A method, system and storage medium for optimizing charging cost of electric taxis based on alliance game

Through the method based on alliance game, a charging cost optimization model is built, which solves the charging cost problem under the rental mode of electric taxi charging piles, realizes the optimization of charging cost and meets charging needs, and reduces the cost of charging station construction.

CN118552227BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-08NANJING UNIV OF POSTS & TELECOMM
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410626871.8
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-05-20
Publication Date
2024-11-08
Estimated Expiration
2044-05-20

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing technology has failed to effectively solve the charging cost optimization problem in the rental mode of electric taxi charging piles, resulting in high construction costs and low utilization rates of charging stations, making it difficult to meet the charging needs of electric taxi.

Method used

Using an alliance game method, a charging cost optimization model is constructed under the constraints of rental power capacity of charging piles and the constraints of mobile energy consumption of electric taxis. The charging distribution strategy of electric taxis is determined through marginal utility function and preference order to optimize the total charging cost. And realize Nash equilibrium through selfish utility functions.

Benefits of technology

Under the constraints of charging pile rental power, the charging cost of electric taxis is optimized, the construction cost of charging piles is saved, and the charging needs of electric taxis are given priority.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention relates to an electric taxi charging cost optimization method, system and storage medium based on alliance game, and relates to the technical field of electric vehicle charging. The method comprises: constructing an electric taxi charging cost optimization model under the constraints of charging pile rental power capacity and electric taxi mobile energy consumption; constructing an alliance game model, an electric taxi marginal utility function, a preference order and an alliance order according to the charging cost optimization model; determining the first charging allocation strategy of the electric taxi according to the marginal utility function and the alliance preference order to optimize the total charging cost; determining the second charging allocation strategy of the electric taxi according to the selfish utility function and the selfish preference order to achieve Nash equilibrium. The present invention saves the construction cost of charging piles, gives priority to meeting the charging needs of electric taxis, and optimizes the charging cost under the constraints of charging pile rental power.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of electric vehicle charging, and in particular to an electric taxi charging cost optimization method, system and storage medium based on alliance game. Background Art

[0002] The automobile industry is one of the most important industries in the world. As an important means of transportation, the popularity and development of automobiles have brought great convenience to people's lives. It is estimated that the number of cars in the world has exceeded one billion, and this number is still growing rapidly. This rapid growth trend not only reflects the vigorous development of the automobile industry, but also shows the popularity of cars as an important means of transportation. The large-scale popularization of cars has improved people's travel efficiency. However, the surge in the number of cars has also led to a sharp increase in urban air pollution levels. In order to alleviate air pollution and reduce the emission of harmful gases such as carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide, most countries encourage the development and use of electric vehicles.

[0003] In response to the challenges of global climate change and urban traffic pollution, public transport electrification is seen as an important solution. Public transport electrification replaces fuel vehicles with electric vehicles, which can significantly reduce vehicle emissions, improve urban air quality, and enhance residents' travel experience. It is one of the key measures to achieve clean urban transportation and sustainable development. The promotion and application of electric taxis play an important role in the process of electrification of contemporary urban public transport. However, with the increase in the number of household electric vehicles, their charging demand is also increasing. Especially during peak hours, electric taxis need to compete with more and more household electric vehicles for the use of public charging piles, and charging difficulties are becoming increasingly serious. The construction of a large number of electric taxi charging stations is the simplest and most direct way to solve this problem. However, the construction cost of charging stations is high, and due to the high mobility and unpredictable charging demand of electric taxis, the construction of a large number of electric taxi charging stations may have problems such as low charging station utilization and unstable income. Existing research on electric taxis mainly solves problems such as electric taxi charging navigation, collaborative charging and charging station site selection through big data, stochastic optimization, game theory and other methods. However, there is currently no solution to the charging cost optimization of electric taxi charging pile rental mode from a game perspective. Summary of the invention

[0004] The main purpose of the present invention is to overcome the shortcomings and deficiencies of the prior art and to provide an electric taxi charging cost optimization method, system and storage medium based on alliance game, which saves the construction cost of charging piles, gives priority to meeting the charging needs of electric taxis, and optimizes the charging cost under the constraint of charging pile rental electricity.

[0005] According to one aspect of the present invention, the present invention provides an electric taxi charging cost optimization method based on alliance game, the method comprising the following steps:

[0006] Determine the total charging cost and the shared cost based on the number of electric taxi charging tasks; construct an optimization model for the charging cost of electric taxis under the constraints of charging pile rental power capacity and electric taxi mobility energy consumption;

[0007] According to the charging cost optimization model, an alliance game model, an electric taxi marginal utility function, a preference order and an alliance order are constructed; the preference order indicates the charging alliance that the electric taxi tends to join; the alliance order indicates the charging alliance that the electric taxi tends to choose; according to the marginal utility function and the alliance preference order, a first charging allocation strategy for the electric taxi is determined to optimize the total charging cost;

[0008] A selfish utility function and a selfish preference order of an electric taxi are constructed, wherein the selfish preference order is used for the electric taxi to quantify its preference; and a second charging allocation strategy of the electric taxi is determined according to the selfish utility function and the selfish preference order to achieve Nash equilibrium.

[0009] Preferably, determining the total charging cost and the shared cost according to the number of electric taxi charging tasks includes:

[0010] Charging stations j The total charging cost is:

[0011]

[0012] Electric taxi v i At the charging station j The charging cost to be shared after completing the charging is:

[0013]

[0014] Among them, f j () is a monotonically increasing concave function that characterizes the size of the lease, T j ={τ i {x i,j =1} means assigned to charging pile s j A set of charging tasks, where x i,j is the binary decision variable for charging task allocation; |T j | indicates T j size; For charging piles j The unit electricity price, For charging piles j The base rental price, Q j For charging piles jTotal charge on For electric taxis i Charging demand, β i Is an electric taxi v i Unit moving energy consumption, d i,j Is an electric taxi v i To charging stations j The shortest distance.

[0015] Preferably, the construction of an electric taxi charging cost optimization model under the constraints of charging pile rental power capacity and electric taxi mobility energy consumption includes:

[0016] The problem of minimizing the charging cost of electric taxis under the constraints of charging pile rental power capacity and electric taxi mobility energy consumption is formalized as follows:

[0017]

[0018] in, For charging piles j The leased power capacity, E i For electric taxis i Battery capacity, N = {s 1 ,s 2 , ..., s n} represents the set of public charging piles that can be rented, and T represents the charging task τ i A collection of .

[0019] Preferably, the construction of the alliance game model, the electric taxi marginal utility function, the preference order and the alliance order according to the charging cost optimization model includes:

[0020] Using marginal utility to measure the strategy of electric taxi users i For the corresponding charging alliance The impact is as follows:

[0021]

[0022] where τ i For electric taxis i The corresponding charging task, For charging pile The total charging cost, a -i In addition to electric taxis i The charging distribution strategy set of other electric taxis, Indicates electric taxi v i Charging alliance of choice;

[0023] definition For electric taxis iThe preference order of any electric taxi v i and any two charging alliances Know The order of the charging alliance is:

[0024]

[0025] Preferably, determining the first charging allocation strategy of the electric taxi according to the marginal utility function and the alliance preference order to optimize the total charging cost comprises:

[0026] (5.1) Initialize the electric taxi charging alliance division

[0027] (5.2) For any charging pile s j ∈N, initialize the charging task set And update the alliance partition Γ = Γ ∪ T j ;

[0028] (5.3) For any charging task τ i ∈T, construct its feasible strategy space A i :

[0029] (5.4) Any electric taxi v i ∈V from the feasible strategy space A i Randomly select a strategy as the current charging allocation strategy a i , and update the corresponding charging alliance

[0030] (5.5) For any charging task τ i ∈T, reconstruct its feasible strategy space A i :

[0031] (5.6) Select strategy space A i The strategy with the greatest utility in If you join the new charging alliance, you will get the utility U i (a′ i , a -i ) is greater than the utility U obtained by the old charging alliance i (a i , a -i ), update the new charging alliance Old Charging Alliance and the current charging allocation strategy a i =a′ i :

[0032] (5.7) Repeat steps (5.5) and (5.6) until the charging allocation strategy of all electric taxis remains unchanged:

[0033] (5.8) Output the electric taxi charging alliance division Γ.

[0034] Preferably, the constructing of the selfish utility function and selfish preference order of electric taxis comprises:

[0035] Electric taxi v i At the charging station j The selfish charging utility U i (T j ):

[0036] U i (T j )=-P i (T j )

[0037] Defining selfish preference relations based on the selfish charging utility of electric taxis

[0038]

[0039] Preference function R i (T j ) is based on the selfish charging utility calculation of electric taxis:

[0040]

[0041] Where H(i) represents the electric taxi v i A historical collection of charging alliances that have been joined before. j ={τ i |x i,j =1} means assigned to charging pile s j A set of charging tasks, where x i,j is a binary decision variable for charging task allocation; || means “or”.

[0042] Preferably, determining the second charging allocation strategy of the electric taxi according to the selfish utility function and the selfish preference order to achieve Nash equilibrium comprises:

[0043] (7.1) Initialize the electric taxi charging alliance division

[0044] (7.2) For any charging station s j ∈N, initialize the charging task set And update the alliance partition Γ = Γ ∪ T j ;

[0045] (7.3) For any electric taxi charging task τ i ∈T, initialize its electric taxi vi Possible charging alliance collection History Collection and charging pile index α i =0;

[0046] (7.4) For any charging station s j ∈N, if the electric taxi v i The remaining battery capacity is enough to reach the charging station j , and in electric taxis v i Join the Charging Alliance j Rear charging piles j If the leased power capacity is sufficient to complete all charging tasks within the alliance, the charging alliance set A that it may join is updated. i =A i ∪{s j};

[0047] (7.5) Electric taxis i From A i Randomly select a charging station s j , and update the corresponding charging alliance T j =T j ∪{τ i}, history set H(i)=H(i)∪{T j} and charging pile index α i =j;

[0048] (7.6) For any electric taxi charging task τ i ∈T, based on the preference function R i (T j ) Calculate the charging pile with the greatest utility and New Charging Alliance If the electric taxi v i The preference function value of Higher than Join the New Charging Alliance Leaving the old charging alliance Then update the history set and charging pile index α i =j * ;

[0049] (7.7) Repeat step (7.6) until all electric taxis do not change the charging alliance they join;

[0050] (7.8) Output the electric taxi charging alliance partition Γ.

[0051] According to another aspect of the present invention, the present invention also provides an electric taxi charging cost optimization system based on alliance game, the system comprising:

[0052] A model building module is used to determine the total charging cost and the shared cost according to the number of electric taxi charging tasks; to build an electric taxi charging cost optimization model under the constraints of charging pile rental power capacity and electric taxi mobility energy consumption;

[0053] A first determination module is used to construct an alliance game model, an electric taxi marginal utility function, a preference order and an alliance order according to the charging cost optimization model; the preference order indicates the charging alliance that the electric taxi tends to join; the alliance order indicates the charging alliance that the electric taxi tends to choose; and determine a first charging allocation strategy for the electric taxi according to the marginal utility function and the alliance preference order to optimize the total charging cost;

[0054] The second determination module is used to construct a selfish utility function and a selfish preference order for the electric taxi, wherein the selfish preference order is used for the electric taxi to quantify its preference; and determine a second charging allocation strategy for the electric taxi according to the selfish utility function and the selfish preference order to achieve Nash equilibrium.

[0055] According to another aspect of the present invention, the present invention also provides an electronic device, which includes: a memory and a processor; the memory is used to store computer-executable instructions, and the processor is used to execute the computer-executable instructions, and the computer-executable instructions can implement the above-mentioned method steps when executed by the processor.

[0056] According to another aspect of the present invention, the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores computer-executable instructions, and the computer-executable instructions implement the above method steps when executed by a processor.

[0057] Beneficial effects: The present invention saves the construction cost of charging piles, gives priority to meeting the charging needs of electric taxis, and optimizes the charging cost under the constraints of charging pile rental electricity.

[0058] The features and advantages of the present invention will become clear through reference to the following drawings and detailed description of specific embodiments of the present invention. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0059] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of the optimization method of charging cost of electric taxis based on alliance game;

[0060] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the electric taxi charging pile rental system;

[0061] Figure 3It is a flow chart of the charging allocation method based on alliance game;

[0062] Figure 4 It is a flow chart of the charging allocation method for selfish behavior;

[0063] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the electric taxi charging cost optimization system based on alliance game. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0064] The following is a clear and complete description of the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0065] Example 1

[0066] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of the optimization method for charging cost of electric taxis based on alliance game. Figure 1 As shown, this embodiment provides an electric taxi charging cost optimization method based on alliance game, and the method includes the following steps:

[0067] S1: Determine the total charging cost and the shared cost based on the number of electric taxi charging tasks; construct an optimization model for the charging cost of electric taxis under the constraints of the charging pile rental power capacity and the electric taxi mobility energy consumption;

[0068] S2: According to the charging cost optimization model, a coalition game model, an electric taxi marginal utility function, a preference order and a coalition order are constructed; the preference order indicates the charging coalition that the electric taxi tends to join; the coalition order indicates the charging coalition that the electric taxi tends to choose; according to the marginal utility function and the coalition preference order, a first charging allocation strategy for the electric taxi is determined to optimize the total charging cost;

[0069] S3: constructing a selfish utility function and a selfish preference order for electric taxis, wherein the selfish preference order is used for the electric taxis to quantify their preferences; and determining a second charging allocation strategy for the electric taxis according to the selfish utility function and the selfish preference order to achieve Nash equilibrium.

[0070] This method saves the cost of charging pile construction, gives priority to meeting the charging needs of electric taxis, and optimizes the charging cost under the constraint of charging pile rental electricity.

[0071] Preferably, determining the total charging cost and the shared cost according to the number of electric taxi charging tasks includes:

[0072] Charging stationsj The total charging cost is:

[0073]

[0074] Electric taxi v i At the charging station j The charging cost to be shared after completing the charging is:

[0075]

[0076] Among them, f j () is a monotonically increasing concave function that characterizes the size of the lease, T j ={τ i |x i,j =1} means assigned to charging pile s j A set of charging tasks, where x i,j is the binary decision variable for charging task allocation: |T j | indicates T j Size: For charging piles j The unit electricity price, For charging piles j The base rental price, Q j For charging piles j Total charge on For electric taxis i Charging demand, β i Is an electric taxi v i Unit moving energy consumption, d i,j Is an electric taxi v i To charging stations j The shortest distance.

[0077] Specifically, a collection of public charging piles on an electric taxi and rental platform is obtained, and based on the electric taxi charging task, an electric taxi charging pile rental model is constructed, including the following steps;

[0078] Let V = {v 1 , v 2 , ..., v m} represents the set of electric taxis, N = {s 1 ,s 2 , ..., s n} indicates a collection of public charging stations that can be rented:

[0079] Electric taxi v i ∈V submits the charging task to the charging pile rental platform as: in, For electric taxis i location, For electric taxis i Charging demand, E i For electric taxis i Battery capacity;

[0080] Charging stations j ∈N submits its own information to the rental platform as follows: in, For charging piles j The base rental price is For charging piles j The unit electricity price, For charging piles j location, For charging piles j of leased power capacity.

[0081] Based on the electric taxi charging pile rental model, a total charging cost model and cost sharing scheme are constructed according to the number of electric taxi charging tasks, including the following steps:

[0082] The total charging cost of the charging pile si consists of the charging pile rental cost and the electricity cost. j ={τ i |x i,j =1} means assigned to charging pile s j A set of charging tasks, where x i,j is a binary decision variable for charging task allocation. If the charging task τ i Assigned to charging piles j , then x i,j =1, otherwise x i,j =0; Charging pile s j The rental cost is Indicates that is a monotonically increasing concave function that characterizes the size of the lease and satisfies f j (0)=0,1≤f j (1) <f j (2)<... <f j (|T j |)≤|T j |,|T j | indicates T j The size of the charging pile s j The electricity cost is Where Q j For charging piles j Total charge on:

[0083]

[0084] in is the charging task τ i The actual charge capacity, β i Is an electric taxi v i Unit moving energy consumption, d i,j Is an electric taxi v i To charging stations j The shortest distance;

[0085] Definition of charging piles j The total charging cost is:

[0086]

[0087] Definition of electric taxi i At the charging station i The charging cost to be shared after completing the charging is:

[0088]

[0089] in is the electricity cost that the electric taxi should share, T j The charging pile s j The charging task collection on The cost of renting the charging pile should be shared by the electric taxi.

[0090] Preferably, the construction of an electric taxi charging cost optimization model under the constraints of charging pile rental power capacity and electric taxi mobility energy consumption includes:

[0091] The problem of minimizing the charging cost of electric taxis under the constraints of charging pile rental power capacity and electric taxi mobility energy consumption is formalized as follows:

[0092]

[0093] in, For charging piles j The leased power capacity, E i For electric taxis i Battery capacity, N = {s 1 ,s 2 , ..., s n} represents the set of public charging piles that can be rented, and T represents the charging task τ i A collection of .

[0094] Specifically, the problem of minimizing the charging cost of electric taxis under the constraints of charging pile rental power capacity and electric taxi mobility energy consumption is constructed and formalized as follows:

[0095]

[0096]

[0097] Among them, constraint (5) ensures that the total charging capacity of any charging pile cannot exceed the upper limit of its rentable power capacity; constraint (6) ensures that any electric taxi has sufficient power to reach the assigned charging pile; constraint (7) ensures that each charging task can be assigned to and only to one charging pile.

[0098] Preferably, the construction of the alliance game model, the electric taxi marginal utility function, the preference order and the alliance order according to the charging cost optimization model includes:

[0099] Using marginal utility to measure the strategy of electric taxi users i For the corresponding charging alliance The impact is as follows:

[0100]

[0101] where τ i For electric taxis i The corresponding charging task, For charging pile The total charging cost, a -i In addition to electric taxis i The charging distribution strategy set of other electric taxis, Indicates electric taxi v i Charging alliance of choice;

[0102] definition For electric taxis i The preference order of any electric taxi v i and any two charging alliances and The order of the charging alliance is:

[0103]

[0104] Specifically, the problem of minimizing the charging cost of electric taxis is restructured into a coalition formation game G = {V, U i , A i , Γ}, where V is the set of players in the game, i.e., the electric taxis, and U i Is an electric taxi v i The utility function of i Indicates electric taxi v i Strategy space. For any electric taxi v i ∈V, and define its charging allocation strategy as a i , the charging piles allocated by this strategy are defined as The corresponding charging alliance is the charging pile The charging task set on is defined as Define the strategy set of all electric taxis as a = {a 1 , a 2 , ..., a m}, the disjoint charging alliance partition is defined as Γ={T 1 , T 2 , ..., T n};

[0105] Using marginal utility to measure the strategy of electric taxi users i For the corresponding charging alliance The impact is specifically defined as:

[0106]

[0107] where τ i For electric taxis i The corresponding charging task, For charging pile The total charging cost, a -i In addition to electric taxis i The charging allocation strategy set of other electric taxis is a -i ={a 1 , a 2 , ..., a i-1 , a i+1 , ..., a n}, Indicates electric taxi v i The selected charging alliance should be noted that at this time, the electric taxi v i The corresponding charging task τ i Not in In In combination with formulas (2), (3), and (9), the utility function of electric taxis can be restated as:

[0108]

[0109] This utility function represents the electric taxi v i Join the Charging Alliance After the charging cost changes, given the charging allocation strategy set of other electric taxis, the electric taxi v i They always tend to join a charging alliance that minimizes the sum of their own charging costs and the total reduction of charging costs of alliance members;

[0110] definition For electric taxis i The preference order of electric taxi vi has a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relation on the set of all possible charging alliances it can form. Given an electric taxi v i Two charging alliances and Indicates electric taxi v i More inclined to join the charging alliance Rather than The choice of an electric taxi to join a charging alliance depends on its preference order for the charging alliance, which will affect the final alliance convergence. In addition, to meet the problem constraints, it is necessary to ensure that the electric taxi v i The strategy space A i Any charging allocation strategy a i satisfy and in Ensure electric taxi v i The remaining battery capacity is enough to reach the charging alliance Corresponding charging pile Guaranteed charging station of rentable power capacity Able to complete the task of increasing chargingτ i The charging alliance T j ∪{τ i All charging tasks in}; Is an electric carv k To charging station i The shortest distance; Is an electric carv i To the charging station The shortest distance.

[0111] For any electric taxi v i and any two charging alliances and The order of defining the charging alliance is:

[0112]

[0113] The alliance order indicates that electric taxis are more inclined to choose the charging alliance with the smallest sum of its own charging cost and the total reduction of the charging costs of alliance members as its own strategic choice.

[0114] Preferably, determining the first charging allocation strategy of the electric taxi according to the marginal utility function and the alliance preference order to optimize the total charging cost comprises:

[0115] (5.1) Initialize the electric taxi charging alliance division

[0116] (5.2) For any charging pile s j ∈N, initialize the charging task set And update the alliance partition Γ = Γ ∪ T j ;

[0117] (5.3) For any charging task τ i ∈T, construct its feasible strategy space A i ;

[0118] (5.4) Any electric taxi v i ∈V from the feasible strategy space A i Randomly select a strategy as the current charging allocation strategy a i , and update the corresponding charging alliance

[0119] (5.5) For any charging task τ i ∈T, reconstruct its feasible strategy space A i ;

[0120] (5.6) Select strategy space A i The strategy with the greatest utility in If you join the new charging alliance, you will get the utility U i (a′ i , a -i ) is greater than the utility U obtained by the old charging alliance i (a i , a -i ), update the new charging alliance Old Charging Alliance and the current charging allocation strategy a i =a′ i ;

[0121] (5.7) Repeat steps (5.5) and (5.6) until the charging allocation strategy of all electric taxis remains unchanged;

[0122] (5.8) Output the electric taxi charging alliance division Γ.

[0123] Specifically, refer to Figure 3 , step (5.3) or (5.5) constructs its feasible strategy space, including the following steps:

[0124] (5.3.1) Initialize strategy space

[0125] (5.3.2) For any charging pile s j ∈N, if the electric taxi v i The corresponding charging task τi Able to reach charging stations j And j of rentable power capacity Able to complete the task of increasing chargingτ i The charging alliance T j ∪{τ i}, then the charging pile s j Add to Electric Taxi i The feasible strategy space A i :

[0126] (5.3.3) Output strategy space A i .

[0127] Preferably, the constructing of the selfish utility function and selfish preference order of electric taxis comprises:

[0128] Electric taxi v i At the charging station j The selfish charging utility U i (T j ):

[0129] U i (T j )=-P i (T j )

[0130] Defining selfish preference relations based on the selfish charging utility of electric taxis

[0131]

[0132] Preference function R i (T j ) is based on the selfish charging utility calculation of electric taxis:

[0133]

[0134] Where H(i) represents the electric taxi v i A historical collection of charging alliances that have been joined before. j ={τ i |x i,j =1} means assigned to charging pile s j A set of charging tasks, where x i,j is a binary decision variable for charging task allocation; || means “or”.

[0135] Specifically, let U i (T j ) is an electric taxi v i At the charging stationj Selfish charging utility for completing charging:

[0136] U i (T j )=-P i (T j ) (12)

[0137] Where T j For charging piles j The corresponding charging alliance, P i (T j ) is an electric taxi v i At the charging station j The charging cost to be shared after the charging is completed;

[0138] Electric taxi v i ∈V needs to establish preferences among the charging alliances it may join and sort the charging alliances according to its preferences. The selfish preference relationship is defined based on the selfish charging utility of electric taxis.

[0139]

[0140] Where T j and T j , for electric taxis v i Possible charging alliances that meet τ i ∈T j and τ i ∈T j′ . R i (T j ) is an electric taxi v i About Charging Alliance j Preference function, selfish preference relation Allow electric taxis i Quantify their preferences. For example, for an electric taxi v i The charging task τ i , given two charging alliances T j and T j′ , Indicates that electric taxis are more inclined to join the charging alliance T j Instead of T j′ ;

[0141] (6.3) Preference function R i (T j ) is based on the selfish charging utility calculation of electric taxis:

[0142]

[0143] Among them, Ui (T j ) indicates Charging Alliance T j Electric taxi v i The selfish charging utility of H(i) represents the electric taxi v i The historical set records the charging alliances that have been joined before. Setting the preference function value to negative infinity helps reduce the complexity of the algorithm; Indicates electric taxi v i The remaining battery capacity is not enough to reach the charging pile s corresponding to the charging alliance j , Indicates that in electric taxi v i Join the Charging Alliance j Rear charging piles j The rental power capacity cannot complete all the charging tasks in the charging alliance. The preference function value is set to negative infinity to ensure that the problem constraints are met. It should be noted that at this time, the electric taxi v i The charging task is in the charging alliance T j Based on the above selfish preference relationship, electric taxis will join the charging alliance that maximizes their selfish charging utility without considering the impact of their decision on other electric taxis, reflecting the selfish behavior of electric taxis.

[0144] Preferably, determining the second charging allocation strategy of the electric taxi according to the selfish utility function and the selfish preference order to achieve Nash equilibrium comprises:

[0145] (7.1) Initialize the electric taxi charging alliance division

[0146] (7.2) For any charging station s j ∈N, initialize the charging task set And update the alliance partition Γ = Γ ∪ T j ;

[0147] (7.3) For any electric taxi charging task τ i ∈T, initialize its electric taxi v i Possible charging alliance collection History Collection and charging pile index α i =0;

[0148] (7.4) For any charging station s j ∈N, if the electric taxi v i The remaining battery capacity is enough to reach the charging station j , and in electric taxis v i Join the Charging Alliance j Rear charging piles jIf the leased power capacity is sufficient to complete all charging tasks within the alliance, the charging alliance set A that it may join is updated. i =A i ∪{s j};

[0149] (7.5) Electric taxis i From A i Randomly select a charging station s j , and update the corresponding charging alliance T j =T j ∪{τ i}, history set H(i)=H(i)∪{T j} and charging pile index α i =j;

[0150] (7.6) For any electric taxi charging task τ i ∈T, based on the preference function R i (T j ) Calculate the charging pile with the greatest utility and New Charging Alliance If the electric taxi v i The preference function value of Higher than Join the New Charging Alliance Leaving the old charging alliance Then update the history set and charging pile index α i =j * ;

[0151] (7.7) Repeat step (7.6) until all electric taxis do not change the charging alliance they join;

[0152] (7.8) Output the electric taxi charging alliance partition Γ.

[0153] For the specific implementation process of this step, please refer to Figure 4 shown.

[0154] This embodiment saves the construction cost of charging piles, gives priority to meeting the charging needs of electric taxis, and optimizes the charging cost under the constraint of charging pile rental electricity.

[0155] In order to more fully understand the technical solution of the present invention, a specific example is given below.

[0156] Let V = {v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 , v 5 , v 6} represents the set of electric taxis, N = {s 1 ,s 2 ,s 3 ,s 4} indicates that the charging pile set is. Electric taxi v i Submit charging tasks to the charging pile rental platform Where electric taxis are located They are (114.126137°E, 22.53824°N), (114.101875°E, 22.537943°N), (114.1073°E, 22.5517°N), (114.10179°E, 22.559822°N), (114.11312°E, 22.545967°N), (114.12084°E, 22.55866°N), and the battery capacity is E i The charging requirements are 70, 65, 75, 80, 85 and 65 kWh respectively. Electric taxi moving energy consumption β i They are 0.15, 0.16, 0.17, 0.2, 0.25 and 0.18 kWh / km respectively. j Submit your information to the rental platform The base rental price The unit electricity price is 8, 6, 7 and 5 yuan respectively. The rented electricity capacity is 0.8, 0.9, 1.0 and 1.2 yuan / kWh respectively. They are 120, 140, 160, and 180 kWh respectively, and the location They are (114.119251°E, 22.549423°N), (114.181697°E, 22.559031°N), (114.122624°E, 22.580606°N), and (114.116362°E, 22.560308°N). j Discount function f that characterizes the size of the number of rental tasks j (x) = x a , where x is the number of electric taxi charging tasks, and a represents the discount coefficient, which are 0.98, 0.95, 0.97, and 0.95 respectively.

[0157] In this embodiment, the electric taxi charging allocation strategy is determined according to the marginal utility function and the alliance preference order described above to optimize the total charging cost, including:

[0158] (5.1) Initialize the electric taxi charging alliance division

[0159] (5.2) For any charging pile sj ∈N, initialize the charging task set And update the alliance partition Γ = Γ ∪ T j ;

[0160] (5.3) For any charging task τ i ∈T, construct its feasible strategy space A i ;

[0161] (5.3.1) Select charging task τ 3 , initialize its strategy space

[0162] (5.3.2) For any charging pile s j ∈N, if the electric taxi v 3 The corresponding charging task τ 3 Able to reach charging stations j And j of rentable power capacity Able to complete the task of increasing chargingτ 3 The charging alliance T j ∪{τ 3}, then the charging pile s j Add to Electric Taxi 3 The feasible strategy space A 3 ;

[0163] (5.3.3) Output strategy space A 3 ;

[0164] (5.4) Electric taxis 3 From the feasible strategy space A 3 Randomly select a strategy as the current charging allocation strategy a 3 =s 1 , and update the corresponding charging alliance T 1 =T 1 ∪{τ 3};

[0165] By executing (5.3.1) to (5.4) for the remaining charging tasks, we can get T 1 ={τ 3}, T 2 ={τ 2 , τ 1}, T 3 ={τ 5}, T 4 ={τ 4 , τ 6}.

[0166] (5.5) For any charging task τ i∈T, reconstruct its feasible strategy space A i :

[0167] (5.6) Select the charging task τ 4 , select its strategy space A 4 The strategy with the greatest utility in Because the utility U gained by joining the new charging alliance 4 (a′ 4 , a -4 ) is greater than the utility U obtained by the old charging alliance 4 (a 4 , a -4 ), update the new charging alliance Old Charging Alliance and the current charging allocation strategy a i =a′ i =s 3 ;

[0168] For the remaining charging tasks, execute (5.6) and we can get T 1 ={τ 3 , τ 2}, T 2 ={τ 5 , τ 1}, T 3 ={τ 4 , τ 6},

[0169] (5.7) Repeat steps (5.5) and (5.6) until the charging allocation strategy of all electric taxis remains unchanged, and finally obtain T 1 ={τ 3 , τ 2}, T 2 ={τ 5 , τ 1}, T 3 ={τ 4 , τ 6},

[0170] (5.8) Output electric taxi charging alliance division Γ = {T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4}, the corresponding total charging cost is: 362.25.

[0171] Furthermore, in this embodiment, the charging allocation strategy of the electric taxi is determined according to the selfish utility function and the selfish preference order to achieve Nash equilibrium, including:

[0172] (7.1) Initialize the electric taxi charging alliance division

[0173] (7.2) For any charging station s j ∈N, initialize the charging task set And update the alliance partition Γ = Γ ∪ T j ;

[0174] (7.3) For any electric taxi charging task τ i ∈T, initialize its electric taxi v i Possible charging alliance collection History Collection and charging pile index α i =0;

[0175] (7.4) Select the electric taxi charging task τ 4 , for any charging pile s j ∈N, if the electric taxi v 4 The remaining battery capacity is enough to reach the charging station j , and in electric taxis v 4 Join the Charging Alliance j Rear charging piles j If the leased power capacity is sufficient to complete all charging tasks within the alliance, the charging alliance set A that it may join is updated. 4 =A 4 ∪{s j};

[0176] (7.5) Electric taxis 4 From A 4 Randomly select a charging station s 3 , and update the corresponding charging alliance T 3 =T 3 ∪{τ 4}, history set H(4) = H(4)∪{T 3} and charging pile index α 4 =3;

[0177] For the remaining charging tasks, perform the above steps (7.4) to (7.5) to obtain T 1 ={τ 2}, T 2 ={τ 3 , τ 1}, T 3 ={τ 4 , τ 5}, T 4 ={τ 6}.

[0178] (7.6) For any electric taxi charging task τ i ∈T, based on the preference function R i (T j ) Calculate the charging pile with the greatest utility and New Charging Alliance If the electric taxi v i The preference function value of Higher than Join the New Charging Alliance Leaving the old charging alliance Then update the history set and charging pile index α i =j * ;

[0179] Select the electric taxi charging task τ 3 , calculate the charging pile with the greatest utility and New Charging Alliance Because electric taxis 3 The preference function value of Higher than Join the New Charging Alliance Leaving the old charging alliance Then update the history set and charging pile index α 3 =j * ;

[0180] For the remaining charging tasks, execute (7.6) and we can get T 1 ={τ 3 , τ 2}, t 2 ={τ 4 , τ 1}, T 3 ={τ 5 , τ 6},

[0181] (7.7) Repeat step (7.6) until all electric taxis do not change the charging alliance they join, and finally get T 1 ={τ 3 , τ 2}, T 2 ={τ 4 , τ 1}, T 3 ={τ 5 , τ 6},

[0182] (7.8) Output electric taxi charging alliance division Γ = {T1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4}, the corresponding total charging cost is 362.88.

[0183] Example 2

[0184] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the electric taxi charging cost optimization system based on alliance game. Figure 5 As shown, this embodiment provides an electric taxi charging cost optimization system based on alliance game, and the system includes:

[0185] Model building module 501, used to determine the total charging cost and the shared cost according to the number of charging tasks for electric taxis; to build an optimization model for charging cost of electric taxis under the constraints of charging pile rental power capacity and electric taxi mobility energy consumption;

[0186] The first determination module 502 is used to construct an alliance game model, an electric taxi marginal utility function, a preference order and an alliance order according to the charging cost optimization model; the preference order indicates the charging alliance that the electric taxi tends to join; the alliance order indicates the charging alliance that the electric taxi tends to choose; and determine the first charging allocation strategy of the electric taxi according to the marginal utility function and the alliance preference order to optimize the total charging cost;

[0187] The second determination module 503 is used to construct a selfish utility function and a selfish preference order for the electric taxi, wherein the selfish preference order is used for the electric taxi to quantify its preference; and determine a second charging allocation strategy for the electric taxi according to the selfish utility function and the selfish preference order to achieve Nash equilibrium.

[0188] The specific implementation process of the functions realized by each module in this embodiment 2 is the same as the implementation process of each step in embodiment 1, and will not be repeated here.

[0189] Example 3

[0190] This embodiment provides an electronic device, which includes: a memory and a processor: the memory is used to store computer-executable instructions, and the processor is used to execute the computer-executable instructions. When the computer-executable instructions are executed by the processor, the method steps in Embodiment 1 are implemented.

[0191] The specific implementation process of this embodiment can refer to the implementation process of the method steps in Example 1, which will not be repeated here.

[0192] Example 4

[0193] This embodiment provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores computer-executable instructions. When the computer-executable instructions are executed by a processor, the method steps in Embodiment 1 are implemented.

[0194] The specific implementation process of this embodiment can refer to the implementation process of the method steps in Example 1, which will not be repeated here.

[0195] It should be understood that each process and / or block in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of the processes and / or blocks in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to generate a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.

[0196] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.

[0197] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A step that specifies a function in one or more boxes.

[0198] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and does not limit the patent scope of the present invention. All equivalent structural changes made by using the contents of the present invention specification and drawings under the concept of the present invention, or directly / indirectly applied in other related technical fields are included in the patent protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for optimizing the charging cost of electric taxis based on alliance game, characterized in that: The method comprises the following steps: Determine the total charging cost and the shared cost based on the number of electric taxi charging tasks; construct an optimization model for the charging cost of electric taxis under the constraints of charging pile rental power capacity and electric taxi mobility energy consumption; According to the charging cost optimization model, an alliance game model, an electric taxi marginal utility function, a preference order and an alliance order are constructed; the preference order indicates the charging alliance that the electric taxi tends to join; the alliance order indicates the charging alliance that the electric taxi tends to choose; according to the marginal utility function and the alliance preference order, a first charging allocation strategy for the electric taxi is determined to optimize the total charging cost; Constructing a selfish utility function and a selfish preference order of an electric taxi, wherein the selfish preference order is used for the electric taxi to quantify its preference; determining a second charging allocation strategy of the electric taxi according to the selfish utility function and the selfish preference order to achieve Nash equilibrium; The construction of the alliance game model, the electric taxi marginal utility function, the preference order and the alliance order according to the charging cost optimization model includes: Using marginal utility to measure the strategy of electric taxi users i For the corresponding charging alliance The impact is as follows: where τ i For electric taxis i The corresponding charging task, For charging pile The total charging cost, a -i In addition to electric taxis i The charging distribution strategy set of other electric taxis, Indicates electric taxi v i Charging alliance of choice; definition For electric taxis i The preference order of any electric taxi v i and any two charging alliances and The order of the charging alliance is: The construction of the selfish utility function and selfish preference order of the electric taxi includes: Electric taxi v i At the charging station j The selfish charging utility U i (T j ): U i (T j )=-P i (T j ) Defining selfish preference relations based on the selfish charging utility of electric taxis Preference function R i (T j ) is based on the selfish charging utility calculation of electric taxis: Where H(i) represents the electric taxi v i A historical collection of charging alliances that have been joined before. j ={τ i |x i,j =1} means assigned to charging pile s j A set of charging tasks, where x i,j is a binary decision variable for charging task allocation, || means or; Determining the second charging allocation strategy of the electric taxi according to the selfish utility function and the selfish preference order to achieve Nash equilibrium includes: (7.1) Initialize the electric taxi charging alliance division (7.2) For any charging station s j ∈N, initialize the charging task set And update the alliance partition Γ = Γ ∪ T j ; (7.3) For any electric taxi charging task τ i ∈T, initialize its electric taxi v i Possible charging alliance collection History Collection and charging pile index α i =0; (7.4) For any charging station s j ∈N, if the electric taxi v i The remaining battery capacity is enough to reach the charging station j , and in electric taxis v i Join the Charging Alliance j Rear charging piles j If the leased power capacity is sufficient to complete all charging tasks within the alliance, the charging alliance set A that it may join is updated. i =A i ∪{s j }; (7.5) Electric taxis i From A i Randomly select a charging station s j , and update the corresponding charging alliance T j =T j ∪{τ i }, history set H(i)=H(i)∪{T j } and charging pile index α i =j; (7.6) For any electric taxi charging task τ i ∈T, based on the preference function R i (T j ) Calculate the charging pile with the greatest utility and New Charging Alliance If the electric taxi v i The preference function value of Higher than Join the New Charging Alliance Leaving the old charging alliance Then update the history set and charging pile index α i =j * ; (7.7) Repeat step (7.6) until all electric taxis do not change the charging alliance they join; (7.8) Output the electric taxi charging alliance partition Γ.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Determining the total charging cost and the shared cost according to the number of electric taxi charging tasks includes: Charging stations j The total charging cost is: Electric taxi v i At the charging station j The charging cost to be shared after completing the charging is: Among them, f j (·) is a monotonically increasing concave function that characterizes the size of the lease, T j ={τ i |x i,j =1} means assigned to charging pile s j A set of charging tasks, where x i,j is the binary decision variable for charging task allocation; |T j | indicates T j size; For charging piles j The unit electricity price, For charging piles j The base rental price, Q j For charging piles j Total charge on For electric taxis i Charging demand, β i Is an electric taxi v i Unit moving energy consumption, d i,j Is an electric taxi v i To charging stations j The shortest distance.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The construction of an electric taxi charging cost optimization model under the constraints of charging pile rental power capacity and electric taxi mobile energy consumption includes: The problem of minimizing the charging cost of electric taxis under the constraints of charging pile rental power capacity and electric taxi mobility energy consumption is formalized as follows: in, For charging piles j The leased power capacity, E i For electric taxis i The battery capacity, N = {s1, s2, ..., s n } represents the set of public charging piles that can be rented, and T represents the charging task τ i A collection of .

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Determining the first charging allocation strategy of the electric taxi according to the marginal utility function and the alliance preference order to optimize the total charging cost includes: (5.1) Initialize the electric taxi charging alliance division (5.2) For any charging pile s j ∈N, initialize the charging task set And update the alliance partition Γ = Γ ∪ T j ; (5.3) For any charging task τ i ∈T, construct its feasible strategy space A i ; (5.4) Any electric taxi v i ∈V from the feasible strategy space A i Randomly select a strategy as the current charging allocation strategy a i , and update the corresponding charging alliance (5.5) For any charging task τ i ∈T, reconstruct its feasible strategy space A i ; (5.6) Select strategy space A i The strategy with the greatest utility in If you join the new charging alliance, you will gain Greater than the utility U obtained by the old charging alliance i (a i ,a -i ), update the new charging alliance Old Charging Alliance and the current charging allocation strategy a i =a i ′; (5.7) Repeat steps (5.5) and (5.6) until the charging allocation strategy of all electric taxis remains unchanged; (5.8) Output the electric taxi charging alliance division Γ.

5. An electric taxi charging cost optimization system based on alliance game, characterized in that: The system comprises: A model building module is used to determine the total charging cost and the shared cost according to the number of electric taxi charging tasks; to build an electric taxi charging cost optimization model under the constraints of charging pile rental power capacity and electric taxi mobility energy consumption; A first determination module is used to construct an alliance game model, an electric taxi marginal utility function, a preference order and an alliance order according to the charging cost optimization model; the preference order indicates the charging alliance that the electric taxi tends to join; the alliance order indicates the charging alliance that the electric taxi tends to choose; and determine a first charging allocation strategy for the electric taxi according to the marginal utility function and the alliance preference order to optimize the total charging cost; A second determination module is used to construct a selfish utility function and a selfish preference order of the electric taxi, wherein the selfish preference order is used for the electric taxi to quantify its preference; and to determine a second charging allocation strategy of the electric taxi according to the selfish utility function and the selfish preference order to achieve Nash equilibrium; According to the charging cost optimization model, the alliance game model, the electric taxi marginal utility function, the preference order and the alliance order are constructed including: Using marginal utility to measure the strategy of electric taxi users i For the corresponding charging alliance The impact is as follows: where τ i For electric taxis i The corresponding charging task, For charging pile The total charging cost, a -i In addition to electric taxis i The charging distribution strategy set of other electric taxis, Indicates electric taxi v i Charging alliance of choice; definition For electric taxis i The preference order of any electric taxi v i and any two charging alliances and The order of the charging alliance is: The construction of the selfish utility function and selfish preference order of the electric taxi includes: Electric taxi v i At the charging station j Selfish charging utility U i (T j ): U i (T j )=-P i (T j ) Defining selfish preference relations based on the selfish charging utility of electric taxis Preference function R i (T j ) is based on the selfish charging utility calculation of electric taxis: Where H(i) represents the electric taxi v i A historical collection of charging alliances that have been joined before. j ={τ i |x i,j =1} means assigned to charging pile s j A set of charging tasks, where x i,j is a binary decision variable for charging task allocation, || means or; Determining the second charging allocation strategy of the electric taxi according to the selfish utility function and the selfish preference order to achieve Nash equilibrium includes: (7.1) Initialize the electric taxi charging alliance division (7.2) For any charging station s j ∈N, initialize the charging task set And update the alliance partition Γ = Γ ∪ T j ; (7.3) For any electric taxi charging task τ i ∈T, initialize its electric taxi v i Possible charging alliance collection History Collection and charging pile index α i =0; (7.4) For any charging station s j ∈N, if the electric taxi v i The remaining battery capacity is enough to reach the charging station j , and in electric taxis v i Join the Charging Alliance j Rear charging piles j If the leased power capacity is sufficient to complete all charging tasks within the alliance, the charging alliance set A that it may join is updated. i =A i ∪{s j }; (7.5) Electric taxis i From A i Randomly select a charging station s j , and update the corresponding charging alliance T j =T j ∪{τ i }, history set H(i)=H(i)∪{T j } and charging pile index α i =j; (7.6) For any electric taxi charging task τ i ∈T, based on the preference function R i (T j ) Calculate the charging pile with the greatest utility and New Charging Alliance If the electric taxi v i The preference function value of Higher than Join the New Charging Alliance Leaving the old charging alliance Then update the history set and charging pile index α i =j * ; (7.7) Repeat step (7.6) until all electric taxis do not change the charging alliance they join; (7.8) Output the electric taxi charging alliance partition Γ.

6. An electronic device, characterized in that: The electronic device comprises: Memory and processor; The memory is used to store computer-executable instructions, and the processor is used to execute the computer-executable instructions. When the computer-executable instructions are executed by the processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 4 is implemented.

7. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores computer-executable instructions, and when the computer-executable instructions are executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 4 is implemented.