messages which do not pass the verification are found as malicious messages, so that the malicious messages can be quickly detected, and the loss of message detection is reduced.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of Internet of Vehicles, and in particular, relates to a method and system for detecting malicious messages based on batch authentication in an Internet of Vehicles. Background Art

[0002] The Vehicle-to-Internet Network (VANET) is a new type of mobile self-organizing network consisting of vehicle nodes, roadside infrastructure roadside units (RSU), trusted centers (TA), etc., and each vehicle node is equipped with an onboard unit (OBU). The communication between vehicle nodes and with the infrastructure is generally achieved through wireless short-range communication protocols, and the communication between roadside infrastructure and the central management system is generally achieved through wired communication. At present, there are still many security issues in the VANET. The VANET is a special mobile self-organizing network. Due to the high-speed mobility of vehicle nodes and the open environment they face, the VANET is vulnerable to various security threats from itself or the outside world. Therefore, the receiving node needs to verify the received message.

[0003] In the verification process of the Internet of Vehicles, the traditional method is that the receiving node needs to perform a detailed aggregation verification process for each message from the sending node. Although this mechanism can effectively filter malicious or erroneous information, it also significantly increases processing time and resource consumption. Especially in a highly dynamic and high-density Internet of Vehicles environment, a large amount of valid information may be discarded unnecessarily due to verification failure, which in turn causes a serious waste of Internet of Vehicles information resources. As a system that is highly dependent on real-time data exchange and intelligent decision-making, the Internet of Vehicles has a close connection between its information update speed, the response efficiency of the early warning mechanism, and the overall network's collaborative ability and the messages broadcast by the verification nodes, which will be directly related to road safety, traffic flow and many other aspects. Therefore, how to optimize the message processing strategy after aggregation verification has become the key to improving the overall performance and effectiveness of the Internet of Vehicles. Summary of the invention

[0004] In order to solve the problems existing in the background technology, one aspect of the present invention provides a malicious message detection method based on batch authentication in a vehicle network, comprising: receiving a message sent by a vehicle and signature information of the message by the vehicle, placing the message sent by the vehicle into a corresponding message list according to the trust level of the vehicle, verifying all messages in the message list using a batch verification algorithm, and if the verification fails, batch authenticating the message list in order from high to low according to the trust level;

[0005] The batch authentication process for message lists includes:

[0006] S1: Based on the vehicle registration information and the vehicle signature information on the message, batch authentication is performed on the messages in the message list using a batch authentication algorithm; if the authentication fails, step S2 is executed;

[0007] S2: Divide the messages in the message list into two parts, and apply the batch verification algorithm to the messages in the two parts for batch verification;

[0008] S3: Continue to execute S2 for some messages that fail batch verification until all messages that fail verification are found as malicious messages; and update the trust level of the vehicle.

[0009] Another aspect of the present invention provides a malicious message detection system based on batch authentication in a vehicle network, the system is based on a malicious message detection method based on batch authentication in a vehicle network, and includes: a trusted center TA, a roadside unit RSU and a vehicle that communicate with each other;

[0010] The trusted center TA includes TRA and KGC. TRA is used to update and store the vehicle's registration information and generate a pseudo identity and pseudonym for the vehicle; KGC is used to generate part of the vehicle's private key.

[0011] The roadside unit RSU is used to verify the message sent by the vehicle according to the vehicle registration information stored in the trusted center TRA and the vehicle's signature information on the message.

[0012] The present invention has at least the following beneficial effects

[0013] The present invention verifies the messages in all message lists through a batch verification algorithm. Compared with verification one by one, it can significantly reduce the time and computing resources required for verification, thereby improving the overall message processing efficiency; in the case of verification failure, the message list is batch authenticated in order from high to low according to the trust level, so that the messages of vehicles with high trust levels can be processed first, ensuring the timely processing and transmission of key information; batch authentication is performed using the vehicle's registration information and signature information, which can effectively verify the authenticity and integrity of the message, and prevent malicious attackers from forging or tampering with the message; by dividing the messages in the message list into two parts for separate verification, and continuing the verification process for some messages that fail the verification, it can ensure that all malicious messages are accurately identified and processed, further improving the security of the message. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0014] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the method flow of the present invention;

[0015] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the process of batch authentication of a message list of the present invention;

[0016] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the framework structure of the Internet of Vehicles of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0017] The following describes the embodiments of the present invention by specific examples, and those skilled in the art can easily understand other advantages and effects of the present invention from the contents disclosed in this specification. The present invention can also be implemented or applied through other different specific embodiments, and the details in this specification can also be modified or changed in various ways based on different viewpoints and applications without departing from the spirit of the present invention. It should be noted that the illustrations provided in the following embodiments only illustrate the basic concept of the present invention in a schematic manner, and the following embodiments and features in the embodiments can be combined with each other without conflict.

[0018] See also Figure 1 , Figure 2 and Figure 3 In this embodiment, the vehicle network self-organizing network is first described. Note that for those skilled in the art, the vehicle network self-organizing network belongs to a basic framework that can be understood by those skilled in the art, so it is not described in detail in the claims of this patent. The following is an implementation method of a vehicle network self-organizing network in this embodiment;

[0019] First, the vehicle network self-organizing network includes: vehicle nodes, roadside units RSU and trusted center TA, and the trusted center TA includes: tracking center (TRA) and key generation center (KGC);

[0020] System initialization, TA generates system parameters and publishes them to the nodes in the Internet of Vehicles. The generated system parameters include:

[0021] TA chooses two large prime numbers p, q and a non-singular elliptic curve E:y 2 ≡x 3 +ax+bmodp, where a,b∈F p , F p is a finite field based on prime numbers p; G is a cyclic group of order q and generator P on the elliptic curve E;

[0022] KGC chooses a random number s∈Z q * As the private key of KGC, Z q * represents the multiplication group modulo q, computing P K =sP as the public key of KGC; TRA selects a random number α as the private key of TRA and calculates the public key P of TRA T =αP; TA selects four hash functions h1, h2, h3 and h4 and publishes system parameters {P, G, q, h1, h2, h3, h4, P K ,P T}; KGC and TRA keep s and α secretly.

[0023] The process of generating vehicle registration information:

[0024] Step 1: When a vehicle joins the VEHICLE AD hoc network, it first sends its own identity information RID to TRA. i ;TRA generates vehicle V based on the vehicle's identity information i Pseudo ID i =h1(RID i ) and the pseudo ID i Return to vehicle V i , where RID i is the vehicle V i Real identity information;

[0025] Step 2: KGC finds the vehicle V from the finite field i A random number d is selected i ∈Z q *, and calculate the vehicle V i Part of the secret key psk i :

[0026] psk i =d i +s(h i modq)

[0027] h i =h2(Q i ||ID i ||P k )

[0028] Q i =d i P

[0029] KGC will i ,psk i}Sent to vehicle V via secure channel i , vehicle V i By calculating and checking the equation psk i P = Q i +h i P k Is it true, vehicle V i Based on the known h2, Q i 、ID i and P k Calculate h yourself i ; If the equation psk i P = Q i +h i P k If the vehicle V i {Q i ,psk i} Store it in its own OBU and execute step 3; otherwise, stop executing the following operations, which means registration fails and needs to be re-registered;

[0030] Step 3, Vehicle V i Pick a random number x i ∈Z q * and psk i Generate your own public and private key pair (vsk i ,vpk i ), where vpk i =x i P is the vehicle V i vsk i is the vehicle V i The private key of vsk i =(x i ,psk i );Vehicle V i Select a random number k i ∈Z q *, and calculate the first part of the pseudonym PID i,1 =k i P, and put RID i 、ID i and PID i,1 Send to TRA;

[0031] Step 4: TRA receives vehicle V i After the pseudonym generation request is made, first i Check RID i The authenticity and legality of the vehicle will be terminated if it fails (TRA i Generate an ID for it i , so TRA can be based on ID i To determine RID i authenticity and legality); if the check passes, TRA is the vehicle V i Calculate its second part pseudonym Finally get the vehicle registration information PID i Includes: PID i =(PID i,1 ,PID i,2 ,VT i ), VT i Indicates registration information PID i The effective time.

[0032] Sending a message, when a vehicle needs to send a message to a receiving node, it first signs the message to generate the signature information of the message. The process is as follows;

[0033] Vehicle V iAccording to the pseudonym PID i , timestamp T i , secret value x i , partial signature key psk i 、Vehicle public key vpk i The calculation is performed based on the following information:

[0034] Vehicle V i Use the secret value x i As the temporary secret key for this signature and select a random number r i ∈Z q * Generate security parameter R i and M i , and finally calculate the main body σ of the message signature i =(psk i +x i M i +r i )modq. Among them, R i =r i P, M i =h4(m i ||PID i ||vpk i ||Q i ||R i ||T i ).

[0035] Vehicle V i Generate Sign i =(Q i ,vpk i ,σ i ) as vehicle V i About Message i At timestamp T i The certificateless signature of the vehicle V i The signed message Msg = {m i ,PID i ,Sign i ,T i}Sent to the nearest RSU through a trusted channel.

[0036] Malicious message detection,RSU performs malicious message detection after receiving the message sent by the vehicle and the vehicle's signature information on the message. The process is as follows:

[0037] See also Figure 1, one aspect of the present invention provides a method for detecting malicious messages based on batch authentication in a vehicle network, comprising: receiving a message sent by a vehicle and signature information of the message by the vehicle, placing the message sent by the vehicle into a corresponding message list according to the trust level of the vehicle, verifying all messages in the message list using a batch verification algorithm, and if the verification fails, batch authenticating the message list in order from high to low according to the trust level;

[0038] The batch authentication process for message lists includes:

[0039] S1: Based on the vehicle registration information and the vehicle signature information on the message, batch authentication is performed on the messages in the message list using a batch authentication algorithm; if the authentication fails, step S2 is executed;

[0040] S2: Divide the messages in the message list into two parts, and apply the batch verification algorithm to the messages in the two parts for batch verification;

[0041] S3: Continue to execute S2 for some messages that fail batch verification until all messages that fail verification are found as malicious messages; and update the trust level of the vehicle.

[0042] Preferably, the vehicle registration information PID i include:

[0043] PID i =(PID i,1 ,PID i,2 ,VT i )

[0044]

[0045] PID i,1 =k i P

[0046] ID i =h1(RID i )

[0047] P T =αP

[0048] Among them, VT i Indicates registration information PID i The effective time of RID i represents the real identity of the vehicle, h1 and h3 are the hash functions selected by TRA, and k i is the vehicle V i The selected random number, α is the secret key of TRA; P T represents the public key of TRA; P represents the generator of group G; || represents connection, Represents the exclusive-or operation.

[0049] Preferably, the vehicle's signature information for the message i include:

[0050] Sign i =(Q i ,vpk i ,σ i )

[0051] σ i =(psk i +x i M i +r i )modq

[0052] M i =h4(m i ||PID i ||vpk i ||Q i ||R i ||T i )

[0053] vpk i =x i P

[0054] R i =r i P

[0055] psk i =d i +s(h i modq)

[0056] h i =h2(Q i ||ID i ||P k )

[0057] Q i =d i P

[0058] Among them, x i and r i is the vehicle V i The random number selected, d i Is KGC for vehicle V i The random number selected, s is the private key of KGC, h2 and h4 are the hash functions selected by TRA, P k is the public key of KGC, P represents the generator of group G; q represents the order of group G; T i Indicates timestamp; m i Indicates an initial message.

[0059] Preferably, performing batch authentication using a batch verification algorithm includes:

[0060] Select a vector a={a1,a2,...,a n}, where a i The range is [1,2 t ] small integer between;

[0061] Construct the following equation:

[0062]

[0063] σ={σ1,σ2,...,σ n}

[0064] Where t represents a preset integer, n represents the number of messages, σ represents the subject of the message signature; P represents the generator of the group G;

[0065] Verify whether the equation is true. If it is true, the verification passes, otherwise the verification fails.

[0066] Preferably, the trust level of the vehicle is set to trusted, doubtful and unbelievable from high to low; the vehicle node that first joins the Internet of Vehicles will be assigned a trust level of doubtful; vehicle nodes with levels of trusted and doubtful are allowed to send messages in the Internet of Vehicles; vehicle nodes with a level of unbelievable are not allowed to send messages in the Internet of Vehicles; the trust level of the vehicle node whose level becomes unbelievable is automatically upgraded to doubtful after a specified time.

[0067] Preferably, updating the trust level of the vehicle includes:

[0068] The trust level of the vehicle node that sends malicious messages will be downgraded to unbelievable, and it will not be allowed to send messages in the Internet of Vehicles within the specified time; the trust level of the vehicle node with a trust level of trusted that has passed message verification will remain unchanged; the trust level of the vehicle node with a trust level of doubtful that has passed message verification will be updated to trusted.

[0069] Another aspect of the present invention provides a malicious message detection system based on batch authentication in a vehicle network, the system is based on a malicious message detection method based on batch authentication in a vehicle network, and includes: a trusted center TRA, a roadside unit RSU and a vehicle that communicate with each other;

[0070] The trusted center TRA is used to update and store the registration information of the vehicle;

[0071] The roadside unit RSU is used to verify the message sent by the vehicle according to the vehicle registration information stored in the trusted center TRA and the vehicle's signature information on the message.

[0072] Preferably, the roadside unit RSU is used to verify the message sent by the vehicle according to the vehicle registration information and the vehicle signature information of the message stored in the TRA, including:

[0073] Receive the message sent by the vehicle and the vehicle's signature information on the message, put the message sent by the vehicle into the corresponding message list according to the vehicle's trust level, and use the batch verification algorithm to verify all the messages in the message list. If the verification fails, the message list is batch authenticated in order from high to low trust levels.

[0074] Preferably, the process of batch authenticating the message list includes:

[0075] S1: Based on the vehicle registration information and the vehicle signature information on the message, batch authentication is performed on the messages in the message list using a batch authentication algorithm; if the authentication fails, step S2 is executed;

[0076] S2: Divide the messages in the message list into two parts, and apply the batch verification algorithm to the messages in the two parts for batch verification;

[0077] S3: Continue to execute S2 for some messages that fail batch verification until all messages that fail verification are found as malicious messages; and update the trust level of the vehicle.

[0078] The batch verification implementation process is as follows:

[0079] The RSU first selects a vector a={a1,a2,...,a n}, where a i The range is [1,2 t ] is a small integer and has little impact on the overall computational overhead.

[0080] RSU maintains a list AL = {AL1, AL2}. When the authenticator RSU receives n message signatures {(m1, PID1, Sign1, T1), (m2, PID2, Sign2, T2), ..., (m n ,PID n ,Sign n ,T n)}, in order to ensure that legitimate messages in the Internet of Vehicles can be quickly broadcast to other vehicles, we adopt a batch authentication strategy based on vehicle trust level. After receiving a message, it is inserted into the corresponding message verification list AL1 or AL2 according to its trust level. First, execute formula (1) on AL and perform batch verification on it.

[0081]

[0082] σ={σ1,σ2,...,σ n}

[0083] The verification node receives the message sent by the vehicle node and applies to TRA for the trust level of the vehicle. According to the trust level of the vehicle, the vehicle nodes with the level of trusted and doubtful can communicate in the Internet of Vehicles, and the messages sent by the vehicle nodes with the level of trusted will be pushed into the priority verification message list AL1, and the messages sent by the vehicle nodes with the level of doubtful will be pushed into the final verification message list AL2;

[0084] The verification node batch verifies the messages in AL1 and AL2 in turn. First, perform formula (1) on AL1 with a higher trust level for batch verification. After AL1 is verified and broadcast to the Internet of Vehicles, perform formula (1) on AL2.

[0085] The messages that fail the verification of formula (1) are verified in sections using the binary verification algorithm, and the process is repeated until all malicious messages are found and deleted. The verification node broadcasts the message that passes the verification; the verification node records the behavior of each vehicle during the message sending process and sends the behavior record to TRA. TRA updates the trust level of the vehicle based on the behavior record.

[0086] The verification is performed in sections according to the binary search algorithm to find out the malicious message specifically including:

[0087] For the aggregation list that fails the aggregation verification, a binary search method is used for segmented verification. In each iteration, the list is divided into two parts, left and right, according to the midpoint of the current list. Formula (1) is verified for these two parts respectively, and the search range is narrowed according to the verification results. If both the left and right parts fail the verification, both the left and right parts need to be verified by formula (1); if the left half passes the verification but the right half fails, it means that the problem lies in the right half, and only the binary verification algorithm needs to be repeated for the right half until the illegal message is found; vice versa.

[0088] In summary, the present invention verifies the messages in all message lists through a batch verification algorithm, which can significantly reduce the time and computing resources required for verification compared to one-by-one verification, thereby improving the overall message processing efficiency; in the case of failure to verify, the message list is batch authenticated in order from high to low according to the trust level, and the messages of vehicles with high trust levels can be processed preferentially to ensure the timely processing and transmission of key information; batch authentication using the vehicle's registration information and signature information can effectively verify the authenticity and integrity of the message, and prevent malicious attackers from forging or tampering with the message; by dividing the messages in the message list into two parts for separate verification, and continuing to execute the verification process for some messages that fail to pass the verification, it can ensure that all malicious messages are accurately identified and processed, and further improve the security of the message. At the same time, the messages sent by the vehicle are placed in the corresponding message list according to the trust level of the vehicle, and differentiated processing of vehicles with different trust levels can be achieved. During the verification process, the messages sent by vehicles with lower trust levels can be more strictly verified and screened to ensure the authenticity and reliability of the message. For vehicles that fail to pass the verification, their trust levels are updated in a timely manner, which can achieve dynamic management of the vehicle's trust status and improve the security and reliability of the system.

[0089] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solution of the present invention rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solution of the present invention can be modified or replaced by equivalents without departing from the purpose and scope of the technical solution, which should be included in the scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for detecting malicious messages based on batch authentication in an Internet of Vehicles, characterized in that: include: Receive the message sent by the vehicle and the vehicle's signature information on the message, put the message sent by the vehicle into the corresponding message list according to the trust level of the vehicle, and use the batch verification algorithm to verify all the messages in the message list. If the verification fails, batch authenticate the message list in order from high to low trust levels; The batch authentication process for a message list includes: S1: Based on the vehicle registration information and the vehicle signature information on the message, the batch verification algorithm is used to batch authenticate the messages in the message list; If the verification fails, execute step S2; S2: Divide the messages in the message list into two parts, and apply the batch verification algorithm to the messages in the two parts for batch verification; S3: Continue to execute S2 for some messages that fail batch verification until all messages that fail verification are found as malicious messages; and update the trust level of the vehicle.

2. According to claim 1, a method for detecting malicious messages based on batch authentication in a vehicle network is characterized in that: The vehicle's registration information PID i include: PID i =(PID i,1 ,PID i,2 ,V.T. i ) PID i,1 =k i P ID i =h1(RID i ) P T =αP Among them, VT i Indicates registration information PID i The effective time of RID i represents the real identity of the vehicle, h1 and h3 are the hash functions selected by TRA, and k i is the vehicle V i The selected random number, α is the secret key of TRA; P T represents the public key of TRA; P represents the generator of group G; || represents connection, Represents the exclusive-or operation.

3. According to claim 2, a method for detecting malicious messages based on batch authentication in a vehicle network, characterized in that: The vehicle's signature information for the message i include: Sign i =(Q i ,vpk i ,σ i ) σ i =(psk i +x i M i +r i )modq M i =h4(m i ||PID i ||vpk i ||Q i ||R i ||T i ) vpk i =x i P R i =r i P psk i =d i +s(h i modq) h i =h2(Q i ||ID i ||P k ) Q i =d i P Among them, x i and r i is the vehicle V i The random number selected, d i Is KGC for vehicle V i The random number selected, s is the private key of KGC, h2 and h4 are the hash functions selected by TRA, P k is the public key of KGC, P represents the generator of group G; q represents the order of group G; T i Indicates timestamp; m i Indicates an initial message.

4. According to claim 3, a method for detecting malicious messages based on batch authentication in a vehicle network is characterized in that: Batch authentication using batch verification algorithms includes: Select a vector a={a1,a2,...,a n }, where a i The range is [1,2 t ] small integer between; Construct the following equation: σ={σ1,σ2,...,σ n } Where t represents a preset integer, n represents the number of messages, σ represents the subject of the message signature; P represents the generator of the group G; Verify whether the equation is true. If it is true, the verification passes, otherwise the verification fails.

5. The method for detecting malicious messages based on batch authentication in a vehicle network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The trust level of the vehicle is set to trusted, doubtful and unbelievable from high to low; the vehicle node that joins the Internet of Vehicles for the first time will be assigned a trust level of doubtful; Vehicle nodes with levels of trusted and doubtful are allowed to send messages in the Internet of Vehicles; vehicle nodes with a level of unbelievable are not allowed to send messages in the Internet of Vehicles; vehicle nodes whose level becomes unbelievable will automatically upgrade their trust level to doubtful after a specified period of time.

6. A method for detecting malicious messages based on batch authentication in a vehicle network according to claim 5, characterized in that: The updating of the trust level of the vehicle includes: The trust level of the vehicle node that sends malicious messages will be downgraded to unbelievable, and it will not be allowed to send messages in the Internet of Vehicles within the specified time; the trust level of the vehicle node with a trust level of trusted that has passed message verification will remain unchanged; the trust level of the vehicle node with a trust level of doubtful that has passed message verification will be updated to trusted.

7. A malicious message detection system based on batch authentication in an Internet of Vehicles, the system is based on a malicious message detection method based on batch authentication in an Internet of Vehicles according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that: include: Trusted center TRA, roadside unit RSU and vehicles that communicate with each other; The trusted center TRA is used to update and store the registration information of the vehicle; The roadside unit RSU is used to verify the message sent by the vehicle according to the vehicle registration information stored in the trusted center TRA and the vehicle's signature information on the message.

8. A malicious message detection system based on batch authentication in a vehicle network according to claim 7, characterized in that: The roadside unit RSU is used to verify the message sent by the vehicle according to the vehicle registration information stored in the trusted center TRA and the vehicle's signature information on the message, including: Receive the message sent by the vehicle and the vehicle's signature information on the message, put the message sent by the vehicle into the corresponding message list according to the vehicle's trust level, and use the batch verification algorithm to verify all the messages in the message list. If the verification fails, the message list is batch authenticated in order from high to low trust levels.

9. The malicious message detection system based on batch authentication in the Internet of Vehicles according to claim 5, characterized in that: The batch authentication process for a message list includes: S1: Based on the vehicle registration information and the vehicle signature information on the message, batch authentication is performed on the messages in the message list using a batch authentication algorithm; if the authentication fails, step S2 is executed; S2: Divide the messages in the message list into two parts, and apply the batch verification algorithm to the messages in the two parts for batch verification; S3: Continue to execute S2 for some messages that fail batch verification until all messages that fail verification are found as malicious messages; and update the trust level of the vehicle.

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