Digital car key processing method, device and platform system

Abstract

The present application is about a digital car key processing method, device and platform system. The digital car key processing method includes: obtaining an authentication message for unlocking / locking sent by a mobile terminal, wherein the authentication message contains a counter field set by a key server; after successfully performing signature verification on the authentication message and successfully performing anti-replay attack verification on the counter field in the authentication message according to a certificate preset in the vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX, unlocking / locking is performed. The solution provided by the present application can expand the application scenarios of digital car keys and improve security performance.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of data security technology, and in particular to a digital car key processing method, device and platform system. Background Art

[0002] With the continuous development of automobile intelligent technology and information technology, digital car keys have emerged. Currently, digital car keys on the market include Bluetooth keys, WIFI keys, etc. These digital car keys generally use third-party encryption solutions and use the hardware security mechanism of mobile terminals to securely store the root certificates and keys required for security authentication.

[0003] However, the root certificates and keys in the relevant technology are generally pre-embedded by domestic mobile terminal manufacturers for some applications such as WeChat programs during production. When the vehicle is sold abroad, the original security mechanism is not applicable because the mobile terminals of foreign users do not have these pre-embedded root certificates and keys, making it impossible to apply to application scenarios in foreign areas. Summary of the invention

[0004] In order to solve or partially solve the problems existing in the related technology, the present application provides a digital car key processing method, device and platform system, which can expand the application scenarios of digital car keys and improve safety performance.

[0005] The first aspect of the present application provides a digital car key processing method, comprising:

[0006] Acquire an authentication message for unlocking / locking sent by a mobile terminal, wherein the authentication message contains a counter field set by a key server;

[0007] After the signature verification of the authentication message is successful according to the certificate preset in the vehicle networking terminal TBOX, and the counter field in the authentication message is successfully verified to prevent replay attacks, unlocking / locking is performed.

[0008] In one implementation, the certificate is preset in the TBOX by a certificate server, and the certificate is generated by the certificate server according to the integrated circuit card identification code ICCID of the TBOX.

[0009] In one implementation, the certificate is stored in a trusted execution environment TEE of the TBOX, and the TEE includes a trusted application TA interface and a client application CA interface.

[0010] In one implementation, the certificate includes a private key certificate and a public key certificate, and after the signature verification of the authentication message is successful and the counter field in the authentication message is successfully verified to prevent replay attacks, unlocking / locking is performed, including:

[0011] Calling the CA interface to perform signature verification on the authentication message according to the public key certificate, wherein the authentication message is encrypted and signed according to the private key certificate;

[0012] After the signature verification is successful, decrypting the counter field in the authentication message;

[0013] After the decrypted counter field is successfully verified to prevent replay attacks, unlocking / locking is performed.

[0014] In one embodiment, after successfully verifying the decrypted counter field against replay attacks, the method further includes:

[0015] The CA interface is called to record the counter field of the authentication message for use in the next verification.

[0016] In one embodiment, the method further comprises:

[0017] An updated counter field sent by the key server is obtained, wherein a value of the updated counter field is greater than a value of the counter field in the historical authentication message sent by the key server.

[0018] A second aspect of the present application provides a digital car key processing method, comprising:

[0019] Send a request to the key server to obtain an authentication message for unlocking / locking;

[0020] receiving an authentication message generated by the key server according to the request, wherein when the key server generates the authentication message, a counter field is set in the authentication message;

[0021] The authentication message is sent to the vehicle networking terminal TBOX, and the TBOX performs unlocking / locking after successfully performing signature verification on the authentication message and successfully performing replay attack prevention verification on the counter field in the authentication message according to the certificate preset in the TBOX.

[0022] In one embodiment, the authentication message is generated by the key server according to the private key certificate obtained from the certificate server, wherein when the key server generates the authentication message according to the private key certificate, a counter field is set in the authentication message, and the value of the counter field of each authentication message increases in sequence;

[0023] The private key certificate is returned by the certificate server after receiving the private key certificate request sent by the key server, and the private key certificate request carries the vehicle identification number VIN of the vehicle.

[0024] In one embodiment, the method further comprises:

[0025] The received authentication message is stored through the hardware security resources of the mobile terminal.

[0026] In one embodiment, the method further comprises:

[0027] A message of deleting the authentication message is sent to the key server. After the key server confirms the legitimacy of the deleted authentication message, an updated counter field is sent to the TBOX. The value of the updated counter field is greater than the value of the counter field in the sent historical authentication message.

[0028] In one embodiment, the receiving the authentication message generated by the key server according to the request includes: receiving multiple authentication messages generated by the key server according to the request;

[0029] The sending of the authentication message to the vehicle networking terminal TBOX includes: selecting one of the authentication messages to send to the vehicle networking terminal TBOX according to the order of the values ​​of the counter fields of the authentication messages.

[0030] A third aspect of the present application provides a vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX, comprising:

[0031] An acquisition module, used to acquire an authentication message for unlocking / locking sent by a mobile terminal, wherein the authentication message contains a counter field set by a key server;

[0032] An authentication module, used to perform signature verification and replay attack prevention verification on the authentication message according to the certificate preset in the vehicle networking terminal TBOX;

[0033] The processing module is used to execute unlocking / locking after the authentication module successfully performs signature verification on the authentication message and successfully performs anti-replay attack verification on the counter field in the authentication message.

[0034] In one implementation, the vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX further includes:

[0035] A storage module is used to store the certificate in the trusted execution environment TEE of the TBOX, and the TEE includes a trusted application TA interface and a client application CA interface.

[0036] In one implementation, the certificate includes a private key certificate and a public key certificate, and the authentication module includes:

[0037] A signature verification submodule, used to call the CA interface and perform signature verification on the authentication message according to the public key certificate, wherein the authentication message is encrypted and signed according to the private key certificate;

[0038] A decryption submodule, used to decrypt the counter field in the authentication message after the signature verification is successful;

[0039] The replay attack prevention submodule is used to perform replay attack prevention verification on the decrypted counter field.

[0040] A fourth aspect of the present application provides a mobile terminal, including:

[0041] A first sending module, used for sending a request for obtaining an authentication message for unlocking / locking to a key server;

[0042] A receiving module, configured to receive an authentication message generated by the key server according to the request, wherein when the key server generates the authentication message, a counter field is set in the authentication message;

[0043] The second sending module is used to send the authentication message to the vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX, and the TBOX performs unlocking / locking after successfully performing signature verification on the authentication message and successfully performing anti-replay attack verification on the counter field in the authentication message according to the certificate preset in the TBOX.

[0044] In one embodiment, the mobile terminal further includes:

[0045] The storage module is used to store the received authentication message through the hardware security resources of the mobile terminal.

[0046] In one embodiment, the mobile terminal further includes:

[0047] The third sending module is used to send a message to delete the authentication message to the key server. After the key server confirms the legitimacy of the deleted authentication message, it sends an updated counter field to the TBOX, and the value of the updated counter field is greater than the value of the counter field in the sent historical authentication message.

[0048] A fifth aspect of the present application provides a digital car key platform system: comprising the above-mentioned vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX and the above-mentioned mobile terminal.

[0049] In one embodiment, the system further comprises:

[0050] The certificate server is used to generate a certificate and preset the certificate in the TBOX. The certificate is generated by the certificate server according to the integrated circuit card identification code ICCID of the TBOX.

[0051] In one embodiment, the system further comprises:

[0052] The key server is used to send a private key certificate request to the certificate server, the private key certificate request carries the vehicle identification number VIN of the vehicle, receive the private key certificate returned by the certificate server according to the private key certificate request, generate the authentication message according to the private key certificate, set a counter field in the authentication message, and the value of the counter field of each authentication message increases sequentially.

[0053] In one embodiment, the key server receives a message from the mobile terminal to delete the authentication message, and after confirming the legitimacy of the deleted authentication message, sends an updated counter field to the TBOX, wherein the value of the updated counter field is greater than the value of the counter field in the sent historical authentication message.

[0054] A sixth aspect of the present application provides a non-temporary machine-readable storage medium having executable code stored thereon. When the executable code is executed by a processor of an electronic device, the processor is caused to execute the above method.

[0055] The technical solution provided by this application may have the following beneficial effects:

[0056] The solution provided by the present application is to pre-set the certificate in TBOX (Telematics BOX, a vehicle-mounted networking terminal, also known as a telematics processor), so that it no longer relies on a specific mobile terminal. Whether the vehicle is sold or used domestically or abroad, the certificate in TBOX can be used to authenticate the authentication message used by the digital car key for unlocking / locking. Moreover, the authentication message contains a counter field set by the key server. After the signature verification of the authentication message is successful, and the counter field in the authentication message is successfully verified to prevent replay attacks, unlocking / locking is performed, which also improves security performance. Therefore, the solution provided by the present application expands the application scenarios of digital car keys and has strong applicability; by storing certificates through the vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX, and setting the counter field by the key server, the counter field is managed, and hardware-level protection is also achieved for the certificate, with a high security level, thereby also improving security performance.

[0057] In the solution provided by the present application, the certificate is stored in the TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) of the TBOX, and the TEE includes a TA (Trusted applications) interface and a CA (Client application) interface; the mobile terminal also stores the received authentication message through the hardware security resources of the mobile terminal, thereby using the mechanism of the secure trusted environment TEE, with a high security level and improved security performance.

[0058] It should be understood that the foregoing general description and the following detailed description are exemplary and explanatory only and are not restrictive of the present application. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0059] The above and other objects, features and advantages of the present application will become more apparent through a more detailed description of exemplary embodiments of the present application in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein the same reference numerals generally represent the same components in the exemplary embodiments of the present application.

[0060] Figure 1 is a flowchart of a digital car key processing method shown in an embodiment of the present application;

[0061] Figure 2 is a flowchart of a digital car key processing method shown in another embodiment of the present application;

[0062] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the process of presetting a TBOX certificate according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0063] Figure 4 It is a schematic diagram of a process of a mobile terminal obtaining an authentication message from a key server according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0064] Figure 5 is a flowchart of a digital car key processing method shown in another embodiment of the present application;

[0065] Figure 6 It is a schematic diagram of a trusted execution environment TEE of TBOX shown in an embodiment of the present application;

[0066] Figure 7 is a structural schematic diagram of a vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX shown in an embodiment of the present application;

[0067] Figure 8 is a structural schematic diagram of a vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX shown in another embodiment of the present application;

[0068] Fig. 9 is a structural schematic diagram of a mobile terminal shown in an embodiment of the present application;

[0069] Fig.10 is a structural schematic diagram of a digital car key platform system shown in an embodiment of the present application;

[0070] Fig.11 It is a structural schematic diagram of a digital car key platform system shown in another embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0071] The preferred embodiments of the present application will be described in more detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Although the preferred embodiments of the present application are shown in the accompanying drawings, it should be understood that the present application can be implemented in various forms and should not be limited by the embodiments described herein. On the contrary, these embodiments are provided to make the present application more thorough and complete, and to fully convey the scope of the present application to those skilled in the art.

[0072] The terms used in this application are for the purpose of describing specific embodiments only and are not intended to limit this application. The singular forms of "a", "said" and "the" used in this application and the appended claims are also intended to include plural forms unless the context clearly indicates other meanings. It should also be understood that the term "and / or" used herein refers to and includes any or all possible combinations of one or more associated listed items.

[0073] It should be understood that although the terms "first", "second", "third", etc. may be used in this application to describe various information, this information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish the same type of information from each other. For example, without departing from the scope of this application, the first information may also be referred to as the second information, and similarly, the second information may also be referred to as the first information. Thus, the features defined as "first" and "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the features. In the description of this application, the meaning of "multiple" is two or more, unless otherwise clearly and specifically defined.

[0074] In the related art, when a vehicle is sold abroad, since the mobile terminals of foreign users do not have these pre-embedded root certificates and keys, the original security mechanism is not applicable, making it impossible to apply to application scenarios in foreign areas. In response to the above problems, the embodiments of the present application provide a digital car key processing method that can expand the application scenarios of digital car keys and improve safety performance. The platform-based key security solution provided by the embodiments of the present application can be applicable to domestic and foreign car models and mobile terminals, as well as to a variety of digital car keys. At the same time, the security level of the solution can reach the financial security level. Utilizing the solution provided by the embodiments of the present application will reduce the cost of domestic and foreign security resource configuration and expand the applicable scenarios of the security solution.

[0075] The technical solution of the embodiments of the present application is described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0076] Figure 1 FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for processing a digital car key according to an embodiment of the present application. The method of this embodiment can be applied to a vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX.

[0077] See also Figure 1 , the method comprising:

[0078] Step S101: obtaining an authentication message for unlocking / locking sent by a mobile terminal, wherein the authentication message includes a counter field set by a key server.

[0079] The authentication message can be generated by the key server based on the private key certificate obtained from the certificate server and then sent to the mobile terminal. The mobile terminal sends the authentication message to the vehicle networking terminal TBOX for authentication. Among them, the private key certificate is returned to the key server by the certificate server after receiving the private key certificate request sent by the key server. The private key certificate request carries the vehicle's VIN (Vehicle Identification Number).

[0080] Step S102, after successfully performing signature verification on the authentication message and successfully performing replay attack prevention verification on the counter field in the authentication message according to the certificate preset in the vehicle networking terminal TBOX, unlocking / locking is performed.

[0081] The certificate is preset in the TBOX by the certificate server, and the certificate is generated by the certificate server according to the ICCID (Integrate Circuit Card Identity) of the TBOX.

[0082] The process of pre-setting the certificate of TBOX includes: after the CDU (Central Display Unit) sends a request for pre-setting the certificate to the certificate server, receiving and storing the certificate obtained by the CDU from the certificate server, wherein the certificate is generated by the certificate server according to the request.

[0083] Certificates can be stored in TBOX's trusted execution environment TEE, which includes the trusted application TA interface and the client application CA interface. By using TBOX's TEE software framework, CA and TA are provided by the TBOX system layer, and signature verification and anti-replay attack verification operations are all implemented in TA. Its process and logic cannot be obtained and understood by non-secure domains, and CA will provide interfaces to upper-layer applications in non-secure domains for customized function implementation, so that hardware-level security can be achieved.

[0084] It should be noted that if the signature verification of the authentication message fails, and / or the verification of the counter field in the authentication message to prevent replay attacks fails, the unlocking / locking will be refused.

[0085] It can be seen from this embodiment that the solution provided by the embodiment of the present application is to pre-set the certificate in the vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX, so that it is no longer dependent on a specific mobile terminal. Whether the vehicle is sold or used domestically or abroad, the certificate in TBOX can be used to authenticate the authentication message used by the digital car key for unlocking / locking. Moreover, the authentication message contains a counter field set by the key server. After the signature verification of the authentication message is successful, and the counter field in the authentication message is successfully verified to prevent replay attacks, unlocking / locking is performed, which also improves security performance. Therefore, the solution provided by the present application expands the application scenarios of digital car keys and has strong applicability; by storing certificates through the vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX, and setting the counter field by the key server, the counter field is managed, and hardware-level protection is also achieved for the certificate, with a high security level, thereby also improving security performance.

[0086] Figure 2 FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for processing a digital car key according to another embodiment of the present invention. The method of this embodiment can be applied to a mobile terminal.

[0087] See also Figure 2 , the method comprising:

[0088] Step S201: Send a request to a key server to obtain an authentication message for unlocking / locking.

[0089] The mobile terminal sends a request to the key server for obtaining an authentication message for unlocking / locking.

[0090] Step S202: receiving an authentication message generated by the key server according to the request, wherein when the key server generates the authentication message, a counter field is set in the authentication message.

[0091] The authentication message can be generated by the key server according to the private key certificate obtained from the certificate server, and then sent to the mobile terminal. The private key certificate is returned to the key server by the certificate server after receiving the private key certificate request sent by the key server. The private key certificate request carries the vehicle identification number VIN of the vehicle. The key server generates an authentication message according to the private key certificate, sets a counter field in the authentication message, and the value of the counter field of each authentication message increases in sequence.

[0092] In the scheme of the embodiment of the present application, the authentication message of the digital car key uses the counter field counter to prevent message replay attacks. The counter of the authentication message is managed and generated by the key server. When the mobile terminal APP creates a digital car key or the number of stored authentication messages is less than a certain threshold, it can apply to the key server for multiple authentication messages. The value of the counter of each authentication message in the multiple authentication messages generated by the key server increases in sequence, and the mobile terminal APP can use these authentication messages in sequence.

[0093] The mobile terminal may also store the received authentication message through the hardware security resources of the mobile terminal.

[0094] Step S203, the authentication message is sent to the vehicle networking terminal TBOX, and the TBOX performs unlocking / locking after successfully performing signature verification on the authentication message and successfully performing anti-replay attack verification on the counter field in the authentication message according to the certificate preset in the TBOX.

[0095] If the mobile terminal receives multiple authentication messages generated by the key server according to the request, it can select one of the authentication messages according to the order of the values ​​of the counter fields of the authentication messages and send it to the vehicle networking terminal TBOX.

[0096] The mobile terminal sends the authentication message received from the key server to the vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX, which authenticates the authentication message according to the certificate preset in the TBOX, and executes unlocking / locking or refuses to execute unlocking / locking according to the authentication result. For example, unlocking / locking is executed after the signature verification of the authentication message is successful, and the counter field in the authentication message is successfully verified to prevent replay attacks.

[0097] The certificate is preset in TBOX by the certificate server, and the certificate is generated by the certificate server according to the integrated circuit card identification code ICCID of TBOX. The certificate is stored in the trusted execution environment TEE of TBOX, which includes the trusted application TA interface and the client application CA interface.

[0098] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the process of presetting a TBOX certificate according to an embodiment of the present application. This embodiment is described through the interaction process between the certificate server, the central display unit CDU, the TBOX, and the secSDK (Software Development Kit) in the TBOX.

[0099] See also Figure 3 The process of pre-setting TBOX certificates includes:

[0100] Step S301: After detecting that the interface of the central display unit CDU is touched, a request for pre-setting the certificate of the TBOX is triggered to be sent to the certificate server.

[0101] On the production line, the production line workers are generally required to click on the UI (User Interface) of the central display unit CDU to trigger the certificate presetting. Function buttons can be set on the UI interface for the production line workers to click, and the results of the operation can be intuitively seen on the screen.

[0102] Step S302, the CDU sends a request for pre-setting the TBOX certificate to the certificate server, and the request carries the integrated circuit card identification code ICCID of the TBOX.

[0103] After the CDU is triggered, it sends a request for pre-setting the TBOX certificate to the certificate server, which carries the TBOX's integrated circuit card identification code ICCID. ICCID is a unique identification number that can be composed of multiple characters, for example, 20 characters. Each TBOX has a globally unique ICCID, and different TBOXes can be identified by ICCID.

[0104] Step S303: the certificate server generates a certificate for the TBOX according to the ICCID of the TBOX.

[0105] When producing TBOX hardware, the embodiment of the present application can preset different pairs of certificates for each TBOX in the factory environment. These certificates are generated in the certificate server according to the ICCID of different TBOXs, so that each vehicle is different. The embodiment of the present application can preset different pairs of certificates for TBOX, for example, 10 pairs of certificates but not limited thereto. There is no limit to the number of pairs, and it can be designed according to the actual usage scenario.

[0106] When presetting the TBOX certificate, the certificate server can generate different certificates for each vehicle based on the ICCID, and send these certificates to TBOX for secure storage inside the chip. Certificates can include public key certificates and private key certificates, both of which are pre-set in TBOX during production and also stored in the certificate server. Among them, the private key certificate is mainly used for signing, and the public key certificate is mainly used for verifying signatures. In addition, if symmetric encryption is performed, the public key certificate will also be used.

[0107] Step S304: the certificate server locally stores the certificate.

[0108] Step S305: The certificate server sends the certificate to the CDU.

[0109] The certificate server sends the certificate including the public key certificate and the private key certificate to the CDU.

[0110] Step S306: CDU forwards the certificate to TBOX.

[0111] The CDU forwards the certificate including the public key certificate and the private key certificate to TBOX.

[0112] Step S307: TBOX stores the certificate locally.

[0113] Step S308: secSDK in TBOX stores the certificate securely.

[0114] TBOX is installed with secSDK, which can be used to store certificates securely. Figure 6 , is a schematic diagram of the trusted execution environment TEE of TBOX shown in an embodiment of the present application.

[0115] like Figure 6 As shown in the figure, in the trusted execution environment TEE, there are trusted application TA interface and client application CA interface. TEE stores sensitive information such as private key certificates and public key certificates in a secure area. These sensitive information can only be accessed or modified by trusted applications authorized by TEE. TBOX supports hardware-level trusted security environment TEE. It calls up the securely stored CA / TA to encrypt and store these certificates. The encryption key is pre-embedded in the TEE hardware and cannot be read out. When these certificates are used for security authentication, TEE will provide another CA interface to authenticate the authentication message and give the authentication result, and will not decrypt and expose the certificate to the memory. Therefore, the TEE software inside TBOX prevents the leakage of certificates. Even if leakage occurs, it cannot be used in other TBOXes.

[0116] Step S309, secSDK returns the processing result to TBOX.

[0117] Step S310: TBOX replies the processing result to CDU.

[0118] TBOX replies the processing result to CDU, indicating that the certificate has been successfully pre-configured for TBOX.

[0119] Figure 4 This is a flow chart of a mobile terminal obtaining an authentication message from a key server according to an embodiment of the present application. This embodiment is described through the interaction process between the mobile terminal, the key server, and the certificate server.

[0120] See also Figure 4 , the process includes:

[0121] Step S401: The mobile terminal checks whether it has an authentication message for unlocking / locking. If it does not have an authentication message, it proceeds to step S402.

[0122] It should be noted that the authentication message mentioned here can also be called a Token.

[0123] Step S402: The mobile terminal authenticates the user.

[0124] For example, the mobile terminal authenticates the user's account and password.

[0125] Step S403: the mobile terminal sends a request to the key server for obtaining an authentication message for unlocking / locking.

[0126] After the identity authentication is successful, the mobile terminal sends a request to the key server to obtain an authentication message for unlocking / locking.

[0127] When the mobile terminal creates a digital car key or the number of stored authentication messages is less than a certain threshold, it can apply for multiple authentication messages from the key server.

[0128] In step S404, the key server checks whether it has stored a private key certificate. If it does not have a private key certificate, it proceeds to step S405. If it has a private key certificate, it proceeds to step S408.

[0129] Step S405: The key server sends a private key certificate request to the certificate server, where the private key certificate request carries the VIN of the vehicle.

[0130] In order to generate the authentication message, the key server will send a private key certificate request to the certificate server according to the vehicle's VIN (Vehicle Identification Number), so as to obtain the private key certificate of the corresponding vehicle. The private key certificate request carries the vehicle's VIN.

[0131] Step S406: The certificate server returns the private key certificate to the key server according to the private key certificate request.

[0132] The certificate server returns the private key certificate corresponding to the vehicle's VIN to the key server based on the private key certificate request and the vehicle's VIN. Each private key certificate will record a cumulative counter that has been used to prevent replay attacks. The counter refers to the count of authentication messages signed by the same private key certificate. For example, if the counter is from 1 to 100, it means that this private key certificate has signed 100 authentication messages.

[0133] Step S407: The key server stores the private key certificate.

[0134] Step S408: The key server generates an authentication message for unlocking / locking according to the private key certificate.

[0135] When the key server generates an authentication message, it sets a counter field in the authentication message. The key server uses the received private key certificate to generate an encrypted and signed authentication message with information such as counter (counter field), timestamp (timestamp), and message type.

[0136] That is to say, the authentication message is encrypted and signed by the key server using the private key certificate; the characteristic data of the authentication message to be verified subsequently may include the counter field counter and the message type type, etc.

[0137] The key server generates an authentication message based on the private key certificate, and sets a counter field in the authentication message. The value of the counter field of each authentication message increases sequentially. In the scheme of the embodiment of the present application, the authentication message of the digital car key uses the counter field counter to prevent message replay attacks. The counter of the authentication message is managed and generated by the key server. When the mobile terminal creates a digital car key or the number of authentication messages is less than a certain threshold, the mobile terminal can apply to the key server for multiple authentication messages. After receiving the request, the key server generates multiple authentication messages, and the value of the counter of each authentication message in the generated multiple authentication messages increases sequentially, and the mobile terminal APP can use these authentication messages in sequence.

[0138] Step S409: The key server returns an authentication message to the mobile terminal.

[0139] After the mobile terminal obtains the authentication message for unlocking / locking from the key server, it calls up the hardware security resources of the mobile terminal (iOS system & Android system) to store the authentication message locally and securely. Through such a security mechanism, these authentication messages can only be used on this mobile terminal, avoiding or reducing the possibility of leakage. The hardware security resources, for example, can be Android Keystore or iOS Keychain, etc., which are not limited in the embodiments of this application.

[0140] Figure 5 FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method for processing a digital car key according to another embodiment of the present invention. This embodiment is described through the interaction process among a certificate server, TBOX, a mobile terminal, and a key server.

[0141] See also Figure 5 , the method comprising:

[0142] Step S501: The certificate server generates a certificate including a private key certificate and a public key certificate, and pre-sets the certificate in the vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX.

[0143] The process of pre-setting TBOX certificates can be found in Figure 3 As shown, no further description is given here.

[0144] Step S502: The mobile terminal sends a request to the key server for obtaining an authentication message for unlocking / locking.

[0145] The mobile terminal can install an APP (Application) to bind the vehicle, and can request an authentication message for unlocking / locking from the key server through the APP. After receiving the authentication message, the authentication message is securely stored.

[0146] When the mobile terminal creates a digital car key or the number of stored authentication messages is less than a certain threshold, it can apply for multiple authentication messages from the key server.

[0147] Step S503: the key server requests a private key certificate from the certificate server.

[0148] After receiving the request from the mobile terminal, the key server requests the private key certificate from the certificate server. It should be noted that if the key server already stores the private key certificate, there is no need to initiate a request to the certificate server again.

[0149] Step S504: The certificate server returns the private key certificate to the key server.

[0150] Step S505: The key server generates an authentication message according to the private key certificate obtained from the certificate server, and returns the authentication message generated according to the private key certificate to the mobile terminal.

[0151] The key server generates an authentication message based on the private key certificate, sets a counter field in the authentication message, and the value of the counter field of each authentication message increases in sequence. The process of the key server generating an authentication message based on the private key certificate can be found in Figure 4 The description in will not be repeated here.

[0152] After the mobile terminal receives the authentication message returned by the key server, it stores the authentication message securely. After the mobile terminal obtains the authentication message for unlocking / locking from the key server, it calls up the hardware security resources of the mobile terminal (iOS system & Android system) to store the authentication message securely locally. Through such a security mechanism, these authentication messages can only be used on this mobile terminal, avoiding or reducing the possibility of leakage. The hardware security resources, for example, can be Android Keystore or iOS Keychain, etc., which are not limited in the embodiments of this application.

[0153] Step S506: The mobile terminal sends an authentication message for unlocking / locking to the TBOX.

[0154] The mobile terminal can send the authentication message for unlocking / locking to the TBOX through physical channels such as Bluetooth or WiFi.

[0155] If the mobile terminal receives multiple authentication messages generated by the key server according to the request, it can select one of the authentication messages according to the order of the values ​​of the counter fields of the authentication messages and send it to the vehicle networking terminal TBOX.

[0156] Step S507: TBOX authenticates the authentication message according to the preset certificate.

[0157] The certification process may include:

[0158] 1) Call the CA interface to perform signature verification on the authentication message based on the public key certificate, where the authentication message is encrypted and signed based on the private key certificate.

[0159] The encryption may be performed using various encryption algorithms, which are not limited in the present embodiment. If a symmetric encryption algorithm is used, a public key certificate is used for encryption.

[0160] Based on the characteristic data in the authentication message, TBOX calls up the CA interface of TBOX and tells TEE which public key certificate to use for signature verification. TBOX passes the data and signature to be verified in the authentication message to the CA interface for signature verification. If it fails, the entire verification process is exited and a failure result is returned.

[0161] 2) After the signature verification is successful, the counter field in the authentication message is decrypted.

[0162] TBOX uses the CA interface to decrypt the counter field and returns the decrypted original data.

[0163] 3) Verify the decrypted counter field to prevent replay attacks.

[0164] TBOX calls up the CA interface to verify the counter field in the authentication message to prevent replay attacks. If it fails, it directly returns a failure result. TBOX performs signature verification and decryption on each authentication message. After the signature verification and decryption pass, it compares the counter of the authentication message. If the counter is larger than the counter saved locally, TBOX considers that the authentication message has passed the verification to prevent replay attacks. At this time, the entire security verification of the authentication message has passed, and it can be unlocked / locked later.

[0165] It should be noted that both CA and TA are supported by the TBOX system software itself. It only provides CA interface to the outside world, and the TA interface cannot be called by the outside world. When the CA interface is called, the CA interface will call the TA interface through the security interface of the system bottom layer.

[0166] 4) After successful verification against replay attacks, TBOX calls up the CA interface and records the counter of this authentication message locally for use in the next counter comparison.

[0167] After TBOX successfully verifies the decrypted counter field to prevent replay attacks, it calls the CA interface to record the counter field of the authentication message for the next verification.

[0168] Step S508: TBOX unlocks / locks the vehicle or refuses to unlock / lock the vehicle according to the authentication result.

[0169] Among them, TBOX can execute unlocking / locking according to the authentication result of success; or refuse to execute unlocking / locking according to the authentication result of failure. Among them, the authentication result is successful, including the signature verification and the anti-replay attack verification. That is to say, after TBOX authenticates the authentication message with the preset certificate, if the authentication passes, it can be considered that the instruction is legal and operations such as unlocking / locking the door can be performed. Otherwise, no vehicle control operation can be performed, that is, operations such as unlocking / locking the door are refused to be executed.

[0170] It can be seen that the solution provided by the embodiment of the present application uses the TEE software framework of TBOX. CA and TA are provided by the TBOX system layer, and the operations of signature verification, decryption, and verification to prevent replay attacks are all implemented in TA, so that its process and logic will not be obtained and understood by the non-secure domain, and CA will provide an interface to the upper-layer application of the non-secure domain for customized function implementation, such as transmission decryption, signature verification, and operation of data of secure files. Such a set of security mechanisms relies on the only chip hardware, so the security operations in TBOX belong to hardware security, which can make the entire digital car key reach the hardware-level security level.

[0171] It should be noted that the mobile terminal can also delete the digital car key, that is, delete the authentication message. Click on the delete authentication message in the mobile terminal APP, and notify the key server at the same time. The key server will also notify TBOX. After TBOX receives the notification from the key server, it will locally record that the authentication message is unavailable.

[0172] The mobile terminal can send a message to delete the authentication message to the key server. After the key server confirms the legitimacy of the deleted authentication message, it sends an updated counter field to the TBOX. The value of the updated counter field is greater than the value of the counter field in the sent historical authentication message.

[0173] That is to say, when the mobile terminal APP deletes the authentication message, it will notify the key server, and the key server will check the legitimacy of the deleted authentication message and confirm the status of the vehicle. After that, the key server will send a command to synchronize and update the couner to TBOX, and save the updated couner locally. The counter will be larger than the maximum value of the counter of all authentication messages in the current mobile terminal APP, so as to invalidate all authentication messages smaller than the counter. In this way, the authentication message can be prohibited from being used after being deleted.

[0174] From the above embodiments, it can be found that the platform-based key security solution provided by the embodiments of the present application can be applied to domestic and foreign car models and mobile terminals, and can also be applied to a variety of digital car keys. At the same time, the security level of the solution can reach the financial security level. Using the solution provided by the embodiments of the present application, the cost of domestic and foreign security resource configuration can be reduced, and the applicable scenarios of the security solution can be expanded.

[0175] The above detailed introduction describes the digital car key processing method shown in the embodiment of the present application. Correspondingly, the embodiment of the present application also provides corresponding equipment and platform systems.

[0176] Figure 7 It is a structural schematic diagram of a vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX shown in an embodiment of the present application.

[0177] See also Figure 7 The embodiment of the present application provides a vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX 70, including: an acquisition module 71, an authentication module 72, and a processing module 73.

[0178] The acquisition module 71 is used to acquire the authentication message for unlocking / locking sent by the mobile terminal, wherein the authentication message contains a counter field set by the key server. The authentication message can be generated by the key server according to the private key certificate obtained from the certificate server, and then sent to the mobile terminal. When the key server generates the authentication message according to the private key certificate, the counter field is set in the authentication message, and the value of the counter field of each authentication message increases in sequence. The mobile terminal sends the authentication message to the vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX for authentication. The private key certificate is returned to the key server by the certificate server after receiving the private key certificate request sent by the key server, and the private key certificate request carries the vehicle identification number VIN of the vehicle.

[0179] The authentication module 72 is used to authenticate the authentication message according to the certificate preset in the vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX, such as signature verification and verification to prevent replay attacks. The certificate is preset in the TBOX by the certificate server, and the certificate is generated by the certificate server according to the ICCID (Integrate Circuit Card Identity) of the TBOX. The process of presetting the certificate of the TBOX includes: after the CDU (Central Display Unit) sends a request for presetting the certificate to the certificate server, the certificate obtained by the CDU from the certificate server is received and stored, wherein the certificate is generated by the certificate server according to the request.

[0180] The processing module 73 is used to execute unlocking / blocking or refuse to execute unlocking / blocking according to the authentication result of the authentication module 72. The processing module 73 can execute unlocking / blocking after the signature verification of the authentication message is successful and the counter field in the authentication message is successfully verified to prevent replay attacks. If the authentication result is failure, the unlocking / blocking is refused.

[0181] It can be seen from this embodiment that the vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX provided in the embodiment of the present application pre-sets the certificate in the vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX, so that it is no longer dependent on a specific mobile terminal. Regardless of whether the vehicle is sold or used domestically or abroad, the certificate in TBOX can be used to authenticate the authentication message used by the digital car key for unlocking / locking, and unlocking / locking can be executed or refused according to the authentication result, thereby expanding the application scenarios of digital car keys and having strong applicability; by storing the certificate in the vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX, hardware-level protection is also achieved for the certificate, and the security level is high, thereby also improving safety performance.

[0182] Figure 8 It is a structural schematic diagram of a vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX shown in another embodiment of the present application.

[0183] See also Figure 8 The embodiment of the present application provides a vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX 70, including: an acquisition module 71, an authentication module 72, a processing module 73, and a storage module 74.

[0184] The functions of the acquisition module 71, the authentication module 72, and the processing module 73 can be found in Figure 7 Description in .

[0185] The storage module 74 is used to store the certificate in the trusted execution environment TEE of TBOX. TEE includes a trusted application TA interface and a client application CA interface. TEE stores sensitive information such as private key certificates and public key certificates in a secure area. These sensitive information can only be accessed or modified by trusted applications authorized by TEE. TBOX supports hardware-level trusted security environment TEE, which calls up the securely stored CA / TA to encrypt and store these certificates. This encryption key is pre-embedded in the TEE hardware and cannot be read out. When these certificates are used for security authentication, TEE will provide another CA interface to authenticate the authentication message and give the authentication result, and will not decrypt the certificate and expose it to the memory. Therefore, the TEE software inside TBOX prevents the leakage of certificates. Even if leakage occurs, it cannot be used in other TBOXes.

[0186] The authentication module 72 may include: a signature verification submodule 721 , a decryption submodule 722 , and a replay attack prevention submodule 723 .

[0187] The signature verification submodule 721 is used to call the CA interface to perform signature verification on the authentication message according to the public key certificate, wherein the authentication message is encrypted and signed according to the private key certificate. The encryption may adopt various encryption algorithms, which are not limited in the embodiments of the present application. If a symmetric encryption algorithm is adopted, a public key certificate will be used for encryption processing. The signature verification submodule 721 calls up the CA interface of TBOX according to the characteristic data in the authentication message, and tells the TEE which public key certificate will be used for signature verification. TBOX passes the data and signature to be verified in the authentication message to the CA interface for signature verification. If it fails, it exits the entire verification process and returns a failure result.

[0188] The decryption submodule 722 is used to decrypt the counter field in the authentication message after the signature verification is successful. The decryption submodule 722 uses the CA interface to decrypt the field where the counter is located and returns the decrypted original data.

[0189] The anti-replay attack submodule 723 is used to verify the anti-replay attack of the decrypted counter field. The anti-replay attack submodule 723 calls the CA interface to verify the counter field in the authentication message. If it fails, it directly returns a failure result. It should be noted that both CA and TA are supported by the TBOX system software itself. It only provides the CA interface to the outside world, and the TA interface cannot be called by the outside world. When the CA interface is called, the CA interface will call the TA interface through the secure interface of the system bottom layer.

[0190] The replay attack prevention submodule 723 may also call the CA interface to record the counter field of the authentication message for use in the next verification.

[0191] The TBOX 70 may also obtain an updated counter field sent by the key server, the value of the updated counter field being greater than the value of the counter field in the historical authentication message sent by the key server.

[0192] Fig. 9 It is a schematic diagram of the structure of a mobile terminal shown in an embodiment of the present application.

[0193] See also Fig. 9 , an embodiment of the present application provides a mobile terminal 90, including: a first sending module 91, a receiving module 92, and a second sending module 93.

[0194] The first sending module 91 is used to send a request for obtaining an authentication message for unlocking / locking to the key server.

[0195] The receiving module 92 is used to receive the authentication message generated by the key server according to the request, wherein when the key server generates the authentication message, a counter field is set in the authentication message. The authentication message can be generated by the key server according to the private key certificate obtained from the certificate server, and then sent to the mobile terminal. The private key certificate is returned to the key server after the certificate server receives the private key certificate request sent by the key server, and the private key certificate request carries the vehicle identification number VIN of the vehicle. The mobile terminal 90 can also store the received authentication message through the hardware security resources of the mobile terminal.

[0196] The second sending module 93 is used to send the authentication message to the vehicle networking terminal TBOX, and the TBOX authenticates the authentication message according to the certificate preset in the TBOX, and performs unlocking / locking or refuses to perform unlocking / locking according to the authentication result. For example, after the signature verification of the authentication message is successful, and the counter field in the authentication message is successfully verified to prevent replay attacks, unlocking / locking is performed. The second sending module 93 of the mobile terminal 90 can send the authentication message received from the key server to the vehicle networking terminal TBOX, and the TBOX authenticates the authentication message according to the certificate preset in the TBOX, and performs unlocking / locking or refuses to perform unlocking / locking according to the authentication result.

[0197] The mobile terminal 90 may further include: a storage module 94 .

[0198] The storage module 94 is used to store the received authentication message through the hardware security resources of the mobile terminal. After the storage module 94 obtains the authentication message for unlocking / locking from the key server, it calls up the hardware security resources of the mobile terminal (iOS system & Android system) to store the authentication message locally and securely. Through such a security mechanism, these authentication messages can only be used on this mobile terminal, avoiding or reducing the possibility of leakage. The hardware security resources, for example, can be Android Keystore or iOS Keychain, etc., which are not limited in the embodiments of the present application.

[0199] The mobile terminal 90 may further include: a third sending module 95 .

[0200] The third sending module 95 is used to send a message to delete the authentication message to the key server. After the key server confirms the legitimacy of the deleted authentication message, it sends an updated counter field to the TBOX. The value of the updated counter field is greater than the value of the counter field in the sent historical authentication message.

[0201] Fig.10 It is a structural schematic diagram of a digital car key platform system shown in one embodiment of the present application.

[0202] See also Fig.10 , an embodiment of the present application provides a digital car key platform system 100, including the above-mentioned vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX 70 and the above-mentioned mobile terminal 90.

[0203] The vehicle networking terminal TBOX 70 is used to obtain the authentication message for unlocking / locking sent by the mobile terminal 90; authenticate the authentication message according to the certificate preset in the vehicle networking terminal TBOX70; and execute unlocking / locking or refuse to execute unlocking / locking according to the authentication result. For example, unlocking / locking is executed after the signature verification of the authentication message is successful and the counter field in the authentication message is successfully verified to prevent replay attacks.

[0204] The mobile terminal 90 is used to send a request to the key server to obtain an authentication message for unlocking / locking; receive the authentication message generated by the key server according to the request; send the authentication message to the vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX70, and TBOX70 authenticates the authentication message according to the certificate preset in TBOX70, and executes unlocking / locking or refuses to execute unlocking / locking according to the authentication result.

[0205] For more detailed functions of the vehicle networking terminal TBOX 70, please refer to Figure 7 and Figure 8 The mobile terminal 90 can refer to the description in Fig. 9 Description in .

[0206] Fig.11 It is a structural schematic diagram of a digital car key platform system shown in another embodiment of the present application.

[0207] See also Fig.11 The embodiment of the present application provides a digital car key platform system 100, including the above-mentioned vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX 70 and the above-mentioned mobile terminal 90, and also includes a certificate server 111 and a key server 112.

[0208] The certificate server 111 is used to generate a certificate and pre-set the certificate in TBOX70. The certificate is generated by the certificate server according to the integrated circuit card identification code ICCID of TBOX70. The certificate is pre-set in TBOX70 by the certificate server 111. The certificate is generated by the certificate server 111 according to the ICCID (Integrate Circuit Card Identity) of TBOX70. The process of pre-setting the certificate of TBOX70 includes: after the CDU (Central Display Unit) sends a request for pre-setting the certificate to the certificate server 111, the certificate obtained by the CDU from the certificate server 111 is received and stored, wherein the certificate is generated by the certificate server 111 according to the request.

[0209] The key server 112 is used to send a private key certificate request to the certificate server 111, the private key certificate request carries the vehicle identification number VIN of the vehicle, and receives the private key certificate returned by the certificate server 111 according to the private key certificate request. In order to generate an authentication message, the key server 112 will send a private key certificate request to the certificate server 111 according to the VIN (Vehicle Identification Number) of the vehicle, so as to obtain the private key certificate of the corresponding vehicle. Among them, the private key certificate request carries the VIN of the vehicle. The certificate server 111 returns the private key certificate corresponding to the VIN of the vehicle to the key server 112 according to the private key certificate request and the VIN of the vehicle. The key server 112 generates an authentication message according to the private key certificate, sets a counter field in the authentication message, and the value of the counter field of each authentication message increases sequentially. Each private key certificate will also record a cumulative counter field that has been used to prevent replay attacks.

[0210] Regarding the device in the above embodiment, the specific manner in which each module performs operations has been described in detail in the embodiment of the method, and will not be elaborated again here.

[0211] Those skilled in the art will further appreciate that the various illustrative logical blocks, modules, circuits, and algorithm steps described in connection with the application herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computer software, or combinations of both.

[0212] The flow chart and block diagram in the accompanying drawings show the possible architecture, function and operation of the system and method according to multiple embodiments of the present application. In this regard, each square box in the flow chart or block diagram can represent a part of a module, a program segment or a code, and the part of the module, the program segment or the code contains one or more executable instructions for realizing the specified logical function. It should also be noted that in some alternative implementations, the functions marked in the square box can also occur in a sequence different from that marked in the accompanying drawings. For example, two continuous square boxes can actually be executed substantially in parallel, and they can sometimes be executed in the opposite order, depending on the functions involved. It should also be noted that each square box in the block diagram and / or the flow chart, and the combination of the square boxes in the block diagram and / or the flow chart can be implemented with a dedicated hardware-based system that performs the specified function or operation, or can be implemented with a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions.

[0213] In addition, the method according to the present application may also be implemented as a computer program or a computer program product, which includes computer program code instructions for executing some or all of the steps in the above method of the present application.

[0214] Alternatively, the present application can also be implemented as a non-temporary machine-readable storage medium (or computer-readable storage medium, or machine-readable storage medium) on which executable code (or computer program, or computer instruction code) is stored. When the executable code (or computer program, or computer instruction code) is executed by a processor of an electronic device (or electronic device, server, etc.), the processor executes part or all of the steps of the above-mentioned method according to the present application.

[0215] The embodiments of the present application have been described above, and the above description is exemplary, not exhaustive, and is not limited to the disclosed embodiments. Many modifications and changes will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the described embodiments. The selection of terms used herein is intended to best explain the principles of the embodiments, practical applications, or improvements to the technology in the market, or to enable other persons of ordinary skill in the art to understand the embodiments disclosed herein.

Claims

1. A digital car key processing method, characterized in that: include: Acquire an authentication message for unlocking / locking sent by a mobile terminal, wherein the authentication message contains a counter field set by a key server; After the signature verification of the authentication message is successful according to the certificate preset in the vehicle networking terminal TBOX, and the counter field in the authentication message is successfully verified to prevent replay attacks, unlocking / locking is performed, and the counter field of the authentication message is recorded for the next verification; Wherein, the certificate includes a private key certificate, and the authentication message is encrypted and signed by the key server according to the private key certificate; The verification that the counter field in the authentication message is successfully protected from replay attacks includes: if the value of the counter field in the authentication message is greater than the value of the counter field stored in the TBOX, the verification that the counter field in the authentication message is successfully protected from replay attacks; The method also includes: obtaining an updated counter field sent by the key server after confirming the legitimacy of the message sent by the mobile terminal to delete the authentication message, wherein the value of the updated counter field is greater than the value of the counter field in the historical authentication message sent by the key server.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The certificate is preset in the TBOX by a certificate server, and the certificate is generated by the certificate server according to the integrated circuit card identification code ICCID of the TBOX.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The certificate is stored in the trusted execution environment TEE of the TBOX, and the TEE includes a trusted application TA interface and a client application CA interface.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The certificate also includes a public key certificate. After the signature verification of the authentication message is successful and the counter field in the authentication message is successfully verified to prevent replay attacks, unlocking / locking is performed, including: Calling the CA interface to perform signature verification on the authentication message according to the public key certificate; After the signature verification is successful, decrypting the counter field in the authentication message; After the decrypted counter field is successfully verified to prevent replay attacks, unlocking / locking is performed.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The counter field recording the authentication message is used for the next verification, including: The CA interface is called to record the counter field of the authentication message for use in the next verification.

6. A digital car key processing method, characterized in that: include: Send a request to the key server to obtain an authentication message for unlocking / locking; receiving an authentication message generated by the key server according to the request, wherein when the key server generates the authentication message, a counter field is set in the authentication message; The authentication message is sent to the vehicle networking terminal TBOX, and the TBOX performs signature verification on the authentication message according to the certificate preset in the TBOX. After the counter field in the authentication message is successfully verified to prevent replay attacks, the TBOX performs unlocking / locking, and records the counter field of the authentication message for the next verification; Wherein, the certificate includes a private key certificate, and the authentication message is encrypted and signed by the key server according to the private key certificate; The verification that the counter field in the authentication message is successfully protected from replay attacks includes: if the value of the counter field in the authentication message is greater than the value of the counter field stored in the TBOX, the verification that the counter field in the authentication message is successfully protected from replay attacks; The method further comprises: A message for deleting the authentication message is sent to the key server. After the key server confirms the legitimacy of the message for deleting the authentication message, an updated counter field is sent to the TBOX, wherein the value of the updated counter field is greater than the value of the counter field in the sent historical authentication message.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that: When the key server generates the authentication message according to the private key certificate, a counter field is set in the authentication message, and the value of the counter field of each authentication message increases in sequence; The private key certificate is returned by the certificate server after receiving the private key certificate request sent by the key server. The private key certificate request carries the vehicle identification number VIN of the vehicle.

8. The method according to claim 6 or 7, characterized in that: The method further comprises: The received authentication message is stored through the hardware security resources of the mobile terminal.

9. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that: The receiving the authentication message generated by the key server according to the request includes: receiving a plurality of authentication messages generated by the key server according to the request; The sending of the authentication message to the vehicle networking terminal TBOX includes: selecting one of the authentication messages to send to the vehicle networking terminal TBOX according to the order of the values ​​of the counter fields of the authentication messages.

10. A vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX, characterized in that: include: An acquisition module, used to acquire an authentication message for unlocking / locking sent by a mobile terminal, wherein the authentication message contains a counter field set by a key server; An authentication module, used to perform signature verification and replay attack prevention verification on the authentication message according to the certificate preset in the vehicle networking terminal TBOX; A processing module, configured to perform unlocking / locking after successfully performing signature verification on the authentication message according to the authentication module and successfully performing replay attack prevention verification on the counter field in the authentication message, and record the counter field of the authentication message for use in the next verification; Wherein, the certificate includes a private key certificate, and the authentication message is encrypted and signed by the key server according to the private key certificate; The processing module is used to verify the success of preventing replay attacks on the counter field in the authentication message if the value of the counter field in the authentication message is greater than the value of the counter field stored in the TBOX; The TBOX is also used to obtain the updated counter field sent by the key server after confirming the legitimacy of the message sent by the mobile terminal to delete the authentication message, wherein the value of the updated counter field is greater than the value of the counter field in the historical authentication message sent by the key server.

11. The vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX according to claim 10, characterized in that: The vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX also includes: A storage module is used to store the certificate in the trusted execution environment TEE of the TBOX, and the TEE includes a trusted application TA interface and a client application CA interface.

12. The vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX according to claim 11, characterized in that: The certificate also includes a public key certificate, and the authentication module includes: The signature verification submodule is used to call the CA interface and perform signature verification on the authentication message according to the public key certificate; A decryption submodule, used to decrypt the counter field in the authentication message after the signature verification is successful; The replay attack prevention submodule is used to perform replay attack prevention verification on the decrypted counter field.

13. A mobile terminal, characterized in that: include: A first sending module, used for sending a request for obtaining an authentication message for unlocking / locking to a key server; A receiving module, configured to receive an authentication message generated by the key server according to the request, wherein when the key server generates the authentication message, a counter field is set in the authentication message; The second sending module is used to send the authentication message to the vehicle networking terminal TBOX, and the TBOX performs signature verification on the authentication message according to the certificate preset in the TBOX. After the verification is successful, the counter field in the authentication message is successfully verified to prevent replay attacks, and then performs unlocking / locking, and records the counter field of the authentication message for the next verification; Wherein, the certificate includes a private key certificate, and the authentication message is encrypted and signed by the key server according to the private key certificate; The verification that the counter field in the authentication message is successfully protected from replay attacks includes: if the value of the counter field in the authentication message is greater than the value of the counter field stored in the TBOX, the verification that the counter field in the authentication message is successfully protected from replay attacks; The mobile terminal further includes: The third sending module is used to send a message to delete the authentication message to the key server. After the key server confirms the legitimacy of the message to delete the authentication message, it sends an updated counter field to the TBOX, and the value of the updated counter field is greater than the value of the counter field in the sent historical authentication message.

14. The mobile terminal according to claim 13, characterized in that: The mobile terminal further includes: The storage module is used to store the received authentication message through the hardware security resources of the mobile terminal.

15. A digital car key platform system, characterized by: The vehicle-mounted networking terminal TBOX comprises any one of claims 10 to 12 and the mobile terminal according to any one of claims 13 to 14; The system further comprises: The key server is used to receive the message of deleting the authentication message sent by the mobile terminal, and after confirming the legitimacy of the message of deleting the authentication message, send an updated counter field to the TBOX, wherein the value of the updated counter field is greater than the value of the counter field in the sent historical authentication message.

16. The system according to claim 15, characterized in that The system further comprises: The certificate server is used to generate a certificate and preset the certificate in the TBOX. The certificate is generated by the certificate server according to the integrated circuit card identification code ICCID of the TBOX.

17. The system according to claim 15 or 16, characterized in that: The key server is also used to send a private key certificate request to the certificate server, the private key certificate request carries the vehicle identification number VIN of the vehicle, receive the private key certificate returned by the certificate server according to the private key certificate request, generate the authentication message according to the private key certificate, set a counter field in the authentication message, and the value of the counter field of each authentication message increases sequentially.

18. A non-transitory machine-readable storage medium having executable code stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor of an electronic device, causes the processor to execute the method as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 5, or to execute the method as claimed in any one of claims 6 to 9.

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