Method and device for protecting private information of chip, equipment, medium and product
By burning a short seed key in the chip and generating private information using derived algorithms, the risk of leakage and storage space occupancy during the chip's private information is solved, and security and cost optimization is achieved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411158916.X
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-21
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-05
Smart Images

Figure CN118898080A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of computer software technology, and in particular to a method, device, equipment, medium and product for protecting chip private information. Background Art
[0002] In the field of chip design, many System on Chip (SoC) will design One Time Programmable (OTP) storage space to store some inherent private information of SoC (such as chip root key, device root key, verification key, debug key, etc.), and the above inherent private information needs to be burned in advance during the production stage of SoC. In order to ensure the security of private information during the production process in the factory, the usual practice is to use symmetric encryption technology to convert the plaintext of private information into ciphertext, and then import the converted ciphertext and mass produce it. The ciphertext is decrypted and used in subsequent usage scenarios to avoid direct exposure of the plaintext of private information.
[0003] However, importing the converted ciphertext and mass producing it has the following defects: First, there is a risk of leakage during the burning process of the private information ciphertext. Second, the length of the private information plaintext is relatively long. The length of the private information ciphertext after symmetrical encryption is consistent with the length of the private information plaintext. Depending on the encryption algorithm, it can reach 2Kb or even longer. The OTP may contain multiple private information, and the private information ciphertext occupies a relatively large OTP storage space, resulting in an increase in chip area and production costs. Third, in order to decrypt the private information ciphertext, it is necessary to maintain a dedicated security environment to save the key, which has high security requirements; if each device requires a different root key (one chip and one key), a secure key protection server is also required to manage the key, which greatly increases the cost. Summary of the invention
[0004] The present invention provides a method, device, equipment, medium and product for protecting chip private information, so as to solve the defects in the prior art that private information ciphertext has the risk of leakage during the burning process, occupies a relatively large OTP space, leads to an increase in chip area and production cost, and requires maintenance of a dedicated security environment to store keys, and requires a secure key protection server to manage keys, which greatly increases the cost.
[0005] The present invention provides a method for protecting chip private information, comprising the following steps: generating a seed key for the private information of a target chip; burning the seed key into a one-time programmable (OTP) storage space of the target chip to avoid security leakage of the target chip during the burning process.
[0006] As an embodiment, after burning the seed key into the one-time programmable OTP storage space of the target chip, it also includes: in response to a private information generation instruction, reading the seed key from the OTP storage space, generating the private information of the target chip based on a preset derivation algorithm and the seed key, or generating the private information of the target chip based on a preset cryptographic algorithm and the seed key.
[0007] As an embodiment, the generating of the private information of the target chip based on a preset derivation algorithm and the seed key includes: substituting the seed key into the derivation algorithm to obtain a derived key generated by the derivation algorithm, and using the derived key as the private information; wherein, the expression of the derivation algorithm is: DK=KDF(Key, Salt, Iterations, Lenth); DK is the derived key, Key is the seed key, Salt is a random number of a cryptographic salt generated in advance for the target chip, Iterations is the number of iterations of the sub-functions included in the target chip, and Lenth is the length of the derived key.
[0008] As an embodiment, the derived algorithm is stored in a security core, and the random number of the cryptographic salt is solidified in the hardware code of the target chip.
[0009] As an embodiment, in each secure boot process of the target chip, the random number of the cryptographic salt, the number of iterations and the length of the derived key are all the same.
[0010] As an embodiment, the cryptographic algorithm includes a symmetric encryption algorithm and an asymmetric encryption algorithm.
[0011] The present invention also provides a device for protecting chip private information, comprising the following modules: a key generation module, used to generate a seed key for the private information of a target chip; a key burning module, used to burn the seed key into a one-time programmable OTP storage space of the target chip to avoid security leakage of the target chip during the burning process.
[0012] The present invention also provides an electronic device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the computer program, the method for protecting chip privacy information as described in any one of the above is implemented.
[0013] The present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the method for protecting chip privacy information as described in any one of the above is implemented.
[0014] The present invention also provides a computer program product, comprising a computer program, wherein when the computer program is executed by a processor, the method for protecting chip private information as described in any one of the above is implemented.
[0015] The method, device, equipment, medium and product for protecting chip private information provided by the present invention adopt a seed key to replace the private information ciphertext. Since the seed key is publicly available, there is no risk of leakage during the burning process, and there is no need to maintain a dedicated security environment for storage. The security requirements are low, and no key protection server is required for management, which reduces the server cost. In addition, the length of the seed key is shorter than the private information ciphertext, which saves OTP space and reduces the chip area and production cost. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0016] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the present invention or the prior art, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.
[0017] Figure 1 It is a flowchart of the entire life cycle of a chip in the prior art.
[0018] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the process of encrypting and decrypting private information of a chip in the prior art.
[0019] Figure 3 It is a flow chart of the method for protecting chip privacy information provided by the present invention.
[0020] Figure 4 It is a schematic diagram of the process of encrypting and decrypting private information of a chip provided by the present invention.
[0021] Figure 5 It is a schematic diagram of the structure of the device for protecting chip privacy information provided by the present invention.
[0022] Figure 6 It is a structural schematic diagram of the electronic device provided by the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0023] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention clearer, the technical solution of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0024] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of the whole life cycle of a chip in the prior art, such as Figure 1 As shown in the figure, SoC chips go through at least three stages in their life cycle, namely, chip design stage, chip production stage and chip use stage. The chip design stage involves solidification and tape-out. Solidification refers to fixing the functions and characteristics of the design on the physical carrier of the chip. Tape-out refers to the process of sending the design to the manufacturing factory for production after completing chip design and verification. The chip production stage involves ciphertext import and mass production. The chip use stage designs the secure boot process and decryption use process.
[0025] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the process of encrypting and decrypting the private information of the chip in the prior art, such as Figure 2 As shown, currently, private information plaintext is usually stored in a secure environment. After encrypting the private information plaintext, the private information ciphertext is obtained. The private information ciphertext is stored in the chip's OTP storage space through the Off-Chip operation. During the chip's SoC Boot process, the private information ciphertext is decrypted to obtain the private information plaintext. During the encryption and decryption process, the length of the private information plaintext and the private information ciphertext are the same. Taking the length of the private information plaintext as 2Kb as an example, the length of the private information ciphertext is also 2Kb. Among them, Off-Chip refers to the interaction with the memory, interface or other devices outside the chip (such as CPU, GPU, FPGA, etc.). SoC Boot refers to starting the operating system and other software on the system-level chip (SoC).
[0026] The above technology will generate private information ciphertext, which may be leaked during the burning process, occupy a relatively large OTP space, resulting in an increase in chip area and production cost. It also requires maintaining a dedicated secure environment to store keys, and a secure key protection server to manage keys, which greatly increases costs and other defects.
[0027] In order to solve the above technical defects, the present invention proposes a solution for protecting the private information of the chip. It only needs to burn a short seed key in the OTP storage space. The seed key is public information and there is no risk of leakage of private information during burning. It can also be encrypted and decrypted to further increase security. Private information can also be obtained according to the seed key during subsequent use.
[0028] Figure 3 FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for protecting chip privacy information provided by the present invention, such as Figure 3 As shown, the present invention provides a method for protecting chip privacy information, which at least includes steps S100 to S200.
[0029] Step S100, generating a seed key for the private information of the target chip; the types of private information of the target chip may include chip root key, device root key, verification key, debug key, etc. The present invention can generate a seed key for each private information of the target chip.
[0030] Among them, the chip root key is a unique, immutable key stored inside an integrated circuit (IC) or a security chip. It is the root of all keys and security features of the chip. The device root key is a key generated by a specific device, usually derived from the chip root key. Each device can use this key for encryption and authentication. The authentication key is a key used for authentication to ensure that the identities of both parties in the communication are authentic. The debugging key is a key used during debugging and development, which may allow developers to access the internal state or sensitive information of the device.
[0031] As an embodiment, the method for generating the seed key may be to use a hardware random number generator or a random number generator provided by the operating system. The operating system provides an API to generate random numbers, such as / dev / urandom on Linux, CryptGenRandom on Windows, etc. The code is import os seed_key = int.from_bytes(os.urandom(16), 'big') # Get a 16-byte random number from the operating system. It can be seen that the length of the seed key is usually smaller than the private information.
[0032] Step S200, burning the seed key into the one-time programmable (OTP) storage space of the target chip to avoid security leakage of the target chip during the burning process.
[0033] It is understandable that the present invention uses a seed key to replace the private information ciphertext. Since the seed key is publicly available, there is no risk of leakage during the burning process, and there is no need to maintain a dedicated security environment for storage. The security requirements are low, and no key protection server is required for management, which reduces the server cost. In addition, the length of the seed key is lower than the private information ciphertext, which saves OTP space, reduces chip area and production costs. The scheme proposed by the present invention not only ensures the security and consistency of private information in the chip production OTP burning process, off-chip storage and on-chip application scenarios, but also significantly optimizes the OTP area in the chip design, effectively saving SoC area and production costs.
[0034] Figure 4FIG. 1 is a flow chart of encrypting and decrypting private information of a chip provided by the present invention, such as Figure 4 As shown, based on the above embodiment, as an optional embodiment, after burning the seed key into the one-time programmable OTP storage space of the target chip, step S300 is also included.
[0035] Step S300, in response to a private information generation instruction, read the seed key from the OTP storage space, generate the private information of the target chip based on a preset derivation algorithm and the seed key, or generate the private information of the target chip based on a preset cryptographic algorithm and the seed key.
[0036] It can be understood that the present invention proposes a solution for generating private information by using a derivation algorithm in the field of chip design, and only a short seed key is needed to obtain the private information according to the derivation algorithm. The present invention can also use some cryptographic algorithms to make the private information derived from each device different under the same code, so as to solve the expansion of the one-chip-one-key scenario.
[0037] Based on the above embodiment, as an optional embodiment, the private information of the target chip is generated based on a preset derivation algorithm and the seed key, including: substituting the seed key into the derivation algorithm to obtain a derived key generated by the derivation algorithm, and using the derived key as the private information.
[0038] The expression of the derivation algorithm is: DK=KDF (Key, Salt, Iterations, Lenth); DK is the derived key, Key is the seed key, Salt is the random number of the cryptographic salt pre-generated for the target chip, Iterations is the number of iterations of the sub-functions included in the target chip, and Lenth is the length of the derived key. Optionally, Salt can be a random number fixed by hardware (RTL Salt).
[0039] For example, if the length of a private information required by the SoC is 2048 bits, if the general method is used, the same 2048-bit private information ciphertext needs to be saved in the OTP; however, after adopting the method described in the present invention, only a 128-bit seed key needs to be saved in the OTP.
[0040] It can be understood that the present invention uses a key derivation algorithm to generate consistent 2048-bit private information each time. This single private information alone can save more than 90% of the OTP space; and there is no need to maintain a dedicated security environment outside the chip to protect the publicly available seed key.
[0041] Based on the above embodiment, as an optional embodiment, the derived algorithm is stored in the security core, and the random number of the cryptographic salt is solidified in the hardware code of the target chip.
[0042] It can be understood that the derived algorithm is placed in the ROM of the security core, which cannot be read or modified from the outside, and is safe and reliable; RTL Salt is solidified by secure hardware and is invisible to the outside, which can ensure the security of the derived key.
[0043] Based on the above embodiment, as an optional embodiment, in each secure boot process of the target chip, the random number of the cryptographic salt, the number of iterations and the length of the derived key are all the same.
[0044] It is understandable that in the secure boot process, using the same input parameters each time (including the publicly available OTP secret information seed, the secure and invisible RTL Salt, the Lenth set according to actual needs and algorithms, etc.) can ensure the consistency of the derived keys.
[0045] Based on the above embodiment, as an optional embodiment, the cryptographic algorithm includes a symmetric encryption algorithm and an asymmetric encryption algorithm, such as an RSA algorithm, an ECC algorithm, and a symmetric algorithm such as AES.
[0046] The following table summarizes the ratio of OTP area that can be saved by using different types of single private information. If the OTP contains multiple private information, the space saving effect is more significant.
[0047]
[0048] Among them, the RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) algorithm is a widely used public key encryption algorithm, mainly used for data encryption and digital signatures, ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) is a public key encryption algorithm based on elliptic curve mathematical theory, and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) is a symmetric key encryption algorithm used to protect electronic data.
[0049] Specifically, generating the private information of the target chip based on a preset cryptographic algorithm and the seed key includes using the seed key as a random number required by the cryptographic algorithm to generate the private information of the target chip, namely, the chip root key, device root key, verification key, debug key and other keys of the target chip.
[0050] If the cryptographic algorithm is the RSA algorithm, then generating the private information of the target chip based on the preset cryptographic algorithm and the seed key means using the seed key as a random number in the key generation process of the RSA algorithm, and generating two large prime numbers according to the seed key. p and q ,calculate n = p × q , n is the modulus, which will be used by both the public and private keys. Calculate the Euler function , select a value that is less than Integer e , so that e and Coprime. Calculation d , so that Here d The key pair generated is: public key ( n , e ), the private key is ( n , d ). It should be noted that the seed key stored in the OTP space is publicly available. The salt parameter of the key derivation algorithm used when generating the p|q prime number from the seed is an unpredictable random number. The derived key also has an unpredictable random property, which can also ensure the security of the RSA algorithm. In order to stably generate the same key from the seed, the salt value is solidified in the RTL.
[0051] If the cryptographic algorithm is an ECC algorithm, then generating the private information of the target chip based on the preset cryptographic algorithm and the seed key means using the seed key as a random number in the key generation process of the ECC algorithm. Specifically, using the seed key as a random number k , is a value between 1 and n A random integer between −1, where n It is the base point G The order of (i.e. the points generated G The maximum number of points that can be generated). Based on the random number k , we can determine the elliptic curve E Base point G , using the private key k and base point G To calculate the public key Q , the calculation method is: 。 It should be noted that the key derived from the seed has an unpredictable random property, and the derived key is generated after startup. It will only be saved in the internal secure RAM of the security processor and will disappear when the power is turned off. It will not be exposed, which can ensure the security of the derived key.
[0052] If the cryptographic algorithm is the AES algorithm, then generating the private information of the target chip based on the preset cryptographic algorithm and the seed key means using the seed key as a random number in the key generation process of the AES algorithm. Specifically, the seed key can be obfuscated and the obfuscated seed key can be used as the key of the AES algorithm. The obfuscation method is to use various obfuscation methods, such as bit operations, mathematical conversions, hash functions, etc., to transform the random number to ensure that the obfuscation process does not reduce the entropy of the random number. After obfuscation, it is necessary to ensure that the generated key still follows the random distribution to prevent the generation of short-cycle or predictable keys. Optionally, the seed key can also be derived through a key derivation function (such as PBKDF2, bcrypt, scrypt) to generate a random key.
[0053] Among them, PBKDF2 is a password derivation function designed to convert a user-provided password into a key by applying a computationally intensive iterative process. bcrypt is a password hash function based on the Blowfish encryption algorithm, specifically designed to securely store passwords, and uses salt values and adjustable work factors (cost factors) to increase the complexity of the calculation. The work factor of bcrypt can be adjusted so that as computing power increases, users can increase the time of hash calculations to keep it secure. bcrypt automatically generates a salt value for each password and stores it in the result, simplifying the management process for users. scrypt is a key derivation function designed to resist ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit) and GPU (graphics processing unit) attacks, emphasizing memory hardening strategies to increase the difficulty of password cracking. scrypt is designed with the amount of memory required in mind, which means that more resources are required to perform calculations, reducing the efficiency of attacks using dedicated hardware (such as ASICs). scrypt allows users to control the cost of memory and time, and increase the difficulty of cracking by selecting different parameter settings. Like other functions, scrypt also supports salt values to ensure that the same password generates different hashes.
[0054] It is understandable that the present invention can use cryptographic algorithms to make each device derive different private information under the same code, thereby realizing a one-chip one-key scenario.
[0055] Based on the above embodiment, as an optional embodiment, in order to further improve security, the seed keys of multiple target chips can be read, and keys can be generated for each seed key according to a derivation algorithm or a cryptographic algorithm, and the keys generated by multiple seed keys can be combined as target private information. The target private information can be used as a shared key for multiple target chips, so that the SoC chips corresponding to the multiple target chips can achieve secure parallel computing.
[0056] Optionally, the seed keys of multiple target chips can be read randomly or the seed keys of multiple target chips can be read. The process of combining the keys generated by the multiple seed keys can be combined randomly or in the order corresponding to the target chips, and the combined keys are used as the target private information. Furthermore, the target chip and the order of the target chips can be set according to the unique identification code of the target chip, so that the set target chip is selected from all the target chips and combined in the order of the target chips.
[0057] Optionally, the cryptographic algorithm may be an RSA algorithm, an ECC algorithm, or an AES algorithm. Taking the ECC algorithm as an example, an elliptic curve is determined for each target chip. , For the n A target chip, select a point on the elliptic curve as the base point G , the coordinates are ( x , y ), each target chip generates a public key based on its own seed key , For the n The public keys of the target chips are randomly swapped, and the swapped public keys are multiplied with the seed keys of the target chips to obtain new keys corresponding to the target chips, that is, new private information, so as to improve the security of private information.
[0058] It can be understood that the present invention utilizes the seed keys of multiple target chips to generate target private information, which can further improve the security of the key.
[0059] On the basis of the above embodiment, as an optional embodiment, in order to realize the secure session between two target chips, the respective seed keys can be read from the OTP storage space of the two target chips, and the private information of the target chip can be generated based on the preset derivation algorithm and the seed key, or the private information of the target chip can be generated based on the preset cryptographic algorithm and the seed key. The private information of the sender in the two target chips is used as the session key. The target chip at the sender obtains the current timestamp, and combines the session key and the timestamp into a message (Message), for example: Message = SessionKey || Timestamp, and uses a secure hash function (such as HMAC) to calculate the message authentication code (MAC) of the message to ensure the integrity and source of the message, such as MAC = HMAC (SessionKey, Message), and then sends the session key, current timestamp and MAC to the target chip at the receiving end. The target chip at the receiving end extracts the session key, current timestamp and MAC, and checks whether the timestamp is within a reasonable range (for example, whether it is within the past few minutes) to prevent replay attacks. The MAC is recalculated using the received session key and timestamp, and compared with the received MAC. If they are the same, the verification is successful. Once the session key is verified, the two target chips can use it for encrypted communication to ensure data confidentiality.
[0060] It is understandable that the present invention can realize secure session through the seed key of the target chip. Different algorithms and seed keys can be used to generate session keys in different session processes to realize one-time one-key and provide security.
[0061] The device for protecting chip privacy information provided by the present invention is described below. The device for protecting chip privacy information described below and the method for protecting chip privacy information described above can be referenced to each other.
[0062] Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of the structure of the device for protecting chip privacy information provided by the present invention, such as Figure 5 As shown, the present invention also provides a device for protecting chip private information, including a key generation module 510 and a key burning module 520.
[0063] The key generation module 510 is used to generate a seed key for the private information of the target chip.
[0064] The key burning module 520 is used to burn the seed key into the one-time programmable (OTP) storage space of the target chip to avoid security leakage of the target chip during the burning process.
[0065] As an embodiment, it also includes a key derivation module, which is used to respond to a private information generation instruction, read the seed key from the OTP storage space, generate the private information of the target chip based on a preset derivation algorithm and the seed key, or generate the private information of the target chip based on a preset cryptographic algorithm and the seed key.
[0066] As an embodiment, the key derivation module is also used to: substitute the seed key into the derivation algorithm to obtain the derived key generated by the derivation algorithm, and use the derived key as the private information; wherein the expression of the derivation algorithm is: DK=KDF(Key, Salt, Iterations, Lenth); DK is the derived key, Key is the seed key, Salt is a random number of the cryptographic salt pre-generated for the target chip, Iterations is the number of iterations of the sub-functions included in the target chip, and Lenth is the length of the derived key.
[0067] As an embodiment, the derived algorithm is stored in a security core, and the random number of the cryptographic salt is solidified in the hardware code of the target chip.
[0068] As an embodiment, in each secure boot process of the target chip, the random number of the cryptographic salt, the number of iterations and the length of the derived key are all the same.
[0069] As an embodiment, the cryptographic algorithm includes a symmetric encryption algorithm and an asymmetric encryption algorithm.
[0070] It should be noted that the device for protecting chip privacy information provided by the present invention can execute the method for protecting chip privacy information described in any of the above embodiments during specific operation, and has the technical effect corresponding to the method, which will not be elaborated in this embodiment.
[0071] Figure 6 An example of a physical structure diagram of an electronic device is shown in FIG. Figure 6 As shown, the electronic device may include: a processor 610, a communication interface 620, a memory 630 and a communication bus 640, wherein the processor 610, the communication interface 620 and the memory 630 communicate with each other through the communication bus 640. The processor 610 may call the logic instructions in the memory 630 to execute a method for protecting chip private information, the method comprising: generating a seed key for the private information of the target chip; burning the seed key into the one-time programmable OTP storage space of the target chip to avoid security leakage of the target chip during the burning process.
[0072] In addition, the logic instructions in the above-mentioned memory 630 can be implemented in the form of a software functional unit and can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium when it is sold or used as an independent product. Based on such an understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art or the part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including a number of instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), disk or optical disk, etc. Various media that can store program codes.
[0073] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program. The computer program can be stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the computer can execute the method for protecting chip private information provided by the above methods. The method includes: generating a seed key for the private information of the target chip; burning the seed key into the one-time programmable OTP storage space of the target chip to avoid security leakage of the target chip during the burning process.
[0074] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon. When the computer program is executed by a processor, it is implemented to execute the method for protecting chip private information provided by the above methods. The method includes: generating a seed key for the private information of the target chip; burning the seed key into the one-time programmable OTP storage space of the target chip to avoid security leakage of the target chip during the burning process.
[0075] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative, wherein the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the scheme of this embodiment. Ordinary technicians in this field can understand and implement it without paying creative labor.
[0076] Through the description of the above implementation methods, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each implementation method can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform, and of course, can also be implemented by hardware. Based on this understanding, the above technical solution is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, a disk, an optical disk, etc., including a number of instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in each embodiment or some parts of the embodiments.
[0077] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments, or make equivalent replacements for some of the technical features therein. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.
Claims
1. A method for protecting chip privacy information, characterized in that: include: Generate a seed key for the private information of the target chip; The seed key is burned into the one-time programmable (OTP) storage space of the target chip to avoid security leakage of the target chip during the burning process.
2. The method for protecting chip privacy information according to claim 1, characterized in that: After burning the seed key into the one-time programmable OTP storage space of the target chip, the method further includes: In response to a private information generation instruction, the seed key is read from the OTP storage space, and the private information of the target chip is generated based on a preset derivation algorithm and the seed key, or the private information of the target chip is generated based on a preset cryptographic algorithm and the seed key.
3. The method for protecting chip privacy information according to claim 2, characterized in that: The generating of the private information of the target chip based on the preset derivation algorithm and the seed key includes: Substituting the seed key into the derivation algorithm to obtain a derived key generated by the derivation algorithm, and using the derived key as the private information; The expression of the derivation algorithm is: DK=KDF (Key, Salt, Iterations, Lenth); DK is the derived key, Key is the seed key, Salt is a random number of the cryptographic salt pre-generated for the target chip, Iterations is the number of iterations of the sub-function included in the target chip, and Lenth is the length of the derived key.
4. The method for protecting chip privacy information according to claim 3, characterized in that: The derived algorithm is stored in the security core, and the random number of the cryptographic salt is solidified in the hardware code of the target chip.
5. The method for protecting chip privacy information according to claim 3 or 4, characterized in that: In each secure boot process of the target chip, the random number of the cryptographic salt, the number of iterations and the length of the derived key are all the same.
6. The method for protecting chip privacy information according to claim 2, characterized in that: The cryptographic algorithms include symmetric encryption algorithms and asymmetric encryption algorithms.
7. A device for protecting chip private information, characterized in that: include: A key generation module, used to generate a seed key for the private information of the target chip; The key burning module is used to burn the seed key into the one-time programmable (OTP) storage space of the target chip to avoid security leakage of the target chip during the burning process.
8. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein: When the processor executes the computer program, the method for protecting chip private information according to any one of claims 1 to 6 is implemented.
9. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the method for protecting chip private information as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 6 is implemented.
10. A computer program product, comprising a computer program, characterized in that When the computer program is executed by a processor, the method for protecting chip private information as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 6 is implemented.
