Encryption control method for aggregation agent terminal of virtual power plant

Abstract

The invention provides a virtual power plant aggregation agent terminal encryption control method, which comprises the following steps that: S1, a master station initiates a connection request to a gateway to require connection with a device; s2, the authentication gateway initiates TCP connection with the device and performs bidirectional identity authentication between the gateway and the device; s3, after the authentication succeeds, the gateway returns a connection success result to the master station; s4, the master station starts to initiate connection with the device, and bidirectional identity authentication of the master station and the device is carried out; s5, after the authentication succeeds, the master station reads the chip serial number, the key version and other information of the device; and S6, starting service interaction between the master station and the device. According to the invention, the security of a communication link between the device and the master station is ensured, the confidentiality and integrity of data transmission between the device and the master station are ensured, and bidirectional identity authentication between the master station and the device is realized.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of encrypted communications, and in particular to an encryption control method for a virtual power plant aggregation proxy terminal. Background Art

[0002] State Grid Corporation of China proposed the concept of "ubiquitous power Internet of Things" in 2018. Ubiquitous power Internet of Things is to give full play to the advantages of advanced communication technology in different business scenarios of the power grid system, and through the integration with intelligent communication technology, add intelligent configuration in various business scenarios of the power system, so that the power Internet of Things has the characteristics of multi-directional state perception, rapid information processing and convenient and flexible application, and further realize the intelligent development of power transmission, distribution and power consumption. The power Internet of Things will configure sensor terminal equipment with certain perception, computing and communication functions in various links of the power grid. With the help of advanced intelligent communication technology, it will complete the functions of large-scale data collection, safe and reliable information transmission, integrated collaborative processing and application integration, so as to gradually realize the comprehensive perception of business, intelligent management and high integration of information in the whole process of stable operation of the power grid and management of various links.

[0003] Wireless private networks can provide multi-level security protection for power base stations, core networks, backhaul networks, and business terminals based on the differentiated security requirements of different power businesses, thereby achieving the goal of efficiently improving the security and stability of wireless communications. Compared with wireless public network communications, it avoids security risks brought about by Internet access and third-party participation. Summary of the invention

[0004] 1. Technical issues to be resolved

[0005] The invention provides an encryption control method for a virtual power plant aggregation proxy terminal.

[0006] (II) Technical solution

[0007] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention is implemented through the following technical solutions:

[0008] A virtual power plant aggregation proxy terminal encryption control method comprises the following steps:

[0009] S1. The master station initiates a connection request to the gateway, requesting to connect to the device;

[0010] S2. The authentication gateway initiates a TCP connection with the device and performs a two-way identity authentication between the gateway and the device;

[0011] S3. After successful authentication, the gateway returns the result of successful connection to the main station;

[0012] S4, the master station starts to initiate a connection with the device and performs a two-way identity authentication between the master station and the device;

[0013] S5. After successful authentication, the master station reads the chip serial number and key version of the device;

[0014] S6. Business interaction begins between the master station and the device.

[0015] Furthermore, in step S2, the two-way identity authentication between the device and the authentication gateway uses the SM2 digital certificate required by the national encryption standard to implement the two-way identity authentication between the authentication gateway and the device.

[0016] Furthermore, the two-way identity authentication process between the authentication gateway and the device is as follows:

[0017] (1) Establishing a network connection between the gateway and the device;

[0018] (2) The authentication gateway generates a random number R1 and sends it to the device;

[0019] (3) The device takes a random number R2, signs R1+R2 and sends it to the master station, while the device saves R1;

[0020] (4) The authentication gateway verifies the validity of the signature with the device certificate. After the verification is completed, the master station completes the identity of the device. The gateway then signs the device random number R2 and sends the signature result to the device.

[0021] (5) The device verifies the correctness of the gateway signature. The verification completes the device's identity authentication of the gateway and returns authentication confirmation information.

[0022] Furthermore, the two-way identity authentication between the master station and the device in step S4 includes two-way identity authentication based on digital certificates, secure interaction of telesignaling and telemetry messages, secure interaction of remote control messages, and secure interaction of remote parameter update messages.

[0023] Furthermore, after the two-way authentication based on digital certificates establishes a link between the device and the main station, two-way authentication is required before the application data message is transmitted; the authentication is initiated by the main station, and the device responds passively. If one party fails to authenticate the other party, the authentication failure information is returned, and the other party's data is not responded; the authentication process is as follows:

[0024] (1) The master station obtains the master station random number R1 from the encryption authentication device (cipher machine) and sends it to the device;

[0025] (2) The device takes a random number R2, signs R1+R2 and sends it to the master station, while the device saves R1;

[0026] (3) The master station verifies the validity of the device signature. After the verification is completed, the master station completes the identity of the device. Then the master station signs the device random number R2 and sends the result to the device.

[0027] (4) The device verifies the correctness of the signature of the master station. After verification, the device completes the identity authentication of the master station and returns the authentication confirmation information;

[0028] (5) After successful authentication, the master station sends a message to read the serial number of the device chip;

[0029] (6) The device returns the serial number of the chip;

[0030] (7) The master station sends a message to read the device key version;

[0031] (8) The device returns the version number of the key currently in the chip.

[0032] Furthermore, the telesignaling and telemetry message interaction process between the device and the master station is as follows:

[0033] (1) The device encrypts the message to be uploaded and calculates the message authentication code MAC, and sends the ciphertext data + MAC as the data field of the uplink message to the master station;

[0034] (2) After receiving the message, the master station first verifies the integrity of the data (verifies the correctness of the MAC) and decrypts it to obtain the plaintext data.

[0035] Furthermore, after the two-way identity authentication is passed, the master station can remotely operate the device at any time within a link connection. The security interaction process of the remote control message is described as follows:

[0036] (1) The master station signs the remote control selection command message to be sent, encrypts the signature data and the original message data, and sends it to the device;

[0037] (2) After receiving the data, the device first decrypts it to obtain the original text and signature data, and then determines the validity of the instruction, verifies the correctness of the signature of the master station, and returns an error message to the master station if it is incorrect; it correctly executes the relevant operations, and obtains the device random number and confirmation message, and then encrypts them and sends them to the master station;

[0038] (3) The master station decrypts the device data and verifies the MAC. If the verification is correct, the master station signs the data to be sent, obtains the signature result, encrypts the signature result and the original text, time and other information, and sends them to the device;

[0039] (4) The device decrypts the encrypted data of the master station, determines the validity of the instruction, verifies the correctness of the signature of the master station, correctly executes the relevant operations, and incorrectly returns error information to the master station.

[0040] Furthermore, after the two-way identity authentication is passed, the master station can perform remote parameter update operations on the device within a link connection. The secure interaction process of remote parameter update is as follows:

[0041] (1) The master station sends an encrypted command to read the fixed area code to the device;

[0042] (2) After receiving the data, the device decrypts and executes the fixed value area code reading operation, and encrypts and returns the fixed value area code reading confirmation command;

[0043] (3) The master station sends an encrypted parameter reading command to the device;

[0044] (4) After the device receives the data, it decrypts the name to execute the parameter reading operation and encrypts the returned parameter reading confirmation command;

[0045] (5) The master station signs the command to be issued to switch the fixed value zone, obtains the signature result, encrypts the command message and the signature result, and sends them to the device;

[0046] (6) After receiving the data, the device decrypts and verifies the validity of the signature of the data, executes the operation of switching the fixed value area, and encrypts and returns the confirmation command of switching the fixed value area;

[0047] (7) The master station signs the parameter preset command message to be sent, obtains signature result data, encrypts the message and signature result data, and sends them to the device;

[0048] (8) After receiving the data, the device first decrypts it to obtain the original text and the signature result, verifies the correctness of the signature result of the master station, and returns an error message to the master station if it is incorrect; correctly executes the relevant operations, obtains the device random number, confirms the encryption of the device random number and the parameter preset command, calculates the MAC, and then uploads it to the master station;

[0049] (9) The master station decrypts the device's uplink data and verifies the MAC. If the verification is correct, the master station signs the data to be sent down, obtains the signature result, encrypts the original data and the signature result, and sends them to the device;

[0050] (10) After the device decrypts the master station data, it verifies the correctness of the master station signature, correctly executes the remote parameter update operation, and records the result in the device log;

[0051] (11) The device encrypts the uplink data (parameter solidification / cancel command confirmation) and calculates the MAC, and finally uploads the ciphertext and MAC data to the master station;

[0052] (12) The master station decrypts the device uplink data (parameter solidification / cancel command confirmation) and verifies the MAC for confirmation;

[0053] (13) The master station reads the remote update parameters and confirms the parameter modification results.

[0054] (III) Beneficial effects

[0055] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: a virtual power plant aggregation proxy terminal encryption control method ensures the security of the communication link between the device and the main station, protects the confidentiality and integrity of the data transmitted between the device and the main station, and realizes two-way identity authentication between the main station and the device; the present invention can focus on preventing malicious damage and attacks on the main station system in the form of attacks such as forged device identity and replay attacks, as well as other illegal operations, to prevent the resulting power grid system accidents. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0056] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0057] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of the encryption control method of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0058] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0059] The security protection scheme of the virtual power plant aggregation proxy terminal involves the main station system, the security access gateway and the terminal device. The security protection of the virtual power plant aggregation proxy terminal should use the two-way authentication technology based on digital certificates to realize the two-way identity authentication between the device and the main station; use the data encryption and message authentication technology based on the symmetric cryptographic algorithm to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the business data; use the domestic cryptographic algorithm and adopt the domestic security chip to realize the storage, management and cryptographic operation of the device key. In the design scheme of the virtual power plant aggregation proxy terminal, the encryption chip is connected to the terminal CPU chip using the SPI interface, and the CPU chip provides 3.3V working power for the encryption chip.

[0060] The security chip SC1161 is a 32-bit CPU chip that supports the SPI interface and integrates 128KB codeflash and 32KB data flash memory. The security chip SC1161 can be used for security protection of the device side in the automation system. It can be used as the unique identifier of the device, providing a secure hardware platform and important data storage functions. The device can use the built-in security chip to realize the encryption and decryption of device data, two-way identity authentication with the master system, and integrity protection of communication data, ensuring the security of device data storage, transmission, and interaction.

[0061] Combination Figure 1 , a virtual power plant aggregation agent terminal encryption control method, comprising the following steps:

[0062] S1. The master station initiates a connection request to the gateway, requesting to connect to the device.

[0063] S2. The authentication gateway initiates a TCP connection with the device and performs a two-way identity authentication between the gateway and the device.

[0064] The two-way identity authentication between the device and the authentication gateway uses the SM2 digital certificate required by the national secret standard to achieve two-way identity authentication between the authentication gateway and the device. The two-way identity authentication process between the authentication gateway and the device is as follows:

[0065] (1) Establishing a network connection between the gateway and the device;

[0066] (2) The authentication gateway generates a random number R1 and sends it to the device;

[0067] (3) The device takes a random number R2, signs R1+R2 and sends it to the master station, while the device saves R1;

[0068] (4) The authentication gateway verifies the validity of the signature with the device certificate. After the verification is completed, the master station completes the identity of the device. The gateway then signs the device random number R2 and sends the signature result to the device.

[0069] (5) The device verifies the correctness of the gateway signature. The verification completes the device's identity authentication of the gateway and returns authentication confirmation information.

[0070] S3. After successful authentication, the gateway returns the result of successful connection to the main station.

[0071] S4. The master station starts to initiate a connection with the device and performs a two-way identity authentication between the master station and the device.

[0072] Bidirectional identity authentication based on digital certificates requires bidirectional identity authentication after a link is established between the device and the master station and before application data message transmission. Identity authentication is initiated by the master station and the device responds passively. If one party fails to authenticate the other party, it returns authentication failure information and does not respond to the other party's data. The authentication process is as follows:

[0073] (1) The master station obtains the master station random number R1 from the encryption authentication device (cipher machine) and sends it to the device;

[0074] (2) The device takes a random number R2, signs R1+R2 and sends it to the master station, while the device saves R1;

[0075] (3) The master station verifies the validity of the device signature. After the verification is completed, the master station completes the identity of the device. Then the master station signs the device random number R2 and sends the result to the device.

[0076] (4) The device verifies the correctness of the signature of the master station. After verification, the device completes the identity authentication of the master station and returns the authentication confirmation information;

[0077] (5) After successful authentication, the master station sends a message to read the serial number of the device chip;

[0078] (6) The device returns the serial number of the chip;

[0079] (7) The master station sends a message to read the device key version;

[0080] (8) The device returns the version number of the key currently in the chip.

[0081] The telesignaling and telemetry message interaction process between the device and the master station is as follows:

[0082] (1) The device encrypts the message to be uploaded and calculates the message authentication code MAC, and sends the ciphertext data + MAC as the data field of the uplink message to the master station;

[0083] (2) After receiving the message, the master station first verifies the integrity of the data (verifies the correctness of the MAC) and decrypts it to obtain the plaintext data.

[0084] After the two-way identity authentication is passed, the master station can remotely operate the device at any time within a link connection. The security interaction process of the remote control message is described as follows:

[0085] (1) The master station signs the remote control selection command message to be sent, encrypts the signature data and the original message data, and sends it to the device;

[0086] (2) After receiving the data, the device first decrypts it to obtain the original text and signature data, and then determines the validity of the instruction, verifies the correctness of the signature of the master station, and returns an error message to the master station if it is incorrect; it correctly executes the relevant operations, and obtains the device random number and confirmation message, and then encrypts them and sends them to the master station;

[0087] (3) The master station decrypts the device data and verifies the MAC. If the verification is correct, the master station signs the data to be sent, obtains the signature result, encrypts the signature result and the original text, time and other information, and sends them to the device;

[0088] (4) The device decrypts the encrypted data of the master station, determines the validity of the instruction, verifies the correctness of the signature of the master station, correctly executes the relevant operations, and incorrectly returns error information to the master station.

[0089] After the two-way identity authentication is passed, the master station can perform remote parameter update operations on the device within a link connection. The secure interaction process of remote parameter update is as follows:

[0090] (1) The master station sends an encrypted command to read the fixed area code to the device;

[0091] (2) After receiving the data, the device decrypts and executes the fixed value area code reading operation, and encrypts and returns the fixed value area code reading confirmation command;

[0092] (3) The master station sends an encrypted parameter reading command to the device;

[0093] (4) After the device receives the data, it decrypts the name to execute the parameter reading operation and encrypts the returned parameter reading confirmation command;

[0094] (5) The master station signs the command to be issued to switch the fixed value zone, obtains the signature result, encrypts the command message and the signature result, and sends them to the device;

[0095] (6) After receiving the data, the device decrypts and verifies the validity of the signature of the data, executes the operation of switching the fixed value area, and encrypts and returns the confirmation command of switching the fixed value area;

[0096] (7) The master station signs the parameter preset command message to be sent, obtains signature result data, encrypts the message and signature result data, and sends them to the device;

[0097] (8) After receiving the data, the device first decrypts it to obtain the original text and the signature result, verifies the correctness of the signature result of the master station, and returns an error message to the master station if it is incorrect; correctly executes the relevant operations, obtains the device random number, confirms the encryption of the device random number and the parameter preset command, calculates the MAC, and then uploads it to the master station;

[0098] (9) The master station decrypts the device's uplink data and verifies the MAC. If the verification is correct, the master station signs the data to be sent down, obtains the signature result, encrypts the original data and the signature result, and sends them to the device;

[0099] (10) After the device decrypts the master station data, it verifies the correctness of the master station signature, correctly executes the remote parameter update operation, and records the result in the device log;

[0100] (11) The device encrypts the uplink data (parameter solidification / cancel command confirmation) and calculates the MAC, and finally uploads the ciphertext and MAC data to the master station;

[0101] (12) The master station decrypts the device uplink data (parameter solidification / cancel command confirmation) and verifies the MAC for confirmation;

[0102] (13) The master station reads the remote update parameters and confirms the parameter modification results.

[0103] S5. After successful authentication, the master station reads the chip serial number and key version of the device;

[0104] S6. Business interaction begins between the master station and the device.

[0105] To sum up, the encryption control method of the virtual power plant aggregation proxy terminal in the embodiment of the present invention ensures the security of the communication link between the device and the main station, protects the confidentiality and integrity of the data transmitted between the device and the main station, and realizes two-way identity authentication between the main station and the device; it focuses on preventing malicious damage and attacks on the main station system in the form of attacks such as forged device identity and replay attacks, as well as other illegal operations, to prevent the resulting power grid system accidents.

[0106] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit the same. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments may still be modified, or some of the technical features may be replaced by equivalents. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A virtual power plant aggregation proxy terminal encryption control method, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1. The master station initiates a connection request to the gateway, requesting to connect to the device; S2. The authentication gateway initiates a TCP connection with the device and performs a two-way identity authentication between the gateway and the device; S3. After successful authentication, the gateway returns the result of successful connection to the main station; S4, the master station starts to initiate a connection with the device and performs a two-way identity authentication between the master station and the device; S5. After successful authentication, the master station reads the chip serial number and key version of the device; S6. Business interaction begins between the master station and the device.

2. A virtual power plant aggregation proxy terminal encryption control method as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The two-way identity authentication between the device and the authentication gateway in step S2 uses the SM2 digital certificate required by the national secret standard to implement the two-way identity authentication between the authentication gateway and the device.

3. A virtual power plant aggregation proxy terminal encryption control method as claimed in claim 2, characterized in that: The two-way identity authentication process between the authentication gateway and the device is as follows: (1) Establishing a network connection between the gateway and the device; (2) The authentication gateway generates a random number R1 and sends it to the device; (3) The device takes a random number R2, signs R1+R2 and sends it to the master station, while the device saves R1; (4) The authentication gateway verifies the validity of the signature with the device certificate. After the verification is completed, the master station completes the identity of the device. The gateway then signs the device random number R2 and sends the signature result to the device. (5) The device verifies the correctness of the gateway signature. The verification completes the device's identity authentication of the gateway and returns authentication confirmation information.

4. A virtual power plant aggregation proxy terminal encryption control method as claimed in claim 3, characterized in that: The two-way identity authentication between the master station and the device in step S4 includes two-way identity authentication based on digital certificates, secure interaction of telesignaling and telemetry messages, secure interaction of remote control messages, and secure interaction of remote parameter update messages.

5. A virtual power plant aggregation proxy terminal encryption control method as claimed in claim 4, characterized in that: The two-way identity authentication based on digital certificates requires two-way identity authentication after a link is established between the device and the master station and before application data message transmission; The identity authentication is initiated by the master station, and the device responds passively. If one party fails to authenticate the other party, it returns the authentication failure information and does not respond to the other party's data. The authentication process is as follows: (1) The master station obtains the master station random number R1 from the encryption authentication device (cipher machine) and sends it to the device; (2) The device takes a random number R2, signs R1+R2 and sends it to the master station, while the device saves R1; (3) The master station verifies the validity of the device signature. After the verification is completed, the master station completes the identity of the device. Then the master station signs the device random number R2 and sends the result to the device. (4) The device verifies the correctness of the signature of the master station. After verification, the device completes the identity authentication of the master station and returns the authentication confirmation information; (5) After successful authentication, the master station sends a message to read the serial number of the device chip; (6) The device returns the serial number of the chip; (7) The master station sends a message to read the device key version; (8) The device returns the version number of the key currently in the chip.

6. A virtual power plant aggregation proxy terminal encryption control method as claimed in claim 4, characterized in that: The telesignaling and telemetry message interaction process between the device and the master station is as follows: (1) The device encrypts the message to be uploaded and calculates the message authentication code MAC, and sends the ciphertext data + MAC as the data field of the uplink message to the master station; (2) After receiving the message, the master station first verifies the integrity of the data and then decrypts it to obtain the plaintext data.

7. A virtual power plant aggregation proxy terminal encryption control method as claimed in claim 4, characterized in that: After the two-way identity authentication is passed, the master station can remotely operate the device at any time within a link connection. The security interaction process of the remote control message is described as follows: (1) The master station signs the remote control selection command message to be sent, encrypts the signature data and the original message data, and sends it to the device; (2) After receiving the data, the device first decrypts it to obtain the original text and signature data, and then determines the validity of the instruction, verifies the correctness of the signature of the master station, and returns an error message to the master station if it is incorrect; it correctly executes the relevant operations, and obtains the device random number and confirmation message, and then encrypts them and sends them to the master station; (3) The master station decrypts the device data and verifies the MAC. If the verification is correct, the master station signs the data to be sent, obtains the signature result, encrypts the signature result and the original text, time and other information, and sends them to the device; (4) The device decrypts the encrypted data of the master station, determines the validity of the instruction, verifies the correctness of the signature of the master station, correctly executes the relevant operations, and incorrectly returns error information to the master station.

8. A virtual power plant aggregation proxy terminal encryption control method as claimed in claim 4, characterized in that: After the two-way identity authentication is passed, the master station can perform remote parameter update operations on the device within a link connection. The secure interaction process of remote parameter update is as follows: (1) The master station sends an encrypted command to read the fixed area code to the device; (2) After receiving the data, the device decrypts and executes the fixed value area code reading operation, and encrypts and returns the fixed value area code reading confirmation command; (3) The master station sends an encrypted parameter reading command to the device; (4) After the device receives the data, it decrypts the name to execute the parameter reading operation and encrypts the returned parameter reading confirmation command; (5) The master station signs the command to be issued to switch the fixed value zone, obtains the signature result, encrypts the command message and the signature result, and sends them to the device; (6) After receiving the data, the device decrypts and verifies the validity of the signature of the data, executes the operation of switching the fixed value area, and encrypts and returns the confirmation command of switching the fixed value area; (7) The master station signs the parameter preset command message to be sent, obtains signature result data, encrypts the message and signature result data, and sends them to the device; (8) After receiving the data, the device first decrypts it to obtain the original text and the signature result, verifies the correctness of the signature result of the main station, and returns an error message to the main station if it is incorrect; Execute relevant operations correctly, obtain the device random number, confirm the encryption of the device random number and parameter preset command, calculate the MAC, and upload it to the main station; (9) The master station decrypts the device's uplink data and verifies the MAC. If the verification is correct, the master station signs the data to be sent down, obtains the signature result, encrypts the original data and the signature result, and sends them to the device; (10) After the device decrypts the master station data, it verifies the correctness of the master station signature, correctly executes the remote parameter update operation, and records the result in the device log; (11) The device encrypts the uplink data and calculates the MAC, and finally uploads the ciphertext and MAC data to the master station; (12) The master station decrypts the device's uplink data and verifies the MAC for confirmation; (13) The master station reads the remote update parameters and confirms the parameter modification results.

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