Threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network

The threshold key management system, built using a dynamic multi-node network and homomorphic encryption algorithm, solves the problem of traditional key management systems struggling to manage and control keys in a distributed environment. It enables distributed generation and recovery of SM2 keys, improves the robustness and scalability of the system, and meets the security and scalability requirements of distributed systems.

CN118972043APending Publication Date: 2024-11-15SHANGHAI ELECTRONIC CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY CENT CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410965264.4
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-17
Publication Date
2024-11-15

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Traditional key management systems struggle to effectively manage and control key distribution, updates, and access in distributed environments, and are susceptible to single points of failure and network latency, failing to meet the security and scalability requirements of distributed systems.

Method used

A threshold key management system based on a dynamic multi-node network is adopted. The dynamic node management protocol is configured through the back-end management platform to realize the dynamic addition, deletion and synchronous update of nodes. Each node generates and stores SM2 key components. Data sharing is carried out using Lagrange interpolation and verifiable secret sharing technology. Trust relationships are built by combining homomorphic encryption algorithm and zero-knowledge proof algorithm to generate threshold key master public key.

Benefits of technology

It realizes the distributed generation, storage and recovery of SM2 keys, enhances the robustness and scalability of the system, and can still ensure the normal use of keys when some key components are damaged or leaked, thus meeting the security and scalability requirements of distributed systems.

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Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of information security, in particular to a threshold key management system based on a dynamic multi-node network. The threshold key management system comprises a post-management platform and a dynamic multi-node network: the post-management platform configures a dynamic node management protocol and realizes dynamic node addition, deletion and synchronous update of the dynamic multi-node network; each node in the dynamic multi-node network generates and stores an SM2 key component, performs data sharing and exchange based on a verifiable secret sharing technology, and generates a main public key of a threshold key; and the dynamic multi-node network adopts a homomorphic encryption algorithm to execute a multiplication-to-addition conversion protocol to carry out data sharing and exchange. According to the invention, the nodes can be dynamically added and deleted, the robustness, security and expansibility of the system are improved, the distributed generation, storage, use and recovery functions of the SM2 key can be realized, the normal use of the key can be ensured by only needing T nodes, and the application scene of the SM2 key is greatly expanded.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of information security technology, and more specifically, to a threshold key management system based on a dynamic multi-node network supporting distributed threshold cryptography. Background Art

[0002] In the current complex information technology environment, enterprises are facing an urgent need to continuously improve data security. Traditional key management systems are difficult to meet the key requirements of distributed systems due to their centralized design architecture. The architecture and design of centralized key management systems are based on centralized management methods, which makes it difficult to effectively manage and control the distribution, update and access of keys in a distributed environment, and may face problems such as network delays and single point failures. As a result, the scalability and flexibility of the system are limited, and it is unable to effectively deal with the problems of large-scale data storage and multi-cloud environments.

[0003] Traditional key management systems are unable to cope with the growing security requirements and the popularity of distributed systems. In a distributed environment, a single key management entity may become an attack target, threatening the security of the entire system. Therefore, the threshold key management system has emerged as a safer and more reliable key management solution. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a threshold key management system based on a dynamic multi-node network, so as to solve the problem that it is difficult to implement secure threshold key management for a dynamic multi-node network in the prior art.

[0005] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides a threshold key management system based on a dynamic multi-node network, comprising a back-end management platform and a dynamic multi-node network:

[0006] The backend management platform is configured with a dynamic node management protocol to realize dynamic addition and deletion of nodes and synchronous update of dynamic multi-node networks;

[0007] Each node in the dynamic multi-node network generates and stores SM2 key components respectively, constructs a polynomial based on Lagrange interpolation method, hides the SM2 key components, and then shares and exchanges data with other nodes based on verifiable secret sharing technology to generate a threshold key master public key;

[0008] Among them, the dynamic multi-node network adopts a homomorphic encryption algorithm to execute a multiplication-to-addition conversion protocol for data sharing and exchange.

[0009] In some embodiments, more than a threshold value T of nodes in the dynamic multi-node network participate in implementing the SM2 threshold signature.

[0010] In some embodiments, the dynamic multi-node network uses a zero-knowledge proof algorithm to build a trust relationship between nodes.

[0011] In some embodiments, the dynamic node management protocol configured by the backend management platform includes a node online function;

[0012] The dynamic multi-node network implements the node online function in the following ways:

[0013] Step S111: Go online and load the dynamic node management protocol to obtain the backend management platform interface information;

[0014] Step S112: the online node sends an online request to the backend management platform;

[0015] Step S113: the backend management platform performs verification after receiving the online request of the online node;

[0016] Step S114: If the verification is passed, the backend management platform generates a node identifier for the online node and issues an online permission;

[0017] Step S115: the backend management platform broadcasts the online permission in the dynamic multi-node network;

[0018] Step S116: After receiving the online permission, the online node of the dynamic multi-node network verifies the online node;

[0019] Step S117: If the verification is passed, the online node stores or changes the online node information, and feeds back the operation result to the back-end management platform;

[0020] Step S118: The backend management platform verifies whether all online nodes have successfully stored or changed the online node information based on the operation results fed back by the online nodes, and returns the verification results to the online nodes.

[0021] In some embodiments, the online request of the online node at least includes an offline node identifier;

[0022] In step S113, after the backend management platform receives the online request of the online node and performs verification, the following further steps are performed:

[0023] Determine whether the online node is in offline node status according to the offline node identifier:

[0024] If it is an offline node state, the backend management platform searches the database to determine whether the online node exists. If so, the node state of the online node is modified to an online state. If not, the search fails and an error message is returned to the online node.

[0025] In the step S116, after receiving the online permission, the online node of the dynamic multi-node network verifies the online node, further comprising:

[0026] Determine whether the online node is in offline node status according to the offline node identifier:

[0027] If it is in the offline node state, the online node searches the database to determine whether the online node exists. If so, the node state of the online node is modified to the online state. If not, the search fails, and the node list of the back-end management platform is obtained and synchronized.

[0028] In some embodiments, the online request of the online node at least includes an offline node identifier;

[0029] In step S113, after the backend management platform receives the online request of the online node and performs verification, the following further steps are performed:

[0030] Determine whether the online node is a new node according to the offline node identifier;

[0031] If it is a new node, the backend management platform searches the database to determine whether the online node exists. If it exists, an error message is returned to the online node. If it does not exist, the backend management platform stores the online node information in the database.

[0032] After receiving the online permission, the online node of the dynamic multi-node network in step S116 verifies the online node, further comprising:

[0033] Determine whether the online node is a new node according to the offline node identifier;

[0034] If it is a new node, the online node searches the database to determine whether the online node exists. If so, it returns and sends an error message to the online node. If not, the online node stores the online node information in the database.

[0035] In some embodiments, the dynamic node management protocol configured by the backend management platform includes a node offline function;

[0036] The dynamic multi-node network implements the node offline function in the following ways:

[0037] Step S121: The backend management platform monitors the dynamic multi-node network status and obtains node alarm information, wherein the node alarm information includes an alarm node identifier, retrieves and verifies the identity information of the alarm node according to the alarm node identifier, and returns an error result if the identity information verification fails;

[0038] Step S122: If the identity information verification passes, the backend management platform sets the alarm node to an offline node state;

[0039] Step S123: The backend management platform broadcasts in the dynamic multi-node network to notify all online nodes of the offline node information;

[0040] Step S124: After receiving the offline node message, the online node of the dynamic multi-node network performs message verification on the offline node, changes the corresponding node state to the offline node state after the verification passes, and returns the result to the back-end management platform after the operation is completed;

[0041] Step S125: After receiving the operation results of all online nodes, the backend management platform determines whether all online nodes have completed the offline node change operation. If so, a success result is returned; otherwise, an error result is returned.

[0042] In some embodiments, the dynamic node management protocol configured by the backend management platform includes a node deregistration function;

[0043] The dynamic multi-node network implements the node deregistration function in the following manner:

[0044] Step S131: The node applying for deregistration initiates a deregistration request;

[0045] Step S132: After receiving the node deregistration request, the backend management platform verifies the identity of the node for which deregistration is applied, and after verification, operates the database to deregister the node for which deregistration is applied;

[0046] Step S133: the backend management platform issues a cancellation permit;

[0047] Step S134: the backend management platform broadcasts in the dynamic multi-node network to notify all online nodes of the cancellation license;

[0048] Step S135: After receiving the cancellation permission message, the online node of the dynamic multi-node network performs message verification on the node applying for cancellation, operates the database to complete the cancellation operation after the verification passes, and returns the operation result to the back-end management platform;

[0049] Step S136: After receiving the operation results of all online nodes, the back-end management platform determines whether all online nodes have completed the node deregistration operation. If so, a success result is returned to the deregistered node to complete the deregistration operation; otherwise, an error result is returned.

[0050] In some embodiments, the dynamic node management protocol configured by the backend management platform includes a node synchronization function;

[0051] The dynamic multi-node network realizes the node synchronization function in the following ways:

[0052] Step S141: The node applying for synchronization initiates a synchronization node request;

[0053] Step S142: After receiving the synchronization node request, the backend management platform verifies the identity of the node applying for synchronization;

[0054] Step S143: After the verification is passed, the backend management platform operates the database to obtain the current node list;

[0055] Step S144: The backend management platform synchronously sends the node list to the node that applies for synchronization.

[0056] In some embodiments, the homomorphic encryption algorithm is a Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm;

[0057] The dynamic multi-node network generates a threshold key master public key, further comprising:

[0058] Step S21, node i sets initial parameters, generates a Paillier homomorphic key, and broadcasts the public key of the homomorphic key;

[0059] Step S22: Node i generates SM2 key components and calculation process parameters to form a verifiable secret sharing parameter set, and broadcasts the verifiable secret sharing parameter set and the corresponding hash commitment;

[0060] Step S23, node i verifies the hash commitments of other nodes. If all verifications pass, verifiable secret sharing is performed, a T-1 degree polynomial is generated, and the polynomial is evaluated according to the verifiable secret sharing parameter sets of other nodes;

[0061] Step S24, node i uses the Paillier homomorphic key to encrypt the polynomial and the SM2 key component to generate the corresponding first step MtA encryption value;

[0062] Step S25: Node i performs homomorphic encryption operation using the Paillier public key based on the received first-step MtA encrypted value and the received verifiable secret sharing parameter set, decomposes multiplication into addition, generates its own second-step MtA encrypted value, and broadcasts it;

[0063] Step S26, node i decrypts the second step MtA encrypted value using the Paillier private key, and generates the third step MtA protocol value in combination with the received verifiable secret sharing parameter set;

[0064] Step S27, node i verifies the MtA protocol value in the third step. After the verification is passed, the SM2 key component is calculated. After the calculation is completed, the node threshold key master public key is obtained.

[0065] In some embodiments, the step S24 further includes: node i uses a zero-knowledge proof algorithm to generate a zero-knowledge proof of the encrypted value of MtA in the first step and broadcasts it;

[0066] The step S25 further comprises: node i verifies the zero-knowledge proof of the encrypted value MtA in the first step, generates the zero-knowledge proof of the encrypted value MtA in the second step by using the zero-knowledge proof algorithm and broadcasts it;

[0067] The step S26 further includes: node i verifies the zero-knowledge proof of the encrypted value MtA in the second step.

[0068] In some embodiments, the initial parameters in step S21 include the total number of threshold nodes N, the threshold value T, the node session identifier rtig i ;

[0069] The step S22 further comprises the following steps:

[0070] Step S221: Randomly generate an integer d i As the SM2 private key component of node i, and calculate the corresponding SM2 public key component D i ;

[0071] Step S222: Node i generates calculation process parameters, which include the first parameter component ρ i , the second parameter component u i , the third parameter component γ i and the fourth parameter component Γ i ;

[0072] Step S223: Set the node session identifier rtig i , public key component D i , the fourth parameter component Γ i , the first parameter component ρ i , the second parameter component u i Combined to generate a verifiable secret sharing parameter set {rtig i ,D i ,Γ i ,ρ i ,u i}, combine the hash values ​​of the verifiable secret sharing parameter set to generate the hash commitment V of node i i ;

[0073] Step S224: Node i hashes the commitment V i Broadcast and send the verifiable secret sharing parameter set {rtig i ,D i ,Γ i ,ρ i ,ui} for broadcasting.

[0074] In some embodiments, the step S23 further comprises the following steps:

[0075] Node i, based on the received verifiable secret sharing parameter set of the corresponding node, calculates the hash value and compares it with the hash commitment of the corresponding node;

[0076] If the check passes, node i constructs a T-1 degree polynomial where j≠i, a (i,k) is a random number.

[0077] In some embodiments, the step S24 further comprises the following steps:

[0078] Step S241: Node i encrypts the T-1 polynomial using the Paillier public key and converts the T-1 polynomial into the first ciphertext EVSS (i,j) ;

[0079] Step S242: Node i receives SM2 private key component d i Use Paillier public key to encrypt and convert SM2 private key component d i Convert to the second ciphertext EKEY (i,j) ;

[0080] Step S243: Node i generates the first ciphertext EVSS (i,j) 、Second EKSY (i,j) As a first step, the MtA encrypted value is broadcast to other corresponding nodes.

[0081] In some embodiments, the step S25 further comprises the following steps:

[0082] Step S251: Decrypt the received first step MtA encrypted value using the Paillier private key to obtain the first EVSS (i,j) Corresponding plaintext VSS (i,j) ;

[0083] Step S252: Decrypt the plaintext VSS (i,j) Add all together to get the node polynomial value Y i , and calculate the node polynomial global parameter YK i ;

[0084] Step S253: by accumulating all fourth parameter components Γ i , and obtain the fourth global parameter Γ;

[0085] Step S254: by accumulating all SM2 public key components Di , get the SM2 public key global parameter A;

[0086] Step S255: Node i generates a random number β (i,j) And use the corresponding Paillier public key to β′ (i,j) Encrypt and obtain β′ (i,j) The corresponding ciphertext, where β′ (i,j) =-β (i,j) ;

[0087] Step S256: Calculate the second step MtA encryption value E (i,j) =EKEY (i,j) *γ i +β′;

[0088] Step S257: Node i broadcasts {E (i,j) ,β′ (i,j) ,YK i}.

[0089] In some embodiments, the step S26 further comprises the following steps:

[0090] Step S261: Node i uses the Paillier private key to encrypt the value E in the second step MtA (i,j) Decrypt and calculate the first exchange parameter α (i,j) ;

[0091] Step S262: According to the first exchange parameter α (i,j) Accumulate and obtain the first intermediate value component δ i , SM2 private key component d i and the fourth global parameter Γ to obtain the second intermediate value component Δ i ;

[0092] Step S263: Node i calculates {Δ i ,δ i The value is used as the third step MtA protocol value and broadcast to other nodes.

[0093] In some embodiments, the step S27 further comprises the following steps:

[0094] Step S271: Calculate the first intermediate value Second median value

[0095] Step S272, check whether Δ is equal to δ*G;

[0096] Step S273: If the verification is passed, calculate and obtain the node threshold key master public key X = δ -1 *Γ-G.

[0097] In some embodiments, the homomorphic encryption algorithm is a Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm;

[0098] The dynamic multi-node network performs threshold signature, further comprising:

[0099] Step S31, node i generates a signature random number, encrypts it using the Paillier homomorphic key, obtains the MtA signature parameter value in the first step, and broadcasts it;

[0100] Step S32: Node i performs homomorphic encryption operation through the Paillier public key, decomposes multiplication into addition, generates the second-step MtA signature parameter value required by T-1 nodes, and broadcasts the parameter after the calculation is completed;

[0101] Step S33: Node i obtains the MtA signature parameter value E in the third step (i,j) ;

[0102] Step S34: Node i uses the SM2 key component and the third step MtA signature parameter value E (i,j) , according to the SM2 algorithm, calculate the signature component of the original text and the corresponding zero-knowledge proof, and broadcast the signature component and zero-knowledge proof after the calculation is completed;

[0103] Step S35, node i verifies the zero-knowledge proof, and after the verification is passed, accumulates all signature components to obtain the actual signature data.

[0104] The threshold key management system based on a dynamic multi-node network proposed in the present invention can realize the distributed generation, storage, use and recovery of SM2 keys. Only T nodes are needed to use the keys normally, thereby greatly expanding the application scenarios of SM2 keys. By adopting dynamic multi-node network management technology, dynamic addition and deletion of nodes can be realized, thereby improving the robustness, security and scalability of the system, and solving the scalability and dynamic problems of the overall system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0105] The above and other features, properties and advantages of the present invention will become more apparent through the following description in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments, in which the same reference numerals always represent the same features, wherein:

[0106] Figure 1 A principle block diagram of a threshold key management system based on a dynamic multi-node network according to an embodiment of the present invention is disclosed;

[0107] Figure 2 A flowchart for implementing a node online function according to an embodiment of the present invention is disclosed;

[0108] Figure 3A flowchart for implementing a node offline function according to an embodiment of the present invention is disclosed;

[0109] Figure 4 A flowchart for implementing a node deregistration function according to an embodiment of the present invention is disclosed;

[0110] Figure 5 A flowchart for implementing a node synchronization function according to an embodiment of the present invention is disclosed;

[0111] Figure 6 A flow chart of a method for generating a key according to an embodiment of the present invention is disclosed;

[0112] Figure 7 A flow chart of using a threshold signature according to an embodiment of the present invention is disclosed;

[0113] Figure 8 A flow chart of generating a threshold signature according to an embodiment of the present invention is disclosed.

[0114] The meanings of the reference numerals in the figures are as follows:

[0115] 100 rear pipe platform;

[0116] 101 post-management platform database;

[0117] 200 dynamic multi-node network;

[0118] 210 first node;

[0119] 211 First Database;

[0120] 220 second node;

[0121] 221 Second database;

[0122] 230 third node;

[0123] 231 Third database;

[0124] 240 fourth node;

[0125] 241 Fourth Database;

[0126] 310 external network nodes;

[0127] 311 external network node database. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0128] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention more clearly understood, the present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the invention and are not used to limit the invention.

[0129] The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network proposed in this invention aims to build an efficient and secure distributed key management solution. The system fully considers the characteristics of distributed environment and realizes centralized management function to ensure unified storage and effective management of keys, so as to meet the needs of multi-location deployment.

[0130] In view of the escalating data threats, this system is committed to providing a strong security mechanism to fully protect the security of keys during storage and transmission. In addition, the system supports a variety of encryption algorithms to meet the security requirements of different application scenarios.

[0131] To reduce potential security risks, this system is designed with flexible key policies and lifecycle management functions. Through reasonable policy settings and lifecycle control, the system can more effectively manage the use and destruction of keys to ensure the security and controllability of keys.

[0132] At the same time, considering the highly dynamic technical environment, the system has excellent scalability and performance optimization capabilities. As the user scale and the number of keys continue to grow, the system can maintain efficient and stable operation and ensure the continuity and reliability of key management.

[0133] In order to meet compliance and regulatory requirements, the system also has comprehensive permission control and audit functions. Through refined permission settings and audit records, the system can ensure that the access and use of keys comply with relevant laws and policies.

[0134] In addition, the system is also adapted to multi-cloud environments and provides developer-friendly interfaces and integration support. This enables the system to flexibly adapt to different technical architectures and business needs and achieve seamless integration with existing systems.

[0135] In order to deal with potential risks and failures, this system also implements disaster recovery and fault tolerance mechanisms. Relying on the characteristics of threshold keys, the system can quickly restore key management services in the event of failures or accidents, ensuring business continuity and data security.

[0136] To sum up, the threshold key management system based on a dynamic multi-node network proposed in the present invention fully considers the characteristics and business needs of the distributed environment while ensuring the security of the key, and provides powerful key management support for distributed systems such as blockchain and privacy computing platforms.

[0137] Figure 1 The principle block diagram of a threshold key management system based on a dynamic multi-node network according to an embodiment of the present invention is disclosed. Figure 1 As shown, the threshold key management system based on a dynamic multi-node network proposed by the present invention includes a back-end management platform 100 and a dynamic multi-node network 200:

[0138] The backend management platform 100 is configured with a dynamic node management protocol to implement dynamic addition and deletion of nodes and synchronous update of the dynamic multi-node network 200;

[0139] Each node in the dynamic multi-node network 200 generates and stores SM2 key components respectively, constructs polynomials based on Lagrange interpolation method, hides SM2 key components, and then shares and exchanges data with other nodes based on verifiable secret sharing technology to generate a threshold key master public key;

[0140] Among them, the dynamic multi-node network uses a homomorphic encryption algorithm to execute a multiplication-to-addition conversion protocol (MtA) for data sharing and exchange.

[0141] Furthermore, the threshold key management system based on a dynamic multi-node network proposed in the present invention can realize SM2 threshold signature as long as more than a threshold value T nodes participate in the dynamic multi-node network, wherein the threshold value T and the total number of threshold nodes N satisfy the following expression: N≥T+1.

[0142] The threshold key management system based on a dynamic multi-node network proposed by the present invention divides the key into multiple components and requires that the complete key can be reconstructed only when a certain threshold condition is reached, thereby providing stronger security. Even if some key components are leaked, attackers cannot obtain the complete key because they need to reach the threshold condition to reconstruct the complete key. At the same time, when some key components are damaged, as long as there are still key components exceeding the threshold condition, the normal use and recovery of the key can still be guaranteed. This technology can not only resist various attacks, including passive attacks and active attacks, but also meet the legal and regulatory requirements for data security in some industries, such as finance, medical care and other fields.

[0143] The threshold key management system based on a dynamic multi-node network proposed in the present invention supports SM2 cryptography and meets the cryptographic support needs of distributed systems with SM2 cryptographic specifications. The core lies in threshold cryptography technology, which is a comprehensive security cryptographic technology based on a specific operation protocol integrating secret sharing, homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge proof algorithm technology.

[0144] The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network proposed by the present invention uses dynamic multi-node network technology, configures the back-end management platform and dynamic node management function module, and uses configurable protocols to complete the dynamic addition and deletion of nodes and the synchronous update of node networks, thereby meeting the adaptation requirements of the threshold password management system for different threshold parameters. At the same time, the dynamic multi-node network meets the expansion requirements of the distributed system.

[0145] like Figure 1As shown, the backend management platform 100 is in communication connection with the dynamic multi-node network 200 and is configured with a dynamic node management protocol to perform identity management and node management on the nodes in the dynamic multi-node network 200 .

[0146] The backend management platform 100 is configured with a backend management platform database 101 for storing node information such as online nodes and offline nodes.

[0147] like Figure 1 As shown, the dynamic multi-node network 200 includes at least a first node 210, a second node 220, a third node 230 and a fourth node 240:

[0148] The first node 210 is configured with a first database 211, the second node 220 is configured with a second database 221, the third node 230 is configured with a third database 231, and the fourth node 240 is configured with a fourth database 241 for storing node information such as online nodes and offline nodes.

[0149] In such Figure 1 In the illustrated embodiment, the back-end management platform 100 and the dynamic multi-node network 200 are both arranged in the intranet, and for the external network node 310 arranged in the external network, the back-end management platform 100 can also provide identity management services, and each node of the dynamic multi-node network 200 can also share and exchange data with the external network node 310.

[0150] The external network node 310 is also configured with an external network node database 311 for storing node information such as online nodes and offline nodes.

[0151] The dynamic node management protocol configured by the back-end management platform proposed in the present invention includes node online, node offline, node deregistration and node synchronization functions.

[0152] Figure 2 A flowchart of implementing a node online function according to an embodiment of the present invention is disclosed. Figure 2 As shown, the dynamic multi-node network implements the node online function in the following ways:

[0153] Step S111: The online node loads the dynamic node management protocol to obtain the backend management platform interface information;

[0154] Step S112: The online node sends an online request to the backend management platform, where the online request includes the node address, node certificate, node signature, and offline node identifier;

[0155] Step S113: the backend management platform performs verification after receiving the online request of the online node;

[0156] Furthermore, the back-end management platform verifies the online nodes through the interface provided by the third party.

[0157] If the verification fails, the corresponding error code is returned and the error information is sent to the online node. If the verification passes, the next step is performed.

[0158] Step S114: The backend management platform generates a node identifier for the online node and issues an online permission, wherein the online permission includes the node address, node identifier, and a signature of the backend management platform;

[0159] Step S115: the backend management platform broadcasts the online permission in the dynamic multi-node network;

[0160] Step S116: After receiving the online permission, the online node of the dynamic multi-node network verifies the online node;

[0161] Step S117: The online node stores or changes the online node information, and feeds back the operation result to the back-end management platform;

[0162] Step S118: The backend management platform verifies whether all online nodes have successfully stored or changed the online node information based on the operation results fed back by the online nodes, and returns the verification results to the online nodes.

[0163] Furthermore, after the step S113 passes the verification, the following steps are further performed:

[0164] Determine whether the online node is an offline node or a new node according to the offline node identifier:

[0165] If it is in the offline node state, the backend management platform calls the database interface to search the database to determine whether the online node exists. If so, the node state of the online node is modified to the online state. If not, the search fails and an error message is returned to the online node.

[0166] If it is a new node, the backend management platform calls the database interface to search the database to determine whether the online node exists. If it exists, an error message is returned to the online node. If it does not exist, the backend management platform stores the online node information in the database.

[0167] Furthermore, after the step S116 passes the verification, the following steps are further performed:

[0168] Determine whether the online node is in an offline node state or a new node according to the offline node identifier;

[0169] If it is in offline node status, the online node calls the database interface to search the database to determine whether the online node exists. If so, the node status of the online node is modified to online status. If not, the search fails, and the node list of the back-end management platform is obtained and synchronized.

[0170] If it is a new node, the online node calls the database interface, searches the database to determine whether the online node exists, if so, returns an error message to the online node, if not, the online node stores the online node information in the database.

[0171] Figure 3 A flowchart of implementing a node offline function according to an embodiment of the present invention is disclosed. Figure 3 As shown, the dynamic multi-node network implements the node offline function in the following ways:

[0172] Step S121: The backend management platform monitors the dynamic multi-node network status and obtains node alarm information, wherein the node alarm information includes an alarm node identifier, retrieves and verifies the identity information of the alarm node according to the alarm node identifier, and returns an error result if the identity information verification fails;

[0173] Step S122: If the identity information verification passes, the backend management platform sets the alarm node to an offline node state;

[0174] Step S123: The backend management platform broadcasts in the dynamic multi-node network to notify all online nodes of the offline node information;

[0175] Step S124: After receiving the offline node message, the online node of the dynamic multi-node network performs message verification on the offline node. After the verification passes, the database interface is called to change the corresponding node state to the offline node state. After the operation is completed, the result is returned to the back-end management platform;

[0176] Step S125: After receiving the operation results of all online nodes, the backend management platform determines whether all online nodes have completed the offline node change operation. If so, a success result is returned; otherwise, an error result is returned.

[0177] Figure 4 A flowchart for implementing a node deregistration function according to an embodiment of the present invention is disclosed. Figure 4 As shown, the dynamic multi-node network implements the node deregistration function in the following manner:

[0178] Step S131: The node applying for deregistration initiates a deregistration request;

[0179] Step S132: After receiving the node deregistration request, the backend management platform verifies the identity of the node for which deregistration is applied, and after verification, operates the database to deregister the node for which deregistration is applied;

[0180] Step S133: the backend management platform issues a cancellation permit;

[0181] Step S134: the backend management platform broadcasts in the dynamic multi-node network to notify all online nodes of the cancellation license;

[0182] Step S135: After receiving the cancellation permission message, the online node of the dynamic multi-node network performs message verification on the node applying for cancellation, operates the database to complete the cancellation operation after the verification passes, and returns the operation result to the back-end management platform;

[0183] Step S136: After receiving the operation results of all online nodes, the back-end management platform determines whether all online nodes have completed the node deregistration operation. If so, a success result is returned to the deregistered node to complete the deregistration operation; otherwise, an error result is returned.

[0184] Figure 5 A flowchart of implementing a node synchronization function according to an embodiment of the present invention is disclosed. Figure 5 As shown, the dynamic multi-node network implements the node synchronization function in the following ways:

[0185] Step S141: The node applying for synchronization initiates a synchronization node request;

[0186] Step S142: After receiving the synchronization node request, the backend management platform verifies the identity of the node applying for synchronization;

[0187] Step S143: After the verification is passed, the backend management platform operates the database to obtain the current node list;

[0188] Step S144: The backend management platform synchronously sends the node list to the node applying for synchronization.

[0189] The threshold key management system based on a dynamic multi-node network proposed in the present invention uses secret sharing technology to construct SM2 key components of polynomial hidden nodes, and then combines the SM2 key components hidden by several nodes into a master SM2 key for cryptographic operations based on the Lagrange interpolation method.

[0190] The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network proposed in the present invention uses homomorphic encryption algorithm and MtA protocol to coordinate the sharing and distribution among nodes in the master key generation process, and assembles the master key without directly exchanging key parameters at the nodes. The homomorphic encryption algorithm uses Paillier additive homomorphic encryption algorithm to implement addition operation on data under encryption, thereby implementing MtA protocol.

[0191] The MtA protocol is a protocol that uses Paillier additive homomorphic encryption technology to implement secret parameter product calculation. Its core goal is to calculate the product between two nodes without leaking the secret parameters to each other under the premise of ensuring data privacy, and further apply the Lagrange interpolation method to combine the master SM2 key.

[0192] Assume that Alice has a secret value a and Bob has a secret value b. Here is a protocol that allows Alice and Bob to obtain another secret value α and β respectively without Alice revealing a and Bob not revealing b, satisfying:

[0193] ab=α+βmod q;

[0194] This protocol is called the Multiplication to Addition protocol (MtA).

[0195] The MtA protocol is implemented through the following three steps:

[0196] The first step of MtA is: Alice generates a Paillier key pair, where sk is the private key and pk is the public key. She encrypts a with the public key pk to obtain the encrypted data c. A =Epk(a) sent to Bob;

[0197] That is, Alice first constructs her own Paillier public-private key pair, publishes the public key, encrypts a with the public key, and then sends it to Bob;

[0198] The second step of MtA is: Bob randomly selects β' and calculates c B =b×Epk(a)+Epk(β')=Epk(ab+β'), let β=-β';

[0199] That is, Bob uses the Paillier homomorphic encryption property to encrypt ab-β using the Paillier public key and sends the encrypted data to Alice;

[0200] The third step of MtA is that after Alice receives the encrypted data cB sent by Bob, she uses her private key sk to decrypt it. The result obtained after decryption is α, and α satisfies α=ab+β' (because β' is randomly selected by Bob, α is also random). In other words, the result obtained after Alice uses the private key to decrypt is recorded as α=Dsk(c B ).

[0201] This step completes the last step of the MtA protocol. Alice obtains another secret value α related to Bob's secret value b, and her secret value a is not disclosed during the whole process. Through the MtA protocol, Alice and Bob can obtain a calculation result related to the secret values ​​of both parties without disclosing their respective secret values. This protocol has broad application prospects in cryptography, secure computing, distributed computing and other fields. For example, in a joint computing scenario, different participants can jointly calculate a result through the MtA protocol without exposing their respective input data, thereby protecting their respective privacy.

[0202] Furthermore, the dynamic multi-node network uses a zero-knowledge proof algorithm to build a trust relationship between nodes.

[0203] The zero-knowledge proof algorithm is used to build a trust relationship between nodes without exchanging private data of nodes, ensuring the security and reliability of the node network. The zero-knowledge proof algorithm can prove to the other party that the node owns the data without transmitting the target data.

[0204] Figure 6 A flow chart of a method for generating a key according to an embodiment of the present invention is disclosed. Figure 6 As shown, the dynamic multi-node network generates a threshold key master public key, further comprising:

[0205] Step S21, node i sets initial parameters, generates a Paillier homomorphic key, and broadcasts the public key of the homomorphic key;

[0206] Step S22: Node i generates SM2 key components and calculation process parameters, combines them to generate a Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) parameter set, and broadcasts the Verifiable Secret Sharing parameter set and the corresponding hash commitment;

[0207] Step S23: Node i verifies the hash commitments of other nodes. If all verifications pass, it performs verifiable secret sharing, generates a T-1 degree polynomial, and evaluates the polynomial according to the verifiable secret sharing parameters of other nodes.

[0208] Step S24, node i uses the Paillier homomorphic key to execute the first step of the MtA protocol, encrypts the polynomial and the SM2 key component, and generates the corresponding first step MtA encryption value;

[0209] In addition, node i uses the zero-knowledge proof algorithm to prove the secret stored in the polynomial. After completing all calculations, node i broadcasts the encrypted value of the first step MtA and the corresponding zero-knowledge proof;

[0210] Step S25: Node i verifies the zero-knowledge proof. If the verification passes, the second step of the MtA protocol is executed.

[0211] In this process, node i performs homomorphic encryption operations through the Paillier public key based on the received first-step MtA encrypted value and the received verifiable secret sharing parameter set, decomposing the multiplication into addition and generating its own second-step MtA encrypted value. Node i broadcasts the second-step MtA encrypted value and the corresponding zero-knowledge proof.

[0212] Step S26, node i verifies the zero-knowledge proof. If the verification is successful, the third step of the MtA protocol is executed. The second step MtA encrypted value is decrypted by the Paillier private key, and the third step MtA protocol value is generated in combination with the received verifiable secret sharing parameter set, completing the combination of the node key component parameters.

[0213] Step S27, node i verifies the MtA protocol value of the third step. If the verification passes, the SM2 key component is calculated. After the calculation is completed, the node threshold key master public key is obtained.

[0214] The above steps of the present invention will be described in detail below.

[0215] In step S21, node i sets initial parameters, generates a Paillier homomorphic key, and broadcasts the public key of the homomorphic key;

[0216] The initial parameters include the total number of threshold nodes N, the threshold value T, the node session identifier rtig i ;

[0217] In this embodiment, the node session identifier rtig i A 16-bit random number.

[0218] Paillier encryption is a public key encryption algorithm based on the problem of large number factorization. It has the property of additive homomorphism, that is, the product of two ciphertexts is equal to the sum of two plaintexts after decryption. This property enables Paillier encryption to perform specific mathematical operations while protecting data privacy.

[0219] In this embodiment, the step S21, generating a Paillier homomorphic key, further includes:

[0220] Step S211, generate two large prime numbers p and q, and ensure that the number of digits of the two prime numbers is large enough;

[0221] The number of digits in a prime number directly determines the security strength of the key, and large prime numbers with hundreds of digits are usually selected. Such prime numbers can not only provide sufficient complexity to prevent easy cracking, but also provide a solid foundation for subsequent encryption operations.

[0222] Step S212, calculate n=p*q and n 2 ;

[0223] This calculation is one of the core steps in the Paillier cipher, as it generates the essential components of the public and private keys. In this way, we can ensure that n is a very large composite number, making any attempt to crack the key by factoring it extremely difficult.

[0224] Step S213, generate a random number g, ensuring that g and n are relatively prime;

[0225] This means that the greatest common divisor of g and n is 1, and there are no other common factors. This choice ensures the randomness and uniqueness of g, thereby enhancing the security of the encryption algorithm.

[0226] Step S214, calculate λ=lcm(p-1,q-1) and μ=(L(g λ mod n 2 )) -1 mod n, where lcm represents the least common multiple,

[0227] In this step, a series of complex calculations are performed to obtain the values ​​of λ and μ in order to obtain the final private key (λ, μ), which will be used for key calculations in the decryption process.

[0228] Step S215, public key (n, g) and private key (λ, μ) of the Paillier homomorphic key.

[0229] These key pairs will be used for subsequent encryption and decryption operations. The public keys n and g will be made public and used to encrypt information, while the private keys (λ, μ) need to be kept safe to prevent unauthorized decryption operations.

[0230] The step S22, node i generates SM2 key components and calculation process parameters, combines them to generate a Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) parameter set, broadcasts the Verifiable Secret Sharing parameter set and the corresponding hash commitment, further comprising the following steps:

[0231] Step S221: Node i uses a random number generator to randomly generate an integer d i ∈[1,n-2 as the SM2 private key component of node i, where n is the order of the SM2 elliptic curve base point G, and the public key component D is calculated by the elliptic curve point multiplication algorithm i =d i *G;

[0232] Step S222: Node i generates the remaining calculation process parameters, which include the first parameter component ρ i , the second parameter component u i , the third parameter component γ i and the fourth parameter component Γ i ;

[0233] The first parameter component ρ i , the second parameter component u i is a random number, the third parameter component γ i is a random integer.

[0234] Furthermore, the first parameter component ρ i , the second parameter component u i are two 32-bit random numbers, and the third parameter component γ i ∈[1,n-2], the fourth parameter component Γ i =γ i *G;

[0235] Step S223: Set the node session identifier rtig i , public key component D i , the fourth parameter component Γ i , the first parameter component ρ i , the second parameter component u i Combined to generate a verifiable secret sharing parameter set {rtig i ,D i ,Γ i ,ρ i ,u i}, verifiable secret sharing parameter set {rtig i ,D i ,Γ i ,ρ i ,u i} hash values ​​are combined to generate the hash commitment V of node i i, hash commitment V i Used to verify whether node i honestly participates in the secret sharing process in subsequent steps;

[0236] Step S224: Node i broadcasts its hash commitment to other nodes, so that each node can obtain the hash commitment of other nodes, making subsequent secret verification possible;

[0237] Node i will be able to verify the secret sharing parameter {trig i ,D i ,Γ i ,ρ i ,u i}Broadcast to other nodes.

[0238] This step is the last step to complete the secret sharing process. By broadcasting this set of parameters, node i ensures that other nodes can obtain the complete information used to generate the hash commitment, so that their honesty can be verified.

[0239] Step S23: Node i verifies the hash commitments of other nodes. If all verifications pass, it performs verifiable secret sharing, generates a T-1 degree polynomial, and evaluates the polynomial according to the verifiable secret sharing parameters of other nodes.

[0240] The purpose of verification is to ensure that the commitment of each node is authentic and has not been tampered with or forged. Only when the hash commitments of all nodes pass the verification, node i will proceed to the next step, that is, to perform the verifiable secret sharing process.

[0241] Node i verifies the hash commitments of other nodes. After all verifications are passed, verifiable secret sharing is performed and the generated content is encrypted, further including the following steps:

[0242] Step S231: Node i calculates the hash value based on the received verifiable secret sharing parameter set of the corresponding node and compares it with the hash commitment of the corresponding node. The verification process is completed only when the two are completely consistent. This step ensures that the commitment of each node is based on the real parameter set, thereby improving the reliability and security of the system.

[0243] Step S232: Once the verification is passed, node i constructs a T-1 degree polynomial where j≠i, a (i,k) is a random number, and the T-1 degree polynomial is the value calculated by node i using the node parameters previously broadcast by node j as independent variables.

[0244] In this way, node i successfully completes the verification and verifiable secret sharing process of the hash commitment of other nodes, which not only ensures that the commitment of each node is authentic, but also further enhances the security of secret information by generating an encrypted T-1 polynomial. Since the present invention adopts a specially designed polynomial construction and interpolation method, it can reduce the number of key component holders under the same threshold value. This step becomes a crucial link in the entire distributed system and lays a solid foundation for subsequent steps.

[0245] Step S24, node i uses the Paillier homomorphic key to encrypt the polynomial and the SM2 key component to generate the corresponding first step MtA encryption value;

[0246] During the execution of the MtA protocol, the first step is to use the Paillier homomorphic key to perform the first step operation, and then generate the corresponding first step MtA encrypted value. This step specifically includes the following steps:

[0247] Step S241: Node i encrypts the T-1 degree polynomial. In this embodiment, the Paillier public key is used for encryption to convert the T-1 degree polynomial into the first ciphertext EVSS. (i,j) ;

[0248] Step S242: Node i sends SM2 private key component d i Encryption processing is performed. In this embodiment, the Paillier public key is used for encryption, and the SM2 private key component d i Convert to obtain the second ciphertext EKEY (i,j) ;

[0249] Step S243: Node i generates the first ciphertext EVSS (i,j) 、Second ciphertext EKEY (i,j) As a first step, the MtA encrypted value is broadcast to other corresponding nodes.

[0250] Step S25, node i verifies the zero-knowledge proof. After passing the verification, the second step of the MtA protocol is executed. Based on the received first-step MtA encrypted value and the received verifiable secret sharing parameter set, the homomorphic encryption operation is performed through the Paillier public key, and the multiplication is decomposed into addition. The second-step MtA encrypted value and the corresponding zero-knowledge proof are generated and broadcasted.

[0251] The specific process is as follows:

[0252] Step S251: Decrypt the received first step MtA encrypted value using the Paillier private key to obtain the first EVSS (i,j) Corresponding plaintext VSS (i,j), which is the T-1 degree polynomial generated for node i;

[0253] Step S252: Add all the decrypted plaintext data to obtain the node polynomial value Y i , and calculate the node polynomial global parameters

[0254] Step S253: by accumulating all fourth parameter components Γ i , get the fourth global parameter

[0255] Step S254: by accumulating all SM2 public key components D i , get the SM2 public key global parameters

[0256] Step S255: Execute the second step of the MtA protocol. Node i generates a random number β (i,j) And use the corresponding Paillier public key to β′ (i,j) Encrypt and obtain β′ (i,j) The corresponding ciphertext, where β′ (i,j) =-β (i,j) ;

[0257] Step S256: Perform Paillier addition operation to calculate the second step MtA encryption value E (i,j) =EKEY (i,j) *γ i +β′;

[0258] Step S257: Node broadcast {E (i,j) ,β′ (i,j) ,YK i}.

[0259] This step is for the node to send its own encrypted data and related information to other participants, providing parameters to ensure the smooth progress of the subsequent calculation process. Other nodes can verify this information to confirm the identity of the node and the authenticity of the data.

[0260] Step S26, node i verifies the zero-knowledge proof. After the verification is passed, the third step of the MtA protocol is executed. The second step MtA encrypted value is decrypted by the Paillier private key, and the third step MtA protocol value is generated in combination with the received verifiable secret sharing parameter set, completing the combination of the node key component parameters.

[0261] Step S26 specifically includes the following steps:

[0262] Step S261: Node i uses the Paillier private key to encrypt the value E in the second step MtA (i,j)Decrypt and calculate the first exchange parameter α (i,j) =DEC Paillier (E (i,j) )+β;

[0263] Step S262: calculate the first exchange parameter α (i,j) , accumulate to obtain the first intermediate value component According to the SM2 private key component d i and the fourth global parameter Γ to obtain the second intermediate value component Δ i =d i * Γ;

[0264] Step S263: Node i calculates {Δ i ,δ i The value is used as the third step MtA protocol value and broadcast to other nodes.

[0265] Step S27, node i verifies the MtA protocol value in the third step. After the verification is passed, the SM2 key component is calculated. After the calculation is completed, the node threshold key master public key is obtained.

[0266] Step S27 specifically includes the following steps:

[0267] Step S271: Calculate the first intermediate value Second median value

[0268] Step S272: Check whether Δ is δ*G. The purpose of this step is to verify whether Δ meets the requirements of the elliptic curve encryption algorithm. According to the previous calculation process, if the operations of all nodes are normal at this time, then the two values ​​should be equal. If they are not equal, it indicates that there is a problem in the previous calculation process.

[0269] Step S273: If the verification is passed, calculate and obtain the threshold key master public key X = δ -1 *Γ-G, the node private key component is d i .

[0270] Through this step, the node successfully completes the calculation process of the SM2 key component. By substituting the specific formula of each parameter, it can eliminate the redundant parameters and only retain the private key component. The main purpose of this calculation method is to ensure that the private key component is not exposed during the entire calculation process, and finally obtain the master public key for network communication.

[0271] Figure 7 A flow chart of using a threshold signature according to an embodiment of the present invention is disclosed, such as Figure 7As shown in the figure, during the user signature operation, the threshold key master public key must first be verified by the user node. If the verification fails, the entire process will terminate directly. Once the verification is successful, the system will further determine whether the current number of nodes has exceeded the preset threshold T. If the number of nodes does not exceed the threshold, the process will also terminate; however, when the number of nodes exceeds the threshold, nodes that meet the quantity requirements can be randomly selected to generate the corresponding threshold signature and perform subsequent output operations.

[0272] Figure 8 A flow chart of generating a threshold signature according to an embodiment of the present invention is disclosed, such as Figure 8 As shown, the dynamic multi-node network generates a threshold signature in the following manner, further comprising:

[0273] Step S31, node i generates a signature random number, encrypts it using the Paillier homomorphic key, obtains the MtA signature parameter value in the first step, and broadcasts it;

[0274] Step S32: Node i performs homomorphic encryption operation through the Paillier public key, decomposes multiplication into addition, generates the second-step MtA signature parameter value required by T-1 nodes, and broadcasts the parameter after the calculation is completed;

[0275] Step S33: Node i obtains the MtA signature parameter value E in the third step (i,j) ;

[0276] Step S34: Node i uses the SM2 key component and the third step MtA signature parameter value E (i,j) , according to the SM2 algorithm, calculate the signature component of the original text and the corresponding zero-knowledge proof, and broadcast the signature component and zero-knowledge proof after the calculation is completed;

[0277] Step S35, node i verifies the zero-knowledge proof, and after the verification is passed, accumulates all signature components to obtain the actual signature data.

[0278] The above steps of the present invention will be described in detail below.

[0279] Step S31, node i generates a signature random number, encrypts it using the Paillier homomorphic key, obtains the MtA signature parameter value in the first step, and broadcasts it;

[0280] Specifically, each node i performs the following operations:

[0281] Step S311: Node i generates a signature random number k i , K i =k i *G;

[0282] Step S312: Calculate

[0283] This step is the calculation process of the Lagrange interpolation method. According to the above formula, the value broadcast by the previous node needs to be used as the parameter for the polynomial independent variable value to perform the calculation.

[0284] Step S313, calculate ω i =λ i *y i ,Ω i =ω i *G;

[0285] This step is the calculation process of Lagrange interpolation method to obtain the intermediate variable ω i .

[0286] Furthermore, after step S313, the following further comprises: calculating the verification parameter A=∑λ i *Y i *G, check whether the threshold key master public key X is consistent with the value of A. If they are consistent, the verification passes and proceeds to the next step. If they are inconsistent, the verification fails and the process ends;

[0287] Among them, the node polynomial value Y i is the corresponding T-1 degree polynomial y i The master public key point is calculated in step S252.

[0288] Step S314: Execute the first step of the MtA protocol and use the Paillier public key to encrypt ω i Get the first step MtA signature parameter value EW (i,j) ;

[0289] Step S315: The node {K i ,Ω i ,E.W. (i,j)}Broadcast to T-1 nodes;

[0290] Step S32: Node i performs homomorphic encryption operation through the Paillier public key, decomposes multiplication into addition, generates the second-step MtA signature parameter value required by T-1 nodes, and broadcasts the parameter after the calculation is completed;

[0291] Step S321: Calculate signature parameters

[0292] Step S322: Execute the second step of the MtA protocol to generate a random number β for each node. (i,j) And use the corresponding Paillier public key to β′ (i,j) Encrypt to obtain the second step MtA signature parameter value, where β′ (i,j) =-β(i,j) ;

[0293] Step S33: Node i executes the third step of the MtA protocol, performs the Paillier addition operation, and obtains the third step MtA signature parameter value E (i,j) =EW (i,j) *k i +β′, complete the calculation of signature parameters;

[0294] Step S34: Node i uses the SM2 key component and the third step MtA signature parameter value E (i,j) , according to the SM2 algorithm, calculate the signature component of the original text and the corresponding zero-knowledge proof. After the calculation is completed, the signature component and the zero-knowledge proof are broadcast.

[0295] The step S34 specifically includes the following steps:

[0296] Step S341, calculate SM2 signature parameter Z according to SM2 algorithm =

[0297] hash{ENTL A ||ID A ||a||b||x G ||y G ||x A ||x A}, e = hash(Z||M);

[0298] The above parameters are defined based on the SM2 standard specification, where the signer has a length of entlen A Bit identifiable ID A , remember ENTL A is the integer entlen A The two bytes converted are the coordinates x of the elliptic curve equation parameters a, b, and G G ,y G , and the coordinates x of the public key X A ,y A , M is the original text to be signed.

[0299] Step S342: Calculate s i =ω i *r+χ i mod n;

[0300] Among them, R xi is the horizontal coordinate corresponding to the signature parameter R;

[0301] χ i =K i *ω i +∑ i≠j E(i,j) .

[0302] Step S343, broadcast to T-1 nodes {s i};

[0303] Step S35, node i verifies the zero-knowledge proof, and after the verification is passed, accumulates all signature components to obtain the actual signature data.

[0304] Step S351: Calculate

[0305] Step S352: output signature (r, s).

[0306] The present invention proposes a threshold key management system based on a dynamic multi-node network, which has the following beneficial effects:

[0307] 1) The threshold cryptography technology is transformed into a national secret technology, so that the SM2 key can be generated, stored, used and recovered in a distributed manner. The recovery process relies on the characteristics of the threshold key, that is, only T nodes are needed to use the key normally, thereby expanding the application scenarios of the SM2 key;

[0308] 2) At least T nodes are required to complete the signature normally, which reflects the design concept of dispersing key permissions through multi-party authorization, effectively avoiding the single point of failure, security risks, expansion limitations, data compliance risks and trust system dependence of centralized key management systems;

[0309] 3) Through dynamic multi-node network management technology, dynamic addition and deletion of nodes can be achieved, thereby improving the robustness, security and scalability of the system, and being able to better cope with a wider range of needs and subsequent iterative upgrades.

[0310] Although the above methods are illustrated and described as a series of actions for simplicity of explanation, it should be understood and appreciated that these methods are not limited by the order of the actions, because according to one or more embodiments, some actions may occur in a different order and / or concurrently with other actions from those illustrated and described herein or not illustrated and described herein but understandable to those skilled in the art.

[0311] As shown in this application and claims, unless the context clearly indicates an exception, the words "a", "an", "an" and / or "the" do not refer to the singular and may also include the plural. Generally speaking, the terms "include" and "comprise" only indicate the inclusion of the steps and elements that have been clearly identified, and these steps and elements do not constitute an exclusive list. The method or device may also include other steps or elements.

[0312] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that information, signals, and data may be represented using any of a variety of different technologies and techniques. For example, data, instructions, commands, information, signals, bits, symbols, and chips cited throughout the above description may be represented by voltage, current, electromagnetic waves, magnetic fields or magnetic particles, optical fields or optical particles, or any combination thereof.

[0313] Those skilled in the art will further appreciate that the various illustrative logic blocks, modules, circuits, and algorithm steps described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of the two. To clearly illustrate this interchangeability of hardware and software, various illustrative components, blocks, modules, circuits, and steps are generally described above in terms of their functionality. Whether such functionality is implemented as hardware or software depends on the specific application and the design constraints imposed on the overall system. The technician may implement the described functionality in different ways for each specific application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as resulting in a departure from the scope of the present invention.

[0314] The various illustrative logic modules and circuits described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented or executed with a general purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination thereof designed to perform the functions described herein. A general purpose processor may be a microprocessor, but in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. The processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, such as a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in cooperation with a DSP core, or any other such configuration.

[0315] The steps of the method or algorithm described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein may be embodied directly in hardware, in a software module executed by a processor, or in a combination of the two. The software module may reside in a RAM memory, a flash memory, a ROM memory, an EPROM memory, an EEPROM memory, a register, a hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art. An exemplary storage medium is coupled to a processor so that the processor can read and write information from / to the storage medium. In an alternative, a storage medium may be integrated into a processor. The processor and the storage medium may reside in an ASIC. The ASIC may reside in a user terminal. In an alternative, the processor and the storage medium may reside in a user terminal as discrete components.

[0316] The above embodiments are provided for persons familiar with the art to implement or use the present invention. Personnel familiar with the art can make various modifications or changes to the above embodiments without departing from the inventive concept of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments, but should be the maximum scope of the innovative features mentioned in the claims.

Claims

1. A threshold key management system based on a dynamic multi-node network, characterized in that: Includes backend platform and dynamic multi-node network: The backend management platform is configured with a dynamic node management protocol to realize dynamic addition and deletion of nodes and synchronous update of dynamic multi-node networks; Each node in the dynamic multi-node network generates and stores SM2 key components respectively, constructs polynomials based on Lagrange interpolation method, hides SM2 key components, and then shares and exchanges data with other nodes based on verifiable secret sharing technology, and generates a threshold key master public key; Among them, the dynamic multi-node network adopts a homomorphic encryption algorithm to execute a multiplication-to-addition conversion protocol for data sharing and exchange.

2. The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The dynamic multi-node network uses a zero-knowledge proof algorithm to build a trust relationship between nodes.

3. The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The dynamic node management protocol configured by the backend platform includes a node online function; The dynamic multi-node network implements the node online function in the following ways: Step S111: Go online and load the dynamic node management protocol to obtain the backend management platform interface information; Step S112: the online node sends an online request to the backend management platform; Step S113: the backend management platform performs verification after receiving the online request of the online node; Step S114: If the verification is passed, the backend management platform generates a node identifier for the online node and issues an online permission; Step S115: the backend management platform broadcasts the online permission in the dynamic multi-node network; Step S116: After receiving the online permission, the online node of the dynamic multi-node network verifies the online node; Step S117: If the verification is passed, the online node stores or changes the online node information, and feeds back the operation result to the back-end management platform; Step S118: The backend management platform verifies whether all online nodes have successfully stored or changed the online node information based on the operation results fed back by the online nodes, and returns the verification results to the online nodes.

4. The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The online request of the online node at least includes an offline node identifier; In step S113, after the backend management platform receives the online request of the online node and performs verification, the following further steps are performed: Determine whether the online node is in offline node status according to the offline node identifier: If it is an offline node state, the backend management platform searches the database to determine whether the online node exists. If so, the node state of the online node is modified to an online state. If not, the search fails and an error message is returned to the online node. In the step S116, after receiving the online permission, the online node of the dynamic multi-node network verifies the online node, further comprising: Determine whether the online node is in offline node status according to the offline node identifier: If it is in the offline node state, the online node searches the database to determine whether the online node exists. If so, the node state of the online node is modified to the online state. If not, the search fails, and the node list of the back-end management platform is obtained and synchronized.

5. The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The online request of the online node at least includes an offline node identifier; In step S113, after the backend management platform receives the online request of the online node and performs verification, the following further steps are performed: Determine whether the online node is a new node according to the offline node identifier; If it is a new node, the backend management platform searches the database to determine whether the online node exists. If it exists, an error message is returned to the online node. If it does not exist, the backend management platform stores the online node information in the database. After receiving the online permission, the online node of the dynamic multi-node network in step S116 verifies the online node, further comprising: Determine whether the online node is a new node according to the offline node identifier; If it is a new node, the online node searches the database to determine whether the online node exists. If so, it returns and sends an error message to the online node. If not, the online node stores the online node information in the database.

6. The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The dynamic node management protocol configured by the backend management platform includes a node offline function; The dynamic multi-node network implements the node offline function in the following ways: Step S121: The backend management platform monitors the dynamic multi-node network status and obtains node alarm information, wherein the node alarm information includes an alarm node identifier, retrieves and verifies the identity information of the alarm node according to the alarm node identifier, and returns an error result if the identity information verification fails; Step S122: If the identity information verification passes, the backend management platform sets the alarm node to an offline node state; Step S123: The backend management platform broadcasts in the dynamic multi-node network to notify all online nodes of the offline node information; Step S124: After receiving the offline node message, the online node of the dynamic multi-node network performs message verification on the offline node, changes the corresponding node state to the offline node state after the verification passes, and returns the result to the back-end management platform after the operation is completed; Step S125: After receiving the operation results of all online nodes, the backend management platform determines whether all online nodes have completed the offline node change operation. If so, a success result is returned; otherwise, an error result is returned.

7. The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The dynamic node management protocol configured by the backend management platform includes a node deregistration function; The dynamic multi-node network implements the node deregistration function in the following manner: Step S131: The node applying for deregistration initiates a deregistration request; Step S132: After receiving the node deregistration request, the backend management platform verifies the identity of the node for which deregistration is applied, and after verification, operates the database to deregister the node for which deregistration is applied; Step S133: the backend management platform issues a cancellation permit; Step S134: the backend management platform broadcasts in the dynamic multi-node network to notify all online nodes of the cancellation license; Step S135: After receiving the cancellation permission message, the online node of the dynamic multi-node network performs message verification on the node applying for cancellation, operates the database to complete the cancellation operation after the verification passes, and returns the operation result to the back-end management platform; Step S136: After receiving the operation results of all online nodes, the back-end management platform determines whether all online nodes have completed the node deregistration operation. If so, a success result is returned to the deregistered node to complete the deregistration operation; otherwise, an error result is returned.

8. The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The dynamic node management protocol configured by the backend management platform includes a node synchronization function; The dynamic multi-node network realizes the node synchronization function in the following ways: Step S141: The node applying for synchronization initiates a synchronization node request; Step S142: After receiving the synchronization node request, the backend management platform verifies the identity of the node applying for synchronization; Step S143: After the verification is passed, the backend management platform operates the database to obtain the current node list; Step S144: The backend management platform synchronously sends the node list to the node that applies for synchronization.

9. The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The homomorphic encryption algorithm is the Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm; The dynamic multi-node network generates a threshold key master public key, further comprising: Step S21, node i sets initial parameters, generates a Paillier homomorphic key, and broadcasts the public key of the homomorphic key; Step S22, node i generates SM2 key components and calculation process parameters to form a verifiable secret sharing parameter set, and broadcasts the verifiable secret sharing parameter set and the corresponding hash commitment; Step S23: Node i verifies the hash commitments of other nodes. If all verifications pass, verifiable secret sharing is performed, a T-1 degree polynomial is generated, and the polynomial is evaluated according to the verifiable secret sharing parameter sets of other nodes. Step S24, node i uses the Paillier homomorphic key to encrypt the polynomial and the SM2 key component to generate the corresponding first step MtA encryption value; Step S25: Node i performs homomorphic encryption operation using the Paillier public key based on the received first-step MtA encrypted value and the received verifiable secret sharing parameter set, decomposes multiplication into addition, generates its own second-step MtA encrypted value, and broadcasts it; Step S26, node i decrypts the second step MtA encrypted value using the Paillier private key, and generates the third step MtA protocol value in combination with the received verifiable secret sharing parameter set; Step S27, node i verifies the MtA protocol value in the third step. After the verification is passed, the SM2 key component is calculated. After the calculation is completed, the node threshold key master public key is obtained.

10. The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network according to claim 9, characterized in that: The step S24 further comprises: node i uses a zero-knowledge proof algorithm to generate a zero-knowledge proof of the encrypted value of MtA in the first step and broadcasts it; The step S25 further comprises: node i verifies the zero-knowledge proof of the encrypted value MtA in the first step, generates the zero-knowledge proof of the encrypted value MtA in the second step by using the zero-knowledge proof algorithm and broadcasts it; The step S26 further includes: node i verifies the zero-knowledge proof of the encrypted value MtA in the second step.

11. The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network according to claim 9, characterized in that: The initial parameters in step S21 include the total number of threshold nodes N, the threshold value T, the node session identifier rtig i ; The step S22 further comprises the following steps: Step S221: Randomly generate an integer d i As the SM2 private key component of node i, and calculate the corresponding SM2 public key component D i ; Step S222: Node i generates calculation process parameters, which include the first parameter component ρ i , the second parameter component u i , the third parameter component γ i and the fourth parameter component Γ i ; Step S223: Set the node session identifier rtig i , public key component D i , the fourth parameter component Γ i , the first parameter component ρ i , the second parameter component u i Combined to generate a verifiable secret sharing parameter set {rtig i ,D i ,Γ i ,ρ i ,u i }, combine the hash values ​​of the verifiable secret sharing parameter set to generate the hash commitment V of node i i ; Step S224: Node i hashes the commitment V i Broadcast and send the verifiable secret sharing parameter set {rtig i ,D i ,Γ i ,ρ i ,u i } for broadcasting.

12. The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network according to claim 11, characterized in that: The step S23 further comprises the following steps: Node i, based on the received verifiable secret sharing parameter set of the corresponding node, calculates the hash value and compares it with the hash commitment of the corresponding node; If the check passes, node i constructs a T-1 degree polynomial where j≠i, a (i,k) is a random number.

13. The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network according to claim 11, characterized in that: The step S24 further comprises the following steps: Step S241: Node i encrypts the T-1 polynomial using the Paillier public key and converts the T-1 polynomial into the first ciphertext EVSS (i,j) ; Step S242: Node i receives SM2 private key component d i Use Paillier public key to encrypt and convert SM2 private key component d i Convert to the second ciphertext EKEY (i,j) ; Step S243: Node i generates the first ciphertext EVSS (i,j) 、Second EKEY (i,j) As a first step, the MtA encrypted value is broadcast to other corresponding nodes.

14. The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network according to claim 13, characterized in that: The step S25 further comprises the following steps: Step S251: Decrypt the received first step MtA encrypted value using the Paillier public key to obtain the first EVSS (i,j) Corresponding plaintext VSS (i,j) ; Step S252: Decrypt the plain text VSS (i,j) Add all together to get the node polynomial value Y i , and calculate the node polynomial global parameter YK i ; Step S253: by accumulating all fourth parameter components Γ i , and obtain the fourth global parameter Γ; Step S254: by accumulating all SM2 public key components D i , get the SM2 public key global parameter A; Step S255: Node i generates a random number β (i,j) And use the corresponding Paillier public key to β′ (i,j) Encrypt and obtain β′ (i,j) The corresponding ciphertext, where β′ (i,j) =-β (i,j) ; Step S256: Calculate the second step MtA encryption value E (i,j) =EKEY (i,j) *γ i +β′; Step S257: Node i broadcasts {E (i,j) ,β′ (i,j) ,YK i }.

15. The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network according to claim 14, characterized in that: The step S26 further comprises the following steps: Step S261: Node i uses the Paillier private key to encrypt the value E in the second step MtA (i,j) Decrypt and calculate the first exchange parameter α (i,j) ; Step S262: According to the first exchange parameter α (i,j) Accumulate and obtain the first intermediate value component δ i , according to the SM2 private key component d i and the fourth global parameter Γ to obtain the second intermediate value component Δ i ; Step S263: Node i calculates {Δ i ,δ i The value is used as the third step MtA protocol value and broadcast to other nodes.

16. The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network according to claim 15, characterized in that: The step S27 further comprises the following steps: Step S271: Calculate the first intermediate value Second median value Step S272, check whether Δ is equal to δ*G; Step S273: If the verification is passed, calculate and obtain the node threshold key master public key X = δ -1 *Γ-G.

17. The threshold key management system based on dynamic multi-node network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The homomorphic encryption algorithm is the Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm; The dynamic multi-node network performs SM2 threshold signature in the following manner, further comprising: Step S31, node i generates a signature random number, encrypts it using the Paillier homomorphic key, obtains the MtA signature parameter value in the first step, and broadcasts it; Step S32: Node i performs homomorphic encryption operation through the Paillier public key, decomposes multiplication into addition, generates the second-step MtA signature parameter value required by T-1 nodes, and broadcasts the parameter after the calculation is completed; Step S33: Node i obtains the MtA signature parameter value E in the third step (i,j) ; Step S34: Node i uses the SM2 key component and the MtA signature parameter value of the third step E (i,j) , according to the SM2 algorithm, calculate the signature component of the original text and the corresponding zero-knowledge proof, and broadcast the signature component and zero-knowledge proof after the calculation is completed; Step S35, node i verifies the zero-knowledge proof, and after the verification is passed, accumulates all signature components to obtain the actual signature data.

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