Dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision based on carbon transaction system

Through dynamic quantum game management methods, the problem of complex entanglement relationships in the low-carbon building supply chain is solved, the low-carbonization of low-carbon buildings and the economic and environmental benefits in the carbon trading market are realized, and a new approach to decision-making behaviors under the carbon trading mechanism is provided. understand.

CN118917690APending Publication Date: 2024-11-08YANSHAN UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411027316.X
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-30
Publication Date
2024-11-08

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

It is difficult for the existing technology to effectively describe and optimize the complex entangled relationship between members of the low-carbon building supply chain, affecting the development of low-carbon buildings and the economic and environmental benefits in the carbon trading market.

Method used

Adopt dynamic quantum game management method based on the carbon trading system, and obtain the game strategies of the game parties, use quantum entanglement processing and anti-entanglement matrix to analyze the strategy selection changes at different stages of the carbon trading mechanism, and optimize strategy management to achieve the optimal management strategy. .

Benefits of technology

It has achieved low carbonization of construction projects while obtaining additional economic and environmental benefits in the carbon trading market, providing a new perspective on interaction and behavioral decision-making among members of low carbon construction supply chains, helping funders, builders and construction parties to formulate effective management strategy.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a dynamic quantum game management method for a low-carbon building decision based on a carbon transaction system, and relates to the technical field of buildings, and the method comprises the following steps: obtaining a game strategy of a game player, and obtaining a final state of the game strategy through quantum entanglement processing; according to the initial state of quantum entanglement, calculating an expected revenue of a gaming party based on a preset revenue matrix; and analyzing strategy selection changes of the gaming party in different stages of the carbon transaction mechanism, and optimizing strategy management according to the strategy selection changes to obtain an optimal management strategy. According to the dynamic quantum game analysis method based on the carbon emission transaction mechanism, low-carbon building strategy selection of the subsidizer, the constructor and the constructor in four different stages is considered through calculation and data analysis, and meanwhile, the proposed dynamic quantum game method can describe decision-making behaviors of decision makers in the face of uncertainty and limited information, so that the decision-making behaviors of the decision makers in the face of the uncertainty and the limited information can be described. And a brand-new perspective is provided for understanding the interaction between the subsidy party and the low-carbon building supply chain member.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of building technology, and in particular to a dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under a carbon trading system. Background Art

[0002] At present, the growing demand for building energy consumption has become an obstacle to the low-carbon transformation of the construction industry. Transforming the construction industry from an energy consumer to a contributor to emission reduction can accelerate the low-carbon transformation of the construction industry. Compared with traditional buildings, low-carbon buildings can reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 25% at the environmental level. At the social level, low-carbon buildings can bring happiness to residents. At the economic level, low-carbon buildings can generate higher rental premiums. In recent years, the carbon emission trading market has gradually developed and matured. Carbon emission trading is to commercialize carbon emission allocations by setting total emissions, determining carbon emission allocations, and relying on platforms and flexible trading mechanisms. Compared with traditional management methods, carbon emission trading has not only pressed the responsibility for greenhouse gas emission control to the emission subject, but also provided an economic incentive mechanism for reducing carbon emissions and reducing the emission reduction costs of the whole society. It is considered to be an effective means of managing carbon emissions. Although the carbon emission trading mechanism has gradually matured, only some regions have included the construction industry in the carbon emission trading market. In view of the low-carbon benefits of the carbon trading mechanism in the construction industry, the implementation of the carbon trading mechanism in low-carbon buildings will provide greater flexibility for low-carbon building decisions.

[0003] At present, a series of studies are being conducted on the decision-making behavior of low-carbon buildings. These studies mainly consider the interaction between stakeholders in the low-carbon building supply chain. However, the impact of the carbon trading mechanism on the interaction between members of the low-carbon building supply chain has not been taken seriously. Therefore, the effectiveness of the carbon trading mechanism in promoting the better development of low-carbon buildings cannot be better verified. In addition, considering the volatility of carbon prices and the uncertainty of carbon emission allocations, builders and contractors will decide whether to develop low-carbon buildings based on the cost and technical input-output ratio of low-carbon buildings. However, builders and contractors will also bear the risk of penalties from sponsors while adopting traditional buildings. These complex factors affect the low-carbon investment returns of builders and contractors, and then affect the behavioral strategies of builders and contractors. Therefore, it is crucial to study the impact of the interaction and behavioral decision-making between members of the low-carbon building supply chain under the carbon trading mechanism on the development of low-carbon buildings.

[0004] Among them, game theory is used to study the behavioral strategy problems between players and is considered to be an effective method to study the interaction and behavioral decision-making between members of the low-carbon building supply chain. Previous studies have mostly focused on using evolutionary game theory and differential game theory to analyze the impact of factors such as fiscal incentives, regulatory penalties, and consumer preferences on the development of low-carbon buildings. In the low-carbon building supply chain, there will be entanglement between the various entities, that is, the decision of one entity immediately affects the state of another entity. However, these methods are not enough to describe the complex entanglement relationship between members of the low-carbon building supply chain.

[0005] Currently, no effective solution has been proposed for the problems in the related technologies. Summary of the invention

[0006] 1. Technical issues to be resolved

[0007] In view of the shortcomings of the existing technology, the present invention provides a dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system, which has the advantages of low-carbonization of construction projects and obtaining additional economic and environmental benefits in the carbon trading market, thereby solving the problem that traditional methods are not sufficient to describe the complex entangled relationships between members of the low-carbon building supply chain.

[0008] (II) Technical solution

[0009] In order to achieve the low carbonization of the above-mentioned construction projects and obtain additional economic and environmental benefits in the carbon trading market, the specific technical solutions adopted by the present invention are as follows:

[0010] A dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under a carbon trading system includes the following steps:

[0011] S1. Obtain the game strategy of the game player and obtain the final state of the game strategy through quantum entanglement processing;

[0012] S2. According to the initial state of quantum entanglement, the expected benefits of the game players are calculated based on the pre-set benefit matrix;

[0013] S3. Analyze the changes in strategy choices of game players at different stages of the carbon trading mechanism, and optimize strategy management based on the changes in strategy choices to obtain the optimal management strategy.

[0014] Furthermore, obtaining the game strategy of the game player and obtaining the final state of the game strategy through quantum entanglement processing includes the following steps:

[0015] S11. Use the entanglement matrix to convert the game strategy of the players into a quantum entangled state;

[0016] S12, applying a strategy matrix to the obtained quantum entangled state to obtain an intermediate state;

[0017] S13. De-entangle the intermediate state through the anti-entanglement matrix to obtain the final state of the game strategy.

[0018] Furthermore, the expression of the entanglement matrix is:

[0019]

[0020] In the formula, represents the entanglement matrix; i represents the imaginary unit symbol; ω represents the degree of quantum entanglement; represents the tensor product; σ x represents the Pauli-x matrix; I represents the identity matrix.

[0021] Furthermore, the expression of the strategy matrix is:

[0022]

[0023] Where U i (μ i ,β i ) represents the strategy matrix; u i Indicates the effort of the game players; β i represents the quantum strategy of the players; i represents the symbol of the imaginary unit.

[0024] Furthermore, the expression of the anti-entanglement matrix is:

[0025]

[0026] In the formula, represents the anti-entanglement matrix; i represents the imaginary unit symbol; ω represents the degree of quantum entanglement; I represents the unit matrix.

[0027] Furthermore, the game parties include funders, builders and constructors.

[0028] Furthermore, the intermediate state is de-entangled by the anti-entanglement matrix, and the final state of the game strategy includes:

[0029] When the quantum strategy chosen by the sponsor is The quantum strategy chosen by the construction party and the construction party is When , the final state expression of the sponsor's game strategy is:

[0030]

[0031] When the quantum strategy selected by the builder is The quantum strategy chosen by the sponsor and the constructor is When , the final state expression of the builder's game strategy is:

[0032]

[0033] When the quantum strategy chosen by the construction party is The quantum strategy chosen by the sponsor and builder is When , the final state of the construction party's game strategy is expressed as:

[0034]

[0035] In the formula, |ψ fin > g 、|ψ fin > d and |ψ fin > c They represent the final states of the game strategies of the sponsor, builder and constructor respectively; represents the anti-entanglement matrix; μ g , μ d , μ c Respectively represent the efforts of the sponsor, builder and constructor; β g , β d , β c They represent the quantum strategies of the funder, builder, and constructor respectively;

[0036] represents the entanglement matrix; i represents the imaginary unit symbol.

[0037] Furthermore, the changes in the strategic choices of the game players at different stages of the carbon trading mechanism are analyzed, and the strategic management is optimized according to the changes in strategic choices. The optimal management strategy includes the following steps:

[0038] S31. Divide the development process of the carbon trading mechanism into different stages;

[0039] S32. In different development stages of the carbon trading mechanism, dynamic quantum game theory is used to analyze the quantum strategy choices of each player and the factors that affect the change of strategy choices;

[0040] S33. Based on the results of dynamic analysis, the quantum strategy choices of each game player at different stages of the carbon trading mechanism are adjusted to obtain the optimal management strategy.

[0041] Furthermore, the development stages include the initial stage, transition stage, growth stage and maturity stage.

[0042] Furthermore, at different development stages of the carbon trading mechanism, the dynamic quantum game theory is used to analyze the quantum strategy selection of each player and the factors affecting the change of strategy selection, including the following steps:

[0043] S321. Obtaining the quantum strategies of each game player at different development stages of the carbon trading mechanism and the changes in the effort level of each game player;

[0044] S322, using mathematical software to randomly generate different initial strategy points for each player;

[0045] S323. Using dynamic quantum game theory, simulate the dynamic evolution of the efforts of each player at each development stage and obtain the evolution result;

[0046] S324. Based on the evolution results, analyze and identify the factors affecting the changes in quantum strategy selection.

[0047] (III) Beneficial effects

[0048] Compared with the prior art, the present invention provides a dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system, which has the following beneficial effects:

[0049] (1) The present invention analyzes the factors that lead to changes in the strategy choices of the three parties in the game; it can provide good management suggestions for the funder, the builder and the construction party. By proposing a carbon-benefit entanglement agreement, it can achieve low-carbonization of construction projects and obtain additional economic and environmental benefits in the carbon trading market.

[0050] (2) The present invention is based on a dynamic quantum game analysis method of the carbon emission trading mechanism. Through calculation and data analysis, the low-carbon building strategy choices of funders, builders and constructors in four different stages are considered. At the same time, the dynamic quantum game method proposed in the present invention can describe the decision-making behavior of decision makers when faced with uncertainty and limited information, which provides a new perspective for understanding the interaction between funders and members of the low-carbon building supply chain. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0051] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0052] Figure 1 is a flow chart of a dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under a carbon trading system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0053] Figure 2 This is a dynamic analysis process diagram of the initial stage in a dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under a carbon trading system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0054] Figure 3 It is a dynamic analysis process diagram of the transition phase in the dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0055] Figure 4 It is a dynamic analysis process diagram of the growth stage in the dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0056] Figure 5 It is a dynamic analysis process diagram of the mature stage in the dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0057] Figure 6 is a schematic diagram of the change trend of the funder's income with the degree of effort in the dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0058] Figure 7 It is a schematic diagram of the change trend of the builder's income with the degree of effort in the dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0059] Figure 8 It is a schematic diagram of the changing trend of the construction party's income with the degree of effort in the dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0060] To further illustrate each embodiment, the present invention provides drawings, which are part of the disclosure of the present invention and are mainly used to illustrate the embodiments and can be used in conjunction with the relevant descriptions in the specification to explain the operating principles of the embodiments. With reference to these contents, ordinary technicians in the field should be able to understand other possible implementations and advantages of the present invention. The components in the figures are not drawn to scale, and similar component symbols are generally used to represent similar components.

[0061] According to an embodiment of the present invention, a dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under a carbon trading system is provided.

[0062] The present invention will now be further described with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. Figure 1 As shown, according to the dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system according to an embodiment of the present invention, the method includes the following steps:

[0063] S1. Obtain the game strategy of the game parties, and obtain the final state of the game strategy through quantum entanglement processing; the game parties include the sponsor, the builder and the construction party.

[0064] As a preferred implementation, obtaining the game strategy of the game player and obtaining the final state of the game strategy through quantum entanglement processing includes the following steps:

[0065] S11. Use the entanglement matrix to convert the game strategy of the players into a quantum entangled state;

[0066] S12, applying a strategy matrix to the obtained quantum entangled state to obtain an intermediate state;

[0067] Specifically, the expression of the strategy matrix is:

[0068]

[0069] Where U i (μ i ,β i ) represents the strategy matrix; u i Indicates the effort of the game players; β i represents the quantum strategy of the players; i represents the symbol of the imaginary unit.

[0070] S13. De-entangle the intermediate state through the anti-entanglement matrix to obtain the final state of the game strategy.

[0071] Specifically, the expression of the anti-entanglement matrix is:

[0072]

[0073] In the formula, represents the anti-entanglement matrix; i represents the imaginary unit symbol; ω represents the degree of quantum entanglement; I represents the unit matrix.

[0074] Among them, the intermediate state is de-entangled by the anti-entanglement matrix, and the final state of the game strategy is obtained, including:

[0075] When the quantum strategy chosen by the sponsor is The quantum strategy chosen by the construction party and the construction party is When , the final state expression of the sponsor's game strategy is:

[0076]

[0077] When the quantum strategy selected by the builder is The quantum strategy chosen by the sponsor and the constructor is When , the final state expression of the builder's game strategy is:

[0078]

[0079] When the quantum strategy chosen by the construction party is The quantum strategy chosen by the sponsor and builder is When , the final state of the construction party's game strategy is expressed as:

[0080]

[0081] In the formula, |ψ fin > g 、|ψ fin > d and |ψ fin > c They represent the final states of the game strategies of the sponsor, builder and constructor respectively; represents the anti-entanglement matrix; μ g , μ d , μ c Respectively represent the efforts of the sponsor, builder and constructor; β g , β d , β c They represent the quantum strategies of the funder, builder, and constructor respectively; represents the entanglement matrix; i represents the imaginary unit symbol.

[0082] S2. According to the initial state of quantum entanglement, the expected benefits of the game players are calculated based on the pre-set benefit matrix;

[0083] S3. Analyze the changes in strategy choices of game players at different stages of the carbon trading mechanism, and optimize strategy management based on the changes in strategy choices to obtain the optimal management strategy.

[0084] As a preferred implementation method, analyzing the changes in the strategy selection of the game players at different stages of the carbon trading mechanism, and optimizing the strategy management according to the changes in the strategy selection, and obtaining the optimal management strategy includes the following steps:

[0085] S31. The development process of the carbon trading mechanism is divided into different stages; the development stages include the initial stage, transition stage, growth stage and mature stage.

[0086] S32. In different development stages of the carbon trading mechanism, dynamic quantum game theory is used to analyze the quantum strategy choices of each player and the factors that affect the change of strategy choices;

[0087] As a preferred implementation method, at different development stages of the carbon trading mechanism, the dynamic quantum game theory is used to analyze the quantum strategy selection of each player and the factors affecting the change of strategy selection, including the following steps:

[0088] S321. Obtaining the quantum strategies of each game player at different development stages of the carbon trading mechanism and the changes in the effort level of each game player;

[0089] S322, using mathematical software to randomly generate different initial strategy points for each player;

[0090] S323. Using dynamic quantum game theory, simulate the dynamic evolution of the efforts of each player at each development stage and obtain the evolution result;

[0091] S324. Analyze and identify the influencing factors of the change in quantum strategy selection based on the evolutionary results.

[0092] S33. Based on the dynamic analysis results, adjust the quantum strategy selections of each game player in different stages of the carbon trading mechanism to obtain the optimal management strategy.

[0093] Specifically, to facilitate the understanding of the above technical solutions of the present invention, the following details the usage process of the present invention in specific applications. The specific implementation steps are as follows:

[0094] Step 1. According to the characteristics of the funder, constructor, and builder in the carbon emission trading market, the following settings are proposed:

[0095] Setting 1. In the quantum game model, the funder, constructor, and builder are all boundedly rational and continuously play games to select the optimal strategy to achieve the balanced development of economic benefits and environmental benefits.

[0096] Setting 2. The funder has two strategies: "strong supervision" and "weak supervision". When the funder conducts strong supervision, an incentive and penalty mechanism will be adopted. However, when the funder adopts weak supervision, the credibility of the funder will decline to some extent.

[0097] Setting 3. The constructor has two strategies: "give rewards for low-carbon buildings" and "do not give rewards for low-carbon buildings". When the constructor adopts the strategy of "not giving rewards for low-carbon buildings", the constructor will be punished by the funder; the builder has two strategies: "adopt low-carbon buildings" and "do not adopt low-carbon buildings". When the builder adopts the strategy of "not adopting low-carbon buildings", the builder will be punished by the funder.

[0098] Setting 4. In the carbon emission trading market, the funder allocates a certain amount of carbon quota q to the builder, and the carbon quota q allocated by the funder should satisfy EL < q < ET, where EL is the carbon emission when traditional buildings are adopted, and ET is the carbon emission when low-carbon technologies are adopted. When the builder does not adopt low-carbon buildings and causes the carbon emission to exceed the carbon emission quota allocated by the funder, the builder will be punished by the funder.

[0099] Setting 5. When both the constructor and the builder choose low-carbon buildings, additional benefits will be generated. When only one party adopts low-carbon buildings, the party that adopts low-carbon buildings will suffer certain losses. When both parties adopt low-carbon buildings, the funder will obtain additional benefits; when only one party adopts low-carbon buildings, the funder needs to pay the environmental governance cost.

[0100] Setting 6. From the perspective of classical games, the two polarization states "investment" and "non-investment" respectively correspond to μ i = 0 and μ i=1, corresponding to the two polarization quantum states |0> and |1> in quantum information. According to the above basic settings and parameter settings, the profit matrix can be obtained, as shown in Table 2:

[0101] Table 2 Profit matrix from the perspective of classic game

[0102]

[0103]

[0104] In Table 2, G represents the funder; D represents the builder; C represents the construction party; W represents the basic income of the funder when both parties adopt traditional buildings; w represents the additional income of the funder when both parties adopt low-carbon technologies; R represents the public supervision benefit; S represents the subsidy of the funder to the builder and the construction party for adopting low-carbon technologies; M represents the cost of strong supervision by the funder; V represents the benefit of adopting traditional buildings; ΔV1 represents the additional benefit of the builder when adopting low-carbon buildings; ΔV2 represents the additional benefit of the construction party when adopting low-carbon buildings; v represents the additional benefit of the cooperation between the two parties when both parties adopt low-carbon buildings; T represents the corporate image when adopting low-carbon technologies; CT represents the cost of adopting traditional buildings; ΔCL1 represents the additional cost of the builder when adopting low-carbon buildings; ΔCL2 represents the additional cost of the construction party when adopting low-carbon buildings; β represents the low-carbon benefits given by the builder to the construction party reward; p represents the carbon price; q represents the carbon quota allocated by the sponsor to the builder; ΔW1 represents the additional income that the sponsor can obtain when only the builder adopts low-carbon buildings; ΔW2 represents the additional income that the sponsor can obtain when only the construction party adopts low-carbon buildings; g represents the penalty amount for the builder adopting traditional buildings; K1 represents the environmental governance cost of the sponsor when only the builder adopts low-carbon buildings; K2 represents the environmental governance cost of the sponsor when only the construction party adopts low-carbon buildings; L1 represents the loss of interests when only the builder adopts low-carbon buildings; L2 represents the loss of interests when only the construction party adopts low-carbon buildings; a represents the cost of weak supervision by the sponsor; k represents the additional environmental governance cost that the sponsor needs to bear when both parties adopt low-carbon technologies; r represents the probability of environmental supervision by the sponsor; c represents the degree of penalty for the construction party adopting traditional buildings.

[0105] Step 2: Quantize the classical game through entanglement matrix and anti-entanglement. Assume that |0> and |1> are the two extreme states of the funder, builder and construction party, including: "work hard" and "don't work hard". Assume that the initial quantum state of the three game parties is |000> (the first number represents the funder, the second number represents the construction party, and the third number represents the construction party). All three parties can choose "work hard (|0>)" and "don't work hard (|1>)".

[0106] Specifically, the expression of the entanglement matrix is:

[0107]

[0108] In the formula, represents the entanglement matrix; i represents the imaginary unit symbol; represents the degree of quantum entanglement, when When , the entanglement degree is the greatest; represents the tensor product; σ x represents the Pauli-x matrix, I is represented by a 4×4 identity matrix.

[0109] Among them, the strategic matrix expressions of the sponsor, builder and constructor are:

[0110]

[0111] In the formula, μ g , μ d , μ c ∈[0,π]; β g , β d , β c Represent the quantum strategies of the sponsor, builder and constructor respectively; U g (μ g ,β g ) represents the funder’s strategy matrix; U d (μ d ,β d ) represents the strategy matrix of the builder; U c (μ c ,β c ) represents the construction party’s strategy matrix;

[0112] When μ g =π, That is, the state of the funder is to not make any effort and adopt a quantum strategy;

[0113] When μ g = 0, That is, the state of the funder is to make efforts and adopt a quantum strategy;

[0114] When μ g ∈(0,π), the effort level of the sponsor is between the two. Similarly, the same is true for the builder and the construction party. Therefore, μ g , μ d , μ c It is considered as a parameter of the efforts of the funders, builders and constructors.

[0115] Consider the entanglement of states in the initial state |000>:

[0116] Assume the initial state is:

[0117]

[0118] The maximum entanglement gate is:

[0119]

[0120] When the quantum strategy chosen by the sponsor is The quantum strategy chosen by the builder and the construction party is When , according to the profit matrix, the expected profit expression of the sponsor is:

[0121]

[0122] In the formula, E g It represents the expected return of the sponsor.

[0123] According to the expression of the expected return of the sponsor, the sponsor quantum dynamic equation is defined as Among them, Q g The dynamic equation representing the funder's revenue;

[0124] When the quantum strategy selected by the builder is The quantum strategy chosen by the sponsor and the constructor is When , according to the profit matrix, the expected profit expression of the builder is:

[0125]

[0126] In the formula, E d It represents the expected profit of the builder.

[0127] According to the expression of the expected benefit of the builder, the builder's quantum dynamic equation is defined as: Among them, Q d The dynamic equation representing the builder’s revenue;

[0128] When the quantum strategy chosen by the construction party is The quantum strategy chosen by the sponsor and builder is When , according to the profit matrix, the expected profit expression of the construction party can be obtained as:

[0129]

[0130] In the formula, represents the expected benefit of the construction party;

[0131] According to the expression of the expected benefit of the construction party, the quantum dynamic equation of the construction party is defined as Among them, Q cIt represents the dynamic equation of the construction party's revenue;

[0132] Step 3. The data related to the carbon trading system in the present invention are derived from research literature related to carbon trading. According to inquiries, as of April 24, 2024, the highest national carbon price is 101.51 yuan / ton and the lowest price is 100.59 yuan / ton. The average carbon price of 101 yuan / ton is calculated based on the cumulative carbon trading volume and cumulative trading amount. For the remaining data, the present invention draws on relevant literature and makes appropriate modifications based on the data related to the content of the present invention. The data table is shown in Table 3;

[0133] Table 3 Parameter values ​​for each stage

[0134]

[0135]

[0136]

[0137] Step 4: Analyze the changes in the strategic choices of the game players at different stages of the carbon trading mechanism, and optimize the strategy management according to the changes in strategic choices;

[0138] Among them, the results of quantum dynamic analysis in the initial stage are:

[0139] like Figure 2 The dynamic analysis process shown describes the dynamic changes in the efforts of the funder, builder, and contractor when they adopt quantum strategies in the initial stage. According to the data in Table 3, different initial strategy points of the funder, builder, and contractor are randomly generated by computer. When all three adopt quantum strategies, they will eventually converge to (0,0,0,) after iteration. Specifically, in the initial stage, the funder, builder, and contractor all adopt low-carbon buildings. Due to the introduction of quantum entanglement, when all three adopt quantum strategies, the previous cooperative relationship and trust foundation make them more inclined to jointly adopt low-carbon building strategies in the initial stage. From the perspective of the funder, the strategy of choosing low-carbon buildings in the initial stage helps to achieve its policy goals, namely, promoting the low-carbon transformation of the construction industry and responding to global warming. From the perspective of the builder, the choice of low-carbon buildings in the initial stage is conducive to seizing market opportunities and meeting the growing trend of consumer demand for green buildings, thereby standing out from the competition. From the perspective of the contractor, the low-carbon building strategy in the initial stage means more cooperation opportunities and technical challenges. By participating in low-carbon building projects, the contractor can obtain additional benefits from cooperating with the contractor and have the opportunity to demonstrate its professional capabilities in environmentally friendly construction.

[0140] Results of quantum dynamic analysis in the transition phase:

[0141] like Figure 3The dynamic analysis process shown describes the dynamic changes in the efforts of the funders, builders and constructors when they adopt quantum strategies in the transition stage. According to the data in Table 3, different initial strategy points of the funders, builders and constructors are randomly generated by computer. When all three adopt quantum strategies, they will eventually converge to (0,0,0,) after iteration, but the convergence speed at this time is slow. Specifically, in the transition stage, the funders, builders and constructors all adopt low-carbon buildings. This result shows that at this stage, although the funders, builders and constructors tend to continue to promote the development of low-carbon buildings driven by policies and markets, their action speed or efficiency is relatively low. This is because there are delays caused by some implementation challenges, technical difficulties, cost considerations or other external factors. These challenges and factors slow down their speed of taking further actions, which ultimately leads to a slow convergence speed in this stage.

[0142] Results of quantum dynamic analysis in the growth stage:

[0143] like Figure 4 The dynamic analysis process shown describes the dynamic changes in the efforts of the funders, builders and construction parties when they adopt quantum strategies in the growth stage. According to the data in Table 3, different initial strategy points of the funders, builders and construction parties are randomly generated by computer. When all three adopt quantum strategies, they will eventually converge to (0, 0, 0.3) after iteration. At this time, it can be seen that the strategy choice of the funder gradually tends to weak regulation. Specifically, in the growth stage, the builders and construction parties still adopt low-carbon buildings, while the enthusiasm of the funders for low-carbon buildings is gradually decreasing. For the funders, under the carbon trading mechanism, with the maturity of the market and the enhancement of self-regulation ability, the funders no longer need to promote the development of low-carbon buildings through strong supervision. Therefore, their strategy choices tend to reduce direct intervention and rely on market mechanisms and policy guidance to achieve low-carbon transformation. For the builders and construction parties, the cooperation and dependence (quantum entanglement) between them means that any party's failure to make efforts to build low-carbon buildings will result in the loss of the interests of both parties. Even in the growth stage, builders and constructors will continue to choose low-carbon buildings because of the entangled relationships they have previously established to avoid financial losses due to lack of effort.

[0144] Results of quantum dynamic analysis in the mature stage:

[0145] like Figure 5The dynamic analysis process shown describes the dynamic changes in the efforts of the funders, builders and constructors when they adopt quantum strategies in the mature stage. According to the data in Table 3, different initial strategy points of the funders, builders and constructors are randomly generated by computer. When all three adopt quantum strategies, they will eventually converge to (0,0,1) after iteration. Specifically, in the mature stage, the builders and constructors still adopt low-carbon buildings, while the enthusiasm of the funders for low-carbon buildings is reduced to the lowest. For the funders, with the maturity of the market and the adjustment of policies, the role of the funders changes to regulators and coordinators. This role change helps the entire construction industry achieve self-regulation and sustainable development instead of relying too much on external incentives. For the builders and constructors, although the enthusiasm of the funders has dropped to the lowest point, the builders and constructors still choose low-carbon buildings due to the previous entanglement relationship and the avoidance of loss of income caused by not working hard. This shows that there is a self-sustaining motivation mechanism among market participants, which helps to maintain the sustainability of low-carbon transformation.

[0146] From the analysis of the above development stages, it can be seen that when all three parties adopt the quantum strategy, the low-carbon building benefits of the sponsor are getting lower and lower. The following explains the reasons for this situation. Figure 6 As shown in Figure 1, the funder's income in the four stages increases with the increase of effort, thereby increasing the funder's enthusiasm. However, in the initial stage, the funder's income change trend is the largest. As the stage changes, the slope of the funder's income change gradually becomes gentle. This is because in β i =0 and when all three parties adopt entanglement, in the initial stage, the funder has to respond to the policy and thus impose strong supervision on the construction party and the construction party. At this time, market participants such as the construction party and the construction party need time to adapt to the new carbon trading mechanism. They will take emission reduction measures to reduce the demand for purchasing additional emission quotas. This adaptation process will lead to an increase in the trading volume and trading value of the carbon market, thereby increasing the income of the funder. At this time, the enthusiasm of the funder is the highest. In the mature stage, the slope of the funder's income change is the lowest. This is in the mature stage, the market operation efficiency is improved, the funder's management and regulation of the market is more efficient, and unnecessary cost expenditures are reduced, but this also means that the additional income brought by improving efficiency is reduced. And as the market matures, the carbon trading market reaches a certain saturation state, the new market participants and trading volume are limited, resulting in a slowdown in the growth of the funder's income. Therefore, the enthusiasm of the funder is the lowest at this time.

[0147] like Figure 7As shown in the figure, the benefits of the builders in the four stages increase with the increase in the degree of effort, thereby reducing the builders' enthusiasm for low-carbon buildings. As the builders' efforts increase, they need to invest more resources and costs to build and develop the project. These costs include more efficient technology, better materials, stricter environmental protection measures, etc., which will lead to increased costs. However, in the initial stage, the builders' benefits are the highest compared to the other three stages. In the early stage of the market, the sponsor will provide various support and incentives, such as tax incentives and subsidies, to encourage the builders to participate in the market and increase their benefits. At this time, the builders' enthusiasm is the greatest. In the mature stage, the builders' benefits are the lowest. This is because in the mature stage, the sponsor's operating efficiency is improved, and the builders are more efficient in the management and operation of the project, reducing unnecessary cost expenditures, but this also means that the additional benefits brought by improving efficiency are reduced. Despite this, the builders will still choose low-carbon buildings in the mature stage. This is because quantum entanglement entangles the interests of the three parties, especially the relationship with the construction party. The two work closely together. If they choose not to work hard, their own benefits will be lost. Therefore, builders will still choose low-carbon buildings.

[0148] like Figure 8 As shown in the figure, the benefits of the construction party in the four stages increase with the increase of effort, thereby reducing the construction party's enthusiasm for low-carbon construction. In economics, the principle of diminishing marginal utility shows that as input increases, the additional benefits will gradually decrease. For the construction party, the initial efforts will bring significant growth in benefits, but as the efforts continue to increase, the additional benefits per unit of effort will decrease. However, in the initial stage, the construction party's benefits are the highest. In the early stage of the market, the sponsor will provide various support and incentives, such as tax incentives and subsidies, to encourage the construction party to participate in the market and increase its benefits. The construction party's benefits are the lowest in the mature stage. In the mature stage, the market operation efficiency is improved, and the construction party is more efficient in the management and operation of the project, reducing unnecessary cost expenditures, but this also means that the additional benefits brought by improving efficiency are reduced. Despite this, the construction party will still choose low-carbon buildings in the mature stage, and the reasons at this time are the same as those of the construction party.

[0149] From the above analysis, we can see that in the early stage of the carbon trading mechanism, builders and construction parties will choose low-carbon buildings. The initial stage is a critical period for the establishment and development of the market. Funders use policy guidance and financial subsidies to encourage market participants to participate in the development and implementation of low-carbon buildings. At this stage, due to the support and incentives of funders, builders can obtain economic benefits such as tax incentives and subsidies, thereby stimulating their enthusiasm. With the maturity of the market and the adjustment of policies, these favorable factors gradually decrease, but the highly entangled relationship established between builders and construction parties before gives both parties the motivation to maintain a cooperative relationship, especially to continue to choose low-carbon buildings in the mature stage. This is because if either party does not work hard, its benefits will be lost. This high level of trust and rich information sharing can encourage all parties to participate more actively in the carbon trading market and adopt low-carbon building technologies.

[0150] In summary, with the help of the above technical solutions of the present invention, the present invention can provide good management suggestions for the funder, the builder and the construction party by analyzing the factors that lead to changes in the strategy selection of the three parties in the game. By proposing a carbon benefit entanglement protocol, the low-carbonization of the construction project can be achieved, and additional economic and environmental benefits can be obtained in the carbon trading market. The present invention is based on the dynamic quantum game analysis method of the carbon emission trading mechanism. Through calculation and data analysis, the low-carbon building strategy selection of the funder, the builder and the construction party in four different stages is considered. At the same time, the dynamic quantum game method proposed by the present invention can describe the decision-making behavior of decision makers in the face of uncertainty and limited information, which provides a new perspective for understanding the interaction between funders and members of the low-carbon building supply chain.

[0151] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system, characterized by: The method comprises the following steps: S1. Obtain the game strategy of the game player and obtain the final state of the game strategy through quantum entanglement processing; S2. According to the initial state of quantum entanglement, the expected benefits of the game players are calculated based on the pre-set benefit matrix; S3. Analyze the changes in strategy choices of game players at different stages of the carbon trading mechanism, and optimize strategy management based on the changes in strategy choices to obtain the optimal management strategy.

2. The dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The step of obtaining the game strategy of the game player and obtaining the final state of the game strategy through quantum entanglement processing comprises the following steps: S11. Using the entanglement matrix to convert the game strategy of the players into a quantum entangled state; S12, applying a strategy matrix to the obtained quantum entangled state to obtain an intermediate state; S13. De-entangle the intermediate state through the anti-entanglement matrix to obtain the final state of the game strategy.

3. The dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The expression of the entanglement matrix is: In the formula, represents the entanglement matrix; i represents the imaginary unit symbol; ω represents the degree of quantum entanglement; represents the tensor product; σ x represents the Pauli-x matrix; I represents the identity matrix.

4. The dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The expression of the strategy matrix is: Where U i (μ i ,β i ) represents the strategy matrix; u i Indicates the effort of the game players; β i represents the quantum strategy of the players; i represents the symbol of the imaginary unit.

5. The dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The expression of the anti-entanglement matrix is: In the formula, represents the anti-entanglement matrix; i represents the imaginary unit symbol; ω represents the degree of quantum entanglement; I represents the unit matrix.

6. The dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The game parties include the funder, the builder and the construction party.

7. The dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system according to claim 6 is characterized in that: The de-entanglement processing of the intermediate state by the anti-entanglement matrix to obtain the final state of the game strategy includes: When the quantum strategy chosen by the sponsor is The quantum strategy chosen by the construction party and the construction party is When , the final state expression of the sponsor's game strategy is: When the quantum strategy selected by the builder is The quantum strategy chosen by the sponsor and the constructor is When , the final state expression of the builder's game strategy is: When the quantum strategy chosen by the construction party is The quantum strategy chosen by the sponsor and builder is When , the final state of the construction party's game strategy is expressed as: In the formula, |ψ fin > g 、|ψ fin > d and |ψ fin > c They represent the final states of the game strategies of the sponsor, builder and constructor respectively; represents the anti-entanglement matrix; μ g , μ d , μ c Respectively represent the efforts of the sponsor, builder and constructor; β g , β d , β c They represent the quantum strategies of the funder, builder, and constructor respectively; represents the entanglement matrix; i represents the imaginary unit symbol.

8. The dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The analysis of the changes in the strategy selection of the game players at different stages of the carbon trading mechanism, and optimizing the strategy management according to the changes in the strategy selection, to obtain the optimal management strategy includes the following steps: S31. Divide the development process of the carbon trading mechanism into different stages; S32. In different development stages of the carbon trading mechanism, use dynamic quantum game theory to analyze the quantum strategy choices of each player and the factors that affect the change of strategy choices; S33. Based on the results of dynamic analysis, the quantum strategy choices of each game player at different stages of the carbon trading mechanism are adjusted to obtain the optimal management strategy.

9. The dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system according to claim 8 is characterized in that: The development stages include an initial stage, a transition stage, a growth stage, and a mature stage.

10. The dynamic quantum game management method for low-carbon building decision-making under the carbon trading system according to claim 8 is characterized in that: The method of using dynamic quantum game theory to analyze the quantum strategy selection and the factors affecting the change of strategy selection of each player at different development stages of the carbon trading mechanism includes the following steps: S321. Obtaining the quantum strategies of each game player at different development stages of the carbon trading mechanism and the changes in the effort level of each game player; S322, using mathematical software to randomly generate different initial strategy points for each player; S323. Using dynamic quantum game theory, simulate the dynamic evolution of the efforts of each player at each development stage and obtain the evolution result; S324. Based on the evolution results, analyze and identify the factors affecting the changes in quantum strategy selection.

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