Safe interconnection intelligent environmental sanitation remote driving system

Abstract

The invention discloses a safe interconnection intelligent environmental sanitation remote driving system, and relates to the technical field of vehicle networking communication safety. In the invention, aiming at the situation that the sanitation vehicle with an automatic driving function is in an abnormal scene which cannot be processed, the vehicle can be controlled to recover normal operation or the vehicle is controlled to a safe area through a remote driving system; the cockpit is connected to a 5G public network in a wired mode, real-time communication with remote vehicle equipment is achieved, it is ensured that control data are efficiently managed and stored through a remote control server, and the sanitation operation quality is improved; in order to solve the problem that a data stream may be threatened in a communication process, a quantum key is fused in a data transmission process, so that the security of communication between a far end and a cockpit and between a field end and a vehicle is effectively improved; in addition, the cloud server can verify the legality of the identities of the vehicle and the cockpit by calculating the hash chain, so that the identity verification speed is further improved, and the communication delay is reduced.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of vehicle networking communication security technology, and specifically to a securely interconnected intelligent environmental sanitation remote driving system. Background Art

[0002] The sanitation industry is a labor-intensive industry with a large number of employees, mainly including managers, vehicle drivers, and grassroots cleaning staff. At present, the traditional urban sanitation work model can no longer meet the development needs of smart cities. The main problems are as follows:

[0003] In terms of work efficiency, the traditional management model relies on the self-discipline of workers and cannot accurately grasp whether the workers are on duty; in terms of work results, sanitation operations are highly dynamic, and citizens' awareness of public environmental hygiene is uneven, which makes it impossible to maintain cleaning for a long time, especially during major holidays and other large-scale gatherings of people, which greatly affects the work results of sanitation workers; in terms of facility supervision, it is impossible to monitor sanitation vehicles and infrastructure in real time, especially the overflowing garbage bins cannot be solved in real time, resulting in "dirty, messy, and poor" conditions around the garbage bins; in terms of safety supervision, some drivers are lazy and slack after driving, and operating vehicles often fail to operate according to the prescribed number of times, exceed speed limits, and fail to operate according to planned sections, which seriously reduces work safety; In response to the above problems, the present invention proposes a securely interconnected intelligent sanitation remote driving system. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a secure and interconnected intelligent sanitation remote driving system to solve the problems raised in the prior art.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solutions: a securely interconnected intelligent sanitation remote driving system, the remote driving system includes a quantum secret service platform QMS, a quantum security gateway and a quantum security encryption suite QES;

[0006] Remote driving system, which uses 5G communication technology to achieve real-time communication with the remote end (cockpit) and the on-site end (vehicle);

[0007] The quantum cryptographic service platform QMS is used to generate quantum keys and transmit them to the cloud and the quantum security encryption suite QES in the remote end - the cockpit and the on-site end - the vehicle through a quantum security gateway to achieve encryption protection for data transmission.

[0008] Furthermore, the quantum secret service platform QMS includes the quantum random number generator QRNG, the quantum key exchange cipher machine ECM, the quantum secret service engine QSS-ME and the quantum key management system QMS-IoV;

[0009] The quantum random number generator QRNG uses a quantum entropy source based on laser spontaneous emission phase noise to generate random numbers. The randomness of the output random numbers meets the requirements of the National Cryptography Administration's randomness detection specification GM / T0005-2012.

[0010] Quantum Key Exchange Cryptographic Machine (ECM), used to control the distribution, management and relay of quantum keys;

[0011] Quantum Secret Service Engine QSS-ME is used to detect the use of quantum keys in the quantum key exchange cipher machine ECM in real time and complete the key distribution;

[0012] The quantum key management system QMS-IoV is used to manage and control quantum key distribution terminals, service terminals and application devices.

[0013] Furthermore, the quantum security gateway is deployed at the network boundary, using quantum keys to replace traditional key exchange to complete remote user access authentication and establish a secure tunnel, providing data transmission encryption, access control and basic routing functions.

[0014] Furthermore, the quantum security encryption suite QES stores the quantum keys distributed by the quantum secret service platform QMS for encryption and decryption of business data at the remote end - the cockpit and the on-site end - the vehicle.

[0015] Furthermore, the remote driving system divides the communication between the remote end - cockpit and the field end - vehicle into four phases including initialization phase, registration phase, identity authentication phase, and key negotiation phase;

[0016] In the initialization phase, quantum keys are generated and stored through the quantum secret service platform QMS;

[0017] During the registration phase, pseudonyms and identity authentication tokens are generated for the remote end - cockpit and the on-site end - vehicle;

[0018] During the identity authentication phase, the cloud server verifies the legitimacy of the remote end (cockpit) and the on-site end (vehicle).

[0019] During the key negotiation phase, the cloud server generates session keys for the remote end - cockpit and the field end - vehicle for subsequent communications.

[0020] Furthermore, in the initialization phase, the privately deployed local quantum security service platform QMS generates quantum keys through the interaction of QSS-ME and QMS-IoV in the internal system, and stores these quantum keys in the secure memory of the local gateway and pre-fills them in the corresponding remote-cockpit and field-vehicle QES. The local quantum security gateway transmits the generated quantum key corresponding to QES to the quantum security gateway in the cloud through a secure communication protocol. After receiving the key message, the quantum security gateway in the cloud verifies and stores it in the secure database in the cloud to achieve quantum key synchronization between the remote control server cloud and the local.

[0021] Furthermore, during the registration phase, the quantum secret service platform QMS generates anonymous credentials and unique identifiers for the remote cockpit and the on-site vehicle, respectively, and generates an identity authentication identifier by calculating a hash chain, which is then transmitted to the remote cockpit and the on-site vehicle.

[0022] On-site vehicle registration steps are as follows:

[0023] Step 6-1-1: The on-site vehicle sends the unique identifier VID of the on-site vehicle to the quantum secret service platform QMS. After receiving the identifier VID, the quantum secret service platform QMS generates a quantum random number QRNGi and then generates a timestamp T1;

[0024] Step 6-1-2: Calculate the anonymous credential CID of the field end-vehicle = H(VID,QRNGi), calculate the hash value H(CID) of the anonymous credential CID, and calculate the identity authentication identifier λ of the field end-vehicle = H QRNGi (CID), then upload λ and QRNGi to the cloud server, and concatenate the message body {CID, H(CID), T1} to send to the field end - vehicle;

[0025] Step 6-1-3: After receiving the message body {CID, H(CID), T1}, the field end-vehicle determines the reliability of the message based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the field end-vehicle will not perform further processing. Then the field end-vehicle calculates the hash value of CID. When H'(CID) = H(CID), it means that the field end-vehicle has successfully received the anonymous credential CID of the field end-vehicle. At this point, the field end-vehicle completes the registration stage;

[0026] The specific steps of the remote cockpit during the registration phase are as follows:

[0027] Step 6-2-1: The remote cockpit sends the unique identifier RID of the remote cockpit to the quantum secret service platform QMS. After receiving the identifier RID, the quantum secret service platform QMS generates a quantum random number QRNGj and then generates a timestamp T2;

[0028] Step 6-2-2: Calculate the anonymous credential YID of the remote cockpit = H(RID,QRNGj), calculate the hash value H(YID) of the anonymous credential YID, and calculate the identity authentication identifier β of the remote cockpit = H QRNGj (YID), then upload β and QRNGj to the cloud server, and concatenate the message body {YID, H(YID), T2} to send to the remote end - the cockpit;

[0029] Step 6-2-3: After receiving the message body {YID, H(YID), T2}, the remote-cockpit determines the reliability of the message based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the remote-cockpit will not perform further processing. Then the remote-cockpit calculates the hash value of YID. When H'(YID) = H(YID), it means that the remote-cockpit has successfully received the remote-cockpit's anonymous credential YID. At this point, the remote-cockpit completes the registration stage.

[0030] Furthermore, in the identity authentication stage, the on-site vehicle and the remote cockpit collect and receive video data VD and log information DR, calculate and splice the message body, and send it to the cloud server. The cloud server verifies the timestamp and data integrity. If the verification is passed, the hash chain calculation is performed based on the stored quantum random number to confirm the legal identity of the on-site vehicle and the remote cockpit.

[0031] The specific steps of the identity authentication phase between the on-site vehicle and the remote cockpit are as follows:

[0032] Step 7-1: After the on-site vehicle collects the video data VD and log information DR, it generates a timestamp T3 and calculates the message body Msg i =E QSKv (VD,DR,CID,H(VD,DR)), where E QSKv () indicates encryption using key QSKv and calculation of message verification code Mac i =H(Msg i ), concatenate the message body {Msg i ,Mac i ,T3,QSK tagv}, where QSK tagv is the key identifier of QSKv, T3 is the timestamp, and is sent to the cloud server;

[0033] Step 7-2: The cloud server receives the message body {Msg i ,Mac i ,T3,QSK tagv}, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the cloud server will not process it further, and then calculate the message verification code Mac i 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagv Find the corresponding key QSK v , using the key QSK v Send message Msg i 'Decrypt to obtain CID, then calculate the hash chain H based on the stored quantum random number QRNGi' QRNGi (CID), if H' QRNGi (CID) = λ, which means that the on-site vehicle has a legal identity. Then the hash values ​​of VD and DR are calculated. If H'(VD, DR) = H(VD, DR), the cloud server obtains and stores VD and DR. The cloud server generates a timestamp T4 and calculates the message body Msg y =E QSKy (VD,DR,H(VD,DR)), where E QSKy () indicates encryption using key QSKy and calculation of message verification code Mac y =H(Msg y ), concatenate the message body {Msg y ,Mac y ,T4,QSK tagy}, where QSK tagy is the key identifier of QSKy, T4 is the timestamp, and is sent to the remote end - the cockpit;

[0034] Step 7-3: The remote cockpit receives the message body {Msg y ,Mac y ,T4,QSK tagy}, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the remote cockpit will not process it further. Then, the Mac y 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagy Find the corresponding key QSK y , using the key QSK y Send message Msg y 'Decrypt to obtain VD and DR, calculate the hash values ​​of VD and DR, if H'(VD, DR) = H(VD, DR), then the remote-cockpit obtains VD and DR, then the remote-cockpit generates the corresponding control signal CT, and then the remote-cockpit generates a timestamp T5, calculates Msg c =E QSKc (CT,YID,H(CT)),E QSKc() indicates encryption using key QSKc and calculation of message verification code Mac c =H(Msg c ), concatenate the message body {Msg c ,Mac c ,T5,QSK tagc}, where QSK tagc is the key identifier of QSKc, T5 is the timestamp, and is sent to the cloud server;

[0035] Step 7-4: The cloud server receives the message body {Msg c ,Mac c ,T5,QSK tagc}, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the cloud server will not process it further, and then calculate the message verification code Mac c 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagc Find the corresponding key QSK c , using QSK c Send message Msg c 'Decrypt to obtain YID, then calculate the hash chain H based on the stored quantum random number QRNGj' QRNGj (YID), if H' QRNGj (YID) = β, which means that the remote cockpit has a legitimate identity; then, the hash value of CT is calculated. If H'(CT) = H(CT), the cloud server generates a timestamp T6 and calculates the message body Msg x =E QSKx (CT,H(CT)),E QSKx () indicates encryption using key QSKx and calculation of message verification code Mac x =H(Msg x ), concatenate the message body {Mac x ,Msg x ,T6,QSK tagx}, where QSK tagx is the key identifier of QSKx, T6 is the timestamp, and is sent to the field end-vehicle. The field end-vehicle receives the message body {Mac x ,Msg x ,T6,QSK tagx}, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the on-site vehicle will not process it further. Then the message verification code Mac is calculated. x 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagx Find the corresponding key QSK x Send message Msgx Decryption is performed, and then the hash value of CT is calculated. If H'(CT) = H(CT), the field-vehicle executes the corresponding operation instruction; at this point, the identity authentication process is completed between the field-vehicle and the remote-cockpit.

[0036] Furthermore, in the key negotiation phase, the cloud server generates session keys for the field-vehicle and remote-cockpit, respectively, and sends a message body containing key information, timestamp, and hash value for verification, ensuring that the remote-cockpit and field-vehicle securely receive the session keys, providing security for subsequent communications;

[0037] The steps for the field end and the vehicle to obtain the session key are as follows:

[0038] Step 8-1-1: The cloud server first generates a timestamp T7, then calculates the session key parameter h=H(YID) and calculates the session key parameter Session key parameters Message body Msg p ={T7,h,QSK tagp}, calculate the message verification code Mac p =H(Msg p ), concatenate the message body {Msg p ,Mac p} and send it to the field end - vehicle;

[0039] Step 8-1-2: On-site end - the vehicle receives the message body {Msg p ,Mac p}, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the on-site vehicle will not perform further processing, and then the message verification code Mac is calculated. p 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagp Find the corresponding key and calculate the session key parameters Session key parameters Then generate timestamp T8 and calculate the message body Calculate Message Verification Code Mac l =H(Msg l ), concatenate the message body {Msg l ,Mac l} and send it to the cloud server;

[0040] Step 8-1-3: The cloud server receives the message body {Msg l ,Mac l}, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the cloud server will not perform further processing. Then, the integrity of the message is determined by calculating the message verification code Mac1'. The hash value of The hash values ​​are equal, that is This means that the field end-vehicle has successfully received the session key, and the field end-vehicle acquisition of the session key stage is completed;

[0041] While the cloud server is generating the session key for the on-site vehicle, it is also generating the corresponding session key for the remote cockpit. The detailed steps are as follows:

[0042] Step 8-2-1: The cloud server first generates a timestamp T9, then calculates the session key parameter s = H(CID) and calculates the session key parameter Session key parameters Message body Msg u ={T9,s,QSK tagu}, calculate the message verification code Mac u =H(Msg u ), concatenate the message body {Msg u ,Mac u} and sends it to the remote end - the cockpit;

[0043] Step 8-2-2: The remote cockpit receives the message body {Msg u ,Mac u}, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the remote cockpit will not process it further, and then calculate the message verification code Mac u 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagu Find the corresponding key and calculate the session key parameters Session key parameters Then generate a timestamp T k , calculate the message body Calculate Message Verification Code Mac k =H(Msg k ), splice message {Msg k ,Mac k} and send it to the cloud server;

[0044] Step 8-2-3: The cloud server receives the message body {Msg k ,Mac k}, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the cloud server will not process it further, and then calculate the message verification code Mack 'To determine the integrity of the message, if The hash value of The hash values ​​are equal, that is This means that the cockpit has successfully received the session key, and the remote-cockpit session key acquisition phase is completed.

[0045] Furthermore, the driving system also includes a security audit function that can monitor the use of quantum keys and system communication processes in real time, and provide detailed security logs and audit reports for subsequent security assessment and optimization.

[0046] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: in the present invention, when a sanitation vehicle with an automatic driving function is in an abnormal scenario that cannot be handled, the vehicle can be controlled by the remote driving system to resume normal operation or maneuver the vehicle to a safe area; the cockpit is connected to the 5G public network by wire, which not only realizes real-time communication with remote vehicle equipment, but also ensures that the control data is efficiently managed and stored through the remote control server, thereby improving the quality of sanitation operations; in response to the problem that data streams may be threatened during communication, the present invention integrates quantum keys in the data transmission process, effectively improving the security of communication between the remote end-cockpit and the on-site end-vehicle; in addition, the cloud server can verify the legitimacy of the vehicle and cockpit identities by calculating the hash chain, further improving the identity authentication speed and reducing communication delays. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0047] Figure 1 This is a system architecture diagram of a securely interconnected smart sanitation remote driving system of the present invention;

[0048] Figure 2 A technical roadmap for a securely interconnected smart sanitation remote driving system of the present invention;

[0049] Figure 3 A 5G communication diagram of a securely interconnected smart sanitation remote driving system of the present invention; DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0050] Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in the field without making any creative work shall fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0051] Example: Figure 1-Figure 3 As shown, the present invention provides a technical solution: a securely interconnected intelligent sanitation remote driving system includes a quantum secret service platform QMS, a quantum security gateway and a quantum security encryption suite QES;

[0052] Remote driving system, which uses 5G communication technology to achieve real-time communication with the remote end (cockpit) and the on-site end (vehicle);

[0053] The quantum cryptographic service platform QMS is used to generate quantum keys and transmit them to the cloud and the quantum secure encryption suite QES in the remote end (cockpit) and the field end (vehicle) through the quantum secure gateway to achieve encryption protection of data transmission;

[0054] Among them, the quantum secret service platform QMS includes the quantum random number generator QRNG, the quantum key exchange cipher machine ECM, the quantum secret service engine QSS-ME and the quantum key management system QMS-IoV;

[0055] The quantum random number generator QRNG uses a quantum entropy source based on the phase noise of laser spontaneous radiation to generate random numbers;

[0056] Quantum Key Exchange Cryptographic Machine (ECM), used to control the distribution, management and relay of quantum keys;

[0057] Quantum Secret Service Engine QSS-ME is used to detect the use of quantum keys in the quantum key exchange cipher machine ECM in real time and complete the key distribution;

[0058] The quantum key management system QMS-IoV is used to manage and control quantum key distribution terminals, service terminals and application devices.

[0059] The quantum security gateway is deployed at the network boundary and uses quantum keys to replace traditional key exchange to complete access authentication of remote users and establish secure tunnels, providing data transmission encryption, access control and basic routing functions.

[0060] Among them, the quantum security encryption suite QES stores the quantum keys distributed by the quantum secret service platform QMS for the remote end - the cockpit and the on-site end - the vehicle to encrypt and decrypt business data.

[0061] The remote driving system divides the communication between the remote end - cockpit and the on-site end - vehicle into four stages: initialization stage, registration stage, identity authentication stage, and key negotiation stage;

[0062] Among them, in the initialization stage, the privately deployed local quantum security service platform QMS generates quantum keys through the interaction of QSS-ME and QMS-IoV in the internal system, and stores these quantum keys in the secure memory of the local gateway and pre-fills them in the corresponding remote-cockpit and field-vehicle QES; the local quantum security gateway transmits the generated quantum key corresponding to QES to the quantum security gateway in the cloud through a secure communication protocol. After receiving the key message, the quantum security gateway in the cloud verifies and stores it in the secure database in the cloud, so as to realize the synchronization of quantum keys between the remote control server cloud and the local.

[0063] Among them, during the registration stage, the quantum secret service platform QMS generates anonymous credentials and unique identifiers for the remote end-cockpit and the on-site end-vehicle respectively, and generates an identity authentication mark by calculating the hash chain, which is transmitted to the remote end-cockpit and the on-site end-vehicle;

[0064] On-site vehicle registration steps are as follows:

[0065] Step 6-1-1: The on-site vehicle sends the unique identifier VID of the on-site vehicle to the quantum secret service platform QMS. After receiving the identifier VID, the quantum secret service platform QMS generates a quantum random number QRNGi and then generates a timestamp T1;

[0066] Step 6-1-2: Calculate the anonymous credential CID of the field end-vehicle = H(VID,QRNGi), calculate the hash value H(CID) of the anonymous credential CID, and calculate the identity authentication identifier λ of the field end-vehicle = H QRNGi (CID), then upload λ and QRNGi to the cloud server, and concatenate the message body {CID, H(CID), T1} to send to the field end - vehicle;

[0067] Step 6-1-3: After receiving the message body {CID, H(CID), T1}, the field end-vehicle determines the reliability of the message based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the field end-vehicle will not perform further processing. Then the field end-vehicle calculates the hash value of CID. When H'(CID) = H(CID), it means that the field end-vehicle has successfully received the anonymous credential CID of the field end-vehicle. At this point, the field end-vehicle completes the registration stage;

[0068] The specific steps of the remote cockpit during the registration phase are as follows:

[0069] Step 6-2-1: The remote cockpit sends the unique identifier RID of the remote cockpit to the quantum secret service platform QMS. After receiving the identifier RID, the quantum secret service platform QMS generates a quantum random number QRNGj and then generates a timestamp T2;

[0070] Step 6-2-2: Calculate the anonymous credential YID of the remote cockpit = H(RID,QRNGj), calculate the hash value H(YID) of the anonymous credential YID, and calculate the identity authentication identifier β of the remote cockpit = H QRNGj (YID), then upload β and QRNGj to the cloud server, and concatenate the message body {YID, H(YID), T2} to send to the remote end - the cockpit;

[0071] Step 6-2-3: After receiving the message body {YID, H(YID), T2}, the remote-cockpit determines the reliability of the message based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the remote-cockpit will not perform further processing. Then the remote-cockpit calculates the hash value of YID. When H'(YID) = H(YID), it means that the remote-cockpit has successfully received the remote-cockpit's anonymous credential YID. At this point, the remote-cockpit completes the registration phase;

[0072] Among them, in the identity authentication stage, the on-site vehicle and the remote cockpit collect and receive video data VD and log information DR, calculate and splice the message body, and send it to the cloud server. The cloud server verifies the timestamp and data integrity. If the verification passes, the hash chain calculation is performed based on the stored quantum random number to confirm the legal identity of the on-site vehicle and the remote cockpit;

[0073] The specific steps of the identity authentication phase between the on-site vehicle and the remote cockpit are as follows:

[0074] Step 7-1: After the on-site vehicle collects the video data VD and log information DR, it generates a timestamp T3 and calculates the message body Msg i =E QSKv (VD,DR,CID,H(VD,DR)), where E QSKv () indicates encryption using key QSKv and calculation of message verification code Mac i =H(Msg i ), concatenate the message body {Msg i ,Mac i ,T3,QSK tagv}, where QSK tagv is the key identifier of QSKv, T3 is the timestamp, and is sent to the cloud server;

[0075] Step 7-2: The cloud server receives the message body {Msg i ,Mac i ,T3,QSK tagv}, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the cloud server will not process it further, and then calculate the message verification code Mac i 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagv Find the corresponding key QSK v , using the key QSK v Send message Msg i 'Decrypt to obtain CID, then calculate the hash chain H based on the stored quantum random number QRNGi' QRNGi (CID), if H' QRNGi(CID) = λ, which means that the on-site vehicle has a legal identity. Then the hash values ​​of VD and DR are calculated. If H'(VD, DR) = H(VD, DR), the cloud server obtains and stores VD and DR. The cloud server generates a timestamp T4 and calculates the message body Msg y =E QSKy (VD,DR,H(VD,DR)), where E QSKy () indicates encryption using key QSKy and calculation of message verification code Mac y =H(Msg y ), concatenate the message body {Msg y ,Mac y ,T4,QSK tagy}, where QSK tagy is the key identifier of QSKy, T4 is the timestamp, and is sent to the remote end - the cockpit;

[0076] Step 7-3: The remote cockpit receives the message body {Msg y ,Mac y ,T4,QSK tagy}, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the remote cockpit will not process it further, and then calculate the message verification code Mac y 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagy Find the corresponding key QSK y , using the key QSK y Send message Msg y 'Decrypt to obtain VD and DR, calculate the hash values ​​of VD and DR, if H'(VD, DR) = H(VD, DR), then the remote-cockpit obtains VD and DR, then the remote-cockpit generates the corresponding control signal CT, and then the remote-cockpit generates a timestamp T5, calculates Msg c =E QSKc (CT,YID,H(CT)),E QSKc () indicates encryption using key QSKc and calculation of message verification code Mac c =H(Msg c ), concatenate the message body {Msg c ,Mac c ,T5,QSK tagc}, where QSK tagc is the key identifier of QSKc, T5 is the timestamp, and it is sent to the cloud server;

[0077] Step 7-4: The cloud server receives the message body {Msg c ,Mac c ,T5,QSKtagc}, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the cloud server will not process it further, and then calculate the message verification code Mac c 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagc Find the corresponding key QSK c , using QSK c Send message Msg c 'Decrypt to obtain YID, then calculate the hash chain H based on the stored quantum random number QRNGj' QRNGj (YID), if H' QRNGj (YID) = β, which means that the remote cockpit has a legitimate identity; then, the hash value of CT is calculated. If H'(CT) = H(CT), the cloud server generates a timestamp T6 and calculates the message body Msg x =E QSKx (CT,H(CT)),E QSKx () indicates encryption using key QSKx and calculation of message verification code Mac x =H(Msg x ), concatenate the message body {Mac x ,Msg x ,T6,QSK tagx}, where QSK tagx is the key identifier of QSKx, T6 is the timestamp, and is sent to the field end-vehicle. The field end-vehicle receives the message body {Mac x ,Msg x ,T6,QSK tagx}, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the on-site vehicle will not process it further. Then the message verification code Mac is calculated. x 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagx Find the corresponding key QSK x Send message Msg x Decryption is performed, and then the hash value of CT is calculated. If H'(CT) = H(CT), the on-site vehicle executes the corresponding operation instruction. At this point, the identity authentication process between the on-site vehicle and the remote cockpit is completed.

[0078] In the key negotiation phase, the cloud server generates session keys for the on-site vehicle and the remote cockpit, and sends a message body containing key information, timestamp, and hash value for verification, ensuring that the remote cockpit and the on-site vehicle receive the session keys securely, providing security for subsequent communications.

[0079] The steps for the field-vehicle to obtain the session key are as follows:

[0080] Step 8-1-1: The cloud server first generates a timestamp T7, then calculates the session key parameter h=H(YID) and calculates the session key parameter Session key parameters Message body Msg p ={T7,h,QSK tagp}, calculate the message verification code Mac p =H(Msg p ), concatenate the message body {Msg p ,Mac p} and send it to the field end - vehicle;

[0081] Step 8-1-2: On-site end - the vehicle receives the message body {Msg p ,Mac p}, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the on-site vehicle will not perform further processing, and then the message verification code Mac is calculated. p 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagp Find the corresponding key and calculate the session key parameters Session key parameters Then generate timestamp T8 and calculate the message body Calculate Message Verification Code Mac l =H(Msg l ), concatenate the message body {Msg l ,Mac l} and send it to the cloud server;

[0082] Step 8-1-3: The cloud server receives the message body {Msg l ,Mac l}, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the cloud server will not perform further processing. Then, the integrity of the message is determined by calculating the message verification code Mac1'. The hash value of The hash values ​​are equal, that is This means that the field end-vehicle has successfully received the session key, and the field end-vehicle acquisition of the session key stage is completed;

[0083] While the cloud server is generating the session key for the on-site vehicle, it is also generating the corresponding session key for the remote cockpit. The detailed steps are as follows:

[0084] Step 8-2-1: The cloud server first generates a timestamp T9, then calculates the session key parameter s = H(CID) and calculates the session key parameter Session key parameters Message body Msg u ={T9,s,QSK tagu}, calculate the message verification code Mac u =H(Msg u ), concatenate the message body {Msg u ,Mac u} and sends it to the remote end - the cockpit;

[0085] Step 8-2-2: The remote cockpit receives the message body {Msg u ,Mac u}, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the remote cockpit will not process it further, and then calculate the message verification code Mac u 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagu Find the corresponding key and calculate the session key parameters Session key parameters Then generate a timestamp T k , calculate the message body Calculate Message Verification Code Mac k =H(Msg k ), splice message {Msg k ,Mac k} and send it to the cloud server;

[0086] Step 8-2-3: The cloud server receives the message body {Msg k ,Mac k}, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is large, the cloud server will not process it further, and then calculate the message verification code Mac k 'To determine the integrity of the message, if The hash value of The hash values ​​are equal, that is This means that the cockpit has successfully received the session key, and the remote-cockpit session key acquisition phase is completed.

[0087] According to a securely interconnected intelligent sanitation remote driving system according to claim 1, it is characterized in that: the driving system also includes a security audit function, which can monitor the use of quantum keys and system communication processes in real time, and provide detailed security logs and audit reports for subsequent security assessment and optimization.

[0088] Finally, it should be noted that the above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments or replace some of the technical features therein by equivalents. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention shall be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A secure and interconnected intelligent sanitation remote driving system, characterized by: The remote driving system includes the quantum secret service platform QMS, the quantum security gateway and the quantum security encryption suite QES; The remote driving system realizes real-time communication with the remote end (cockpit) and the on-site end (vehicle) through 5G communication technology; The quantum cryptographic service platform QMS is used to generate quantum keys and transmit them to the cloud and the quantum security encryption suite QES in the remote end (cockpit) and the on-site end (vehicle) through a quantum security gateway to achieve encryption protection for data transmission.

2. A securely interconnected intelligent sanitation remote driving system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The quantum secret service platform QMS includes a quantum random number generator QRNG, a quantum key exchange cipher machine ECM, a quantum secret service engine QSS-ME and a quantum key management system QMS-IoV; The quantum random number generator QRNG generates random numbers using a quantum entropy source based on laser spontaneous radiation phase noise; The quantum key exchange cipher machine ECM is used to control the distribution, management and relay of quantum keys; The quantum secret service engine QSS-ME is used to detect the use of quantum keys in the quantum key exchange cipher machine ECM in real time and complete the key distribution; The quantum key management system QMS-IoV is used to manage and control quantum key distribution terminals, service terminals and application devices.

3. A securely interconnected intelligent sanitation remote driving system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The quantum security gateway is deployed at the network boundary and uses quantum keys to replace traditional key exchange to complete access authentication of remote users and establishment of secure tunnels, providing data transmission encryption, access control and basic routing functions.

4. According to claim 1, a securely interconnected intelligent sanitation remote driving system is characterized by: The quantum secure encryption suite QES stores quantum keys distributed by the quantum secret service platform QMS for encryption and decryption of business data at the remote end - the cockpit and the on-site end - the vehicle.

5. A securely interconnected intelligent sanitation remote driving system according to claim 5, characterized in that: The remote driving system divides the communication between the remote end-cockpit and the on-site end-vehicle into four stages, including an initialization stage, a registration stage, an identity authentication stage, and a key negotiation stage; In the initialization phase, quantum keys are generated and stored through the quantum secret service platform QMS; During the registration phase, a pseudonym and identity authentication mark are generated for the remote end - cockpit and the on-site end - vehicle; In the identity authentication stage, the legitimacy of the remote end - cockpit and the on-site end - vehicle's identity is verified through the cloud server; During the key negotiation phase, the cloud server generates session keys for the remote end - cockpit and the on-site end - vehicle for subsequent communications.

6. A securely interconnected intelligent sanitation remote driving system according to claim 5, characterized in that: During the registration phase, the quantum secret service platform QMS generates anonymous credentials and unique identifiers for the remote cockpit and the on-site vehicle, respectively, and generates an identity authentication identifier by calculating a hash chain, which is then transmitted to the remote cockpit and the on-site vehicle; On-site - The specific steps in the vehicle registration phase are as follows: Step 6-1-1: The on-site vehicle sends the unique identifier VID of the on-site vehicle to the quantum secret service platform QMS. After receiving the identifier VID, the quantum secret service platform QMS generates a quantum random number QRNGi and then generates a timestamp T1; Step 6-1-2: Calculate the anonymous credential CID of the field end-vehicle = H(VID,QRNGi), calculate the hash value H(CID) of the anonymous credential CID, and calculate the identity authentication identifier λ of the field end-vehicle = H QRNGi (CID), then upload λ and QRNGi to the cloud server, and concatenate the message body {CID, H(CID), T1} to send to the field end - vehicle; Step 6-1-3: After receiving the message body {CID, H(CID), T1}, the field end-vehicle determines the reliability of the message based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the field end-vehicle will not perform further processing. Then the field end-vehicle calculates the hash value of CID. When H'(CID) = H(CID), it means that the field end-vehicle has successfully received the anonymous credential CID of the field end-vehicle. At this point, the field end-vehicle completes the registration stage; The specific steps of the remote cockpit during the registration phase are as follows: Step 6-2-1: The remote cockpit sends the unique identifier RID of the remote cockpit to the quantum secret service platform QMS. After receiving the identifier RID, the quantum secret service platform QMS generates a quantum random number QRNGj and then generates a timestamp T2; Step 6-2-2: Calculate the anonymous credential YID of the remote cockpit = H(RID,QRNGj), calculate the hash value H(YID) of the anonymous credential YID, and calculate the identity authentication identifier β of the remote cockpit = H QRNGj (YID), then upload β and QRNGj to the cloud server, and concatenate the message body {YID, H(YID), T2} to send to the remote end - the cockpit; Step 6-2-3: After receiving the message body {YID, H(YID), T2}, the remote-cockpit determines the reliability of the message based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the remote-cockpit will not perform further processing. Then the remote-cockpit calculates the hash value of YID. When H'(YID) = H(YID), it means that the remote-cockpit has successfully received the remote-cockpit's anonymous credential YID. At this point, the remote-cockpit completes the registration stage.

7. The securely interconnected intelligent sanitation remote driving system according to claim 1 is characterized by: In the identity authentication stage, the on-site vehicle and the remote cockpit collect and receive video data VD and log information DR, calculate and splice the message body, and send it to the cloud server. The cloud server verifies the timestamp and the integrity of the data. If the verification is passed, the hash chain calculation is performed based on the stored quantum random number to confirm the legal identity of the on-site vehicle and the remote cockpit; The specific steps of the identity authentication phase between the on-site vehicle and the remote cockpit are as follows: Step 7-1: After the on-site vehicle collects the video data VD and log information DR, it generates a timestamp T3 and calculates the message body Msg i =E QSKv (VD,DR,CID,H(VD,DR)), where E QSKv () indicates encryption using key QSKv and calculation of message verification code Mac i =H(Msg i ), concatenate the message body {Msg i ,Mac i ,T3,QSK tagv }, where QSK tagv is the key identifier of QSKv, T3 is the timestamp, and is sent to the cloud server; Step 7-2: The cloud server receives the message body {Msg i ,Mac i ,T3,QSK tagv }, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the cloud server will not process it further, and then calculate the message verification code Mac i 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagv Find the corresponding key QSK v , using the key QSK v Send message Msg i 'Decrypt to obtain CID, then calculate the hash chain H based on the stored quantum random number QRNGi' QRNGi (CID), if H' QRNGi (CID) = λ, which means that the on-site vehicle has a legal identity. Then the hash values ​​of VD and DR are calculated. If H'(VD, DR) = H(VD, DR), the cloud server obtains and stores VD and DR. The cloud server generates a timestamp T4 and calculates the message body Msg y =E QSKy (VD,DR,H(VD,DR)), where E QSKy () indicates encryption using key QSKy and calculation of message verification code Mac y =H(Msg y ), concatenate the message body {Msg y ,Mac y ,T4,QSK tagy }, where QSK tagy is the key identifier of QSKy, T4 is the timestamp, and is sent to the remote end - the cockpit; Step 7-3: The remote cockpit receives the message body {Msg y ,Mac y ,T4,QSK tagy }, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the remote cockpit will not process it further, and then calculate the message verification code Mac y 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagy Find the corresponding key QSK y , using the key QSK y Send message Msg y 'Decrypt to obtain VD and DR, calculate the hash values ​​of VD and DR, if H'(VD, DR) = H(VD, DR), then the remote-cockpit obtains VD and DR, then the remote-cockpit generates the corresponding control signal CT, and then the remote-cockpit generates a timestamp T5, calculates Msg c =E QSKc (CT,YID,H(CT)),E QSKc () indicates encryption using key QSKc and calculation of message verification code Mac c =H(Msg c ), concatenate the message body {Msg c ,Mac c ,T5,QSK tagc }, where QSK tagc is the key identifier of QSKc, T5 is the timestamp, and it is sent to the cloud server; Step 7-4: The cloud server receives the message body {Msg c ,Mac c ,T5,QSK tagc }, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the cloud server will not process it further, and then calculate the message verification code Mac c 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagc Find the corresponding key QSK c , using QSK c Send message Msg c 'Decrypt to obtain YID, then calculate the hash chain H based on the stored quantum random number QRNGj' QRNGj (YID), if H' QRNGj (YID) = β, which means that the remote cockpit has a legitimate identity; then, the hash value of CT is calculated. If H'(CT) = H(CT), the cloud server generates a timestamp T6 and calculates the message body Msg x =E QSKx (CT,H(CT)),E QSKx () indicates encryption using key QSKx and calculation of message verification code Mac x =H(Msg x ), concatenate the message body {Mac x ,Msg x ,T6,QSK tagx }, where QSK tagx is the key identifier of QSKx, T6 is the timestamp, and is sent to the field end-vehicle. The field end-vehicle receives the message body {Mac x ,Msg x ,T6,QSK tagx }, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the on-site vehicle will not process it further. Then the message verification code Mac is calculated. x 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagx Find the corresponding key QSK x Send message Msg x Decryption is performed, and then the hash value of CT is calculated. If H'(CT) = H(CT), the field-vehicle executes the corresponding operation instruction; at this point, the identity authentication process is completed between the field-vehicle and the remote-cockpit.

8. The securely interconnected intelligent sanitation remote driving system according to claim 1 is characterized by: In the key negotiation phase, the cloud server generates session keys for the on-site end-vehicle and the remote end-cockpit respectively, and sends a message body containing key information, timestamp and hash value for verification, ensuring that the remote end-cockpit and the on-site end-vehicle securely receive the session keys, providing security for subsequent communications; The steps for the field-vehicle to obtain the session key are as follows: Step 8-1-1: The cloud server first generates a timestamp T7, then calculates the session key parameter h=H(YID) and calculates the session key parameter Session key parameters Message body Msg p ={T7,h,QSK tagp },in, For XOR operation, calculate the message verification code Mac p =H(Msg p ), concatenate the message body {Msg p ,Mac p } and send it to the field end - vehicle; Step 8-1-2: On-site end - the vehicle receives the message body {Msg p ,Mac p }, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the on-site vehicle will not perform further processing, and then the message verification code Mac is calculated. p 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagp Find the corresponding key and calculate the session key parameters Session key parameters Then generate timestamp T8 and calculate the message body Calculate Message Verification Code Mac l =H(Msg l ), concatenate the message body {Msg l ,Mac l } and send it to the cloud server; Step 8-1-3: The cloud server receives the message body {Msg l ,Mac l }, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the cloud server will not perform further processing. Then, the integrity of the message is determined by calculating the message verification code Mac1'. The hash value of The hash values ​​are equal, that is This means that the field end-vehicle has successfully received the session key, and the field end-vehicle acquisition of the session key stage is completed; While the cloud server is generating the session key for the on-site vehicle, it is also generating the corresponding session key for the remote cockpit. The detailed steps are as follows: Step 8-2-1: The cloud server first generates a timestamp T9, then calculates the session key parameter s = H(CID) and calculates the session key parameter Session key parameters Message body Msg u ={T9,s,QSK tagu }, calculate the message verification code Mac u =H(Msg u ), concatenate the message body {Msg u ,Mac u } and sends it to the remote end - the cockpit; Step 8-2-2: The remote cockpit receives the message body {Msg u ,Mac u }, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the remote cockpit will not process it further, and then calculate the message verification code Mac u 'To determine the integrity of the message, according to QSK tagu Find the corresponding key and calculate the session key parameters Session key parameters Then generate a timestamp T k , calculate the message body Calculate Message Verification Code Mac k =H(Msg k ), splice message {Msg k ,Mac k } and send it to the cloud server; Step 8-2-3: The cloud server receives the message body {Msg k ,Mac k }, the reliability of the message is first determined based on the time difference. If the time difference is greater than the threshold, the cloud server will not process it further, and then calculate the message verification code Mac k 'To determine the integrity of the message, if The hash value of The hash values ​​are equal, that is This means that the cockpit has successfully received the session key, and the remote-cockpit session key acquisition phase is completed.

9. The securely interconnected intelligent sanitation remote driving system according to claim 1 is characterized by: The driving system also includes a security audit function that can monitor the use of quantum keys and system communication processes in real time, and provide detailed security logs and audit reports for subsequent security assessment and optimization.

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