A risk control method and device for a high-security electronic system
By identifying and monitoring the failure types caused by space radiation, adjusting system mitigation measures, ensuring the availability of electronic systems in the space environment, it solves the problem that the existing technology cannot effectively evaluate and control the success of space radiation effects on spacecraft missions, and achieves the realization of The risk is controllable and knowable.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN201911403887.8
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2019-12-30
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-06
- Estimated Expiration
- 2039-12-30
AI Technical Summary
The existing technology lacks effective methods to evaluate and control the risk of the space radiation environment on aerospace electronic systems, resulting in the impact of mission success and the inability to accurately identify and control the quantitative impact of space radiation effects on missions.
By obtaining fault categories based on the categories of functional failure status, determining the failure rate and recovery time, adjusting mitigation measures using availability formulas, ensuring that the system meets task requirements, and setting up a monitoring system to monitor critical faults and achieve risk control.
It effectively reduces the risk of electronic systems in the spatial environment, ensures that the system availability meets preset thresholds, reduces design errors, and improves task success rate.
Smart Images

Figure CN113128802B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of risk control of electronic systems, and in particular to a risk control method and device for a high-security electronic system. Background Art
[0002] In the process of achieving tasks, electronic systems will be affected by the environment, such as space radiation. The space radiation environment refers to all natural radiation from the ground to the outer space of the universe. The natural radiation environment includes galactic cosmic rays, solar cosmic rays, the Earth's capture zone, and atmospheric neutron radiation. From the ground to an altitude of 36,000 kilometers is the daily working environment of electronic systems such as satellites, aircraft, and ground network computers. Satellites and other outer space vehicles working above 100 kilometers are mainly affected by galactic cosmic rays, solar cosmic rays, and the Earth's capture zone; the main radiation environment of near-space aircraft within the range of 20 kilometers to 100 kilometers is mainly neutrons, protons, electrons, etc.; aircraft within the range of 3 kilometers to 20 kilometers are mainly affected by atmospheric neutron radiation; the radiation environment below 3 kilometers and on the ground is mainly neutrons.
[0003] The radiation particles in the space radiation environment can cause serious radiation damage effects on materials and radiation-sensitive devices. Radiation damage effects can be divided into single event effects (SEE), total ionization dose effects (TID), displacement damage effects (DD), etc. according to their types, which can lead to failures in electronic equipment. Cumulative effects such as total dose effects and displacement damage effects can cause hard failures of semiconductor integrated circuits in electronic systems, while transient effects such as single particle effects can cause hard and / or soft failures of semiconductor integrated circuits in electronic systems. Therefore, natural space environmental hazards will affect mission success, and a set of risk assessment methods for evaluating space environmental hazards on mission success is needed to quantitatively and accurately guide the selection of key components of electronic systems, the protection design of key functions, and the reliability improvement of key systems, effectively avoid over-design and under-design, and ensure mission success. Summary of the invention
[0004] In order to solve the above problems, an embodiment of the present invention provides a risk control method and device for a high-security electronic system.
[0005] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a risk control method for a high-security electronic system, comprising: according to the category of functional failure state, obtaining all fault types under each type of functional failure state, obtaining all fault types of the system, and determining the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the faults; according to the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the faults, determining whether the system as a whole meets the task requirements; determining that each fault has a corresponding in-depth defense strategy; according to the expected value of the failure rate and the index value of the failure rate, determining that each type of fault meets a preset safety margin; determining the key fault type according to the degree of harm caused by each fault type and whether the harm is acceptable; determining that each key fault type has a monitoring system that can monitor the occurrence of the fault and the recovery time of the fault.
[0006] Further, the determining whether the system as a whole meets the task requirements according to the predicted values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the failures includes: according to the availability formula, if the availability of the system meets the preset threshold, then the system as a whole meets the task requirements; the availability formula includes:
[0007]
[0008] Accordingly, the method further includes: adjusting the mitigation measures for each fault according to the availability formula so that the system availability meets the preset threshold; wherein A is the system availability, i is the fault type, λ i is the failure rate of type i failure, T i is the recovery time of type i fault.
[0009] Furthermore, the categories of the functional failure status include: planned short-term hard failure, planned long-term hard failure, unplanned short-term hard failure, unplanned long-term hard failure, unplanned short-term soft failure and unplanned long-term soft failure.
[0010] Furthermore, the method also includes: determining the fault objects that need to be monitored and obtaining the true value of the fault rate; determining whether the fault rate index value meets the task requirements based on the true value of the fault rate and the fault rate index value, and if not, adjusting the index value.
[0011] Furthermore, the key monitored fault objects include faults that do not meet a preset safety margin.
[0012] Furthermore, determining the expected value of all failure rates includes obtaining the total failure rate of each component after responding to all physical failure mechanisms of the space environment based on the BOM list of the system, and determining the expected value of each failure rate.
[0013] Furthermore, the method of obtaining the total failure rate of each device after responding to all physical failure mechanisms includes: obtaining the single particle effect failure rate, total dose effect failure rate and displacement damage failure rate caused by space radiation response to obtain the space radiation failure rate; obtaining the non-space radiation failure rate caused by the response of components to all non-space radiation failure physical mechanisms; the sum of the space radiation failure rate and the non-space radiation failure rate, combined with device manufacturing parameters and process parameters, to obtain the total failure rate of components in the space environment.
[0014] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a risk control device for a high-security electronic system, comprising: a fault determination module, which is used to obtain all faults of each type of functional failure state according to the category of the functional failure state, obtain all faults of the system, and determine the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the faults; a task decision module, which is used to determine whether the system as a whole meets the task requirements according to the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the faults; a deep defense judgment module, which is used to determine that each fault has a corresponding mitigation measure; a design margin judgment module, which is used to determine that each fault meets a preset safety margin according to the expected value of the failure rate and the index value of the failure rate; a critical fault determination module, which is used to determine the critical fault type according to the degree of harm caused by each fault type and whether the harm impact is acceptable; a monitoring configuration module, which is used to determine that each critical fault has a monitoring system that can monitor the occurrence of the fault and the recovery time of the fault.
[0015] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides an electronic device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the program, the steps of the risk control method for a high-security electronic system of the first aspect of the present invention are implemented.
[0016] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the risk control method for a high-security electronic system of the first aspect of the present invention.
[0017] The risk control method and device for a high-security electronic system provided by an embodiment of the present invention obtains all faults of each type of functional failure state according to the category of the functional failure state, obtains all faults of the system, determines the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the faults, and is conducive to obtaining all faults and corresponding failure rates that affect the mission risk. According to the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the faults, it is determined that the system as a whole meets the mission requirements. According to the expected values of the failure rates and the index values of the failure rates, it is determined that each failure meets the preset safety margin, so that the system as a whole meets the mission requirements, and each failure meets the preset safety margin, limiting the risk to a controlled state. It is determined that each critical fault has a monitoring system to ensure that all faults can be monitored in a timely manner, which is conducive to the implementation of mitigation measures. This method effectively realizes the risk control of the system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0018] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.
[0019] Figure 1 A flow chart of a risk control method for a high-security electronic system provided by an embodiment of the present invention;
[0020] Figure 2 A structural diagram of a risk control device for a high-security electronic system provided by an embodiment of the present invention;
[0021] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the physical structure of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0022] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0023] Traditional "space radiation environment reliability" assessment methods at home and abroad have three main deficiencies:
[0024] (1) There is a lack of basic theory, which cannot scientifically explain the quantitative impact of current space radiation effects on the success or failure of aerospace missions.
[0025] Existing spacecraft mainly use device-level radiation evaluation methods to conduct separate test evaluations of single-element effects (SEE), total dose effects (TID), and displacement damage effects (DD). The comprehensive impact of the three types of radiation effects on devices is not considered, and there is no method to consider the comprehensive impact of the three types of radiation effects on spacecraft electronic systems. At present, the radiation design margin (RDM) method is mainly used, and there is no close quantitative relationship with spacecraft mission indicators. Therefore, it is impossible to quantitatively evaluate the comprehensive ability of the three types of radiation effects to complete specific mission requirements of spacecraft more accurately. Due to the lack of basic theory, it is impossible to scientifically explain the quantitative impact of current space radiation effects on the success or failure of aerospace missions.
[0026] (2) There is a lack of evaluation methods to calculate the quantitative impact of space radiation effects on the success or failure of aerospace missions.
[0027] Existing engineering methods for predicting the reliability of aerospace electronic payloads do not include space radiation environmental stress, such as GJB299 and MIL-HDBK-217, resulting in certain mission risks. MIL-STD-217F "Electronic Equipment Reliability Prediction" points out that all models in this manual cannot be used to predict the impact of nuclear survivability or ionizing radiation. The recommended value in the microcircuit failure rate prediction model is 0.5, which assumes that the space environment is good, which is inconsistent with the actual harsh space radiation environment. There is no reliability theory basis and corresponding tools to guide the selection of devices that meet the requirements of specific mission indicators, which may lead to the phenomenon of local over-design and local under-design of satellite space radiation reliability, posing mission risks. Therefore, due to the lack of evaluation methods, the quantitative impact of space radiation effects on the success or failure of aerospace missions cannot be calculated.
[0028] (3) Lack of effective data makes it impossible to accurately calculate the quantitative impact of space radiation effects on the success or failure of aerospace missions.
[0029] Existing spacecraft mainly use device-level radiation evaluation methods to conduct separate test evaluations of single event effects (SEE), total dose effects (TID), and displacement damage effects (DD). The indicator requirements for single event effects of key devices are usually that the LET threshold of single event latchup caused by heavy ions is greater than 75MeV / cm 2 mg, the LET threshold of single event upset caused by heavy ions is greater than 37MeV / cm 2 mg, or the turnover rate is less than 10 -7 The total dose effect index requirement for key components is usually a total dose resistance greater than 100 rad, and the displacement damage effect index requirement for key components is usually a displacement damage resistance greater than the equivalent 10 MeV proton 10 10 / cm 2Data of different dimensions cannot add up to comprehensive effects, and are not the failure rate of spacecraft missions caused by space radiation effects, nor are they effective data for determining mission success or failure. Therefore, due to the lack of effective data, the quantitative impact of space radiation effects on the success or failure of aerospace missions cannot be accurately calculated.
[0030] In short, due to the lack of basic theory, evaluation methods and effective data, it is impossible to scientifically explain the success or failure of the missions of spacecraft currently in orbit.
[0031] At present, there is an urgent need for a set of space radiation reliability test and evaluation methods for aerospace systems to avoid the coexistence of large-scale over-design and under-design as much as possible, and to make the risk impact of space radiation environment effects on the success or failure of aerospace missions quantitatively identifiable, knowable and controllable.
[0032] Figure 1 A flow chart of a risk control method for a high-security electronic system provided by an embodiment of the present invention, such as Figure 1 As shown, an embodiment of the present invention provides a risk control method for a high-security electronic system, comprising:
[0033] S0. According to the category of the functional failure state, all fault categories under each category of functional failure state are obtained, all faults of the system are obtained, and the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the faults are determined.
[0034] Electronic systems in high-security application fields such as nuclear power plants, satellites, and aircraft will produce multiple functional failure conditions (FFCs) under the action of seven stresses (temperature, humidity, electricity, chemistry, vibration, temperature cycle, and radiation). When the combined frequency of multiple functional failure conditions λ exceeds the industry-recognized acceptable red line threshold (e.g., 10 -9 / h, etc.), security risks will arise.
[0035] This method is to evaluate the electronic system before it performs a mission in a space environment to ensure that the risk of the electronic system performing the mission is minimized or even zero risk. The space environment may affect the electronic components of the electronic system in it and produce space radiation effects (SRE effects) or space non-radiation effects. For example, radiation effects include charging and discharging effects, single particle effects, etc., which affect the accuracy of electronic components and cause errors. First, the space environment of the electronic system corresponding to the task to be detected can be obtained, including temperature, humidity, concentration of various compounds in the chemical environment, radiation intensity and other data. The task is the work performed by the electronic system, such as aviation missions, aerospace missions, and nuclear power plant monitoring missions.
[0036] In order to facilitate the determination of all faults, the categories of functional failure states are first determined or have been determined in the embodiments of the present invention.
[0037] As an example of the preferred embodiment, the categories of functional failure states include: planned short-term hard failure, planned long-term hard failure, unplanned short-term hard failure, unplanned long-term hard failure, unplanned short-term soft failure (with monitoring) and unplanned long-term soft failure (without monitoring). That is, there are 6 types of functional failure states, and each type of functional failure state has multiple fault types.
[0038] Planned interruptions are interruptions that can be predicted in advance. For example, the power of an electronic system will run out, which can be predicted in advance when the system is designed. Unplanned interruptions are the opposite. Planned interruptions and unplanned interruptions are divided into long-term interruptions and short-term interruptions according to whether the system has backup or repair after the interruption occurs. For example, if it can switch to a backup battery, it is a short-term planned interruption. For system soft errors, the abnormality type is divided into short-term soft failures with monitoring and long-term soft failures without monitoring, depending on whether the monitoring system (BIST) is set. The first four are hard faults, and the last two are soft faults.
[0039] In a space environment, various physical failure mechanisms will affect the electronic system (including those generated inside components), thus causing component failures. The physical failure mechanisms include: temperature, humidity, vibration, temperature cycle, chemical environment, electrical stress and radiation, etc. Under each classification result, the corresponding failure probability caused by the response to the physical failure mechanism is obtained respectively. The recovery time of the fault is the time from the occurrence of the fault to the recovery of the fault, which is the response measure taken for the fault during design. For example, the time to switch to the backup battery after the power is exhausted. For the 6 types of functional failure states FFC, the embodiment of the present invention adopts the RIDM5-step analysis method to determine the detailed and specific faults i and failure rates λ in the 6 categories. i and fault recovery time T i combination method.
[0040] Under the six types of functional failure states, all faults in each type of failure state can be further obtained. For example, according to effect classification (neutron effect, proton effect), stress classification (the above 7 types of stress), mission profile classification, etc. Then, according to the five-step analysis method based on RIDM, the risk control analysis of the system is carried out in sequence.
[0041] S1. Determine whether the system as a whole meets the mission requirements based on the expected values of all failure rates and failure recovery times.
[0042] All faults i, fault rate λ i and fault recovery time T i After confirmation, the overall compliance of the system is determined based on these three.
[0043] As an optional embodiment, it is determined according to the following formula:
[0044]
[0045] Among them, A is the system availability, i is the fault type, λ i is the failure rate of type i failure, T i is the recovery time of type i fault.
[0046] That is, in all λ i After all are determined, according to the corresponding T i , the overall availability of the system can be calculated. For example, the preset threshold is 0.957, and the A calculated according to the formula must meet this threshold to determine that the system as a whole meets the task requirements.
[0047] S2. Make sure that each fault has a corresponding in-depth defense strategy.
[0048] The fault recovery time is obtained based on the protection and mitigation measures during system design. The in-depth defense strategy includes various protection and mitigation measures. After determining that the overall task requirements are met, further determine whether each fault has a corresponding in-depth defense strategy. If not, add the setting.
[0049] S3. According to the predicted value of the failure rate and the index value of the failure rate, determine whether each type of failure meets the preset safety margin.
[0050] For each probability of failure, there is a corresponding λ i-spec ,λ i-pre ,λ i-real , respectively represent the index value, the expected value and the true value. In the embodiment of the present invention, it is determined whether each fault meets the preset safety margin according to the expected value and the index value. For example, the expected value of the failure probability of a certain type of fault is 10 -5 , and the task requires an index value of 10 -4 , the ratio of the predicted value to the index value is 10, and the system's safety margin for the fault is 10 times. If it is greater than the preset value, the preset safety margin is met. All faults need to meet the safety margin.
[0051] S4. Determine the critical fault types based on the degree of harm caused by each fault type and whether the impact of the harm is acceptable.
[0052] First, the key fault type that causes the functional failure state can be determined according to the harmful consequences or degree of harm caused by the fault. The embodiment of the present invention does not specifically limit the method of obtaining joint faults according to the degree of harm caused by each fault type, including but not limited to determining according to any one or more combinations of the required index value of the fault, the expected value of the failure rate, the recovery time of the mitigation measures, and the safety margin of the fault. For example, a threshold can be set according to the above single index parameter or a combination of multiple index parameters to select.
[0053] According to the degree of harm caused by each fault type and whether the harm is acceptable, the method of determining the key fault type includes determining the degree of harm according to the index requirement value, thereby determining the key fault type. For fault types with a large degree of harm, the index requirement value is often set to a small value, such as 10 -9 , the failure rate index requirement value can be selected to be less than 10 -6 The fault type is regarded as the key fault type.
[0054] According to the degree of harm caused by each fault type and whether the harm is acceptable, the method of determining the key fault type also includes the following: determining according to the expected value of the failure rate, such as selecting a failure rate greater than 10 -6 The fault type is regarded as the critical fault type. Or it can be determined based on the safety margin. For example, the fault type with a safety margin less than 2 times is a critical fault. Or according to the availability formula, the product of the expected failure rate and the fault recovery time is greater than the preset threshold to obtain a critical fault, or the critical fault type is determined based on the system availability.
[0055] Secondly, the key fault type can be determined based on whether the hazard impact is acceptable. Determining whether the hazard impact is acceptable includes determining based on the safety margin. If the safety margin is greater than the preset threshold, the hazard impact caused by the fault type is acceptable, otherwise it is unacceptable. Finally, the joint fault type can be comprehensively determined based on the degree of hazard and whether the hazard impact is acceptable. For example, the fault is divided into 10 levels according to the hazard level and the index requirement value. -9 (Class A), 10 -7 (Class B) and 10 -5 (Class C), corresponding to the degree of harm from large to small. Class A faults can be selected as key faults, and whether the harm is acceptable can also be considered on this basis. For example, the expected index value of a Class A fault is 10 -10 , with a safety margin of 10 times, the hazard impact is considered acceptable and is not considered a critical failure; the expected index value of a Class B failure is 10 -7 , with only 1 times the safety margin, the hazard impact is considered unacceptable and is treated as a critical failure.
[0056] S5. Ensure that each critical fault type has a monitoring system that can monitor the occurrence of the fault and the recovery time of the fault.
[0057] That is, ensure that the critical fault i can be monitored and the data of the recovery time Ti can be obtained. Check whether a monitoring system (BIST) is set for the critical fault i. If not, set a corresponding monitoring system. The monitoring system is used to monitor the occurrence of fault i. After the fault is detected, the fault is recovered through the preset mitigation measures and the recovery time Ti is obtained. According to the actual recovery time of the fault, the design value of Ti can be evaluated and adjusted.
[0058] The risk control method for a high-security electronic system provided by an embodiment of the present invention obtains all faults of each type of functional failure state according to the category of the functional failure state, obtains all faults of the system, determines the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the faults, and is conducive to obtaining all faults and corresponding failure rates that affect the mission risk. According to the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the faults, it is determined that the system as a whole meets the mission requirements. According to the expected values of the failure rates and the index values of the failure rates, it is determined that each fault meets the preset safety margin, so that the system as a whole meets the mission requirements, and each fault meets the preset safety margin, limiting the risk to a controlled state. It is determined that each critical fault has a monitoring system, which ensures that all critical faults can be monitored in a timely manner, which is conducive to the implementation of mitigation measures. This method effectively realizes the risk control of the system.
[0059] Based on the content of the above embodiment, as an optional embodiment, determining whether the system as a whole meets the task requirements according to the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the failures includes: determining whether the system as a whole meets the task requirements according to the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the failures includes: according to the availability formula, if the availability of the system meets the preset threshold, then the system as a whole meets the task requirements; the availability formula includes:
[0060]
[0061] Accordingly, the method further includes: adjusting the mitigation measures for each fault according to the availability formula so that the system availability meets the preset threshold; wherein A is the system availability, i is the fault type, λ i is the failure rate of type i failure, T i is the recovery time of type i fault.
[0062] If it is not satisfied, the corresponding protection and mitigation measures can be adjusted by adjusting the recovery time T of the measures. i , until A that meets the preset conditions can be obtained, thus achieving system risk control. That is to say, in all λ i After all are determined, adjust T by adjusting the mitigation strategy i , A that meets the preset conditions can be obtained, thereby achieving overall risk control of the system.
[0063] For different mission environments, the availability threshold can be set through experiments or analysis based on the characteristics or requirements of the electronic system. By adjusting the response time of each fault, the availability is greater than the preset threshold, thereby ensuring that the risk is reduced to an acceptable range, finding the missing items and gaps in zero-risk control, controlling the key items that affect the mission indicator requirements, and completing the in-depth prevention and control measures. In principle, multiple iterations can achieve zero risk, or find the bottleneck that affects the realization of zero risk, and clarify the risk status.
[0064] Based on the content of the above embodiment, as an optional embodiment, the preset classification method includes: planned interruption short-term hard failure, planned interruption long-term hard failure, unplanned interruption short-term hard failure, unplanned interruption long-term hard failure, unplanned interruption short-term soft failure (with monitoring) and unplanned interruption long-term soft failure (without monitoring). The specific content has been mentioned in the above embodiment and will not be repeated here. This abnormal type classification method can analyze each abnormal type in a targeted manner, which is conducive to the classification of fault types.
[0065] As an optional embodiment, when judging whether the mission requirements are met as a whole, the planned interruption short-term hard failure may not be considered as the fault i and the corresponding fault rate.
[0066] Based on the content of the above embodiment, as an optional embodiment, the method also includes: determining the fault objects that need to be monitored in key areas and obtaining the true value of the failure rate; determining whether the failure rate index value meets the task requirements based on the true value of the failure rate and the failure rate index value, and if not, adjusting the index value.
[0067] For some fault types, it is necessary to further determine whether the indicator value is set reasonably, that is, the fault object that needs to be monitored in key areas. The fault object to be monitored in key areas can be all faults or key fault types, which can be determined based on the degree of impact caused by the fault.
[0068] The true value of the failure rate can be determined based on the test results of the system or the components that constitute the system in the space environment. For the index value and the true value, the ratio of the true value to the index value and the comparison result of the preset threshold can be used to verify whether the verification index requirements meet the task requirements, that is, whether the verification index is reasonable. If the index value is unreasonable, it will be adjusted accordingly, and the adjusted index value will be used in the above-mentioned RIDM 5-step analysis method. After multiple iterations, zero risk can be achieved, or the bottleneck that affects the realization of zero risk can be found, and the risk status can be clarified, so as to achieve the goal of zero risk in principle.
[0069] Based on the content of the above embodiment, as an optional embodiment, the fault objects to be monitored include faults that do not meet the preset safety margin.
[0070] Considering that in real applications, there may be situations where the fault does not meet the preset safety margin due to the setting of the index value. For faults that do not meet the preset safety margin, it may be caused by unreasonable setting of the index value. Take this type of fault as the fault object that needs to be monitored, and obtain the true value of the failure rate; according to the true value of the failure rate and the failure rate index value, determine whether the failure rate index value meets the task requirements. If not, adjust the index value.
[0071] Based on the contents of the above embodiments, as an optional embodiment, the expected values of all failure rates are determined, including: according to the BOM (Bill of Material) list of the system, the total failure rate of each component after responding to each physical failure mechanism of the space environment is obtained, and the expected value of each failure rate is determined.
[0072] Specifically, each electronic system consists of multiple devices, circuit boards for each device, and devices for each circuit board, which are divided into four levels. According to the BOM list of the system, all components of the system can be obtained. Based on all components, the total failure rate of each device after responding to each physical failure mechanism of the space environment is obtained. For example, the above-mentioned temperature, humidity, vibration, temperature cycle, chemical environment, electrical stress and radiation, etc., determine the corresponding component failure rate based on the results of the response of each physical failure mechanism and the corresponding parameter values of the space environment, for example, which can be obtained through experiments. On this basis, according to the failure rate of each component, the failure rate of fault i can be determined.
[0073] The embodiment of the present invention can consider all electronic components of the electronic system from four levels based on the unified BOM list, and consider all the physical mechanisms of failure that produce responses, so as to cover all failure risks.
[0074] Based on the contents of the above embodiments, as an optional embodiment, the total failure rate of each device after responding to all physical failure mechanisms is obtained, including: obtaining the single particle effect failure rate, total dose effect failure rate and displacement damage failure rate caused by space radiation response to obtain the space radiation failure rate; obtaining the non-space radiation failure rate caused by the component response to all non-space radiation failure physical mechanisms; the sum of the space radiation failure rate and the non-space radiation failure rate, combined with the device manufacturing parameters and process parameters, to obtain the total failure rate of the component in the space environment.
[0075] Considering the response of each component to each physical failure mechanism, the embodiment of the present invention can determine the failure rate of each component according to the following method:
[0076] First, consider the radiative and non-radiative cases separately:
[0077] λ space =λ SEE +λ TID+λ DD ;
[0078] Among them, λ space is the failure rate caused by space radiation, λ TID is the failure rate caused by the total dose effect, λ DD is the failure rate caused by displacement damage, λ SEE is the failure rate caused by single particle effect, and the specific method for obtaining each type of failure rate is the existing technology.
[0079] λ physical =λ NOspace +λ space ;
[0080] Among them, λ NOspace is the failure rate caused by non-space radiation, which can be obtained by existing technology, λ physical is the total failure rate caused by the physical mechanism of failure.
[0081] For details, please refer to the document "A method of Space Radiation Environment Reliability PredicTion".
[0082] The total failure rate of each device in response to each failure physical mechanism in the space environment can be obtained according to the following formula:
[0083] λ=λ physical ×Π PM ×Π Process ;
[0084] Among them, λ is the failure rate of a single component in a space environment, Π PM is the device manufacturing parameter, representing the quality and technical influencing parameters of device manufacturing, Π Process Process parameters represent the quality and technical control parameters of the device's product development, manufacturing and use processes.
[0085] For all components, the availability of the system can be obtained according to the above method.
[0086] Based on the above embodiments, through the two verification results of the indicator value, the expected value and the actual value, the availability formula can adjust the mitigation measures or design solutions to find the missing items and gaps of zero-risk control. Control the key items that affect the task indicator requirements and complete the in-depth prevention and control measures. In principle, multiple iterations can achieve zero risk, or find the bottlenecks that affect the realization of zero risk and clarify the risk status. Thereby achieving the goal of zero risk in principle.
[0087] Figure 2The structure diagram of the risk control device of the high-security electronic system provided by the embodiment of the present invention is as follows: Figure 2 As shown, the risk control device of the high-safety electronic system includes: a fault determination module 200, a task decision module 201, a deep defense judgment module 202, a design margin judgment module 203, a key fault determination module 204 and a monitoring configuration module 205. Among them, the fault determination module 200 is used to obtain all faults of each type of functional failure state according to the category of the functional failure state, obtain all faults of the system, and determine the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the faults; the task decision module 201 is used to determine that the system as a whole meets the task requirements according to the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the faults; the deep defense judgment module 202 is used to determine that each fault has a corresponding mitigation measure; the design margin judgment module 203 is used to determine that each fault meets the preset safety margin according to the expected value of the failure rate and the index value of the failure rate; the key fault determination module 204 is used to determine the key fault type according to the degree of harm caused by each fault type and whether the harm impact is acceptable; the monitoring configuration module 205 is used to determine that each fault has a monitoring system that can monitor the occurrence of the fault and the recovery time of the fault.
[0088] The device embodiments provided in the embodiments of the present invention are for implementing the above-mentioned method embodiments. For specific processes and detailed contents, please refer to the above-mentioned method embodiments, which will not be repeated here.
[0089] The risk control device for a high-security electronic system provided by an embodiment of the present invention obtains all faults of each type of functional failure state according to the category of the functional failure state, obtains all faults of the system, determines the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the faults, and is conducive to obtaining all faults and corresponding failure rates that affect the mission risk. According to the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the faults, it is determined that the system as a whole meets the mission requirements. According to the expected values of the failure rates and the index values of the failure rates, it is determined that each fault meets the preset safety margin, so that the system as a whole meets the mission requirements, and each fault meets the preset safety margin, limiting the risk to a controlled state. It is determined that each critical fault has a monitoring system, which ensures that all critical faults can be monitored in a timely manner, which is conducive to the implementation of mitigation measures. This method effectively realizes the risk control of the system.
[0090] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the physical structure of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention, such as Figure 3As shown, the electronic device may include: a processor 301, a communication interface 302, a memory 303 and a bus 304, wherein the processor 301, the communication interface 302 and the memory 303 communicate with each other through the bus 304. The communication interface 302 can be used for information transmission of the electronic device. The processor 301 can call the logic instructions in the memory 303 to execute the following method: according to the category of the functional failure state, all fault types in each type of functional failure state are obtained, all fault types of the system are obtained, and the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the fault are determined; according to the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the fault, it is determined that the system as a whole meets the task requirements; it is determined that each fault has a corresponding in-depth defense strategy; according to the expected value of the failure rate and the index value of the failure rate, it is determined that each type of fault meets the preset safety margin; according to the degree of harm caused by each fault type and whether the harm impact is acceptable, the key fault type is determined; it is determined that each key fault type has a monitoring system that can monitor the occurrence of the fault and the recovery time of the fault.
[0091] In addition, the logic instructions in the above-mentioned memory 303 can be implemented in the form of software functional units and can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium when sold or used as an independent product. Based on such an understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art or the part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including a number of instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the above-mentioned method embodiments of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), disk or optical disk and other media that can store program codes.
[0092] On the other hand, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, is implemented to execute the transmission methods provided by the above-mentioned embodiments, for example, including: according to the category of functional failure state, obtaining all fault types under each type of functional failure state, obtaining all fault types of the system, and determining the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the faults; according to the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the faults, determining that the system as a whole meets the task requirements; determining that each fault has a corresponding in-depth defense strategy; according to the expected value of the failure rate and the index value of the failure rate, determining that each type of fault meets a preset safety margin; determining the key fault type according to the degree of harm caused by each fault type and whether the harm is acceptable; determining that each key fault type has a monitoring system that can monitor the occurrence of faults and the recovery time of the faults.
[0093] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative, wherein the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, i.e., they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the scheme of this embodiment. Those of ordinary skill in the art may understand and implement it without creative effort.
[0094] Through the description of the above implementation methods, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each implementation method can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform, and of course, it can also be implemented by hardware. Based on this understanding, the above technical solution is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, a disk, an optical disk, etc., including a number of instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the methods of each embodiment or some parts of the embodiment.
[0095] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments, or make equivalent replacements for some of the technical features therein. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.
Claims
1. A risk control method for a high-security electronic system, It is characterized in that include: According to the category of functional failure state, all fault categories under each category of functional failure state are obtained, all fault categories of the system are obtained, and the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the failures are determined; Based on the expected values of all failure rates and failure recovery times, determine whether the system as a whole meets the mission requirements; Make sure every failure has a corresponding defense-in-depth strategy; According to the predicted value of the failure rate and the index value of the failure rate, determine whether each type of failure meets the preset safety margin; Determine the key fault types based on the degree of harm caused by each fault type and whether the impact of the harm is acceptable; Ensure that each critical fault type has a monitoring system that can monitor the occurrence of the fault and the recovery time of the fault; Determining whether the system as a whole meets the mission requirements based on the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the failures includes: According to the availability formula, if the availability of the system meets the preset threshold, the system as a whole meets the task requirements; The availability formula includes: Accordingly, the method further comprises: According to the availability formula, adjust the mitigation measures for each fault so that the system availability meets the preset threshold; Among them, A is the system availability, i is the fault type, λ i is the failure rate of type i failure, T i is the recovery time of type i fault; The method further comprises: Determine the fault objects that need to be monitored and obtain the true value of the failure rate; According to the actual value of the failure rate and the failure rate index value, determine whether the failure rate index value meets the task requirements. If not, adjust the index value; The method of determining the expected values of all failure rates includes: According to the BOM list of the system, obtain the total failure rate of each component after responding to all physical failure mechanisms of the space environment, and determine the expected value of each failure rate; The obtaining of the total failure rate of each component after responding to all physical failure mechanisms of the space environment includes: Obtain the single event effect failure rate, total dose effect failure rate and displacement damage failure rate caused by space radiation response to obtain the space radiation failure rate; Obtain the non-space radiation failure rate caused by the component's response to all non-space radiation failure physical mechanisms; The sum of the space radiation failure rate and the non-space radiation failure rate, combined with the device manufacturing parameters and process parameters, obtains the total failure rate of the components in the space environment; The calculation formula of the spatial radiation failure rate is as follows: l space =λ SEE +λ TID +λ DD ; λ space is the spatial radiation failure rate, λ TID is the total dose effect failure rate, λ DD is the displacement damage failure rate, λ SEE is the single event effect failure rate; The calculation formula for the total failure rate of the components in the space environment is as follows: λ=λ physical ×P PM ×P Process ; λ is the failure rate of a single component in a space environment, Π PM is the device manufacturing parameter, representing the quality and technical influencing parameters of device manufacturing, Π Process Process parameters represent the quality and technical control parameters of the device's product development, manufacturing and use processes; l physical =λ NOspace +λ space ; λ NOspace is the non-spatial radiation failure rate, λ physical is the total failure rate caused by the physical mechanism of failure.
2. The risk control method for a high-security electronic system according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The categories of functional failure states include: Planned interruption short-term hard failure, planned interruption long-term hard failure, unplanned interruption short-term hard failure, unplanned interruption long-term hard failure, unplanned interruption short-term soft failure and unplanned interruption long-term soft failure.
3. The risk control method for a high-security electronic system according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The key fault objects to be monitored include faults that do not meet preset safety margins.
4. A risk control device for high-security electronic systems, It is characterized in that include: A fault determination module is used to obtain all faults of each type of functional failure state according to the type of functional failure state, obtain all faults of the system, and determine the expected value of all failure rates and the recovery time of the faults; The task decision module is used to determine whether the system as a whole meets the task requirements based on the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the failures; A defense-in-depth judgment module is used to ensure that each fault has a corresponding mitigation measure; A design margin judgment module is used to determine whether each fault meets a preset safety margin based on the predicted value of the fault rate and the index value of the fault rate; A critical fault determination module is used to determine the critical fault type according to the degree of harm caused by each fault type and whether the harm impact is acceptable; Monitoring configuration module, used to ensure that each key fault type has a monitoring system that can monitor the occurrence of the fault and the recovery time of the fault; Determining whether the system as a whole meets the mission requirements based on the expected values of all failure rates and the recovery time of the failures includes: According to the availability formula, if the availability of the system meets the preset threshold, the system as a whole meets the task requirements; The availability formula includes: Accordingly, the method further comprises: According to the availability formula, adjust the mitigation measures for each fault so that the system availability meets the preset threshold; Among them, A is the system availability, i is the fault type, λ i is the failure rate of type i failure, T i is the recovery time of type i fault; The device is also used for: Determine the fault objects that need to be monitored and obtain the true value of the failure rate; According to the actual value of the failure rate and the failure rate index value, determine whether the failure rate index value meets the task requirements. If not, adjust the index value; The method of determining the expected values of all failure rates includes: According to the BOM list of the system, obtain the total failure rate of each component after responding to all physical failure mechanisms of the space environment, and determine the expected value of each failure rate; The obtaining of the total failure rate of each component after responding to all physical failure mechanisms of the space environment includes: Obtain the single event effect failure rate, total dose effect failure rate and displacement damage failure rate caused by space radiation response to obtain the space radiation failure rate; Obtain the non-space radiation failure rate caused by the component's response to all non-space radiation failure physical mechanisms; The sum of the space radiation failure rate and the non-space radiation failure rate, combined with the device manufacturing parameters and process parameters, obtains the total failure rate of the components in the space environment; The calculation formula of the spatial radiation failure rate is as follows: l space =λ SEE +λ TID +λ DD ; λ space is the spatial radiation failure rate, λ TID is the total dose effect failure rate, λ DD is the displacement damage failure rate, λ SEE is the single event effect failure rate; The calculation formula for the total failure rate of the components in the space environment is as follows: λ=λ physical ×P PM ×P Process ; λ is the failure rate of a single component in a space environment, Π PM is the device manufacturing parameter, representing the quality and technical influencing parameters of device manufacturing, Π Process Process parameters represent the quality and technical control parameters of the device's product development, manufacturing and use processes; l physical =λ NOspace +λ space ; λ NOspace is the non-spatial radiation failure rate, λ physical is the total failure rate caused by the physical mechanism of failure.
5. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, It is characterized in that When the processor executes the program, the steps of the risk control method for a high-safety electronic system as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 3 are implemented.
6. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, It is characterized in that When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the risk control method for a high-security electronic system as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 3 are implemented.
