Multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method and system for privacy protection
Through the multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method combined with identification factor and quasi-marking factor, and using XOR filter and public key encryption technology, the problems of single-factor limitations and high resource consumption in the IoT device authentication method are solved, and the authentication process is stable and data security reduce maintenance costs and computing burden.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202410945284.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-15
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-12
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-07-15
AI Technical Summary
The existing IoT device authentication methods rely on a single factor, which has problems such as device limitations and high resource consumption, and insufficient user privacy protection and data security measures, resulting in increased implementation and maintenance costs.
Using multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method, through the combination of identification factor and quasi-identification factor, the XOR filter and hash function are used for encryption, combined with public key encryption technology and lightweight encryption communication protocol, a preset attenuation model is introduced for authentication and Key negotiation ensures data transmission security and system resources optimization.
It enhances the robustness of the authentication process and system stability, reduces the risk of production and service interruption, reduces the computing burden and maintenance costs, and ensures the privacy of user data and efficient data interaction.
Smart Images

Figure CN118944889A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of information security technology, and in particular relates to a privacy-protected multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method and system. Background Art
[0002] In recent years, with the rapid popularization of 5G networks, my country has entered an era of the Internet of Everything, and the IoT device industry has flourished. Thanks to the high bandwidth and low latency characteristics of 5G networks, IoT devices are widely used in smart homes, industrial automation, medical health and other fields. Since IoT devices may need to execute key commands from the center while collecting and transmitting sensitive data, security issues become particularly important. Authentication, as the first line of defense to solve these security issues, is crucial in the IoT environment. However, with the continuous upgrading of hacker technology, simple authentication has become no longer safe. In response to this, a variety of authentication schemes have been proposed to solve this problem.
[0003] Researchers from East China Jiaotong University introduced an innovative "Trusted Device Transfer Identity Authentication Method for Industrial Internet of Things", which aims to improve the security of industrial Internet of Things devices. The method includes four processes: registration of devices and gateways, direct authentication of gateways, direct authentication of devices, and transfer authentication of devices. Specifically, each device generates its own device fingerprint, and uses lightweight operations such as random character generation algorithm, hash function, and XOR operation to achieve mutual authentication between devices and gateways and servers. Although this method performs well in improving device authentication and secure communication, there are still some challenges and limitations. First, the method relies on device fingerprints for authentication, which may encounter difficulties in distinguishing similar devices produced by the same manufacturer, especially when attackers use devices from the same source to operate. The limitation of relying on a single factor may greatly increase the probability of the system being attacked. In addition, although the method is designed with low resource consumption in mind, in a large-scale network environment, continuous monitoring and data analysis may put pressure on system resources and have high requirements for computing power and storage space. With the rapid development of IoT technology, new threats continue to emerge, and the defects of the authentication process designed by this method still affect the authentication security of IoT devices.
[0004] Based on the above-mentioned existing technical solutions and other existing technologies, the existing technical solutions have the following shortcomings: single-factor authentication makes authentication security have device limitations; user privacy protection and data security protection measures during the authentication process are not comprehensive, and lead to increased implementation and maintenance costs, especially in an environment with limited resources or tight budgets, the cost increase is more significant. Summary of the invention
[0005] In order to solve the above problems existing in the prior art, the present invention provides a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method and system. The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions:
[0006] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method, which is applied to a multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication system including a gateway server, an Internet of Things device, and a trusted institution, and the method comprises:
[0007] The trusted institution generates and distributes a key pair according to the registration information of the gateway server as the public key and private key of the gateway server; the IoT device obtains the identification factor, generates a corresponding identifier and device key, and generates an XOR filter according to the identification factor and device key; the gateway server stores the XOR filter and selects hash functions H1 and H2 for publication;
[0008] The IoT device obtains the index information of the XOR filter based on the acquired identification factor to be authenticated and the device key, performs hash processing on the identification factor to obtain a corresponding hash value, obtains the message to be sent based on the hash value, the index information and the timestamp of the current IoT device, and encrypts the message based on the public key of the gateway server to obtain a corresponding ciphertext;
[0009] The gateway server decrypts the ciphertext based on the identifier and the private key of the gateway server to obtain a decrypted message, verifies the rationality of the timestamp of the IoT device corresponding to the decrypted message, authenticates the identification factor and the quasi-identification factor to be authenticated in the decrypted message respectively, obtains an identification factor authentication result and a quasi-identification factor authentication result, processes the identification factor authentication result and the quasi-identification factor authentication result based on a preset attenuation model and a preset weight, obtains a final trust score, compares the final trust score with a preset overall threshold, and if the judgment condition is not met, the authentication fails and the authentication is terminated; if the judgment condition is met, the authentication succeeds, and then generates first verification information based on the final trust score, the timestamp of the current gateway server and the hash function H1; wherein, in the initial several authentication processes, the preset weights are set to: the identification factor weight is 1, and the quasi-identification factor weight is 0; after the initial several authentication processes, the preset weights are adjusted accordingly based on the preset attenuation model;
[0010] The IoT device generates second verification information based on the timestamp of the gateway server corresponding to the first verification information and the hash function H1, and performs matching verification on the first verification information and the second verification information. If they do not match, the authentication is terminated. If they match, the IoT device and the gateway server perform key negotiation based on the first verification information and the second verification information, and use the hash function H2 to generate a session key for subsequent communication.
[0011] In one embodiment of the present invention, the process in which the trusted institution generates and distributes a key pair according to the registration information of the gateway server as the public key and private key of the gateway server includes:
[0012] The trusted organization uses the public key cryptography Rabin algorithm based on the registration information of the gateway server to obtain and distribute the key pair (pk, sk); wherein the pk represents the public key of the gateway server, which is published publicly by the trusted organization, and the sk represents the private key of the gateway server, which is sent by the trusted organization to the gateway server for storage.
[0013] In one embodiment of the present invention, the process of an IoT device acquiring an identification factor, generating a corresponding identifier and a device key, and generating an XOR filter according to the identification factor and the device key includes:
[0014] The IoT device obtains an identification factor, selects a random number as a corresponding identifier, and generates a first random number rk as the device key;
[0015] Based on the identification factor, a threshold τ of the Hamming distance is defined to obtain a fault-tolerant set F; the fault-tolerant set F is expressed as (f1, f2, …, f j ,…,f σ ), f j represents the jth fault tolerance factor, j∈[1,σ];
[0016] Initialize the XOR filter XF;
[0017] Generate a stack γ; the stack γ includes σ+1 identification groups, σ represents the total number of elements in the fault-tolerant set, and the identification group is represented by (f j ,Ind j ), Ind j represents f j Corresponding index information;
[0018] The XOR filter XF is updated using a first formula, and the updated XOR filter XF is output; the first formula is as follows:
[0019]
[0020] Where M represents the mapping function, represents a bitwise XOR operation, and h0, h1, and h2 represent three independent hash functions selected by the algorithm.
[0021] In one embodiment of the present invention, the identification factor includes: fingerprint information; the quasi-identification factor includes: authentication location and authentication time.
[0022] In one embodiment of the present invention, the process of obtaining the index information of the XOR filter by the IoT device based on the acquired identification factor to be authenticated and the device key includes:
[0023] The IoT device obtains the index information of the XOR filter using the second formula based on the acquired identification factor f to be authenticated and the device key; wherein the second formula is as follows:
[0024] Ind α =h α (f,rk);
[0025] Among them, α∈[0,2], h α represents the hash function selected during registration, and rk represents the device key.
[0026] In one embodiment of the present invention, a process of performing hash processing on the alignment identification factor to obtain a corresponding hash value, obtaining a message to be sent based on the hash value, index information and the timestamp of the current IoT device, and encrypting based on the public key of the gateway server to obtain a corresponding ciphertext includes:
[0027] The IoT device performs hash processing on each quasi-identification factor using the SHA-256 algorithm to obtain a hash value l after the quasi-identification factor is processed by the hash function. i ; Among them, l i =H(quasi-identification factor, rk), where H represents processing with SHA-256;
[0028] Generate a second random number r1 based on the timestamp, index information and hash value l of the current IoT device i , get the message m to be sent;
[0029] Based on the public key of the gateway server, the message m to be sent is encrypted using the R.Enc encryption algorithm to obtain the corresponding ciphertext c; wherein,
[0030] m={r1||T1||M(f,rk)||Ind0||Ind1||Ind2||l i};
[0031] c = R.Enc(m,pk);
[0032] T1 represents the timestamp of the current IoT device, M represents the mapping function, f represents the identification factor to be authenticated, rk represents the device key, || represents the connection operation, l i represents the hash value corresponding to the quasi-identification factor, and pk represents the public key of the gateway server.
[0033] In one embodiment of the present invention, the gateway server decrypts the ciphertext based on the identifier and the private key of the gateway server to obtain the decrypted message, and verifies the rationality of the timestamp of the IoT device corresponding to the decrypted message, including:
[0034] The gateway server decrypts the ciphertext c according to the identifier using the private key of the gateway server and the R.Dec decryption algorithm to obtain a decrypted message m′; wherein m′=R.Dec(c,sk), sk represents the private key of the gateway server;
[0035] Verify whether the timestamp T1 of the IoT device corresponding to the decrypted message m′ is reasonable. If not, terminate the authentication process. If reasonable, continue with the subsequent processing process.
[0036] In one embodiment of the present invention, the process of respectively authenticating the identification factor to be authenticated and the quasi-identification factor in the decrypted message to obtain the identification factor authentication result and the quasi-identification factor authentication result includes:
[0037] Based on the XOR filter corresponding to the decrypted message, the identification factor to be authenticated in the decrypted message is authenticated using the third formula. If the third formula is established, the identification factor to be authenticated is credible, and the identification factor authentication result R is obtained. d ; The third formula is as follows:
[0038]
[0039] For each quasi-identification factor in the decrypted message, the quasi-identification factor is stored in the non-relational database Redis, the number of occurrences of the quasi-identification factor is counted, and the number of occurrences of the quasi-identification factor is compared with the preset threshold corresponding to the quasi-identification factor. If the number is greater than or equal to the preset threshold, the quasi-identification factor is considered to be credible; if the number is less than the preset threshold, the quasi-identification factor is considered to be unreliable, thereby obtaining a credible judgment of each quasi-identification factor;
[0040] Based on the weight information corresponding to each quasi-identification factor, the trust judgment corresponding to the quasi-identification factor is processed to obtain the quasi-identification factor credibility, and the quasi-identification factor credibility is compared with the first threshold. If it is greater than or equal to the first threshold, the quasi-identification factor is considered to be credible as a whole; if it is less than the first threshold, the quasi-identification factor is considered to be untrustworthy as a whole, thereby obtaining the quasi-identification factor authentication result R a .
[0041] In one embodiment of the present invention, the process of processing the identification factor authentication result and the quasi-identification factor authentication result based on a preset attenuation model and a preset weight to obtain a final trust score includes:
[0042] The decay rate is obtained based on the preset decay model and the interval time of adjacent authentication processes. The preset attenuation model is as follows:
[0043]
[0044] Where t represents the interval between adjacent authentication processes, λ represents the parameter used to control the decay rate, 0<λ<1, It represents the decay rate obtained according to the input interval time, and e represents the natural constant in the mathematical definition;
[0045] Based on the attenuation rate The final credibility score is obtained using the fourth formula; the fourth formula is as follows:
[0046]
[0047] Among them, S a Indicates preset weight;
[0048] The final trust score is compared with the preset overall threshold. If the final trust score is greater than or equal to the preset overall threshold and meets the judgment conditions, the authentication is judged to be successful and the subsequent processing process continues. If the final trust score is less than the preset overall threshold and does not meet the judgment conditions, the authentication fails and the authentication is terminated.
[0049] In a second aspect, the present invention provides a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication system, the system comprising:
[0050] Gateway servers, IoT devices and trusted institutions; among them,
[0051] The trusted institution is used to generate and distribute a key pair according to the registration information of the gateway server as the public key and private key of the gateway server.
[0052] The IoT device is used to obtain an identification factor, generate a corresponding identifier and a device key, and generate an XOR filter according to the identification factor and the device key, obtain index information of the XOR filter based on the obtained identification factor to be authenticated and the device key, perform hash processing on the identification factor to obtain a corresponding hash value, obtain a message to be sent based on the hash value, the index information and the timestamp of the current IoT device, and encrypt it based on the public key of the gateway server to obtain a corresponding ciphertext;
[0053] The gateway server is used to store the XOR filter, select hash functions H1 and H2 for publication, decrypt the ciphertext based on the identifier and the private key of the gateway server to obtain the decrypted message, verify the rationality of the timestamp of the IoT device corresponding to the decrypted message, authenticate the identification factor to be authenticated and the quasi-identification factor in the decrypted message respectively, obtain the identification factor authentication result and the quasi-identification factor authentication result, process the identification factor authentication result and the quasi-identification factor authentication result based on a preset attenuation model and a preset weight, obtain a final trust score, compare the final trust score with a preset overall threshold, if the judgment condition is not met, the authentication fails and the authentication is terminated, if the judgment condition is met, the authentication is successful, and then generate the first verification information based on the final trust score, the timestamp of the current gateway server and the hash function H1; wherein, in the initial several authentication processes, the preset weights are set to: the identification factor weight is 1, and the quasi-identification factor weight is 0; after the initial several authentication processes, the preset weights are adjusted accordingly based on the preset attenuation model;
[0054] The IoT device is further configured to generate second verification information based on a timestamp of the gateway server corresponding to the first verification information and the hash function H1;
[0055] The Internet of Things device and the gateway server are also used for the Internet of Things device to generate second verification information based on the timestamp of the gateway server corresponding to the first verification information and the hash function H1, and to perform matching verification on the first verification information and the second verification information. If they do not match, the authentication is terminated; if they match, key negotiation is performed based on the first verification information and the second verification information, and a session key is generated using the hash function H2 for subsequent communications.
[0056] Beneficial effects of the present invention:
[0057] In the solution provided by the present invention, the robustness of the authentication process is enhanced by combining the multi-factor authentication design of identification factors and quasi-identification factors, ensuring that the authentication can still be completed stably and accurately when the system faces environmental interference or slight damage; the XOR filter is introduced for encryption, and the Hamming distance is used to dynamically adjust the fault tolerance threshold to maintain the normal operation of the system in the case of system failure, reducing the risk of production and service interruption; the use of public key encryption technology, combined with lightweight encryption communication protocols, not only ensures the security of data transmission, but also takes into account the computing power limitations of the Internet of Things system. By implementing strict data access control, the privacy of user data is further consolidated; the use of a preset attenuation model can intelligently adapt to changes in system behavior, identify anomalies in a timely manner, and reduce the impact on system performance, while greatly reducing the system's computing burden and extending system endurance. The improvement of secure multi-party computing technology not only reduces the computational complexity and communication costs, but also promotes the efficiency of data interaction and privacy protection. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0058] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the steps of a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention;
[0059] Figure 2 A flowchart of a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention;
[0060] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the process of authenticating identification factors to be authenticated and quasi-identification factors in a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention;
[0061] Figure 4 An example diagram of protocol communication of a complete process of the authentication phase in a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention;
[0062] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the structure of a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication system provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0063] The following will be combined with the accompanying drawings of the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0064] In order to achieve the purpose of utilizing multi-factor authentication to improve user privacy and data security during the authentication process while reducing maintenance costs, an embodiment of the present invention provides a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method and system.
[0065] A schematic diagram of the steps of a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention is shown in FIG. Figure 1 , see the flowchart Figure 2 , below, first combine Figure 1 and Figure 2 , a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention is introduced.
[0066] The embodiment of the present invention provides a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method, such as Figure 1 and Figure 2 As shown, the following steps may be included:
[0067] S1, the trusted institution generates and distributes a key pair based on the registration information of the gateway server as the public key and private key of the gateway server; the IoT device obtains the identification factor, generates the corresponding identifier and device key, and generates an XOR filter based on the identification factor and the device key; the gateway server stores the XOR filter and selects hash functions H1 and H2 for publication;
[0068] S2, the IoT device obtains the index information of the XOR filter based on the obtained identification factor to be authenticated and the device key, performs hash processing on the identification factor to obtain the corresponding hash value, obtains the message to be sent based on the hash value, the index information and the timestamp of the current IoT device, and encrypts it based on the public key of the gateway server to obtain the corresponding ciphertext;
[0069] S3, the gateway server decrypts the ciphertext based on the identifier and the private key of the gateway server to obtain the decrypted message, verifies the rationality of the timestamp of the IoT device corresponding to the decrypted message, authenticates the identification factor and the quasi-identification factor to be authenticated in the decrypted message respectively, obtains the identification factor authentication result and the quasi-identification factor authentication result, processes the identification factor authentication result and the quasi-identification factor authentication result based on the preset attenuation model and the preset weight, obtains the final trust score, compares the final trust score with the preset overall threshold, if the judgment condition is not met, the authentication fails and the authentication is terminated, if the judgment condition is met, the authentication is successful, and then generates the first verification information based on the final trust score, the timestamp of the current gateway server and the hash function H1; wherein, in the initial several authentication processes, the preset weights are set to: the identification factor weight is 1, and the quasi-identification factor weight is 0; after the initial several authentication processes, the preset weights are adjusted accordingly based on the preset attenuation model;
[0070] S4, the IoT device generates second verification information based on the timestamp of the gateway server corresponding to the first verification information and the hash function H1, and performs matching verification on the first verification information and the second verification information. If they do not match, the authentication is terminated. If they match, the IoT device and the gateway server perform key negotiation based on the first verification information and the second verification information, and use the hash function H2 to generate a session key for subsequent communications.
[0071] The multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present invention may include: a registration phase, an authentication phase, and a subsequent key negotiation phase. It can be understood that the registration phase corresponds to the processing of S1, the authentication phase corresponds to the processing of obtaining the second verification information from S2 to S4, and the subsequent key negotiation phase corresponds to the remaining processing of S4. The multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present invention enhances the robustness of the authentication process by combining the multi-factor authentication design of the identification factor and the quasi-identification factor, ensuring that the authentication can still be completed stably and accurately when the system faces environmental interference or slight damage; introduces an XOR filter to dynamically adjust the fault tolerance threshold to maintain the normal operation of the system in the event of a system failure, reducing the risk of production and service interruption; uses a preset attenuation model to intelligently adapt to changes in system behavior, identify anomalies in a timely manner, and reduce the impact on system performance, while greatly reducing the system's computing burden and extending system endurance. For ease of understanding, the various steps of the multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present invention are described in detail below.
[0072] For S1, this may include:
[0073] S11, the trusted institution generates and distributes a key pair according to the registration information of the gateway server as the public key and private key of the gateway server.
[0074] Specifically, S11 may include:
[0075] The gateway server sends a registration request to the trusted organization. The trusted organization uses the public key cryptography Rabin algorithm based on the registration information of the gateway server to obtain and distribute the key pair (pk, sk); wherein pk represents the public key of the gateway server, which is published publicly by the trusted organization; sk represents the private key of the gateway server, which is sent by the trusted organization to the gateway server for storage.
[0076] The registration information of the gateway server may include information only used to prove that the gateway server is a gateway server. It can be understood that S11 is the registration process of the gateway server.
[0077] S12, the IoT device obtains the identification factor, generates a corresponding identifier and device key, and generates an XOR filter according to the identification factor and the device key.
[0078] Specifically, S12 may include:
[0079] S121, the IoT device obtains an identification factor, selects a random number as a corresponding identifier, and generates a first random number rk as a device key.
[0080] It is understandable that the IoT device first obtains the identification factor f0, selects a random number as its identifier ID, sends the identification factor f0 and the identifier ID to the trusted institution, and generates a first random number rk as the device key. The identification factor may include: fingerprint information. The device key can reduce collisions and improve security. It is understandable that the identification factor may also include: biometric information such as face information and voice information.
[0081] S122, based on the identification factor, define the threshold τ of the Hamming distance, so as to obtain the fault-tolerant set F; the fault-tolerant set F is expressed as (f1, f2, …, f j ,…,f σ ), f j represents the j-th fault tolerance factor, j∈[1,σ].
[0082] Specifically, assuming that the identification factor has n bits, a threshold τ of the Hamming distance is defined, and at this time, the elements of the fault-tolerant set F include σ; wherein the calculation formula of σ is as follows:
[0083]
[0084] The elements of the fault tolerance set F are various fault tolerance factors. The fault tolerance factor can be a string with the same number of bits as the identification factor, but with a threshold τ bit difference compared with the identification factor. Based on all the fault tolerance factors, the fault tolerance set F (f1, f2, …, f j ,…,f σ ), j∈[1,σ], It represents the number of fault tolerance factors corresponding to the Hamming distance of τ. It can be understood that σ can be the sum of the number of fault tolerance factors corresponding to the Hamming distances of τ, τ-1, …, 1.
[0085] S123, initializing the XOR filter XF.
[0086] Specifically, the XF.Init(σ) algorithm may be selected to initialize the XOR filter XF; it is understandable that XF.Init(σ) includes pre-set code that can implement initialization.
[0087] S124, generate a stack γ; the stack γ includes σ+1 identification groups, σ represents the total number of elements in the fault-tolerant set, and the identification group is represented by (f j ,Ind j ), Ind j represents f jThe corresponding index information.
[0088] Specifically, the stack γ may be generated using the XF.GenStack(FU{f0}) algorithm; it is understandable that XF.GenStack(FU{f0}) includes pre-set code that can realize the generation of the stack.
[0089] S125, using the first formula to update the XOR filter XF, and outputting the updated XOR filter XF; the first formula is as follows:
[0090]
[0091] Where M represents the mapping function, represents a bitwise XOR operation, and h0, h1, and h2 represent three independent hash functions selected by the algorithm.
[0092] It can be understood that the role of the mapping function M is to map the target value to a k-bit integer. Specifically, its process is to hash the target value and extract the first k bits of the hash value. The XOR filter is introduced for encryption, and the Hamming distance is used to dynamically adjust the fault tolerance threshold to maintain the normal operation of the system in the event of a system failure, reducing the risk of production and service interruption.
[0093] Exemplarily, the identification factor f0 may be 110101, and the threshold τ of the Hamming distance is defined as 1. At this time, all situations of the tolerance allowable values under the error allowable range of 1 are obtained, and then all the tolerance allowable values are formed into a tolerance set to obtain an XOR filter.
[0094] S13, the gateway server stores the XOR filter and selects hash functions H1 and H2 to publish.
[0095] In the multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present invention, by introducing XOR filters and Hamming distance calculation, the fault tolerance threshold is dynamically adjusted to maintain the normal operation of the system in the event of equipment failure, thereby reducing the risk of production and service interruption. The use of Rabin public key encryption technology, combined with a lightweight encryption communication protocol, not only ensures the security of data transmission, but also takes into account the computing power limitations of IoT devices. By implementing strict data access control, the privacy of user data is further consolidated, especially in sensitive areas such as medical health, effectively protecting personal health information from leakage. The registration stage can be divided into registration with the gateway server and the IoT device. After the client of the IoT device passes in the corresponding parameters, it enters the authentication stage.
[0096] For S2, this may include:
[0097] S21, the IoT device obtains index information of the XOR filter based on the acquired identification factor to be authenticated and the device key.
[0098] Specifically, S21 may include:
[0099] The IoT device obtains the index information of the XOR filter using the second formula based on the acquired identification factor f to be authenticated and the device key; wherein the second formula is as follows:
[0100] Ind α =h α (f,rk);
[0101] Among them, α∈[0,2], h α It represents the hash function selected during registration, and rk represents the device key.
[0102] Quasi-identification factors may include: authentication location and authentication time. It is understandable that quasi-identification factors may also include: authentication behavior operation habits, network traffic patterns, connection behavior, response time, interaction frequency, etc.
[0103] S22, hash processing is performed on the alignment identification factor to obtain a corresponding hash value, and the message to be sent is obtained based on the hash value, index information and the timestamp of the current IoT device, and encrypted based on the public key of the gateway server to obtain a corresponding ciphertext.
[0104] Specifically, S22 may include:
[0105] S221, the IoT device performs hash processing on each quasi-identification factor using the SHA-256 algorithm to obtain a hash value l after the quasi-identification factor is processed by the hash function i ; Among them, l i =H(quasi-identification factor, rk), where H represents processing with SHA-256;
[0106] S222, generating a second random number r1 based on the timestamp, index information and hash value l of the current IoT device i , get the message m to be sent;
[0107] S223, based on the public key of the gateway server, encrypt the message m to be sent using the R.Enc encryption algorithm to obtain the corresponding ciphertext c; wherein,
[0108] m={r1||T1||M(f,rk)||Ind0||Ind1||Ind2||l i};
[0109] c = R.Enc(m,pk);
[0110] T1 represents the timestamp of the current IoT device, M represents the mapping function, f represents the identification factor to be authenticated, rk represents the device key, || represents the connection operation, l i Represents the hash value corresponding to the quasi-identification factor, and pk represents the public key of the gateway server.
[0111] After obtaining the corresponding ciphertext c, the IoT device sends the ciphertext c and identifier ID to the gateway server.
[0112] The embodiment of the present invention enhances the robustness of the authentication process by combining a multi-factor authentication design with an identification factor and a quasi-identification factor, ensuring that authentication can still be completed stably and accurately when the device faces environmental interference or slight damage.
[0113] For S3, this can include:
[0114] S31, the gateway server decrypts the ciphertext based on the identifier and the private key of the gateway server, obtains the decrypted message, and verifies the rationality of the timestamp of the IoT device corresponding to the decrypted message.
[0115] Specifically, S31 may include:
[0116] The gateway server decrypts the ciphertext c using the private key of the gateway server and the R.Dec decryption algorithm according to the identifier to obtain the decrypted message m′; wherein m′=R.Dec(c,sk), sk represents the private key of the gateway server;
[0117] Verify whether the timestamp T1 of the IoT device corresponding to the decrypted message m′ is reasonable. If not, terminate the authentication process. If reasonable, continue with the subsequent processing.
[0118] It can be understood that after receiving the ciphertext c, the gateway server first decrypts the ciphertext c to obtain the decrypted message m'. The decrypted message m' contains the identification factor to be authenticated and the quasi-identification factor. At this time, it is necessary to verify the rationality of the timestamp T1 of the IoT device corresponding to the decrypted message m'. If it is unreasonable, the authentication process is terminated. If it is reasonable, the subsequent processing process continues. This can enhance the privacy of user data, especially in sensitive fields such as medical health, and effectively prevent the leakage of personal health information.
[0119] S32, respectively authenticate the identification factor to be authenticated and the quasi-identification factor in the decrypted message to obtain an identification factor authentication result and a quasi-identification factor authentication result.
[0120] A schematic diagram of the process of authenticating the identification factor to be authenticated and the quasi-identification factor in a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention is shown in FIG. Figure 3 .from Figure 3As can be seen from the figure, the authentication process of the identification factor to be authenticated and the quasi-identification factor may include: first, authenticating the identification factor, and determining the identification factor authentication result R d ; Secondly, judge each quasi-identification factor separately to obtain the credibility of each quasi-identification factor; for the credibility of all quasi-identification factors, calculate the overall credibility of the quasi-identification factor according to the weight, and judge it to obtain the quasi-identification factor authentication result R a ; Combine it with the identification factor authentication result R d After processing, the final credibility score is obtained, and the credibility of the result is determined, and then the user can choose to exit the agreement or proceed to the next step. Figure 3 The processing of S32 and S33 in S3 is corresponding to the processing of S32 and S33. The processing of S32 and S33 is described in detail below.
[0121] Specifically, S32 may include:
[0122] S321, based on the XOR filter corresponding to the decrypted message, use the third formula to authenticate the identification factor to be authenticated in the decrypted message. If the third formula is established, the identification factor to be authenticated is credible, and the identification factor authentication result R is obtained. d ; The third formula is as follows:
[0123] M(f,rk)=XF[Ind0]⊕XF[Ind1]⊕XF[Ind2].
[0124] Among them, if the identification factor to be authenticated is credible, the authentication result of the identification factor R d If the identification factor to be authenticated is not credible, the authentication result R d is 0.
[0125] S322, for each quasi-identification factor in the decrypted message, the quasi-identification factor is stored in the non-relational database Redis, the number of occurrences of the quasi-identification factor is counted, and it is compared with the preset threshold corresponding to the quasi-identification factor. If it is greater than or equal to the preset threshold, the quasi-identification factor is considered to be credible; if it is less than the preset threshold, the quasi-identification factor is considered to be unreliable, thereby obtaining a credible judgment for each quasi-identification factor.
[0126] Specifically, the preset threshold can be set to 0.5. For each quasi-identification factor in the decrypted message, the quasi-identification factor is stored in the non-relational database Redis, the number of occurrences of the quasi-identification factor is counted, the number of times the quasi-identification factor is the same result and the total number of occurrences of the quasi-identification factor are taken as the quotient, and the result is compared with the preset threshold. If it is greater than or equal to the preset threshold, the quasi-identification factor is credible, and the credible judgment of the quasi-identification factor is 1. If it is less than the preset threshold, the quasi-identification factor is not credible, and the credible judgment of the quasi-identification factor is 0. It can be understood that the preset threshold can be selected or modified as needed.
[0127] S323, based on the weight information corresponding to each quasi-identification factor, the trust judgment corresponding to the quasi-identification factor is processed to obtain the quasi-identification factor trustworthiness, and the quasi-identification factor trustworthiness is compared with the first threshold value. If it is greater than or equal to the first threshold value, the quasi-identification factor is deemed to be trustworthy as a whole; if it is less than the first threshold value, the quasi-identification factor is deemed to be untrustworthy as a whole, thereby obtaining the quasi-identification factor authentication result R a .
[0128] Specifically, for each quasi-identification factor, the weight information corresponding to the quasi-identification factor is multiplied by the trust judgment corresponding to the quasi-identification factor to obtain the trustworthy branch of the quasi-identification factor; the trustworthy branches of all quasi-identification factors are added to obtain the trustworthiness of the quasi-identification factor; the trustworthiness of the quasi-identification factor is compared with the first threshold value, if it is greater than or equal to the first threshold value, the quasi-identification factor is deemed to be trustworthy as a whole, and if it is less than the first threshold value, the quasi-identification factor is deemed to be untrustworthy as a whole, thereby obtaining the quasi-identification factor authentication result R a Among them, if the quasi-identification factor is credible as a whole, then the quasi-identification factor authentication result R a is 1. If the quasi-identification factor is not credible as a whole, then the quasi-identification factor authentication result R a is 0.
[0129] S33, processing the identification factor authentication result and the quasi-identification factor authentication result based on a preset attenuation model and preset weights to obtain a final trustworthy score.
[0130] For S33, this may include:
[0131] S331, obtaining a decay rate based on a preset decay model and the interval between adjacent authentication processes The preset attenuation model is as follows:
[0132]
[0133] Where t represents the interval between adjacent authentication processes, λ represents the parameter used to control the decay rate, 0<λ<1, It represents the decay rate obtained according to the input interval time, and e represents the natural constant in the mathematical definition;
[0134] S332, based on decay rate The final credibility score is obtained using the fourth formula; the fourth formula is as follows:
[0135]
[0136] Among them, S a Indicates the preset weight.
[0137] S333, compare the final trust score with the preset overall threshold. If the final trust score is greater than or equal to the preset overall threshold and meets the judgment conditions, the authentication is judged to be successful and the subsequent processing continues. If the final trust score is less than the preset overall threshold and does not meet the judgment conditions, the authentication fails and the authentication is terminated.
[0138] As can be understood, assuming that the last authentication time is t0 and the current authentication time is t1, substituting t1-t0 as t into the fourth formula, we get The result is the decay rate obtained by the interval time of adjacent authentication processes. And through the function graph corresponding to the fourth formula, it can be seen that The range is always between 0 and 1. During each authentication process, the attenuation needs to be reset.
[0139] In the initial stage, i.e. the cold start stage, due to the lack of sufficient historical data, the credibility of the quasi-identification factor is difficult to accurately evaluate. Therefore, in the initial several authentication processes, the preset weights are set as follows: the identification factor weight is 1, and the quasi-identification factor weight is 0; the specific number of times can be selected and set according to demand. At this time, the quasi-identification factor is only responsible for data recording and does not participate in the actual authentication decision. It only relies on the identification factor for authentication. The initial several authentication processes are mainly used to collect relevant data of the quasi-identification factor, so as to accurately evaluate its credibility in the subsequent authentication process. This design ensures security and stability in the cold start stage, while accumulating data for the effectiveness of the quasi-identification factor. After several authentications, i.e. after the cold start process is completed, the preset weights are adjusted accordingly based on the preset attenuation model.
[0140] By combining identification factors and quasi-identification factors, the system can provide multi-level security. Even if a single factor is compromised, other factors can still provide additional verification, increasing the robustness and fault tolerance of the system. Integrating deep learning and pattern recognition, it can intelligently adapt to changes in device behavior, identify anomalies in a timely manner, and reduce the impact on device performance. The innovative design of the fault tolerance mechanism ensures that when individual components fail, authentication operations can continue through system redundancy and data fusion strategies, improving the stability and reliability of the overall system.
[0141] S34, generating first verification information based on the final trust score, the timestamp of the current gateway server and the hash function H1.
[0142] Specifically, after the IoT device obtains the final trust score, it generates a random number r2, and generates the first verification information based on the final trust score, the timestamp of the current gateway server and the hash function H1. The expression of the first verification information is as follows:
[0143] digest1=H1(ID||r1||r2||T1||T2);
[0144] Wherein, T2 represents the timestamp of the current gateway server.
[0145] For S4, this may include:
[0146] S41, the IoT device generates second verification information based on the timestamp of the gateway server corresponding to the first verification information and the hash function H1.
[0147] The expression of the second verification information is as follows:
[0148] digest2=H1(ID||r1||r2||T1||T2).
[0149] S42, based on the first verification information and the second verification information, the IoT device and the gateway server perform key negotiation and use the hash function H2 to generate a session key for subsequent communications.
[0150] The first verification information and the second verification information are judged. If they are not equal, the protocol is terminated. If they are equal, the gateway server is authenticated successfully, and a session key is generated using the hash function H2.
[0151] The expression of the session key is as follows:
[0152] ssk=H2(r1||r2||ID).
[0153] This process ensures that the generated session key is highly secure and unique. Each of the above elements has its own unique role and is indispensable. Without r1, the security and uniqueness of the key will be reduced; without r2, the risk of the key being predicted will increase; without ID, the possibility of key replay and impersonation attacks will increase. In addition, the three elements are combined through the connection operation to ensure that the generated session key is both highly random and bound to the device identity. After encryption by the hash function, even if the attacker knows r1, r2 and ID, he cannot reverse the session key. Using this ssk, the device and the server can communicate safely in the subsequent communication. This design ensures that the IoT device and the gateway server can establish a secure encrypted channel in the subsequent communication, effectively preventing various attack methods and ensuring the security of data transmission.
[0154] An example diagram of protocol communication of a complete process of the authentication phase in a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention is shown in FIG. Figure 4 ,from Figure 4 As can be seen, taking fingerprint information as the identification factor f, location l and time t as quasi-identification factors, the IoT device first calculates Ind α =h α (f,rk), then take r1 to get the message m to be sent, and use the R.Enc algorithm to encrypt m to get the ciphertext c. After sending {ID,c} to the gateway server, the gateway server decrypts it to get m′. Verify the timestamp, identification factor, quasi-identification factor, and finally verify the final trust score. If it is trustworthy, take r2 and calculate the corresponding digest, and send it back to the IoT device. The IoT device verifies whether the timestamp and the corresponding digest are correct. If they are correct, the authentication is successful and enters the subsequent key negotiation stage. Based on the above steps, this method can effectively enhance security while reducing costs, and at the same time improve the stability of the system through multi-factor concurrent authentication. It can be understood that any threshold in the embodiment of the present invention can be set or modified according to the needs of actual use.
[0155] To facilitate understanding, the embodiments of the present invention are introduced below with reference to specific examples.
[0156] Exemplarily, the fingerprint information is set as the identification factor f, and the authentication location l and the authentication time t are set as quasi-identification factors.
[0157] First, the registration process is performed: when registering, use: f=1001011000110111, and the threshold τ of the Hamming distance is 1.
[0158] Calculate all the fault tolerances of the fingerprint information to form a fault tolerance set, and the output is as follows:
[0159] f1=0001011000110111
[0160] f2=1101011000110111
[0161] f3=1011011000110111
[0162] f4=1000011000110111
[0163] f5=1001111000110111
[0164] f6=1001001000110111
[0165] f7=1001010000110111
[0166] f8=1001011100110111
[0167] f9=1001011010110111
[0168] f 10 =1001011001110111
[0169] f 11 =1001011000010111
[0170] f 12 =1001011000100111
[0171] f 13 =1001011000111111
[0172] f 14 =1001011000110011
[0173] f 15 =1001011000110101
[0174] f 16 =1001011000110110.
[0175] An XOR filter is generated based on the above fault-tolerant set and fingerprint information and stored in the server.
[0176] Next, proceed with the authentication process:
[0177] The authentication location l is l=Lat:34.12616766666667, Lon:108.82747033333332, and the authentication time t is t=13:23. For specific authentication situations that may occur, please refer to Case 1-Case 11.
[0178] Case 1: The f, l, t used for authentication are exactly the same as those used for registration, and are in the cold start phase of the first 10 times.
[0179] Use during authentication:
[0180] f=1001011000110111, l=Lat: 34.12616766666667, Lon: 108.82747033333332, t=13:23.
[0181] At this time, the fingerprint is first compared with the fingerprint information during registration, and the query result is credible because the two are completely consistent at this time. In the cold start stage, l and t are only used for storage and are not included in the trust judgment.
[0182] Authentication succeeds, and the key ssk used for subsequent sessions is returned.
[0183] As you can understand, the check method is usually used to determine whether a certain state or property is satisfied. It is widely used in various algorithms and data structures in computer science, especially when it is necessary to traverse and check whether the elements meet a certain condition.
[0184] Case 2: The f used for authentication is inconsistent with the f used for registration, and it is in the cold start phase of the first 10 times.
[0185] Use during authentication:
[0186] f=1001011000110110, l=Lat: 34.12616766666667, Lon: 108.82747033333332, t=13:23.
[0187] First, compare the fingerprint information and use the XOR filter check method. Since the fingerprint information only changes by 1 bit at this time, it is within the fault tolerance range, the query result is reliable, and it is in the cold start stage. l and t are only used for storage and are not included in the trust judgment.
[0188] Authentication succeeds, and the key ssk used for subsequent sessions is returned.
[0189] Case 3: The f used for authentication is inconsistent with the f used for registration, and it is in the cold start phase of the first 10 times.
[0190] Use during authentication:
[0191] f=1001011000110100, l=Lat: 34.12616766666667, Lon: 108.82747033333332, t=13:23.
[0192] First, compare the fingerprint information and use the XOR filter check method. Since the fingerprint information changes by more than 1 bit at this time, it is not within the fault tolerance range, and the query result is unreliable. In the cold start stage, l and t are only used for storage and are not included in the trust judgment.
[0193] Authentication failed.
[0194] Case 4: The f, l, t used for authentication are exactly the same as those used for registration, and it is in the normal authentication stage after 10 times.
[0195] Use during authentication:
[0196] f=1001011000110111, l=Lat: 34.12616766666667, Lon: 108.82747033333332, t=13:23.
[0197] First, compare the fingerprint with the fingerprint information at the time of registration, and use the check method of the XOR filter. Since the two are completely consistent at this time, the query result is credible for the identification factor authentication result; judge the authentication location l and authentication time t, and calculate the credible score by comparison. The result is credible and the quasi-identification factor authentication result is obtained; dynamically adjust the weights of each factor through attenuation. As time changes, the weights of the authentication location l and authentication time t gradually decrease, and the weight of the fingerprint information f gradually increases. The final credible score is obtained through weight calculation.
[0198] Authentication succeeds, and the key ssk used for subsequent sessions is returned.
[0199] Case 5: The f used for authentication is inconsistent with the f used for registration, and it is in the normal authentication stage after 10 times.
[0200] Use during authentication:
[0201] f=1001011000110110, l=Lat: 34.12616766666667, Lon: 108.82747033333332, t=13:23.
[0202] First, compare the fingerprint information, and use the XOR filter check method. Since the fingerprint information only changes by 1 bit at this time, it is within the fault tolerance range, and the query result is reliable. The authentication result of the identification factor is credible; judge the authentication location l and the authentication time t, and calculate the credible score by comparison. The result is credible, and the quasi-identification factor authentication result is obtained; adjust the weights of each factor dynamically through attenuation. As time changes, the weights of the authentication location l and the authentication time t gradually decrease, and the weight of the fingerprint information f gradually increases. The final credible score is obtained through weight calculation.
[0203] Authentication succeeds, and the key ssk used for subsequent sessions is returned.
[0204] Case 6: The f used for authentication is inconsistent with the f used for registration, and it is in the normal authentication stage after 10 times.
[0205] Use during authentication:
[0206] f=1001011000110100, l=Lat: 34.12616766666667, Lon: 108.82747033333332, t=13:23.
[0207] First, compare the fingerprint information, and use the check method of the XOR filter. Since the fingerprint information changes more than 1 bit at this time, it is not within the fault tolerance range. The query result shows that the identification factor authentication result is unreliable. The authentication location l and authentication time t are judged, and the trust score is calculated by comparison. The result is reliable, and the quasi-identification factor authentication result is obtained; the weights of each factor are adjusted dynamically by attenuation. As time changes, the weights of the authentication location l and authentication time t gradually decrease, and the weight of the fingerprint information f gradually increases. The final trust score is obtained by weight calculation.
[0208] If the final trust score obtained is greater than or equal to the preset overall threshold, the authentication is successful and the key ssk for subsequent sessions is returned. If the final trust score is less than the preset overall threshold, the authentication fails.
[0209] Case 7: The l used for authentication is inconsistent with the l used for registration, and it is in the normal authentication stage after 10 times.
[0210] Use during authentication:
[0211] f=1001011000110111, l=Lat: 50.12616766666667, Lon: 100.82747033333332, t=13:23.
[0212] First, compare the fingerprint with the fingerprint information at the time of registration, and use the check method of the XOR filter. Since the two are completely consistent at this time, the query result is that the identification factor authentication result is credible; judge the authentication location l and authentication time t, and calculate the credible score by comparison. It is found that the authentication location l is not credible but the authentication time t is credible, and the quasi-identification factor authentication result is obtained; adjust the weights of each factor dynamically through attenuation. As time changes, the weights of the authentication location l and authentication time t gradually decrease, and the weight of the fingerprint information f gradually increases. The final credible score is obtained through weight calculation.
[0213] If the final trust score obtained is greater than or equal to the preset overall threshold, the authentication is successful and the key ssk for subsequent sessions is returned. If the final trust score is less than the preset overall threshold, the authentication fails.
[0214] Case 8: The t used for authentication is inconsistent with the t used for registration, and it is in the normal authentication stage after 10 times.
[0215] Use during authentication:
[0216] f=1001011000110111, l=Lat: 34.12616766666667, Lon: 108.82747033333332, t=15:14.
[0217] First, compare the fingerprint with the fingerprint information at the time of registration, and use the check method of the XOR filter. Since the two are completely consistent at this time, the query result is that the identification factor authentication result is credible; judge the authentication location l and authentication time t, and calculate the credibility score by comparison. It is found that the authentication location l is credible but the authentication time t is not credible, and the quasi-identification factor authentication result is obtained; dynamically adjust the weights of each factor through attenuation. As time changes, the weights of the authentication location l and authentication time t gradually decrease, and the weight of the fingerprint information f gradually increases. The final credibility score is obtained through weight calculation.
[0218] If the final trust score obtained is greater than or equal to the preset overall threshold, the authentication is successful and the key ssk for subsequent sessions is returned. If the final trust score is less than the preset overall threshold, the authentication fails.
[0219] Case 9: The l and t used for authentication are inconsistent with the l and t used for registration, and it is in the normal authentication stage after 10 times.
[0220] Use during authentication:
[0221] f=1001011000110111, l=Lat: 50.12616766666667, Lon: 100.82747033333332, t=15:14.
[0222] First, compare the fingerprint with the fingerprint information at the time of registration. Through the check method of the XOR filter, since the two are completely consistent at this time, the query result is that the identification factor authentication result is credible; judge the authentication location l and authentication time t, and calculate the credible score by comparison. It is found that both the authentication location l and authentication time t are unreliable, and the quasi-identification factor authentication result is obtained; dynamically adjust the weights of each factor through attenuation. As time changes, the weights of the authentication location l and authentication time t gradually decrease, and the weight of the fingerprint information f gradually increases. The final credible score is obtained through weight calculation.
[0223] If the final trust score obtained is greater than or equal to the preset overall threshold, the authentication is successful and the key ssk for subsequent sessions is returned. If the final trust score is less than the preset overall threshold, the authentication fails.
[0224] Case 10: The f, l, t used for authentication are inconsistent with the f, l, t used for registration, and it is in the normal authentication stage after 10 times.
[0225] Use during authentication:
[0226] f=1001011000110110, l=Lat: 50.12616766666667, Lon: 100.82747033333332, t=15:14.
[0227] First, compare the fingerprint information, and use the check method of the XOR filter. Since the fingerprint information only changes by 1 bit at this time, it is within the fault tolerance range, and the query result is that the identification factor authentication result is credible; judge the authentication location l and authentication time t, and calculate the credible score by comparison. It is found that both the authentication location l and authentication time t are unreliable, and the quasi-identification factor authentication result is obtained; dynamically adjust the weights of each factor through attenuation. As time changes, the weights of the authentication location l and authentication time t gradually decrease, and the weight of the fingerprint information f gradually increases. The final credible score is obtained through weight calculation.
[0228] If the final trust score obtained is greater than or equal to the preset overall threshold, the authentication is successful and the key ssk for subsequent sessions is returned. If the final trust score is less than the preset overall threshold, the authentication fails.
[0229] Case 11: The f, l, t used for authentication are inconsistent with the f, l, t used for registration, and it is in the normal authentication stage after 10 times.
[0230] Use during authentication:
[0231] f=1001011000110100, l=Lat: 50.12616766666667, Lon: 100.82747033333332, t=15:14.
[0232] First, compare the fingerprint information, and use the check method of the XOR filter. Since the fingerprint information changes more than 1 bit at this time, it does not belong to the fault tolerance range, and the query result shows that the identification factor authentication result is unreliable; judge the authentication location l and authentication time t, and calculate the trust score by comparison. It is found that both the authentication location l and authentication time t are unreliable, and the quasi-identification factor authentication result is obtained; dynamically adjust the weights of each factor through attenuation. As time changes, the weights of the authentication location l and authentication time t gradually decrease, and the weight of the fingerprint information f gradually increases. The final trust score is obtained through weight calculation.
[0233] Authentication failed.
[0234] In a second aspect, corresponding to the above-mentioned multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method embodiment, the embodiment of the present invention also provides a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication system, such as Figure 5 As shown, the system includes:
[0235] Gateway servers, IoT devices and trusted institutions; among them,
[0236] The trusted institution is used to generate and distribute a key pair according to the registration information of the gateway server as the public key and private key of the gateway server.
[0237] The IoT device is used to obtain the identification factor, generate the corresponding identifier and device key, and generate an XOR filter according to the identification factor and the device key, obtain the index information of the XOR filter based on the obtained identification factor to be authenticated and the device key, perform hash processing on the identification factor to obtain the corresponding hash value, obtain the message to be sent based on the hash value, the index information and the timestamp of the current IoT device, and encrypt it based on the public key of the gateway server to obtain the corresponding ciphertext;
[0238] The gateway server is used to store the XOR filter, and select hash functions H1 and H2 for publication, decrypt the ciphertext based on the identifier and the private key of the gateway server, obtain the decrypted message, verify the rationality of the timestamp of the IoT device corresponding to the decrypted message, authenticate the identification factor to be authenticated and the quasi-identification factor in the decrypted message respectively, obtain the identification factor authentication result and the quasi-identification factor authentication result, process the identification factor authentication result and the quasi-identification factor authentication result based on a preset attenuation model and preset weights, obtain the final trust score, compare the final trust score with the preset overall threshold, if the judgment condition is not met, the authentication fails and the authentication is terminated, if the judgment condition is met, the authentication is successful, and then the first verification information is generated based on the final trust score, the timestamp of the current gateway server and the hash function H1; wherein, in the initial several authentication processes, the preset weights are set to: the identification factor weight is 1, and the quasi-identification factor weight is 0; after the initial several authentication processes, the preset weights are adjusted accordingly based on the preset attenuation model;
[0239] The IoT device is further used to generate second verification information based on the timestamp of the gateway server corresponding to the first verification information and the hash function H1;
[0240] The IoT device and the gateway server are also used for the IoT device to generate second verification information based on the timestamp of the gateway server corresponding to the first verification information and the hash function H1, and to perform matching verification on the first verification information and the second verification information. If they do not match, the authentication is terminated; if they match, a key negotiation is performed based on the first verification information and the second verification information, and a session key is generated using the hash function H2 for subsequent communications.
[0241] The embodiment of the present invention enhances the robustness of the authentication process by combining the multi-factor authentication design of identification factors and quasi-identification factors, ensuring that the authentication can be completed stably and accurately when the system faces environmental interference or slight damage; introduces XOR filters for encryption, uses Hamming distance to dynamically adjust the fault tolerance threshold, maintains the normal operation of the system in the event of system failure, and reduces the risk of production and service interruption; uses public key encryption technology, combined with lightweight encryption communication protocols, not only to ensure the security of data transmission, but also to take into account the computing power limitations of the Internet of Things system. By implementing strict data access control, the privacy of user data is further consolidated; the use of preset attenuation models can intelligently adapt to changes in system behavior, identify anomalies in a timely manner, and reduce the impact on system performance, while greatly reducing the system's computing burden and extending system endurance. The improvement of secure multi-party computing technology not only reduces computing complexity and communication costs, but also promotes efficient data interaction and privacy protection.
[0242] As for the above-mentioned system embodiment, since it is basically similar to the multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method embodiment, the description is relatively simple, and the relevant parts can be referred to the partial description of the multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method embodiment.
[0243] It should be noted that the system of the embodiment of the present invention is a system that applies the above-mentioned multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method, and all embodiments of the above-mentioned multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method are applicable to the system and can achieve the same or similar beneficial effects.
[0244] It should be noted that in the description of the present invention, it should be understood that the terms "first" and "second" are only used for descriptive purposes and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of the indicated technical features. Therefore, the features defined as "first" and "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the features. In the description of the present invention, the meaning of "plurality" is two or more, unless otherwise clearly and specifically defined.
[0245] Each embodiment in this specification is described in a related manner, and the same or similar parts between the embodiments can be referred to each other, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments. In particular, for the system embodiment, since it is basically similar to the method embodiment, the description is relatively simple, and the relevant parts can be referred to the partial description of the method embodiment.
[0246] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the protection scope of the present invention. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention are included in the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims
1. A privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method, characterized in that: Applied to a multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication system including a gateway server, an Internet of Things device, and a trusted institution, the method includes: The trusted institution generates and distributes a key pair according to the registration information of the gateway server as the public key and private key of the gateway server; the IoT device obtains the identification factor, generates a corresponding identifier and device key, and generates an XOR filter according to the identification factor and the device key; the gateway server stores the XOR filter and selects hash functions H1 and H2 for publication; The IoT device obtains the index information of the XOR filter based on the acquired identification factor to be authenticated and the device key, performs hash processing on the identification factor to obtain a corresponding hash value, obtains the message to be sent based on the hash value, the index information and the timestamp of the current IoT device, and encrypts the message based on the public key of the gateway server to obtain a corresponding ciphertext; The gateway server decrypts the ciphertext based on the identifier and the private key of the gateway server to obtain a decrypted message, verifies the rationality of the timestamp of the IoT device corresponding to the decrypted message, authenticates the identification factor and the quasi-identification factor to be authenticated in the decrypted message respectively, obtains an identification factor authentication result and a quasi-identification factor authentication result, processes the identification factor authentication result and the quasi-identification factor authentication result based on a preset attenuation model and a preset weight, obtains a final trust score, compares the final trust score with a preset overall threshold, and if the judgment condition is not met, the authentication fails and the authentication is terminated; if the judgment condition is met, the authentication succeeds, and then generates first verification information based on the final trust score, the timestamp of the current gateway server and the hash function H1; wherein, in the initial several authentication processes, the preset weights are set to: the identification factor weight is 1, and the quasi-identification factor weight is 0; after the initial several authentication processes, the preset weights are adjusted accordingly based on the preset attenuation model; The IoT device generates second verification information based on the timestamp of the gateway server corresponding to the first verification information and the hash function H1, and performs matching verification on the first verification information and the second verification information. If they do not match, the authentication is terminated. If they match, the IoT device and the gateway server perform key negotiation based on the first verification information and the second verification information, and use the hash function H2 to generate a session key for subsequent communication.
2. According to claim 1, a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method is characterized in that: The process in which the trusted institution generates and distributes a key pair according to the registration information of the gateway server as the public key and private key of the gateway server includes: The trusted organization uses the public key cryptography Rabin algorithm based on the registration information of the gateway server to obtain and distribute the key pair (pk, sk); wherein the pk represents the public key of the gateway server, which is published publicly by the trusted organization, and the sk represents the private key of the gateway server, which is sent by the trusted organization to the gateway server for storage.
3. According to claim 1, a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method is characterized in that: The process in which the IoT device obtains an identification factor, generates a corresponding identifier and a device key, and generates an XOR filter according to the identification factor and the device key includes: The IoT device obtains an identification factor, selects a random number as a corresponding identifier, and generates a first random number rk as the device key; Based on the identification factor, a threshold τ of the Hamming distance is defined to obtain a fault-tolerant set F; the fault-tolerant set F is expressed as (f1, f2, …, f j ,…,f σ ), f j represents the jth fault tolerance factor, j∈[1,σ]; Initialize the XOR filter XF; Generate a stack γ; the stack γ includes σ+1 identification groups, σ represents the total number of elements in the fault-tolerant set, and the identification group is represented by (f j ,Ind j ),Ind j represents f j Corresponding index information; The XOR filter XF is updated using a first formula, and the updated XOR filter XF is output; the first formula is as follows: Where M represents the mapping function, represents a bitwise XOR operation, and h0, h1, and h2 represent three independent hash functions selected by the algorithm.
4. According to claim 1, a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method is characterized in that: The identification factors include: fingerprint information; the quasi-identification factors include: authentication location and authentication time.
5. According to claim 1, a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method is characterized in that: The process of obtaining the index information of the XOR filter by the IoT device based on the acquired identification factor to be authenticated and the device key includes: The IoT device obtains the index information of the XOR filter using the second formula based on the acquired identification factor f to be authenticated and the device key; wherein the second formula is as follows: Ind α =h α (f,rk); Among them, α∈[0,2], h α represents the hash function selected during registration, and rk represents the device key.
6. According to claim 5, a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method is characterized in that: The process of performing hash processing on the alignment identification factor to obtain a corresponding hash value, obtaining a message to be sent based on the hash value, index information and the timestamp of the current IoT device, and encrypting based on the public key of the gateway server to obtain a corresponding ciphertext includes: The IoT device performs hash processing on each quasi-identification factor using the SHA-256 algorithm to obtain a hash value l after the quasi-identification factor is processed by the hash function. i ; Among them, l i =H(quasi-identification factor, rk), where H represents processing with SHA-256; Generate a second random number r1, and obtain the message m to be sent based on the timestamp, index information and encrypted quasi-identification factor of the current IoT device; Based on the public key of the gateway server, the message m to be sent is encrypted using the R.Enc encryption algorithm to obtain the corresponding ciphertext c; wherein, m={r1||T1||M(f,rk)||Ind0||Ind1||Ind2||l i }; c = R.Enc(m,pk); T1 represents the timestamp of the current IoT device, M represents the mapping function, f represents the identification factor to be authenticated, rk represents the device key, || represents the connection operation, l i represents the hash value corresponding to the quasi-identification factor, and pk represents the public key of the gateway server.
7. According to claim 1, a privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method is characterized in that: The gateway server decrypts the ciphertext based on the identifier and the private key of the gateway server to obtain a decrypted message, and verifies the rationality of the timestamp of the IoT device corresponding to the decrypted message, including: The gateway server decrypts the ciphertext c according to the identifier using the private key of the gateway server and the R.Dec decryption algorithm to obtain a decrypted message m′; wherein m′=R.Dec(c,sk), sk represents the private key of the gateway server; Verify whether the timestamp T1 of the IoT device corresponding to the decrypted message m′ is reasonable. If not, terminate the authentication process. If reasonable, continue with the subsequent processing process.
8. A privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method according to claim 6, characterized in that: The process of respectively authenticating the identification factor to be authenticated and the quasi-identification factor in the decrypted message to obtain an identification factor authentication result and a quasi-identification factor authentication result includes: Based on the XOR filter corresponding to the decrypted message, the identification factor to be authenticated in the decrypted message is authenticated using the third formula. If the third formula is established, the identification factor to be authenticated is credible, and the identification factor authentication result R is obtained. d ; The third formula is as follows: M(f,rk)=XF[Ind0]⊕XF[Ind1]⊕XF[Ind2]; For each quasi-identification factor in the decrypted message, the quasi-identification factor is stored in the non-relational database Redis, the number of occurrences of the quasi-identification factor is counted, and the number of occurrences of the quasi-identification factor is compared with the preset threshold corresponding to the quasi-identification factor. If the number is greater than or equal to the preset threshold, the quasi-identification factor is considered to be credible; if the number is less than the preset threshold, the quasi-identification factor is considered to be unreliable, thereby obtaining a credible judgment of each quasi-identification factor; Based on the weight information corresponding to each quasi-identification factor, the trust judgment corresponding to the quasi-identification factor is processed to obtain the quasi-identification factor credibility, and the quasi-identification factor credibility is compared with the first threshold. If it is greater than or equal to the first threshold, the quasi-identification factor is considered to be credible as a whole; if it is less than the first threshold, the quasi-identification factor is considered to be untrustworthy as a whole, thereby obtaining the quasi-identification factor authentication result R a .
9. A privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication method according to claim 8, characterized in that: The process of processing the identification factor authentication result and the quasi-identification factor authentication result based on the preset attenuation model and the preset weight to obtain a final trust score, comparing the final trust score with a preset overall threshold, and terminating the authentication if the judgment condition is not met, and terminating the authentication if the judgment condition is met, includes: The decay rate is obtained based on the preset decay model and the interval time of adjacent authentication processes. The preset attenuation model is as follows: Where t represents the interval between adjacent authentication processes, λ represents the parameter used to control the decay rate, 0<λ<1, It represents the decay rate obtained according to the input interval time, and e represents the natural constant in the mathematical definition; Based on the attenuation rate The final credibility score is obtained using the fourth formula; the fourth formula is as follows: Among them, S a Indicates preset weight; The final trust score is compared with the preset overall threshold. If the final trust score is greater than or equal to the preset overall threshold and meets the judgment conditions, the authentication is judged to be successful and the subsequent processing process continues. If the final trust score is less than the preset overall threshold and does not meet the judgment conditions, the authentication fails and the authentication is terminated.
10. A privacy-preserving multi-factor fault-tolerant authentication system, characterized in that: include: Gateway servers, IoT devices and trusted institutions; among them, The trusted institution is used to generate and distribute a key pair according to the registration information of the gateway server as the public key and private key of the gateway server. The IoT device is used to obtain an identification factor, generate a corresponding identifier and a device key, and generate an XOR filter according to the identification factor and the device key, obtain index information of the XOR filter based on the obtained identification factor to be authenticated and the device key, perform hash processing on the identification factor to obtain a corresponding hash value, obtain a message to be sent based on the hash value, the index information and the timestamp of the current IoT device, and encrypt it based on the public key of the gateway server to obtain a corresponding ciphertext; The gateway server is used to store the XOR filter, select hash functions H1 and H2 for publication, decrypt the ciphertext based on the identifier and the private key of the gateway server to obtain the decrypted message, verify the rationality of the timestamp of the IoT device corresponding to the decrypted message, authenticate the identification factor to be authenticated and the quasi-identification factor in the decrypted message respectively, obtain the identification factor authentication result and the quasi-identification factor authentication result, process the identification factor authentication result and the quasi-identification factor authentication result based on a preset attenuation model and a preset weight, obtain a final trust score, compare the final trust score with a preset overall threshold, if the judgment condition is not met, the authentication fails and the authentication is terminated, if the judgment condition is met, the authentication is successful, and then generate the first verification information based on the final trust score, the timestamp of the current gateway server and the hash function H1; wherein, in the initial several authentication processes, the preset weights are set to: the identification factor weight is 1, and the quasi-identification factor weight is 0; after the initial several authentication processes, the preset weights are adjusted accordingly based on the preset attenuation model; The IoT device is further configured to generate second verification information based on a timestamp of the gateway server corresponding to the first verification information and the hash function H1; The Internet of Things device and the gateway server are also used for the Internet of Things device to generate second verification information based on the timestamp of the gateway server corresponding to the first verification information and the hash function H1, and to perform matching verification on the first verification information and the second verification information. If they do not match, the authentication is terminated; if they match, key negotiation is performed based on the first verification information and the second verification information, and a session key is generated using the hash function H2 for subsequent communications.
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