Vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method and device based on certificateless signature

Through certificate-free signing technology, anonymous identity and complete keys are generated in the Internet of Vehicles environment, the security and privacy protection of information transmission between vehicles is solved, and efficient, anonymous and traceable message authentication is achieved, which is suitable for on-board networks. need.

CN118921657AActive Publication Date: 2024-11-08WUHAN UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411173544.8
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-08-26
Publication Date
2024-11-08
Estimated Expiration
2044-08-26

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the Internet of Vehicles environment, information transmission between vehicles lacks effective security and privacy protection, which can easily lead to message forgery, identity leakage and data leakage. The existing technology has high computing and communication overhead, insufficient privacy protection and complex system.

Method used

Adopt anonymous traceability authentication method for vehicle messages based on uncertified signatures, and construct a signature algorithm through a certificate-free password system to generate anonymous identity and complete public and private keys, reduce computing and communication overhead, ensure the security and integrity of messages, and Anonymous identity traceability is performed in the key generation center.

Benefits of technology

It realizes efficient, anonymous and traceability message authentication, reduces computing overhead, protects vehicle privacy, is suitable for on-board equipment with limited resources, and simplifies system integration.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a vehicle message anonymous traceable authentication method and device based on a certificateless signature. The method comprises the following steps: generating a system main private key and system parameters based on security parameters; generating an anonymous identity of the vehicle according to the system parameters and the unique identity identifier of the vehicle; generating a complete public key and a complete private key based on the anonymous identity and system parameters of the vehicle; when information is shared among the vehicles, the vehicle serving as a signer signs a message by using the complete public key of the vehicle, the complete private key of the vehicle and the system parameters; and the vehicle as a verification party verifies the received signature and message by using the system parameters. And when a vehicle maliciously sends a false message or a wrong message to mislead other vehicles to run, the key generation center traces the unique identity of the vehicle according to the anonymous identity of the vehicle. According to the invention, the security and privacy protection capability of the Internet of Vehicles system are improved, and the operation efficiency of the whole system is also improved.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of vehicle network security technology, and in particular to a vehicle message anonymous traceability authentication method and device based on certificateless signature. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of intelligent transportation systems and connected vehicle technologies, information exchange between vehicles has become increasingly frequent and important. This information exchange not only improves road safety but also optimizes traffic flow and enhances the driving experience. However, this information exchange also raises significant security and privacy concerns.

[0003] In the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) environment, vehicles can share information such as vehicle location, speed, driving behavior, road conditions, emergency stops, and steering intentions. However, this information may contain sensitive information, including but not limited to location data, identity information, communication data, and user behavior data. If this information is not properly protected, it may lead to the following problems: (1) Message forgery and tampering: Malicious vehicles can forge or tamper with messages to mislead other vehicles and traffic systems, which may cause traffic accidents or unreasonable traffic flow; (2) Identity leakage: If the vehicle's identity information is not protected, attackers can track and identify specific vehicles, invading user privacy and causing security threats; (3) Data leakage: Data exchanged between vehicles may be intercepted and analyzed by malicious third parties, resulting in privacy leakage and data abuse.

[0004] Therefore, in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) environment, information transmission between vehicles must ensure the authenticity, integrity, and privacy of messages to prevent malicious attacks and information tampering. Current IoV security and privacy protection technologies mainly include solutions based on public key infrastructure (PKI), symmetric encryption schemes, and hybrid encryption schemes. However, these solutions have the following shortcomings: high computational and communication overhead: PKI-based solutions usually involve complex cryptographic operations and certificate management, resulting in high computational and communication overhead, which may not be efficient enough for resource-constrained in-vehicle systems; insufficient privacy protection: many existing solutions fail to effectively hide the true identity of the vehicle, making it easy for the vehicle to be tracked and identified during communication; system complexity: existing solutions usually involve multiple steps and complex operational processes, which may increase system complexity and maintenance costs. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This paper proposes a method for anonymous and traceable authentication of vehicle messages based on certificateless signatures. This method uses a certificateless cryptographic system to construct a signature algorithm, aiming to improve the security and integrity of messages during transmission. The signature does not require bilinear pairing, ensuring efficient signing and verification, including reduced computational and communication overhead.

[0006] The technical solution adopted in the present invention is as follows:

[0007] A first aspect provides a vehicle message anonymous traceability authentication method based on certificateless signature, comprising:

[0008] Generate system master private key and system parameters based on security parameters;

[0009] Generate an anonymous identity of the vehicle based on system parameters and the vehicle's unique identity;

[0010] Generate a complete public key and a complete private key based on the anonymous identity of the vehicle and system parameters;

[0011] When sharing information between vehicles, the signing vehicle signs the message using its own complete public key, its own complete private key, and system parameters;

[0012] The vehicle, acting as the verifier, verifies the received signature and message using system parameters.

[0013] In one embodiment, the method further comprises:

[0014] When a vehicle maliciously sends false or erroneous messages to mislead other vehicles, the key generation center traces the vehicle's unique identity based on the vehicle's anonymous identity.

[0015] In one embodiment, the system parameters are: sp = {G, q, P, P Pub ,H1,H2,H3,h}, where G represents the additive cyclic group on the elliptic curve of order q, q represents a large prime number, P represents a generator of G, P Pub Represents the system master public key, P Pub =msk·P, where msk represents the system master private key, H1, H2, H3, and h represent four collision-resistant hash functions, namely: H1:G→{0,1} * 、H2:{0,1} * ×G→Z q 、H3:G×{0,1} * ×{0,1} * →Z q and h:G→Z q , where → represents the mapping, {0,1} * Indicates a string of length *, Z q represents the group of integers of order q.

[0016] In one embodiment, generating a complete public key and a complete private key based on the anonymous identity of the vehicle and system parameters includes:

[0017] The vehicle inputs the anonymous identity AID and system parameters sp to generate (x, X), where x represents the secret value and X represents the part of the public key corresponding to the secret value; the vehicle uses x as the secret value and stores it secretly;

[0018] The vehicle sends the anonymous identity and the partial public key corresponding to the secret value to the key generation center. After receiving the message, the key generation center inputs the anonymous identity, the partial public key corresponding to the secret value, the system master private key and the system parameters to generate the encrypted partial private key cy and partial public key Y, and forwards it to the vehicle. The vehicle calculates Obtain the partial private key py and verify the equation py·P=Y+P Pub Check whether H2(AID,X+Y) is true to check the correctness of the partial private key py;

[0019] The vehicle inputs the secret value x, the partial private key py and the system parameter sp to generate the complete private key vsk;

[0020] The partial public key X corresponding to the vehicle input secret value, the partial public key Y generated by the key generation center and the system parameter sp generate the complete public key vpk.

[0021] In one embodiment, when sharing information between vehicles, the signing vehicle uses its own complete public key, its own complete private key, and system parameters to sign the message, including:

[0022] Vehicle V as the signatory s Enter your own complete public key vpk s , its own complete private key vsk s , message m s and timestamp t s For message m s Sign and get signature σ s ;

[0023] Vehicle V as the signatory s {vpk s ,σ s ,m s ,t s} to the vehicle V acting as the verifier v .

[0024] In one embodiment, the vehicle, as the verifier, verifies the received signature and message using system parameters, including:

[0025] Vehicle V as the verifier v First check the timestamp t s If the information is invalid, the information will be discarded; otherwise, enter {vpk s ,σ s ,m s,t s} and system parameters sp for verification.

[0026] In one embodiment, when the vehicle V serving as the verification party v When there are multiple signed messages received, batch verification is performed on the multiple signed messages received.

[0027] Based on the same inventive concept, the second aspect of the present invention provides an anonymous and traceable vehicle message authentication device based on certificateless signature, comprising:

[0028] System initialization module, used to generate system master private key and system parameters based on security parameters;

[0029] An anonymous identity generation module, used to generate an anonymous identity of the vehicle based on system parameters and the vehicle's unique identity identifier;

[0030] A key generation module for generating a complete public key and a complete private key based on the anonymous identity of the vehicle and system parameters;

[0031] The message signing module is used when vehicles share information with each other. The vehicle as the signatory uses its own complete public key, its own complete private key and system parameters to sign the message.

[0032] The verification module is used for the vehicle as the verifier to verify the received signature and message using system parameters.

[0033] Based on the same inventive concept, the third aspect of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored. When the program is executed by a processor, the anonymous traceable authentication method for vehicle messages based on certificateless signature described in the first aspect is implemented.

[0034] Based on the same inventive concept, the fourth aspect of the present invention provides a computer device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and run on the processor. When the processor executes the program, the anonymous traceable authentication method for vehicle messages based on certificateless signatures described in the first aspect is implemented.

[0035] Compared with the prior art, the advantages and beneficial technical effects of the present invention are as follows:

[0036] (1) Efficiency: Without using bilinear pairing operations, the signing and verification processes are more efficient and suitable for real-time communication needs in vehicle networks; (2) Anonymity: Ensure the anonymity of vehicle messages, protect the privacy of vehicle owners, and prevent unauthorized tracking and monitoring; (3) Traceability: Allow authorized agencies to trace vehicle messages when necessary, find out the true source of the messages, and ensure the traceability of security and responsibility; (4) Partial key transmission security: The partial keys generated by the key generation center KGC are encrypted, and no one except the receiver can decrypt the partial private keys, ensuring the security of partial private key transmission; (5) Reduced computational overhead: Avoiding the computationally complex bilinear pairing operation, greatly reducing the computational overhead of the system, and suitable for vehicle-mounted devices with limited resources; (6) Simple implementation: Since it does not involve complex bilinear pairing operations, the method is simpler to implement and easy to integrate into existing vehicle systems; (7) Short signature length: The generated signature length is short, saving storage space and transmission bandwidth, improving communication efficiency. The short signature length and efficient calculation process reduce the bandwidth demand during the communication process, and are suitable for efficient data transmission in vehicle networks.

[0037] Through these advantages, the present invention can provide an efficient, secure and flexible authentication method while ensuring the anonymity and traceability of vehicle messages, and is suitable for message authentication application scenarios in mobile vehicle networks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0038] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.

[0039] Figure 1 The overall model diagram of the anonymous and traceable vehicle message authentication method based on certificateless signature provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 2 Flowchart of a method for anonymous traceable authentication of vehicle messages based on certificateless signature in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0041] Figure 3 This is a framework diagram of an anonymous traceable authentication device for vehicle messages based on certificateless signatures in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0042] Certificateless cryptography is a well-researched and widely used cryptographic technology that effectively eliminates the reliance on certificates in traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) systems, significantly reducing system complexity and maintenance costs. Compared to identity-based cryptography (IBC), certificateless cryptography uses public and private keys generated jointly by the user and a key generation center (KGC), thus avoiding the key escrow issues common in IBC.

[0043] Based on this, the present invention proposes an anonymous and traceable vehicle message authentication method based on certificateless signature technology, which meets the requirements of the Internet of Vehicles system for message authentication efficiency, privacy protection and security.

[0044] This invention designs a method for anonymous and traceable authentication of vehicle messages based on certificateless signatures. Its primary application is message authentication in connected vehicle systems, including but not limited to scenarios where a vehicle notifies following vehicles of emergency stops, steering intentions, acceleration, or deceleration. This method incorporates technologies such as cryptography, certificateless signatures, and anonymity mechanisms. First, this method utilizes a certificateless cryptographic system to design an efficient signature algorithm that eliminates bilinear pairing operations, significantly reducing computational and communication overhead. Second, the system incorporates an anonymity mechanism to protect the vehicle's true identity while providing traceability. To further enhance security, this method incorporates encryption during the process of generating a portion of the private key for the user by the Key Generation Center (KGC), ensuring the security of the private key during transmission. Finally, this method is applied to connected vehicle message authentication, ensuring the verifiability of the message source and the integrity of the message content. This patented method comprises six steps and ten algorithms. Through this series of optimizations, the invention not only enhances the security and privacy protection capabilities of connected vehicle systems but also improves the overall system efficiency.

[0045] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention more clear, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts shall fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0046] Example 1

[0047] The present invention discloses a vehicle message anonymous traceability authentication method based on certificateless signature, the method comprising:

[0048] S1: Generates the system master private key and system parameters based on security parameters;

[0049] S2: Generate an anonymous identity of the vehicle based on system parameters and the vehicle’s unique identity;

[0050] S3: Generates a complete public key and a complete private key based on the vehicle's anonymous identity and system parameters;

[0051] S4: When sharing information between vehicles, the vehicle acting as the signer signs the message using its own complete public key, its own complete private key, and system parameters;

[0052] S5: The vehicle, acting as the verifier, verifies the received signature and message using the system parameters.

[0053] See Figure 1 , which is the overall model diagram of the vehicle message anonymous traceability authentication method based on certificateless signature provided by the embodiment of the present invention. The participants include the key generation center KGC, the vehicle V i and V j , the main operations of each party are as follows Figure 1 shown.

[0054] Specifically, S1 performs system initialization, generating the system master private key and system parameters. S2 generates anonymous identities. S3 performs key generation, generating the vehicle's key (complete public and private keys). S4 performs message signing, ensuring the authenticity and integrity of the message source. S5 verifies the signature.

[0055] In one embodiment, the method further comprises S6:

[0056] When a vehicle maliciously sends false or erroneous messages to mislead other vehicles, the key generation center traces the vehicle's unique identity based on the vehicle's anonymous identity.

[0057] Specifically, step S6 mainly performs anonymous identity tracing.

[0058] The specific implementation of each step of the present invention is described in detail below.

[0059] Step S1 can be implemented in the following ways:

[0060] KGC inputs security parameter λ, calls the system initialization algorithm (msk, sp)←Setup(λ), the algorithm returns (msk, sp), KGC uses msk as the system master key and keeps it secret, and discloses the system parameter sp. Note: sp={G,q,P,P Pub ,H1,H2,H3,h}, where G represents the additive cyclic group on the elliptic curve of order q, q represents a large prime number, P represents a generator of G, P Pub=msk·P represents the system master public key, H1, H2, H3, and h represent four collision-resistant hash functions, namely: H1:G→{0,1} * 、H2:{0,1} * ×G→Z q 、H3:G×{0,1} * ×{0,1} * →Z q and h:G→Z q , where → represents the mapping, {0,1} * Indicates the length is * String, Z q represents the group of integers of order q.

[0061] In the specific implementation process, step S2 can be achieved by the following methods:

[0062] The vehicle inputs the unique identity ID and system parameter sp to call the anonymous identity generation algorithm (AID)←AnonGen(ID,sp). The algorithm returns AID, and the vehicle uses AID as its anonymous identity to protect the vehicle's identity privacy.

[0063] In the specific implementation process, step S3 can be achieved by the following methods:

[0064] Step 3.1: The vehicle inputs the anonymous identity AID and system parameters sp and calls the secret value generation algorithm (x, X)←SetSecValne(AID, sp). The algorithm returns (x, X). The vehicle uses x as the secret value and saves it secretly.

[0065] Step 3.2: The vehicle sends the anonymous identity AID and the partial public key X corresponding to the secret value to KGC. After receiving the message, KGC inputs the anonymous identity AID, the partial public key X corresponding to the secret value, the system master key msk and the system parameter sp to call the partial key generation algorithm (cy, Y) ← PartialSecKeyGen (AID, X, msk, sp). The algorithm returns (cy, Y). KGC forwards the encrypted partial private key cy and partial public key Y to the vehicle. At this point, the vehicle can calculate Obtain part of the private key and then verify the equation py·P=Y+P Pub Check whether H2(AID,X+Y) is true to check the correctness of the partial private key py. If the equation is true, it means that the partial private key py is correct, otherwise it is wrong;

[0066] Step 3.3: The vehicle inputs the secret value x, the partial private key py, and the system parameter sp and calls the private key generation algorithm (vsk)←SetSecKey(x,cy,sp). The algorithm returns vsk, and the vehicle uses vsk as the complete private key.

[0067] Step 3.4: The vehicle inputs the partial public key X corresponding to the secret value, the partial public key Y generated by KGC, and the system parameter sp and calls the public key generation algorithm (vpk)←SetPubKey(X,Y,sp). The algorithm returns vpk, and the vehicle uses vpk as the complete public key.

[0068] In the specific implementation process, step S4 can be achieved by the following methods:

[0069] V s Enter the public key vpk s 、Private key vsk s , message m s and timestamp t s Call the signature algorithm (σ s )←Sign(vpk s ,vsk s ,m s ,t s ,sp), the algorithm returns the signature σ s , V s Send {vpk s ,σ s ,m s ,t s} to the verification party V v .

[0070] In the specific implementation process, step S5 can be achieved by the following methods:

[0071] Single message verification: Received message {vpk s ,σ s ,m s ,t s}, to ensure the timeliness and freshness of the message, the verification party V v First check the timestamp t s If the information is invalid, the information is discarded; otherwise, the verification party V v Enter {vpk s ,σ s ,m s ,t s} and system parameter sp call verification algorithm 1or0←Verify(vpk s ,σ s ,m s ,t s ,sp), if the algorithm returns a value of “1”, it means the verification is successful, otherwise the verification fails.

[0072] When verifying multiple messages, batch verification can be performed to reduce computational overhead. To ensure the timeliness and freshness of messages, first, the receiver checks the validity of each message's timestamp and discards invalid messages based on the validity of the timestamp. Second, the receiver enters the message set {[vpk k ,σ k ,m k ,t k ]|k=1,2,…,n} and system parameter sp, call the batch verification algorithm 1or0←BatchVerify({[vpk1,σ1,m1,t1]...[vpk n ,σ n ,m n ,t n ]},sp), if the algorithm returns a value of "1", it means that the batch verification is successful, otherwise the batch verification fails.

[0073] In the specific implementation process, step S6 can be achieved by the following methods:

[0074] When a vehicle maliciously sends false or misleading messages to other vehicles, KGC can trace the vehicle's anonymous identity (AID) back to its true unique ID. The steps are as follows: KGC inputs the malicious vehicle's anonymous identity (AID), the system's master public key (msk), D, and the system parameter (sp), and calls the anonymous identity tracing algorithm (ID←AnonTrace(AID,msk,D,sp). The algorithm returns the true unique ID corresponding to the AID.

[0075] Figure 2 The flowchart of the anonymous traceable authentication method for vehicle messages based on certificateless signatures in an embodiment of the present invention is as follows. The method includes six steps, and the algorithms involved and their functions are described in detail as follows:

[0076] 1. The system initialization algorithm is used to generate the system master private key msk and system parameters sp. During system initialization, the key generation center KGC inputs the security parameter λ and calls the system initialization algorithm (msk, sp)←Setup(λ). The algorithm calculates and returns the system master public key and system parameters. KGC secretly stores the system master key and discloses the system parameters. The specific implementation of the system initialization algorithm is as follows: The algorithm takes the security parameter λ as input. After receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm generates two large prime numbers p and q, and satisfies p|q-1; secondly, define G as the additive cyclic group on the q-order elliptic curve, and P is a generator of G; then, select 4 collision-resistant hash functions: H1:G→{0,1} * 、H2:{0,1} * ×G→Z q 、H3:G×{0,1} *×{0,1} * →Z q and h:G→Z q , where → represents a mapping, {0,1} * Indicates a string of length *, Z q represents an integer group of order q, with the set of group elements being {0,1,...,q-1}; again, select a random number msk∈Z q , calculate P Pub =msk·P as the system master public key, sp={G,q,P,P Pub ,H1,H2,H3,h}; Finally, output (msk,sp) as the algorithm return value, where msk is the system master private key and sp represents the system parameters;

[0077] 2. The anonymous identity generation algorithm is used to generate vehicle anonymity to protect the vehicle's identity privacy. When generating an anonymous identity, the vehicle inputs its unique identifier and system parameters to call the anonymous identity generation algorithm (AID)←AnonGen(ID,sp). The algorithm calculates and returns the anonymous identity. The specific implementation of the anonymous identity generation algorithm is as follows: The algorithm takes the unique identifier ID and the system parameter sp as input. After receiving the parameters, the algorithm first generates a random number d∈Z q , calculate D = dP, D is the intermediate variable for generating the anonymous identity AID; then, calculate Finally, the AID is output as the algorithm return value, where AID is the anonymous identity of the ID as a unique identifier.

[0078] 3. The secret value generation algorithm is used to generate the vehicle's secret value and its corresponding partial public key. When generating the secret value, the vehicle inputs its anonymous identity and system parameters, and calls the secret value generation algorithm (x, X) ← SetSecValne (AID, sp). The algorithm calculates and returns the secret value and its corresponding partial public key. The specific description of the secret value generation algorithm is as follows: The algorithm takes the anonymous identity AID and the system parameter sp as input. After receiving the parameters, the algorithm first generates a random number x∈Z q ; Then calculate X = xP; Finally, output (x, X) as the algorithm return value, where x represents the secret value and X represents the partial public key corresponding to the secret value x.

[0079] 4. The partial key generation algorithm is used to generate partial public keys and private keys of the vehicle. When obtaining partial keys, the vehicle sends the anonymous identity, the partial private key corresponding to the secret value, and the system parameters to KGC to obtain the partial public key and partial private key. After receiving the message, KGC inputs the anonymous identity, the partial public key corresponding to the secret value, the system master key and the system parameters, and calls the partial key generation algorithm (cy, Y)←PartialSecKeyGen(AID, X, msk, sp). The algorithm calculates and returns the encrypted partial private key cy and partial public key Y. The specific description of the partial key generation algorithm is as follows: The algorithm takes the anonymous identity AID, the partial public key X corresponding to the secret value, the system master private key msk and the system parameter sp as input. After receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm generates a random number y∈Z; secondly, calculates Y=yP and py=y+msk·H2(AID,X+Y)mod q; then, the encrypted partial private key is obtained. Finally, (cy, Y) is output as the algorithm return value, where cy represents the encrypted partial private key, which ensures the security of the transmission of the partial private key, and Y represents the partial public key generated by KGC.

[0080] 5. The private key generation algorithm is used to generate the complete private key of the vehicle. When generating the complete private key, the vehicle inputs its secret value, the encrypted partial private key and the system parameters, and calls the private key generation algorithm (vsk)←SetSecKey(x,cy,sp). The algorithm calculates and returns the complete private key of the vehicle. The specific description of the private key generation algorithm is as follows: The algorithm takes the secret value x, the encrypted partial private key cy and the system parameter sp as input. After receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm calculates Get the partial private key py; then calculate vsk = (x + py) mod q; finally, output vsk as the algorithm return value, where vsk represents the user's complete private key;

[0081] 6. The public key generation algorithm is used to generate the complete public key of the vehicle. When generating the complete public key, the vehicle inputs the partial public key corresponding to the secret value, the partial public key generated by KGC, and the system parameters, and calls the public key generation algorithm (vpk)←SetPubKey(X,Y,sp). The algorithm calculates and returns the complete public key of the vehicle. The specific description of the public key generation algorithm is as follows: The algorithm takes the partial public key X corresponding to the secret value, the partial public key Y generated by KGC, and the system parameter sp as input. After receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm calculates vpk=X+Y; then, it outputs vsk as the algorithm return value, where vpk represents the user's complete public key;

[0082] 7. The message signature algorithm is used by the vehicle to sign the message. When signing the message, the vehicle inputs the signer's public key, signer's private key, message, timestamp and system parameters, calls the message signature algorithm (σ)←Sign(vpk,vsk,m,t,sp), and the algorithm calculates and returns the signature. The specific description of the message signature algorithm is as follows: The algorithm takes the signer's public key vpk, the signer's private key vsk, the message m, the timestamp t and the system parameter sp as input. After receiving the parameters, the algorithm first generates a random number r∈Z q , calculate R = rP (R is an intermediate variable); then, calculate σ = vsk + rH3 (vpk, m, t) mod q; finally, output σ as the algorithm return value, where σ represents the signer's signature on the message m.

[0083] 8. The verification algorithm is used to verify the correctness of the signature and the integrity of the message. When verifying the signature, the vehicle inputs the signature, message, timestamp, and system parameters, and calls the verification algorithm 1or0←Verify(vpk,σ,m,t,sp). The algorithm calculates and returns the result of verification success or failure. The specific description of the verification algorithm is as follows: The algorithm takes the signature σ, message m, timestamp t, and system parameter sp as input. After receiving the parameters, the algorithm first calculates α=H2(AID,vpk) and β=H3(vpk,m,t), and then verifies the equation σP=vpk+αP Pub +βR is true. If the equation is true, "1" is output as the algorithm return value. If the equation is not true, "0" is output as the algorithm return value, where "1" indicates successful verification and "0" indicates failed verification. α and β represent hash values, which are used to replace cumbersome long string formulas and are intermediate variables. R is also an intermediate variable.

[0084] 9. The batch verification algorithm is used to batch verify the correctness of multiple signatures and the integrity of their messages. When performing batch verification, the vehicle inputs the signature, message, timestamp set and system parameters, and calls the batch verification algorithm 1or0←BatchVerify({[vpk1,σ1,m1,t1]...[vpk n ,σ n ,m n ,t n ]},sp), the algorithm calculates and returns the result of verification success or failure. The specific description of the batch verification algorithm is as follows: The algorithm is based on the set {[vpk k ,σ k ,m k ,t k ]|k=1,2,...,n} and system parameter sp as input. After receiving the message, first, the algorithm calculates the set Then, verify the equation If the equation is true, the algorithm returns "1" as the return value. If the equation is false, the algorithm returns "0" as the return value. "1" indicates that the batch verification is successful, and "0" indicates that the batch verification fails. k represents the subscript of the elements in the set, from 1 to n, and n represents the total number of messages received at one time (for batch verification). They are all symbols involved in the accumulation. α k , β k Represents the hash value calculated during the batch verification process, which is used to replace the cumbersome long string formula and is an intermediate variable. k It is also an intermediate variable.

[0085] 10. The anonymous identity tracing algorithm is used to trace the real unique identifier of the vehicle. When performing the anonymous identity tracing algorithm, KGC inputs the anonymous identity, the system master private key and the system parameters, and calls the anonymous identity tracing algorithm ID←AnonTrace(AID,msk,D,sp). The algorithm calculates and returns the unique identifier of the vehicle. The specific description of anonymous identity tracing is as follows: The algorithm takes the anonymous identity AID, the system master public key msk, D and the system parameter sp as input. After receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm calculates Then, output the ID as the algorithm return value.

[0086] The method of the present invention is described below with reference to specific examples.

[0087] This embodiment provides a certificateless anonymous and traceable vehicle message authentication method, which mainly includes six steps: system initialization, anonymous identity generation, key generation, message signing, signature verification, and anonymous identity tracing. The description of each step is as follows:

[0088] Step 1: Mainly perform system initialization. KGC inputs the security parameter λ and calls the system initialization algorithm (msk, sp)←Setup(λ). After receiving the parameters, the algorithm first generates two large prime numbers p and q, and satisfies p|q-1; secondly, define G as the additive cyclic group on the q-order elliptic curve, and P is a generator of G; then, select four collision-resistant hash functions: H1:G→{0,1} * 、H2:{0,1} * ×G→Z q 、H3:G×{0,1} * ×{0,1} * →Z q and h:G→Z q , where → represents a mapping, {0,1} * Indicates a string of length *, Z q represents an integer group of order q, with the set of group elements being {0,1,...,q-1}; again, select a random number msk∈Zq , calculate P Pub =msk·P,sp={G,q,P,P Pub ,H1,H2,H3,h}; Finally, output (msk,sp) as the algorithm return value, where msk is the system master private key and sp represents the system parameters;

[0089] Step 2: Mainly generate anonymous identity, vehicle V i Enter a unique ID i and system parameters sp to call the anonymous identity generation algorithm (AID i )←AnonGen(ID i ,sp), after receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm generates a random number d i ∈Z q , calculate D i =d i P; then, calculate Finally, output the AID i As the algorithm return value, the vehicle V i AID i As an anonymous identity. Note: With vehicle V i For example, the following V i Both refer to the same vehicle, V j For another vehicle.

[0090] Step 3: Mainly for key generation, divided into 4 sub-steps:

[0091] Step 3.1: Vehicle V i Enter anonymous identity AID i and system parameters sp to call the secret value generation algorithm (x i ,X i )←SetSecValne(AID i ,sp), after receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm generates a random number x i ∈Z q ; Then calculate X i =x i P; Finally, output (x i ,X i ) as the algorithm return value, vehicle V i x i as a secret value and kept secret.

[0092] Step 3.2: Vehicle V i Send anonymous identity AID i and X i To KGC, after receiving the message, KGC enters AID i 、X i, msk and system parameters sp call partial key generation algorithm (cy i ,Y i )←PartialSecKeyGen(AID i ,X i ,msk,sp), after receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm generates a random number y i ∈Z q ; Secondly, calculate Y i =y i P and py i =y i +msk·H2(AID i ,X i +Y i )modq; Then, encrypt the private key to get Finally, the output (cy i ,Y i ) as the algorithm return value, where cy i Indicates the encrypted part of the private key, Y i Represents the partial public key generated by KGC. Finally, KGC will (cy i ,Y i ) forwarded to vehicle V i At this time, the vehicle V i Can be calculated To verify the equation py i P = Y i +P Pub H2(AID i ,X i +Y i ) is established to verify the partial private key py i If the equation is true, it means the key is correct, otherwise the private key is wrong;

[0093] Step 3.3: Vehicle V i Enter the secret value x i , encrypted part of the private key cy i and system parameters sp call private key generation algorithm (vsk i )←SetSecKey(x i ,cy i ,sp), after receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm calculates Get part of the private key py i ; Then calculate vsk i =(x i +py i )modq; Finally, output vsk i As the algorithm return value, the vehicle V i vsk iAs a full private key;

[0094] Step 3.4: The vehicle inputs the partial public key X corresponding to the secret value i , Partial public key Y generated by KGC i And the system parameter sp calls the public key generation algorithm (vpk i )←SetPubKey(X i ,Y i ,sp), after receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm calculates vpk i =X i +Y i ; Then, output vsk i As the algorithm return value, the vehicle V i vpk i As a complete public key.

[0095] Step 4: Sign the message to ensure the reliability of the message source and the integrity of the message. i To other vehicles V j When sharing information, you need to use a private key to digitally sign the message. The specific steps are as follows: Vehicle V i Enter the public key vpk i 、Private key vsk i , message m i and timestamp t i Call the signature algorithm (σ i )←Sign(vpk i ,vsk i ,m i ,t i ,sp), after receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm generates a random number r i ∈Z q , calculate R i =r i P; then, calculate σ i =vsk i +r i H3(vpk i ,m i ,t i )modq; Finally, output σ i As the algorithm return value, the vehicle V i σ i As a response to the message m i Signature of vehicle V i Send message {vpk i ,σ i ,m i ,t i} Give the adjacent vehicle V j .

[0096] Step 5: Mainly perform signature verification, including single message verification and multi-message verification, as follows:

[0097] a) Single message verification: Receive the message {vpk i ,σ i ,m i ,t i}, in order to ensure the timeliness and freshness of the news, the vehicle V j First check the timestamp t i If the information is invalid, the information is discarded; otherwise, the vehicle V j Enter {vpk i ,σ i ,m i ,t i} and system parameter sp call verification algorithm 1or 0←Verify(vpk i ,σ i ,m i ,t i ,sp), after receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm calculates α i =H2(AID i ,vpk i ) and β i =H3(vpk i ,m i ,t i ), then, verify the equation σ i P=vpk i +α i P Pub +β i If the equation is true, the algorithm returns "1"; if not, the algorithm returns "0." If the algorithm returns "1," verification is successful; otherwise, verification fails.

[0098] b) Multi-message verification: This method also supports multi-message verification (also called batch verification), that is, the receiver receives multiple messages and can verify these messages in batches to reduce computational overhead. To ensure the timeliness and freshness of the messages, first, the receiver checks the validity of the timestamp of each message and discards invalid messages based on the validity of the timestamp; second, the receiver inputs the message set {[vpk k ,σ k ,m k ,t k ]|k=1,2,...,n} and system parameter sp, call the batch verification algorithm 1or0←BatchVerify({[vpk1,σ1,m1,t1]...[vpk n ,σ n ,mn ,t n ]},sp), after receiving the message, first, the algorithm calculates the set Then verify the equation If the equation is true, the algorithm returns "1" as the return value. If the equation is false, the algorithm returns "0" as the return value. If the algorithm returns "1", the batch verification is successful. Otherwise, the batch verification fails.

[0099] Step 6: Mainly for anonymous identity tracing. When a vehicle maliciously sends false messages or misleads other vehicles, KGC can use the vehicle’s anonymous identity AID to i Trace back to the real unique ID i The steps are as follows: KGC inputs the anonymous identity AID of the malicious vehicle i , system master public key msk, D i and system parameter sp to call anonymous tracing algorithm ID i ←AnonTrace(AID i ,msk,D i ,sp), after receiving the parameters, first, the algorithm calculates The algorithm then returns the AID i The corresponding real unique identification ID i .

[0100] In summary, the present invention has designed an anonymous and traceable authentication method for vehicle messages based on certificateless signatures. By introducing an efficient signature algorithm, an anonymous mechanism, and an enhanced key generation process, this method achieves high efficiency, security, and privacy protection for message authentication in the connected vehicle system. This method significantly reduces computational and communication overhead, protects the true identity of the vehicle, and provides traceability, ensuring the verifiability of the message source and the integrity of the message content. The method and system of the present invention can be widely used in scenarios including, but not limited to, notifying following vehicles of vehicle emergency stops, steering intentions, acceleration and deceleration, and so on.

[0101] Example 2

[0102] Based on the same inventive concept, this embodiment discloses an anonymous and traceable vehicle message authentication device based on certificateless signature, comprising:

[0103] System initialization module, used to generate system master private key and system parameters based on security parameters;

[0104] An anonymous identity generation module, used to generate an anonymous identity of the vehicle based on system parameters and the vehicle's unique identity identifier;

[0105] A key generation module for generating a complete public key and a complete private key based on the anonymous identity of the vehicle and system parameters;

[0106] The message signing module is used when vehicles share information with each other. The vehicle as the signatory uses its own complete public key, its own complete private key and system parameters to sign the message.

[0107] The verification module is used for the vehicle as the verifier to verify the received signature and message using system parameters.

[0108] The anonymous identity tracing module is used to trace the unique identity of a vehicle based on its anonymous identity when a vehicle maliciously sends false messages or false messages to mislead other vehicles.

[0109] See Figure 3 The system initialization module is implemented through the system initialization algorithm, the anonymous identity generation module is implemented through the anonymous identity generation algorithm, the key generation module includes the secret value generation algorithm, the partial key generation algorithm, the private key generation algorithm and the public key generation algorithm, the message signature module is implemented through the signature algorithm, the signature verification module includes the single message verification algorithm and the batch verification algorithm, and the anonymous identity tracing module is implemented through the anonymous identity tracing algorithm.

[0110] Since the device described in Example 2 of the present invention is used to implement the anonymous and traceable vehicle message authentication method based on certificateless signatures in Example 1 of the present invention, the specific structure and variations of the device are readily apparent to those skilled in the art based on the method described in Example 1 of the present invention, and thus will not be further described here. All devices used in the method of Example 1 of the present invention fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0111] Example 3

[0112] Based on the same inventive concept, the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored. When the program is executed by a processor, the method described in the first embodiment is implemented.

[0113] Since the computer-readable storage medium described in the third embodiment of the present invention is used to implement the anonymous and traceable vehicle message authentication method based on certificateless signatures in the first embodiment of the present invention, the specific structure and variations of the computer-readable storage medium are readily understood by those skilled in the art based on the method described in the first embodiment of the present invention, and thus will not be further described here. All computer-readable storage media used in the method of the first embodiment of the present invention fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0114] Example 4

[0115] The present invention also provides a computer device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the method described in the first embodiment when executing the program.

[0116] Since the computer device described in Example 4 of the present invention is the computer device used to implement the anonymous and traceable vehicle message authentication method based on certificateless signatures in Example 1 of the present invention, the specific structure and variations of the computer device are readily understood by those skilled in the art based on the method described in Example 1 of the present invention, and thus will not be further described here. All computer devices used in the method of Example 1 of the present invention fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0117] It will be understood by those skilled in the art that embodiments of the present invention may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Thus, the present invention may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Furthermore, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to magnetic disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0118] The present invention is described with reference to flowcharts and / or block diagrams of methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that each process and / or block in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams, as well as combinations of processes and / or blocks in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams. Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.

[0119] Although preferred embodiments of the present invention have been described, those skilled in the art may make additional changes and modifications to these embodiments once they are aware of the basic inventive concepts. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including the preferred embodiments and all changes and modifications that fall within the scope of the present invention. Obviously, those skilled in the art may make various changes and modifications to the embodiments of the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the embodiments of the present invention. Thus, the present invention is intended to include such changes and modifications to the embodiments of the present invention if they fall within the scope of the claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A vehicle message anonymous traceability authentication method based on certificateless signature, characterized in that: include: Generate system master private key and system parameters based on security parameters; Generate an anonymous identity of the vehicle based on system parameters and the vehicle's unique identity; Generate a complete public key and a complete private key based on the anonymous identity of the vehicle and system parameters; When sharing information between vehicles, the vehicle acting as the signer signs the message using its own complete public key, its own complete private key, and system parameters; The vehicle, acting as the verifier, verifies the received signature and message using the system parameters.

2. The anonymous and traceable vehicle message authentication method based on certificateless signature as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The method further comprises: When a vehicle maliciously sends false or erroneous messages to mislead other vehicles, the key generation center traces the unique identity of the vehicle based on the anonymous identity of the vehicle.

3. The anonymous traceability authentication method for vehicle messages based on certificateless signature as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The system parameters are: sp = {G, q, P, P Pub ,H1,H2,H3,h}, where G represents the additive cyclic group on the q-order elliptic curve, q represents a large prime number, P represents a generator of G, and P Pub Represents the system master public key, P Pub =msk·P, msk represents the system master private key, H1, H2, H3, h represent four collision-resistant hash functions, namely: H1:G→{0,1} * 、H2:{0,1} * ×G→Z q 、H3:G×{0,1} * ×{0,1} * →Z q and h:G→Z q , where → represents the mapping, {0,1} * Represents a string of length *, Z q represents the group of integers of order q.

4. The anonymous traceability authentication method for vehicle messages based on certificateless signature as claimed in claim 3 is characterized in that: Based on the anonymous identity of the vehicle and system parameters, a full public key and a full private key are generated, including: The vehicle inputs the anonymous identity AID and the system parameter sp to generate (x,X), where x represents the secret value and X represents the partial public key corresponding to the secret value; the vehicle takes x as the secret value and saves it secretly; The vehicle sends the anonymous identity and the partial public key corresponding to the secret value to the key generation center. After receiving the message, the key generation center inputs the anonymous identity, the partial public key corresponding to the secret value, the system master private key and the system parameters to generate the encrypted partial private key cy and partial public key Y, and forwards it to the vehicle. The vehicle calculates py=cy⊕h(x·P Pub ) obtains the partial private key py and verifies the equation py·P=Y+P Pub Whether H2(AID,X+Y) holds true is used to check the correctness of the partial private key py; The vehicle inputs the secret value x, the partial private key py and the system parameter sp to generate the complete private key vsk; The partial public key X corresponding to the vehicle input secret value, the partial public key Y generated by the key generation center and the system parameter sp generate the complete public key vpk.

5. The anonymous traceability authentication method for vehicle messages based on certificateless signature as claimed in claim 3, characterized in that: When sharing information between vehicles, the signing vehicle signs the message using its own complete public key, its own complete private key, and system parameters, including: Vehicle V as the signatory s Enter your own complete public key vpk s , its own complete private key vsk s 、Message s and timestamp t s For message m s Sign and get signature σ s ; Vehicle V as the signatory s {vpk s ,σ s ,m s ,t s } to the vehicle V acting as the verifier v .

6. The anonymous traceability authentication method for vehicle messages based on certificateless signature as claimed in claim 5, characterized in that: The vehicle, as the verifier, verifies the received signature and message using system parameters, including: Vehicle V as the verifier v First check the timestamp t s If the information is invalid, the information is discarded; otherwise, enter {vpk s ,σ s ,m s ,t s } and system parameters sp for verification.

7. The anonymous traceability authentication method for vehicle messages based on certificateless signature as claimed in claim 6, characterized in that: When the vehicle V v When there are multiple signed messages received, batch verification is performed on the multiple signed messages received.

8. A vehicle message anonymous traceability authentication device based on certificateless signature, characterized in that: include: A system initialization module, used to generate a system master private key and system parameters based on security parameters; An anonymous identity generation module, used to generate an anonymous identity of the vehicle based on system parameters and a unique identity identifier of the vehicle; A key generation module for generating a complete public key and a complete private key based on the anonymous identity of the vehicle and system parameters; The message signing module is used when vehicles share information with each other. The vehicle as the signatory uses its own complete public key, its own complete private key and system parameters to sign the message. The verification module is used for the vehicle as the verification party to verify the received signature and message using the system parameters.

9. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the program is executed by a processor, the anonymous traceability authentication method for vehicle messages based on certificateless signature as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.

10. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that: When the processor executes the program, the anonymous traceability authentication method for vehicle messages based on certificateless signature is implemented as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

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