Safe starting method and system of trusted controller

Abstract

The invention discloses a secure startup method and system of a trusted controller, and belongs to the technical field of industrial control system security, and the method comprises the steps: configuring a secure startup strategy in U-Boot, and executing the secure startup strategy in the startup process of the trusted controller through a trusted controller drive; when the trusted controller is started, the security starting strategy is verified by adopting the first-level security strategy, and corresponding security check is executed according to the security starting strategy after verification is passed; after the trusted controller is started, the security starting strategy establishes a trusted chain according to the trusted files, measurement verification is carried out on all the trusted files of the trusted chain, and when all the trusted files pass verification, the trusted controller passes trusted verification; according to the secure starting method of the trusted controller, the reliability of the system is improved through establishment and verification of the trusted chain, a flexible protected area and comprehensive trusted file verification, and comprehensive security guarantee is provided for the system.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of industrial control system security technology, and in particular to a secure startup method and system for a trusted controller. Background Art

[0002] With the development of information technology, the security of computer systems has received more and more attention. The system startup process is the best opportunity for attackers to invade, so it is crucial to ensure the security of the startup process. Currently, the Universal Boot Loader (U-Boot) is a widely used open source boot loader that can boot a variety of operating systems and hardware platforms. However, the traditional U-Boot startup process lacks flexibility and security, especially in the configuration of the startup strategy, which often only supports limited customization and security protection measures.

[0003] The traditional U-Boot boot process has deficiencies in verifying the boot image, lacks a strict verification mechanism, or over-relies on hardware-level security measures, such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This approach of relying on a single security measure is difficult to effectively defend against various potential attacks in a complex and changing network environment. Once an attacker finds a vulnerability, they may successfully load unauthorized or malicious software, thereby threatening the security of the entire system.

[0004] In addition, as open source software, U-Boot's code base is open for sharing, but it may also contain known or unknown security vulnerabilities. Once these vulnerabilities are discovered and exploited by attackers, they may allow them to execute arbitrary code or even bypass the system's security restrictions, posing a serious security threat to the system. Summary of the invention

[0005] In view of the problems existing in the prior art, the present invention provides a secure boot method and system for a trusted controller. The method constructs a boot policy configuration in U-Boot, so that the secure boot policy can be configured in both the U-Boot stage and the operating system stage, thereby enhancing the overall security of the system.

[0006] The present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions: In a first aspect, the present application provides a secure startup method of a trusted controller, comprising: Configure a secure boot strategy in U-Boot; the secure boot strategy includes the following steps: modifying a U-Boot configuration file; generating a signature key and a certificate; signing a boot image with the signature key; embedding the signature key and the certificate into U-Boot; and compiling the modified U-Boot source code with a cross-compilation tool chain; A trusted controller driver is constructed in the U-Boot, and a secure boot strategy is executed during the trusted controller boot process through the trusted controller driver; When the trusted controller is started, the first-level security policy is used to verify the secure boot policy. After the verification is passed, the corresponding security check is performed according to the secure boot policy. The steps of the first-level security policy to verify the secure boot policy are as follows: generate a key pair; use the private key in the key pair to sign the U-Boot and kernel images; package the signature into the U-Boot environment; verify the signature in the U-Boot startup process; After the trusted controller is started, the secure boot strategy establishes a trusted chain based on the trusted files and performs measurement verification on each trusted file in the trusted chain. When all trusted files pass the verification, the trusted controller passes the trusted verification.

[0007] Furthermore, configuring the secure boot policy in U-Boot specifically includes: constructing a boot policy configuration in U-Boot, and configuring the secure boot policy into U-Boot through the boot policy configuration.

[0008] Furthermore, the trusted controller driver executes the secure boot policy during the trusted controller startup process and stores the secure boot policy in a protected area.

[0009] Furthermore, the protected area is a trusted platform module.

[0010] Furthermore, the first-level security policy is used to verify the secure boot policy. When the verification fails, U-Boot refuses to boot and enters the recovery mode, recording an error log.

[0011] Furthermore, the secure boot strategy establishes a trusted chain based on the trusted file, including: The secure boot strategy builds a trusted chain during the startup process of the trusted controller and uses a hash algorithm to measure and verify the trusted file. The steps of measuring and verifying the hash algorithm are as follows: determining the trusted file to be verified; selecting a hash algorithm; calculating the hash value of the trusted file; comparing the hash value with the preset hash value; and determining the measurement verification result based on the comparison result.

[0012] Furthermore, the trusted files include Linux kernel files, initramfs files, bootloader configuration files and all files under the boot directory. Each trusted file is measured and verified, and the measurement value of the trusted file is compared with a benchmark value. When the measurement value is the same as the benchmark value, the trusted file is trusted; when the measurement value is different from the benchmark value, the trusted file is untrustworthy.

[0013] In a second aspect, the present application provides a trusted controller secure boot policy construction system, including: A configuration module is used to configure a secure boot strategy in U-Boot; the secure boot strategy includes the following steps: modifying a U-Boot configuration file; generating a signature key and a certificate; signing a boot image with a signature key; embedding the signature key and the certificate into U-Boot; and compiling the modified U-Boot source code with a cross-compilation tool chain; A driver module is used to build a trusted controller driver in the U-Boot, and execute a secure boot strategy during the trusted controller startup process through the trusted controller driver; The verification module is used to verify the secure boot policy using the first-level security policy when the trusted controller is started. After the verification is passed, the corresponding security check is performed according to the secure boot policy. The steps of verifying the secure boot policy using the first-level security policy are as follows: generate a key pair; use the private key in the key pair to sign the U-Boot and kernel images; package the signature into the U-Boot environment; verify the signature in the U-Boot startup process; The trusted module is used after the trusted controller is started. The secure boot strategy establishes a trusted chain based on the trusted files and performs measurement verification on each trusted file in the trusted chain. When all trusted files pass the verification, the trusted controller passes the trusted verification.

[0014] In a third aspect, the present application provides an electronic device, including: Memory for storing computer programs; A processor is used to implement the steps of the secure startup method of a trusted controller when executing the computer program.

[0015] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the secure startup method of the trusted controller are implemented.

[0016] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial technical effects: The present application provides a secure boot method for a trusted controller, which ensures security from the initial stage of system startup by configuring and executing a secure boot policy in U-Boot. Unauthorized or malicious system startup attempts are prevented. The secure boot policy itself is verified using a primary security policy (such as a boot password, signature verification, etc.). When the primary security policy verification fails, U-Boot will refuse to start and enter recovery mode, while recording an error log. This provides an important basis for administrators to diagnose and solve problems, and also prevents the system from crashing due to configuration errors or security threats, ensuring the reliability and integrity of the secure boot policy itself. In addition, the secure boot policy establishes a trusted chain based on trusted files, and performs measurement verification on each trusted file in the trusted chain. This ensures that the trusted files used in the system startup process have not been tampered with, thereby enhancing the overall credibility of the system. By comparing the measurement value of the trusted file with the baseline value, any potential security threats can be discovered and prevented in a timely manner. The secure boot method of the trusted controller improves system reliability through enhanced security, establishment and verification of a trusted chain, flexible protected areas, and comprehensive trusted file verification, providing comprehensive security protection for the system.

[0017] Furthermore, secure boot policies and related data are stored in protected areas (such as TPM), which further improves data security. Hardware security modules such as TPM provide additional physical and logical protection to prevent data from being accessed or tampered with without authorization.

[0018] Furthermore, this method not only verifies key system files (such as the Linux kernel, initramfs files, and bootloader configuration files), but also verifies all files under the boot directory. This comprehensive verification strategy ensures the overall trustworthiness of the system boot environment.

[0019] The present application also proposes a secure boot system of a trusted controller, an electronic device and a computer storage medium, all of which have all the advantages of the secure boot method of the trusted controller mentioned above. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0020] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. It should be understood that the following drawings only show certain embodiments of the present application and therefore should not be regarded as limiting the scope. For ordinary technicians in this field, other related drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0021] Figure 1 A flow chart of a secure startup method of a trusted controller provided by the present invention; Figure 2A structural schematic diagram of a secure boot system of a trusted controller provided by the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0022] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all the embodiments. The components of the embodiments of the present application described and shown in the drawings here can be arranged and designed in various different configurations.

[0023] Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present application provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the present application for which protection is sought, but merely represents selected embodiments of the present application. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in the field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0024] The core of a secure boot method for a trusted controller provided in the present application is to store a secure boot policy in a trusted platform module of the trusted controller, establish a trusted chain based on trusted files during the system startup process, and perform measurement verification on each trusted file of the trusted chain, so as to implement the secure boot policy in both the U-Boot stage and the operating system stage, thereby enhancing the overall security of the system. See also Figure 1 , a secure boot method for a trusted controller, comprising the following steps: Step 1: Build the boot policy configuration in U-Boot and configure the secure boot policy into U-Boot through the boot policy configuration.

[0025] Configuring a secure boot policy in U-Boot may include the following steps: a. Modify the U-Boot configuration file: Open the U-Boot configuration file and add the following command to enable the secure boot policy: #define CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT, where define is a preprocessing instruction in C language, used to define macros.

[0026] b. Generate signing key and certificate: Use the X.509 certificate generation tool to generate a signing key and certificate for booting the image.

[0027] c. Start the image: Use the generated signing key to sign the kernel, U-Boot itself, or other boot images that need to be signed.

[0028] d. Embed the signing key and certificate into U-Boot: Embed the signing key and certificate into U-Boot's firmware. e. Compile U-Boot: Compile the modified U-Boot source code using the cross-compilation toolchain.

[0029] Step 2: Build a trusted controller driver in U-Boot, execute the secure boot policy during the boot process through the trusted controller driver, and store the configured secure boot policy in a protected area, such as TPM (Trusted Platform Module) or other security chips.

[0030] Step 3: Use the startup policy configuration to build a first-level security policy, such as startup password, signature verification, etc. When the trusted controller starts, U-Boot first reads and verifies the secure boot policy through the first-level security policy, and then performs corresponding security checks and operations according to the first-level security policy. If the verification fails, U-Boot refuses to start the secure boot policy, enters recovery mode and records an error log.

[0031] The first-level security policy verifies the secure boot policy steps as follows: a. Generate a key pair: Use tools such as OpenSSL, an open source encryption library and command-line tool, SSL, Secure Sockets Layer to generate a pair of public and private keys.

[0032] b. Sign U-Boot and kernel images: Sign U-Boot and kernel images using private key.

[0033] c. Package the signature into the U-Boot environment: Add the signature to the U-Boot environment variable.

[0034] d. Verify signature: Verify the signature of U-Boot and kernel image during the U-Boot boot process.

[0035] Step 4: After the trusted controller is started, the secure boot strategy establishes a trusted chain based on the trusted files, and performs measurement verification on each trusted file in the trusted chain. When all trusted files pass the verification, the trusted controller passes the trusted verification.

[0036] S4.1. The secure boot strategy is based on GRUB (GRand Unified Bootloader, a multi-operating system boot program), U-Boot or bootloader, and builds a trusted chain and performs measurement verification during the system startup process.

[0037] S4.2. Trusted files include Linux (operating system) kernel files, initramfs (initial RAM file system) files, bootloader configuration files, and all files under the boot directory. The measurement value is extended to the PCR (Platform Configuration Registers) corresponding to the trusted platform module, and the measurement value of the trusted file is compared with the benchmark value. When the measurement value is the same as the benchmark value, the trusted file is trusted. When the measurement value is different from the benchmark value, the trusted file is untrusted.

[0038] Optionally, the secure boot strategy establishes a trusted chain according to a trusted file, including: The secure boot strategy builds a trusted chain during the trusted controller boot process and uses a hash algorithm for measurement verification. The steps of the hash algorithm for measurement verification are as follows: a. Determine the verification target: Identify the trusted files that need hash verification. b. Select a hash algorithm: Select an appropriate hash algorithm, SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 256-bit).

[0039] c. Calculate hash value: Use the selected hash algorithm to perform hash calculation on the trusted file to obtain a hash value of fixed length.

[0040] d. Compare hash values: Compare the calculated hash value with the known or expected hash value.

[0041] e. Analyze and verify the results: Determine the integrity and authenticity of the trusted file based on the hash value comparison results.

[0042] f. Further inspection: If the verification result fails, further inspection can be carried out.

[0043] In S4.2, the measurement verification of the trusted file is a key step to ensure that the trusted files used in the system startup process have not been tampered with. The following is an example of the measurement verification process of S4.2, as follows: 1. The bootloader determines the list of trusted files that need to be verified based on the secure boot policy, including Linux kernel files, initramfs files, bootloader configuration files, and all files in the boot directory.

[0044] 2. The Bootloader reads the contents of these trusted files from the specified storage location.

[0045] 3. Use a hash algorithm (such as SHA-256) to hash the content of each trusted file to generate a metric value (i.e., hash value).

[0046] 4. Compare the calculated measurement value with the pre-stored baseline value (stored in a secure location such as TPM or a specific encrypted partition).

[0047] If the measurement value is the same as the reference value, it means that the trusted file has not been tampered with since the last verification, and the trusted file is considered to be trusted.

[0048] If the measurement value is different from the baseline value, it means that the trusted file has been tampered with or damaged, and the file is marked as untrustworthy.

[0049] 5. For untrusted trusted files, the Bootloader will execute predetermined security response measures. This may include stopping the boot process, falling back to safe mode, recording error logs, or notifying the administrator.

[0050] For verified trusted files, the Bootloader extends their measurement values ​​to the PCR of the trusted platform module. This helps to continue to verify the integrity and trustworthiness of the system in subsequent stages.

[0051] 6. The bootloader should record the measurement values ​​and verification status of all trusted files for subsequent auditing and troubleshooting. In addition, the bootloader can also report any security events or anomalies to the administrator.

[0052] Step 5. If you need to update the secure boot policy, you can dynamically update it through the boot policy configuration and store the new secure boot policy in a protected area.

[0053] Before downloading a new secure boot policy, the legitimacy and trustworthiness of the update source must be verified. This can be done through digital signatures, certificate verification, or a known secure channel. The update source is verified to be trustworthy, and the update package containing the new secure boot policy is downloaded. The download process should use a secure transmission protocol, such as HyperText Transfer Protocol over Secure Socket Layer, to prevent data from being intercepted or tampered with during transmission. After the download is complete, the update package needs to be verified for integrity to ensure that it has not been tampered with. This is usually achieved by verifying the hash value or digital signature of the update package. Before updating the new secure boot policy, back up the current secure boot policy. This helps to quickly restore to the previous state if problems occur during the update process. After ensuring that the update package is safe and correct, update the new secure boot policy in it to the corresponding configuration of U-Boot. It is necessary to modify U-Boot's environment variables, configuration files, or directly update in the firmware. Store the updated secure boot policy in a protected area, such as a trusted platform module, a secure storage chip, or an encrypted partition to prevent unauthorized access.

[0054] The secure boot method of the above-mentioned trusted controller has the following advantages: 1. Enhanced system security: By building a secure boot strategy in U-Boot and performing strict verification steps (such as boot password, signature verification, etc.) during the boot process, unauthorized or malicious system booting is effectively prevented. Secondly, hash measurement verification is performed on trusted files (such as Linux kernel, initramfs file, bootloader configuration file, etc.) to ensure that these trusted files have not been tampered with during the boot process, thereby enhancing the overall security of the system.

[0055] 2. Establishment of trusted chain: The secure boot strategy is based on the trusted chain. Starting from the initial stage of boot, the trustworthiness of each trusted file is gradually verified to ensure the integrity and trustworthiness of the entire boot process. By extending the measurement value of the trusted file to the PCR of the trusted platform module, a reliable basis is provided for subsequent verification and auditing.

[0056] 3. Flexible update mechanism: Supports dynamic update of secure boot policies through configuration tools, and stores new secure boot policies in protected areas (such as TPM or specific encrypted partitions), which enables the system to flexibly respond to new security threats and vulnerabilities. The secure boot policy can be updated without shutting down or redeploying the entire system, which improves the maintainability and response speed of the system.

[0057] 4. Detailed audit and log records: Record the measurement results and verification status of all files, providing rich data support for subsequent audits and troubleshooting. Any security incidents or abnormal situations can be reported to the administrator, helping the administrator to promptly discover and deal with potential security threats.

[0058] 5. High reliability and fault tolerance: During the verification process, if an untrusted file is found, the Bootloader will execute predetermined security response measures, such as stopping the boot process, falling back to safe mode, etc., thereby avoiding the risk of system crash due to tampering of trusted files. This mechanism ensures the high reliability and fault tolerance of the system in the face of malicious attacks or accidental damage.

[0059] 6. This solution is not only applicable to embedded systems based on U-Boot, but can also be extended to other systems using GRUB, U-Boot or bootloader, and has wide applicability. Through integration with TPM, the security and credibility of the system are further improved.

[0060] In summary, the secure boot method of the trusted controller provides comprehensive security protection for the system through strict verification steps, establishment of a trusted chain, flexible update mechanism, detailed auditing and logging, as well as high reliability and fault tolerance.

[0061] Correspondingly, see Figure 2 The present application also provides a secure boot system of a trusted controller, including: A configuration module is used to configure a secure boot strategy in U-Boot; the secure boot strategy includes the following steps: modifying a U-Boot configuration file; generating a signature key and a certificate; signing a boot image with a signature key; embedding the signature key and the certificate into U-Boot; and compiling the modified U-Boot source code with a cross-compilation tool chain; A driver module is used to build a trusted controller driver in the U-Boot, and execute a secure boot strategy during the trusted controller startup process through the trusted controller driver; The verification module is used to verify the secure boot policy using the first-level security policy when the trusted controller is started. After the verification is passed, the corresponding security check is performed according to the secure boot policy. The steps of verifying the secure boot policy using the first-level security policy are as follows: generate a key pair; use the private key in the key pair to sign the U-Boot and kernel images; package the signature into the U-Boot environment; verify the signature in the U-Boot startup process; The trusted module is used after the trusted controller is started. The secure boot strategy establishes a trusted chain based on the trusted files and performs measurement verification on each trusted file in the trusted chain. When all trusted files pass the verification, the trusted controller passes the trusted verification.

[0062] It should be noted that in the several embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are only schematic. For example, the division of each module is only a logical function division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation. For example, multiple modules can be combined or integrated into another device, or some features can be ignored or not executed. The module described as a separate component may or may not be physically separated. The component displayed as a module may be a physical unit or multiple physical units, that is, it may be located in one place, or it may be distributed in multiple different places. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the scheme of this embodiment.

[0063] In addition, each module in each embodiment of the present invention may be integrated into a processing unit, each module may exist physically separately, or two or more modules may be integrated into one unit. The above-mentioned integrated unit may be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of a software functional unit.

[0064] An electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application includes a memory and a processor. A computer program is stored in the memory. When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of a secure startup method of a trusted controller described in any of the above embodiments are implemented.

[0065] Another electronic device provided in the embodiment of the present application may also include: an input port connected to the processor, used to transmit multimodal data collected by an external acquisition device to the processor; and a display unit connected to the processor, used to display the processing results of the processor to the outside world; a communication module connected to the processor, used to realize the communication between the electronic device and the outside world. The display unit can be a display panel, a laser scanning display, etc.; the communication method adopted by the communication module includes but is not limited to mobile high-definition link technology, universal serial bus, high-definition multimedia interface, wireless connection (including wireless fidelity technology, Bluetooth communication technology, low-power Bluetooth communication technology, communication technology based on IEEE802.11s), IEEE 802.11s is a standard developed by IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) for wireless local area networks, specifically used to support the construction and management of wireless mesh networks.

[0066] An embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of a secure startup method of a trusted controller described in any of the above embodiments are implemented.

[0067] The computer-readable storage medium involved in this application includes random access memory, internal memory, read-only memory (ROM), electrically programmable ROM, electrically erasable programmable ROM, registers, hard disks, removable disks, CD-ROMs (Compact Disc Read-Only Memory), or any other form of storage medium known in the technical field.

[0068] For the description of the relevant parts of a trusted controller secure boot policy construction system, electronic device, and computer-readable storage medium provided in the embodiment of the present application, please refer to the detailed description of the corresponding parts in a trusted controller secure boot method provided in the embodiment of the present application, which will not be repeated here. In addition, the parts of the above technical solutions provided in the embodiment of the present application that are consistent with the implementation principles of the corresponding technical solutions in the prior art are not described in detail to avoid excessive elaboration.

[0069] The above contents are only for explaining the technical idea of ​​the present invention and cannot be used to limit the protection scope of the present invention. Any changes made on the basis of the technical solution in accordance with the technical idea proposed by the present invention shall fall within the protection scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A secure boot method for a trusted controller, characterized in that: include: Configure secure boot policy in U-Boot; The secure boot strategy includes the following steps: modifying the U-Boot configuration file; Generate signing keys and certificates; Use the signature key to sign the boot image; embed the signature key and certificate into U-Boot; compile the modified U-Boot source code with the cross-compilation tool chain; A trusted controller driver is constructed in the U-Boot, and a secure boot strategy is executed during the trusted controller boot process through the trusted controller driver; When the trusted controller is started, the first-level security policy is used to verify the secure boot policy. After the verification is passed, the corresponding security check is performed according to the secure boot policy. The steps of the first-level security policy to verify the secure boot policy are as follows: generate a key pair; use the private key in the key pair to sign the U-Boot and kernel images; package the signature into the U-Boot environment; Verify the signature during the U-Boot boot process; After the trusted controller is started, the secure boot strategy establishes a trusted chain based on the trusted files and performs measurement verification on each trusted file in the trusted chain. When all trusted files pass the verification, the trusted controller passes the trusted verification.

2. A secure boot method for a trusted controller according to claim 1, characterized in that: The configuring of the secure boot policy in U-Boot specifically includes: constructing a boot policy configuration in U-Boot, and configuring the secure boot policy into U-Boot through the boot policy configuration.

3. A secure boot method for a trusted controller according to claim 1, characterized in that: The trusted controller driver executes the secure boot policy during the trusted controller startup process and stores the secure boot policy in a protected area.

4. A secure boot method for a trusted controller according to claim 3, characterized in that: The protected area is a trusted platform module.

5. A secure boot method for a trusted controller according to claim 1, characterized in that: The first-level security policy is used to verify the secure boot policy. When the verification fails, U-Boot refuses to boot and enters the recovery mode, recording the error log.

6. A secure boot method for a trusted controller according to claim 1, characterized in that: The secure boot strategy establishes a trusted chain based on a trusted file, including: The secure boot strategy builds a trusted chain during the startup process of the trusted controller and uses a hash algorithm to measure and verify the trusted file. The steps of measuring and verifying the hash algorithm are as follows: determining the trusted file to be verified; selecting a hash algorithm; calculating the hash value of the trusted file; comparing the hash value with the preset hash value; and determining the measurement verification result based on the comparison result.

7. A secure boot method for a trusted controller according to claim 6, characterized in that: The trusted files include Linux kernel files, initramfs files, bootloader configuration files and all files under the boot directory. Each trusted file is measured and verified, and the measurement value of the trusted file is compared with the benchmark value. When the measurement value is the same as the benchmark value, the trusted file is trusted. When the measurement value is different from the benchmark value, the trusted file is untrustworthy.

8. A trusted controller secure boot system, characterized in that: include: Configuration module, used to configure secure boot policy in U-Boot; The secure boot strategy includes the following steps: modifying the U-Boot configuration file; Generate signature key and certificate; use signature key to sign the boot image; embed signature key and certificate into U-Boot; compile the modified U-Boot source code with cross-compilation tool chain; A driver module is used to build a trusted controller driver in the U-Boot, and execute a secure boot strategy during the trusted controller startup process through the trusted controller driver; The verification module is used to verify the secure boot policy using the first-level security policy when the trusted controller is started. After the verification is passed, the corresponding security check is performed according to the secure boot policy. The steps of verifying the secure boot policy using the first-level security policy are as follows: generate a key pair; use the private key in the key pair to sign the U-Boot and kernel image; and package the signature into the U-Boot environment; Verify the signature during the U-Boot boot process; The trusted module is used after the trusted controller is started. The secure boot strategy establishes a trusted chain based on the trusted files and performs measurement verification on each trusted file in the trusted chain. When all trusted files pass the verification, the trusted controller passes the trusted verification.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: Memory for storing computer programs; A processor, configured to implement the steps of a secure boot method for a trusted controller as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 when executing the computer program.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the secure startup method of a trusted controller as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

Images