Train operation control system based on SIL4 perception technology

Abstract

The invention discloses a train operation control system based on an SIL4-level perception technology, and relates to the field of train operation control systems. According to the train operation control system, the SIL4-level sensing technology is adopted as the core technology of a backup subsystem of the train operation control system, the signal machine state and obstacle information can be recognized through the visual sensing technology, the sensing movement authorization is calculated, train front clearance monitoring and train operation control are deeply fused, and therefore the train can operate under ATP safety protection; and in combination with a backup sensing system, the operation safety and fault recovery efficiency of the vehicle-vehicle system under the backup level are improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of train operation control systems, and in particular to a train operation control system based on SIL4 level sensing technology. Background Art

[0002] The statements in this section merely provide background information related to the present disclosure and may not constitute prior art.

[0003] The full name of the CBTC system is the Communication-Based Train Control System. It adopts advanced communications and computer calculations to continuously control and monitor the moving block mode of train operation. It realizes information exchange between trains and stations or control centers through on-board equipment and trackside communication equipment to complete train operation control.

[0004] Due to the high density and high speed of urban rail transit vehicles, the CBTC system has the advantages of short departure intervals and higher safety and reliability, so it has been widely used in the field of urban rail transit signal systems in recent years. CBTC technology is also a sustainable and cutting-edge train operation control technology, such as the basis of new generation technologies such as FAO, I-CBTC, and train control systems based on vehicle-to-vehicle communication.

[0005] At present, CBTC systems generally have three levels of control, namely CBTC level, point level, and interlocking level. The point system corresponding to the point level is a degraded system and has limitations in use in the event of a failure. The main problems are as follows:

[0006] 1. In case of a bicycle wireless communication failure, the following problems will occur:

[0007] Stop and wait: Since the point system adopts the route blocking method, when the line interval is small, there will usually be multiple trains in one route. When the rear train in the route is downgraded, it needs to stop and wait for the front train (CBTC level) to clear the route. If the front train in the route is downgraded, the rear train will be downgraded, and the rear train will also need to stop and wait for the front train to clear the route.

[0008] The efficiency of upgrading to point level is low: the current point system requires the train to be downgraded and run in RM mode (speed limit 25km / h) to the variable transponder ahead before it can be upgraded to the point level, and the upgrading efficiency is low.

[0009] In response to the above situation, the common measures currently in operation are: downgraded trains enter the station in RM mode. If they can be upgraded normally when leaving the station, the trains continue to operate; if they cannot be restored, they are switched to EUM mode and manually driven off the line.

[0010] 2. When a wireless communication failure occurs in the operating area, the following problems will occur:

[0011] Stop and wait: When there are multiple vehicles on the approach route, the vehicle needs to stop and wait for the train ahead to clear before continuing to run;

[0012] Increased workload for dispatchers: Dispatchers cannot understand the actual location of trains and need to confirm the location of trains one by one and direct them to clear the routes one by one;

[0013] Low upgrade efficiency: see the corresponding description of "Single-vehicle wireless communication failure";

[0014] Car pressing: The point system adopts route blocking, and the system interval is larger than that of the main system, which will cause the subsequent trains to press;

[0015] In response to this situation, the common handling measures in current operations are: the train stops and waits, the dispatcher confirms the location of the faulty train one by one, and directs the trains to clear the route in sequence. When there is only one car in the route and the point operation conditions are met, the train switches to RM mode in the fault area, operates in the route blocking mode, and organizes some trains to go offline according to the vehicle pressure situation.

[0016] 3. When wireless communication fails on the entire line, trains will stop and wait, dispatchers’ workload will increase, upgrade efficiency will be low, and trains will be stuck.

[0017] In response to this situation, the common handling method in current operations is: the dispatcher confirms the idle area of ​​the line section, manually directs the trains to clear the approach in sequence, and directs some trains to go offline. When there is only one car in the approach and the point operation conditions are met, the train switches to RM mode in the fault area and operates in the approach blocking mode. Summary of the invention

[0018] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a train operation control system based on SIL4 level perception technology in response to the problems existing in the prior art. The SIL4 level perception technology is used as the core technology of the backup subsystem of the train operation control system. Its visual perception technology can be used to identify the status of signal machines, obstacle information and calculate perception movement authorization, and the clearance monitoring in front of the train is deeply integrated with the train operation control, so as to realize the operation of the train under ATP safety protection. Combined with the backup perception system, the operation safety and fault recovery efficiency of the vehicle system at the backup level are improved.

[0019] The technical solution of the present invention is as follows:

[0020] A train operation control system based on SIL4 level sensing technology, including: adding ITE Hawkeye system based on the existing CBTC system architecture;

[0021] The ITE Hawkeye system collects line information data ahead of the train through sensor equipment, and uses real-time positioning, map construction technology and sensor fusion technology to achieve train precise positioning, obstacle detection, and traffic light recognition functions; and dynamically calculates the visible distance based on the line conditions and obstacle detection results, and comprehensively calculates the train operation curve to achieve train safety protection functions.

[0022] Furthermore, after the ITE Hawkeye system is used as the train backup sensing system, the train operation control system adds the ABL operation level on the basis of the original operation level; when the train operation control system only calculates the mobile authorization driving based on the backup sensing system, the operation level is defined as the ABL operation level.

[0023] Furthermore, on the basis of the main communication, backup communication is added to confirm and protect the operation information in real time; when the main communication fails, the backup communication establishes a continuous communication channel between the train and the ground equipment.

[0024] Furthermore, backup communication is used to transmit key information during train operation and entry into the station. The trackside RC forwards the key information to the ATP system through backup communication. The ATP system can protect the train operation in real time based on the hazard source information.

[0025] Furthermore, the backup communication link selects a transmission mode other than the primary communication.

[0026] Furthermore, the primary communication selects LTE technology, and the backup communication selects WLAN technology.

[0027] Furthermore, both on-board equipment and ground equipment need to judge the status of the main communication and backup communication links. The link priority is that the main communication is higher than the backup communication. Under normal circumstances, the main communication transmits information, and the backup communication maintains the link through periodic information. When the train needs to enter the ABL operating level, the main communication is used first under normal circumstances, and the backup communication is used to transmit information when the main communication is unavailable.

[0028] Furthermore, when the train is at the ABL operating level, the ground equipment completes the linkage screen door function through the backup communication information, and does not use the backup communication information in other cases.

[0029] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0030] 1. The present invention adds a backup sensing ITE system on the basis of the existing communication-based train automatic control system architecture to form a train operation control system based on SIL4 level sensing technology. The backup sensing equipment identifies the signal status and track area clearance monitoring to ensure the safety of train operation.

[0031] 2. When a train-to-ground communication failure occurs, or an RC crash occurs, or the system cannot rely on RC information to calculate movement authorization for the train, the present invention can calculate movement authorization for the train through the backup sensing system, and the train can run safely under the protection of the ATP system, thereby solving the problem of long-term train detention in the section and improving the processing capability of the train system under equipment failure and the efficiency of fault recovery. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0032] Figure 1 This is a communication block diagram of a train operation control system based on SIL4 level sensing technology. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0033] It should be noted that relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "include", "comprise" or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or device. In the absence of further restrictions, the elements defined by the sentence "comprise a ..." do not exclude the existence of other identical elements in the process, method, article or device including the elements.

[0034] The features and performance of the present invention are further described in detail below in conjunction with the embodiments.

[0035] Embodiment 1

[0036] See also Figure 1 , a train operation control system based on SIL4 level sensing technology, including:

[0037] The ITE Hawkeye system is added to the existing CBTC system architecture to form a train operation control system based on SIL4-level sensing technology; the ITE Hawkeye system is a backup sensing system and technical supplement for the train system, which greatly improves the system availability;

[0038] The ITE Hawkeye system collects line information data ahead of the train through radar, camera and other sensor equipment, and uses real-time positioning, map construction technology and sensor fusion technology to achieve precise train positioning, obstacle detection and traffic light recognition functions; and dynamically calculates the visible distance based on the line conditions and obstacle detection results, and comprehensively calculates the train operation curve to achieve train safety protection functions; the ITE Hawkeye system, as a backup perception system, mainly improves the safety of train operation at the reserve level and the train operation efficiency after fault recovery.

[0039] After the ITE Eagle Eye system is used as the train backup perception system, the train operation control system adds the ABL operation level on the basis of the original operation level; when the train operation control system only calculates the mobile authorization based on the backup perception system, the operation level is defined as the ABL operation level; specifically, when the train-ground wireless communication fails, the ground equipment system fails, or the train has not completed screening and cannot calculate the mobile authorization, the on-board equipment cannot calculate the mobile authorization for the train based on the real-time ground information, and the mobile authorization can be calculated for the train in real time based on the backup perception system. After manual confirmation, the train runs based on the backup perception mobile authorization. At this time, the train operation level is the backup perception operation level, which is defined as the ABL operation level.

[0040] The ABL operating level is based on the perception of line of sight driving or identification of traffic lights. The existing VBTC / CBTC level section blocking status, SPKS pressed, PSD turned on, ESB pressed, temporary speed limit set (lower than the ABL speed limit), and established protection areas will all affect the VBTC level operation. Therefore, at the ABL operating level, the on-board equipment cannot obtain the above information and requires manual confirmation before driving.

[0041] In order to meet the requirement that the train can continue to operate at the ABL operating level by relying on the backup sensing system, it is necessary to add backup communication to confirm and protect the above information in real time; after confirming the above information remotely or locally, the train can continue to operate at the ABL operating level to the red light signal or the nearest platform in front.

[0042] After the train was downgraded, in order to reduce the pressure on dispatching train control, backup communications were added. At the same time, the automation capabilities of train dispatching and control were also improved to ensure that the trains could enter the station normally.

[0043] That is, on the basis of the main communication, backup communication is added to confirm and protect the operation information in real time; when the main communication fails, the backup communication establishes a continuous communication channel between the train and the ground equipment; that is, using an independent communication module, the key information of the front line and the key information of the train are transmitted to the ground equipment through an independent communication link, completing the information transmission function when the main communication fails.

[0044] Due to bandwidth and real-time limitations, backup communications are mainly used to transmit key information during train operation and entry, such as platform doors, emergency closures, SPKS, section blockades, temporary speed limits, and established protection areas. Trackside RC forwards key information to the ATP system through backup communications. The ATP system can protect train operation in real time based on hazard source information.

[0045] In this embodiment, specifically, the backup communication link selects a transmission mode other than the primary communication; for example, the primary communication selects LTE technology, and the backup communication selects WLAN technology, such as Figure 1 As shown;

[0046] Taking data transmission from the center to the vehicle as an example, the data transmission path of the backup communication is:

[0047] Starting point: Center. Through the signal system, through the firewall, to the external system.

[0048] Passing point: trackside. Shared vehicle-mounted WLAN network channel.

[0049] End point: in-vehicle. Using the WLAN channel of the external system, the data is transmitted to the communication device of the external system, which forwards the data to the backup communication device of the signal system.

[0050] For unmanned FAO lines, for ABL_FAM / CAM mode trains, key hazard source information such as SPKS can be obtained in real time based on backup communication to ensure the driving safety of ABL_FAM / CAM mode trains. The above risks that cannot be avoided manually can be avoided through train-to-ground communication. At the same time, in the event of other risks, the dispatcher can remotely control the train to stop in time.

[0051] For manned lines, for ABL_AM mode trains, key hazard source information such as SPKS can be obtained in real time based on backup communications to ensure the driving safety of ABL_AM mode trains. For ABL_CM mode trains, the driver and the central dispatcher cooperate to protect the train operation.

[0052] The details are as follows:

[0053] Table 1 Safety protection methods in different operation modes

[0054]

[0055] The vehicle-mounted and ground-based equipment establish secure communication through backup communication, and the vehicle-mounted and ground-based equipment exchange information through the backup communication cycle. When the primary communication is normal, information is also exchanged through the backup communication cycle. When the backup communication is abnormal, the vehicle-mounted equipment can alarm to inform the central dispatch.

[0056] In this embodiment, specifically, both the on-board equipment and the ground equipment need to determine the status of the main communication and backup communication links. The link priority is that the main communication is higher than the backup communication. Under normal circumstances, the main communication transmits information, and the backup communication maintains the link through periodic information. When the train needs to enter the ABL operating level, the main communication is used first under normal circumstances, and the backup communication is used to transmit information when the main communication is unavailable.

[0057] In this embodiment, specifically, when the train is at the ABL operation level, the ground equipment completes the linkage screen door function through the backup communication information, and does not use the backup communication information in other cases.

[0058] When the ground equipment and the vehicle communicate through backup communication, the dispatch interface should have corresponding prompts or alarms. (Note: The content of the backup link interaction is not the complete version of the dispatch command information. If the interactive information of the backup link is used, it is regarded as a change in the dispatch command mode. Therefore, it is recommended to prompt the dispatcher or require the dispatcher's confirmation before use.)

[0059] The above-mentioned embodiments only express the specific implementation methods of the present application, and the descriptions thereof are relatively specific and detailed, but they cannot be understood as limiting the protection scope of the present application. It should be pointed out that, for ordinary technicians in this field, several variations and improvements can be made without departing from the technical solution concept of the present application, and these all belong to the protection scope of the present application.

[0060] This background section is provided to generally present the context of the invention, and the work of the presently named inventors, the work to the extent described in this background section, and aspects of this section that did not constitute prior art at the time of application are neither explicitly nor implicitly admitted to be prior art to the present invention.

Claims

1. A train operation control system based on SIL4 level sensing technology, characterized in that: include: Adding ITE Hawkeye system based on the existing CBTC system architecture; The ITE Hawkeye system collects line information data ahead of the train through sensor equipment, and uses real-time positioning, map construction technology and sensor fusion technology to achieve train precise positioning, obstacle detection, and traffic light recognition functions; and dynamically calculates the visible distance based on the line conditions and obstacle detection results, and comprehensively calculates the train operation curve to achieve train safety protection functions.

2. A train operation control system based on SIL4 level sensing technology according to claim 1, characterized in that: After the ITE Eagle Eye system is used as the train backup sensing system, the train operation control system adds the ABL operation level on the basis of the original operation level; when the train operation control system only calculates the mobile authorization driving based on the backup sensing system, this operation level is defined as the ABL operation level.

3. A train operation control system based on SIL4 level sensing technology according to claim 2, characterized in that: On the basis of primary communication, backup communication is added to confirm and protect operation information in real time; when the primary communication fails, the backup communication establishes a continuous communication channel between the train and ground equipment.

4. A train operation control system based on SIL4 level sensing technology according to claim 3, characterized in that: Backup communication is used to transmit key information during train operation and entry into the station. The trackside RC forwards the key information to the ATP system through backup communication. The ATP system can protect the train operation in real time based on the hazard source information.

5. A train operation control system based on SIL4 level sensing technology according to claim 4, characterized in that: The backup communication link selects a transmission mode other than the primary communication.

6. A train operation control system based on SIL4 level sensing technology according to claim 5, characterized in that: LTE technology is selected for primary communication, and WLAN technology is selected for backup communication.

7. A train operation control system based on SIL4 level sensing technology according to claim 6, characterized in that: Both on-board equipment and ground equipment need to determine the status of the primary communication and backup communication links. The link priority is that primary communication is higher than backup communication. Under normal circumstances, primary communication transmits information, and backup communication maintains the link through periodic information. When the train needs to enter the ABL operating level, primary communication is used first under normal circumstances, and backup communication is used to transmit information when primary communication is unavailable.

8. A train operation control system based on SIL4 level sensing technology according to claim 7, characterized in that: When the train is at the ABL operating level, the ground equipment completes the linkage screen door function through the backup communication information. In other cases, the backup communication information is not needed.

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