Method for preventing feeding valve of reaction kettle from being opened by mistake and reaction kettle control system

Abstract

The invention provides a method for preventing feeding valves of a reaction kettle from being opened by mistake and a reaction kettle control system.The method comprises the steps that before reaction gas is introduced, an instrument air header pipe is cut off or communicated through a control valve according to preset detection conditions, and the instrument air header pipe is connected with all the feeding valves of the reaction kettle; the control valve is connected with the instrument air header pipe; after the reaction gas is introduced, intermittent feeding of the reaction kettle is controlled, the pressure in the reaction kettle is monitored, and under the condition that the pressure is high, all feeding valves of the reaction kettle are closed. The method provided by the invention solves the technical problem of safety and production loss caused by misoperation of a batch feeding valve in the prior art, and aiming at the high-pressure reaction kettle with a plurality of batch feeding pipelines, the method provided by the invention can effectively prevent the occurrence of a countercurrent working condition caused by mistaken opening of the feeding valve due to misoperation of personnel; according to the protection method provided by the invention, the working condition protection cost is saved while the working condition protection is greatly improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The invention relates to the field of chemical industry, and in particular to a method for preventing a feed valve of a reactor from opening by mistake and a reactor control system. Background Art

[0002] In the prior art, there are many feeding valves involved in the high-pressure reaction system, and the possibility of misoperation of the valves increases accordingly. Misoperation of the batch feeding valves often has serious consequences for safety and production, and the mistaken opening of the batch feeding valve by personnel is one of the reasons for the occurrence of the reverse flow condition. If the feeding valve is opened by mistake during the reaction, the high-pressure material in the reactor will flow back to the reaction raw material storage tank, which may cause the raw material storage tank to rupture due to overpressure. This hidden danger cannot be avoided by relying solely on perfect management measures, and the prior art needs to be improved. Summary of the invention

[0003] Based on the above problems, the present invention proposes a method for preventing the feed valve of a reactor from being accidentally opened and a reactor control system, which solves the technical problem in the prior art that the misoperation of the batch feeding valve causes losses to safety and production. For a high-pressure reactor with multiple batch feeding pipelines, the method provided by the present invention can effectively prevent the occurrence of a backflow condition caused by the misoperation of the feed valve by personnel. The protection method provided by the present invention greatly improves the working condition protection while saving the cost of working condition protection.

[0004] The present invention provides a method for preventing a feed valve of a reactor from being opened by mistake, comprising:

[0005] At least one control valve is installed on the instrument air main of the reactor's feeding valve, and a judgment condition and an execution action corresponding to the judgment condition are added to the sequential control program of the reactor. The reactor adopts DCS logic so that the feeding valve is not allowed to be opened when the internal pressure of the reactor is high. The feeding mode of the reactor's feeding valve is intermittent feeding.

[0006] In addition, the control valve is a three-way solenoid valve, which is connected in series to the instrument air main pipe.

[0007] In addition, the step of installing at least one control valve on the instrument air main of the feed valve of the reactor comprises:

[0008] Two three-way solenoid valves are connected in series to the instrument air main of the feed valve of the reactor, and the two three-way solenoid valves are connected in front of the pressure transmitter of the instrument air main.

[0009] In addition, the adding of judgment conditions in the sequential control program of the reactor and the execution actions corresponding to the judgment conditions include:

[0010] Add in the sequential control program: after the addition of raw material feed is completed and before the addition of reaction gas begins, close the control valve and all feed valves.

[0011] In addition, the adding of judgment conditions in the sequential control program of the reactor and the execution actions corresponding to the judgment conditions include:

[0012] Add in the sequential control program: before the reaction gas is introduced into the reactor, if it is detected that the control valve and all the feed valves are in a closed state, the reaction gas is allowed to be introduced.

[0013] In addition, the adding of judgment conditions in the sequential control program of the reactor and the execution actions corresponding to the judgment conditions include:

[0014] Before the reaction gas is introduced into the reactor, if it is detected that the pressure value of the instrument air main is greater than a preset threshold, the introduction of the reaction gas is not allowed.

[0015] In addition, the adding of judgment conditions in the sequential control program of the reactor and the execution actions corresponding to the judgment conditions include:

[0016] Before the reaction gas is introduced into the reactor, if it is detected that the bypasses with protective functions of the feeding valves are all in a closed state, the introduction of the reaction gas is allowed.

[0017] The present invention further provides a reactor, which adopts the method for preventing the reactor feed valve from opening by mistake as described in any one of the above items.

[0018] In addition, the reactor is a hydrogen reactor or a polymerization reactor.

[0019] The present invention also provides a reactor control system, which adopts the method for preventing the reactor feed valve from opening by mistake as described in any one of the above items.

[0020] The present invention solves the technical problem in the prior art that misoperation of batch feeding valves causes losses to safety and production. For a high-pressure reactor with multiple batch feeding pipelines, the method provided by the present invention can effectively prevent misoperation by personnel from causing misopening of the feeding valve and causing a backflow condition. The protection method provided by the present invention greatly improves the working condition protection while saving the cost of working condition protection. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0021] Figure 1 A working principle diagram of a reactor after adding a control valve provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0022] Figure 2 It is a working principle diagram of a reactor using DCS logic in the prior art;

[0023] Figure 3 This is a working principle diagram of a reactor using SIS interlocking in the prior art. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0024] The present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with specific embodiments and drawings. It is only intended to elaborate on the specific embodiments of the present invention and does not impose any limitation on the present invention. The protection scope of the present invention shall be subject to the claims.

[0025] The present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with specific embodiments and drawings. It is only intended to elaborate on the specific embodiments of the present invention and does not impose any limitation on the present invention. The protection scope of the present invention shall be subject to the claims.

[0026] Reference Figure 1 The present invention provides a method for preventing a feed valve of a reactor from being opened by mistake, comprising:

[0027] Before introducing the reaction gas, according to the preset detection conditions, the instrument air main pipe is cut off or connected through the control valve, the instrument air main pipe is connected to all the feed valves of the reactor, and the control valve is connected to the instrument air main pipe;

[0028] After the reaction gas is introduced, the intermittent feeding of the reactor is controlled and the pressure inside the reactor is monitored. When the pressure is high, all the feeding valves of the reactor are closed.

[0029] The preset detection conditions include, for example, detecting whether the raw material feeding is completed before the reaction gas is added, etc. Through the detection, it is ensured that all the feed valves are closed when the reaction gas is introduced and during the reaction, so as to ensure that the reactor can produce safely under high pressure.

[0030] The method of cutting off or connecting the instrument air main pipe by controlling the valve is to install at least one control valve on the instrument air main pipe of the reactor's feeding valve, and add judgment conditions and execution actions corresponding to the judgment conditions in the reactor's sequential control program. Among them, the reactor adopts DCS logic to prevent the feeding valve from being opened when the reactor's internal pressure is high, and the feeding method of the reactor's feeding valve is intermittent feeding.

[0031] The following is a comparison between the technical solution provided in the prior art to solve the problem that the raw material feed valve is not allowed to be opened when the pressure in the reactor is high and the technical solution provided by the present invention:

[0032] The following is an example of batch feeding of a hydrogenation reactor, sequential batch operation to complete the feeding of the reaction raw materials, and then the reactor is pressurized with hydrogen to perform a hydrogenation reaction. The operating pressure is 4MPaG and the operating temperature is 70°C. The operating condition of the raw material feed valve being opened by mistake due to personnel misoperation during the hydrogenation reaction is analyzed. Considering different degrees of protection measures, the possibility of the valve opening by mistake when the protection fails is deeply analyzed, thereby illustrating the economy and safety of the present invention.

[0033] Comparative Example 1: Taking the DCS logic in the reactor as an example, it is explained that the raw material feed valve is not allowed to be opened when the pressure in the reactor is high. DCS logic is the abbreviation for the logical control of the operation process of the reactor by the DCS system. DCS (Distributed Control System) is a distributed control system. The following is an example of a hydrogenation reactor.

[0034] Reference Figure 2 The DCS logic of the hydrogenation reactor is that the raw material feed valve is not allowed to be opened at high pressure. When the personnel mistakenly open the raw material feed valve from the human-machine interface, according to the interlock priority principle, the raw material feed valve may be opened only when and only when the pressure sensor or DCS system of the hydrogenation reactor fails.

[0035] Figure 2 In the figure, HMI stands for human-machine interface, PT-xxx stands for the pressure gauge of the instrument air main, DCS Logic stands for DCS logic, IA stands for instrument air, DTT stands for solenoid valve disabling action, XV1 stands for feed valve of raw material 1, XVn stands for feed valve of raw material n, and FC stands for the fail-safe position (fail-closed) of the feed valve.

[0036] Referring to the LOPA Guide, the DCS logic overall failure probability (PFD) of the hydrogenation reactor pressure not allowing the raw material feed valve to be opened is 0.1. If only the sensor or DCS system failure is considered, the exSI Lentia software is used for calculation. The failure probability (PFD) of a single meter or DCS system failure is about 0.06, and the frequency of valve opening due to operator error is 0.1 times / year. Therefore, considering the failure of the reactor pressure sensor or DCS system as the enabling condition for the valve opening due to operator error, the frequency of mitigation events is reduced to 0.006 times / year. If the severity of the consequences caused by the high-pressure hydrogen backflow is high (such as S1, S2 levels), the protection of not allowing the raw material feed valve to be opened due to high pressure alone cannot pass the LOPA standard.

[0037] Comparative Example 2: Taking the SIS interlocking method in the reactor as an example, it is explained that the raw material feed valve is not allowed to be opened when the pressure in the reactor is high.

[0038] SIS interlock is a safety instrumented system interlock, which is an automatic safety protection system. When dangerous situations occur in the industrial production process, such as over-temperature, over-pressure, abnormal liquid level, etc., which may lead to major accidents (such as explosion, fire, leakage of toxic and hazardous substances), SIS interlock will automatically perform a series of pre-set actions.

[0039] Reference Figure 3 The working principle of the SIS interlocking method for the hydrogenation reactor, which is set to not allow the opening of the raw material feed valve due to high pressure, is that the personnel cannot open the raw material feed valve from the human-machine interface due to erroneous operation. The feed valve can only be opened when and only when the pressure sensor or SIS system of the hydrogenation reactor fails.

[0040] Figure 3 In the figure, HMI stands for human-machine interface, PZT-xxx stands for the pressure gauge of the instrument air main, SI SLogic stands for SI S interlock, IA stands for instrument air, DTT stands for solenoid valve disabling action, XV1A stands for the feed valve of raw material 1, XV1B stands for another feed valve of raw material 1, XVnA stands for the feed valve of raw material n, and XVnB stands for another feed valve of raw material n. FC is the fail-safe position (fail-closed) of the feed valve.

[0041] Considering the failure of sensors and SIS systems, the exSI Lentia software is used for calculation. The failure probability PFD of 2oo3 pressure gauge or SIS system failure is about 10-4, and the frequency of valve opening due to operator error is 0.1 times / year. Therefore, considering the failure of the pressure sensor or SIS system of the reactor as the enabling condition for valve opening due to operator error, the frequency of mitigation events is reduced to 10-5 times / year. At this time, even if the consequences caused by high-pressure hydrogen backflow are of high severity, the scenario can still be analyzed through LOPA, and the risk control is within an acceptable range.

[0042] However, when the hydrogenation reactor has multiple batch feeds, it is necessary to purchase multiple SIL-certified valves to reduce the risk of accidental valve opening due to human operating errors, which increases production costs. Considering cost reduction and efficiency improvement, this solution is obviously not feasible.

[0043] In the present invention, on the basis of the protection of not allowing the raw material feed valve to be opened under high pressure (DCS logic), instrument air cut-off protection is added, that is, the raw material feed valve is not allowed to be opened under high pressure (DCS logic) and the instrument air is cut off to prevent the raw material feed valve from opening by mistake, thereby preventing the valve from opening by mistake due to human operation errors.

[0044] Moreover, the present invention adopts a method of preventing the raw material feed valve from opening accidentally by controlling the valve to cut off or connect the instrument air main according to preset detection conditions before introducing the reaction gas, so that the closure of all feed valves can be controlled at the instrument air main, thereby fundamentally preventing personnel from opening the feed valve through the human-machine operation interface or other operation buttons or by accidentally touching the valve.

[0045] Here, the instrument air main is connected to all the feed valves of the reactor, and the control valve is connected to the instrument air main; after the reaction gas is introduced, the intermittent feed of the reactor is controlled, and the pressure inside the reactor is monitored. When the pressure is high, all the feed valves of the reactor are closed.

[0046] Optionally, in Figure 1 In the figure, 1 is a reactor, the control valve at 2 is added by the present invention, for example, a three-way solenoid valve DTT is added, for example, two three-way solenoid valves DTT are added, PT-xxx represents the pressure gauge of the instrument air main, IA represents instrument air, DTT represents the solenoid valve disabling action, XV1 is the feed valve of raw material 1, XVn is the feed valve of raw material n, and FC is the fail-safe position (fail-closed) of the feed valve. Sequential control represents a sequential control program.

[0047] In the present invention, judgment conditions and execution actions corresponding to the judgment conditions are added to the sequential control program of the reactor, such as closing the control valve and all feed valves after the addition of raw materials is completed and before the addition of reaction gas begins. At this time, the passage of the instrument air main pipe is cut off by cutting off the passage of the instrument air main pipe, that is, by closing the control valve, which is equivalent to cutting off from the root to prevent the raw material feed valve from being opened by mistake.

[0048] Optionally, the valve can be a three-way solenoid valve. In order to avoid the failure of the cut-off protection caused by valve damage, two or more control valves can be added for double and multiple protection. In actual production, adding two control valves for cut-off protection is the optimal solution while controlling costs.

[0049] In the present invention, compared with the comparative example 1, the enabling condition for opening the valve by mistake due to human operation error is further increased by installing a control valve on the instrument air main pipe to cut off the instrument air main pipe, thereby greatly enhancing the protection capability of preventing the batch feeding valve from opening by mistake.

[0050] The test results of the technical solution provided by the present invention are as follows: after considering the enabling conditions, the frequency of mitigation events is reduced to 6×10-5 times / year. At the same time, this technical solution does not involve SIS interlocking, and naturally does not require the SIL level of the feeding valve. For high-pressure reactors (i.e., high-pressure reactors) with multiple batch feed pipelines, the simplicity and economy of preventing personnel from misoperating the valve and causing the reverse flow condition protection are greatly improved.

[0051] The method provided by the present invention solves the technical problem in the prior art that misoperation of batch feeding valves causes losses to safety and production. For a high-pressure reactor with multiple batch feeding pipelines, the method provided by the present invention can effectively prevent misoperation by personnel from causing misopening of the feeding valve and triggering a backflow condition. The protection method provided by the present invention greatly improves the working condition protection while saving the cost of working condition protection.

[0052] In one embodiment, before the reaction gas is introduced, according to the preset detection conditions, the instrument air main pipe is cut off or connected by controlling the valve, including:

[0053] After the addition of raw materials is completed and before the addition of reaction gas begins, close all feed valves and cut off the instrument air main.

[0054] When the reactor is working, the raw materials for the reaction are added first, and then the reaction gas, such as hydrogen, is introduced. If the feeding valve is opened by mistake after the hydrogen is introduced, there will be more reaction gas, such as hydrogen, in the reactor, resulting in a higher temperature and pressure in the reactor. Therefore, after the raw materials are added, that is, the feeding is completed, all the feeding valves must be closed. The feeding valves include the raw material feeding valve and the hydrogen feeding valve, so as to ensure that the reaction gas in the reactor is installed with the preset gas amount for reaction, so that the temperature and pressure in the reactor are within a safe range.

[0055] In one embodiment, before the reaction gas is introduced, according to the preset detection conditions, the instrument air main pipe is cut off or connected by controlling the valve, including:

[0056] Before introducing the reaction gas into the reactor, if it is detected that the control valve and all the feed valves are in the closed state, the reaction gas is allowed to be introduced, the instrument air main is connected and the feed valve of the reaction gas is opened.

[0057] Before introducing the reaction gas into the reactor, it is necessary to check whether the control valve and all the feed valves are in the closed state. As long as any valve is open, the sequential control program will consider that the feeding has not been completed. Before introducing the reaction gas into the reactor, if it is detected that the control valve and all the feed valves are in the closed state, the feeding is ensured to be completed before the reaction gas is introduced, thereby ensuring that no gas enters other valves, ensuring that the amount of reaction gas introduced is the predetermined amount, and the subsequent reaction in the reactor can be carried out safely.

[0058] In one embodiment, before the reaction gas is introduced, according to the preset detection conditions, the instrument air main pipe is cut off or connected by controlling the valve, including:

[0059] Before the reaction gas is introduced into the reactor, if it is detected that the pressure value of the instrument air main is greater than the preset threshold, the reaction gas is not allowed to be introduced, all feed valves are closed, and the instrument air main is cut off.

[0060] Before introducing the reaction gas into the reactor, if the pressure value of the instrument air main is detected to be greater than the preset threshold, such as 1 Pa, it is considered that the instrument air main is still in the ventilation state and has not been closed, and the reaction gas cannot be allowed to be introduced at this time. By detecting the pressure value of the instrument air main before introducing the reaction gas into the reactor, the amount of reaction gas introduced is guaranteed to be the predetermined amount, so that the subsequent reaction in the reactor can be carried out safely.

[0061] In one embodiment, before the reaction gas is introduced, according to the preset detection conditions, the instrument air main pipe is cut off or connected by controlling the valve, including:

[0062] Before introducing the reaction gas into the reactor, if it is detected that the protective bypass of the feeding valve is in a closed state, the reaction gas is allowed to be introduced, the instrument air main is connected and the reaction gas feed valve is opened.

[0063] Usually, when designing the system, a bypass such as MOS or OOS bypass is designed for the feeding valve. When the bypass is not closed, the feeding valve may be opened by mistake. Therefore, before passing the reaction gas, it is necessary to detect whether the bypass is in a closed state. If it is, the reaction gas can be allowed to pass in. By detecting whether the bypass of the feeding valve is in a closed state before passing the reaction gas into the reactor, it is ensured that the amount of reaction gas passed in is the predetermined amount, so that the subsequent reaction in the reactor can be carried out safely.

[0064] Reference Figure 1 The present invention also proposes a reactor control system, comprising: a reactor 1, one or more feed valves DTT, an instrument air main, and a control valve 2, wherein the discharge end of the feed valve is connected to the reactor, the feed ends of all feed valves are connected to the instrument air main, and the control valve is connected to the instrument air main. The control valve and / or the feed valve are controlled by the method for preventing the reactor feed valve from opening by mistake as described in any one of the above items.

[0065] exist Figure 1 In the figure, 1 is a reactor, the control valve at 2 is added by the present invention, for example, a three-way solenoid valve is added, for example, two three-way solenoid valves are added, PT-xxx represents the pressure gauge of the instrument air main, IA represents instrument air, DTT represents the solenoid valve disabling action, XV1 is the feed valve of raw material 1, XVn is the feed valve of raw material n, and FC is the fail-safe position (fail-closed) of the feed valve. Sequential control represents a sequential control program.

[0066] In the present invention, judgment conditions and execution actions corresponding to the judgment conditions are added to the sequential control program of the reactor, such as closing the control valve and all feed valves after the addition of raw materials is completed and before the addition of reaction gas begins. At this time, the passage of the instrument air main pipe is cut off by cutting off the passage of the instrument air main pipe, that is, by closing the control valve, which is equivalent to cutting off from the root to prevent the raw material feed valve from being opened by mistake.

[0067] Optionally, the valve can be a three-way solenoid valve. In order to avoid the failure of the cut-off protection caused by valve damage, two or more control valves can be added for double and multiple protection. In actual production, adding two control valves for cut-off protection is the optimal solution while controlling costs.

[0068] In the present invention, compared with the comparative example 1, the enabling condition for opening the valve by mistake due to human operation error is further increased by installing a control valve on the instrument air main pipe to cut off the instrument air main pipe, thereby greatly enhancing the protection capability of preventing the batch feeding valve from opening by mistake.

[0069] The method provided by the present invention solves the technical problem in the prior art that misoperation of batch feeding valves causes losses to safety and production. For a high-pressure reactor with multiple batch feeding pipelines, the method provided by the present invention can effectively prevent misoperation by personnel from causing misopening of the feeding valve and triggering a backflow condition. The protection method provided by the present invention greatly improves the working condition protection while saving the cost of working condition protection.

[0070] In one embodiment, the control valve is a three-way solenoid valve, which is connected in series to the instrument air main.

[0071] The three-way solenoid valve is selected for the valve because of its characteristics of flexible control of fluid flow direction, fast and accurate switching, adaptability to a variety of media, strong media compatibility, no influence of medium flow direction and pressure, high reliability, convenient operation and energy saving, and small space occupation.

[0072] In one embodiment, two three-way electromagnetic valves are included, and the two three-way electromagnetic valves are connected in series to the instrument air main pipe.

[0073] When the two three-way solenoid valves are energized at the same time and the pressure transmitter of the instrument air main fails, from a safety perspective, the protection capability of preventing the valve from opening accidentally during batch addition is greatly enhanced.

[0074] If only one three-way solenoid valve is used, when the three-way solenoid valve fails, the action of cutting off the pressure of the instrument air main will be invalid. Therefore, two three-way solenoid valves are used to control them together to make them more reliable and enable them to perform the action of cutting off the pressure of the instrument air main more normally.

[0075] In one embodiment, the three-way solenoid valve is connected in front of the pressure transmitter of the instrument air main pipe. The instrument air main pipe is connected from the instrument air pipe network or the instrument air storage tank, and is a total instrument air pipeline entering the system. The added three-way solenoid valve is connected in series to the instrument air main pipe, and the pressure gauge of the instrument air main pipe is after the two three-way solenoid valves.

[0076] In one embodiment, the reactor is a hydrogen reactor or a polymerization reactor.

[0077] The method proposed in this embodiment can be used in either a hydrogen reactor or a polymerization reactor, and can solve the technical problem of the feed valve opening caused by human misoperation of the reactor.

[0078] The above description is only the principle and preferred embodiment of the present invention. It should be pointed out that for ordinary technicians in this field, several other modifications can be made based on the principle of the present invention, which should also be considered as the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for preventing the feed valve of a reactor from opening by mistake, characterized in that: include: Before introducing the reaction gas, according to the preset detection conditions, the instrument air main pipe is cut off or connected through the control valve, the instrument air main pipe is connected to all the feed valves of the reactor, and the control valve is connected to the instrument air main pipe; After the reaction gas is introduced, the intermittent feeding of the reactor is controlled, and the pressure inside the reactor is monitored. When the pressure is high, all the feeding valves of the reactor are closed.

2. The method for preventing the reactor feed valve from opening by mistake according to claim 1, characterized in that: Before the reaction gas is introduced, according to the preset detection conditions, the instrument air main pipe is cut off or connected by controlling the valve, including: After the addition of raw materials is completed and before the addition of reaction gas begins, close all feed valves and cut off the instrument air main.

3. The method for preventing the reactor feed valve from opening by mistake according to claim 1, characterized in that: Before the reaction gas is introduced, according to the preset detection conditions, the instrument air main pipe is cut off or connected by controlling the valve, including: Before the reaction gas is introduced into the reactor, if it is detected that the control valve and all the feed valves are in the closed state, the reaction gas is allowed to be introduced, the instrument air main is connected and the feed valve of the reaction gas is opened.

4. The method for preventing the reactor feed valve from opening by mistake according to claim 1, characterized in that: Before the reaction gas is introduced, according to the preset detection conditions, the instrument air main pipe is cut off or connected by controlling the valve, including: Before the reaction gas is introduced into the reactor, if it is detected that the pressure value of the instrument air main is greater than a preset threshold, the reaction gas is not allowed to be introduced, all feed valves are closed, and the instrument air main is cut off.

5. The method for preventing the reactor feed valve from opening by mistake according to claim 1, characterized in that: Before the reaction gas is introduced, according to the preset detection conditions, the instrument air main pipe is cut off or connected by controlling the valve, including: Before the reaction gas is introduced into the reactor, if it is detected that the bypasses with protective function of the feeding valves are all in the closed state, the reaction gas is allowed to be introduced, the instrument air main is connected and the feed valve of the reaction gas is opened.

6. A reactor control system, characterized in that: include: A reactor, one or more feed valves, an instrument air main, and a control valve, wherein the discharge end of the feed valve is connected to the reactor, the feed ends of all the feed valves are connected to the instrument air main, and the control valve is connected to the instrument air main. The control valve and / or the feed valve are controlled by the method for preventing the reactor feed valve from accidentally opening as described in any one of claims 1 to 5.

7. The reactor control system according to claim 6, characterized in that: The control valve is a three-way solenoid valve, which is connected in series to the instrument air main pipe.

8. The reactor control system according to claim 7, characterized in that: It comprises two three-way electromagnetic solenoid valves, which are connected in series to the instrument air main pipe.

9. The reactor control system according to claim 7, characterized in that: The three-way solenoid valve is connected in front of the pressure transmitter of the instrument air main pipe.

10. The reactor control system according to any one of claims 6 to 9, characterized in that: The reactor is a hydrogen reactor or a polymerization reactor.

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