Electric vehicle charging system information safety testing device

Abstract

The utility model relates to the technical field of charging port information safety, and particularly discloses an electric vehicle charging system information safety testing device which comprises a vehicle power supply plug connected with a vehicle charging port. The vehicle power supply plug comprises an interface end plate, the upper end of the interface end plate is provided with a connection confirmation interface and a charging signal interface, and the lower end of the interface end plate is provided with a protection grounding interface and a low-voltage auxiliary power supply interface. A resistor of 1 kilohm is connected in series between the connection confirmation interface and the protection grounding interface. The low-voltage auxiliary power supply interface is connected with a wake-up voltage; the charging signal interface is connected with a test tool, and the test tool is in communication connection with the operation end. Various attack behaviors of hackers are simulated, the information safety of the electric vehicle charging system is detected, and the personal and property safety is guaranteed.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The utility model relates to the technical field of vehicle charging port information security, in particular to an electric vehicle charging system information security testing device. Background Art

[0002] With the widespread application of information technology in the automotive field, the functions of electric vehicle charging ports are increasing. The charging port of an electric vehicle is a communication interface directly exposed to the outside of the vehicle. During the charging connection process, a large amount of data will be exchanged between the vehicle and the charging facility, including vehicle identification information, charging status, payment information, etc. This information has certain privacy value and is easy to leak or abuse. Hackers are also likely to directly invade the vehicle through this interface, tamper with the vehicle ECU software to achieve the purpose of controlling the vehicle, or directly implant viruses to make the vehicle lose its functions.

[0003] To ensure the communication security between the charging port and the connected facilities, encryption technology is often used to protect data transmission, or identity authentication and authorization are used to prevent abuse, or security monitoring is performed during use to avoid threats or abnormal behavior. However, all of the above are monitoring and control of communication data during use, and there is no direct test for the security of the charging port itself, which makes it difficult to ensure the security of the charging port itself.

[0004] Therefore, in order to detect the information security of the electric vehicle charging system and protect personal and property safety, it is now necessary to provide an electric vehicle charging system information security testing device. Utility Model Content

[0005] The utility model aims to provide an information security testing device for an electric vehicle charging system, which can simulate various attack behaviors of hackers, detect the information security of the electric vehicle charging system, and ensure personal and property safety.

[0006] In order to achieve the above purpose, the utility model adopts the following technical solutions:

[0007] The utility model is mainly used to simulate various attack behaviors of hackers, detect the information security of electric vehicle charging systems, and improve the safety of electric vehicles. Specifically, it provides an electric vehicle charging system information security test device, including a vehicle power supply plug, which is connected to the vehicle charging port; the vehicle power supply plug includes an interface end plate, a connection confirmation interface and a charging signal interface are provided at the upper end of the interface end plate, and a protective grounding interface and a low-voltage auxiliary power supply interface are provided at the lower end of the interface end plate; a 1KΩ resistor is connected in series between the connection confirmation interface and the protective grounding interface; a wake-up voltage is connected to the low-voltage auxiliary power supply interface; a test tool is connected to the charging signal interface, and the test tool is connected to the operating end in communication.

[0008] The principles and advantages of this solution are:

[0009] According to the internal structure of the charging system, a 1KΩ resistor is used so that the charging system can detect the resistance value that meets the requirements, thereby ensuring the start of communication, establishing the communication connection between the monitoring system and the vehicle charging port, and ensuring the accuracy and stability of the communication. Only on the basis of establishing communication can the test be completed quickly through the automatic input test script, simulating various hacker attacks, and detecting the information security of the electric vehicle charging system. It can also form a variety of tests to make the operation convenient and the test accurate, ensuring the information security of the charging port, thereby protecting personal and property safety. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0010] Figure 1 The utility model is a structural schematic diagram of an information security testing device for an electric vehicle charging system. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0011] The following is further described in detail through specific implementation methods:

[0012] The reference numerals in the drawings of the specification include: vehicle power supply plug 1, interface terminal plate 2, test tool 3, operating terminal 4, buckle 5.

[0013] The embodiment is basically as shown in the attached Figure 1 As shown: an electric vehicle charging system information security testing device includes a vehicle power supply plug 1 whose overall structure is similar to the vehicle charging port socket structure, so that the vehicle power supply plug 1 is connected to the vehicle charging port to form a communication connection.

[0014] As attached Figure 1 As shown, the vehicle power plug 1 includes an interface end plate 2, a circular connection confirmation interface and a charging signal interface are installed at the upper end of the interface end plate 2, and a circular protective grounding interface PE and a low-voltage auxiliary power interface are installed at the lower end of the interface end plate 2. At the same time, in this embodiment, the vehicle power plug 1 also includes a shell, and a buckle 5 is integrally formed on the outer side of the interface end plate 2. The shell is buckled on the interface end plate 2 through the buckle 5, which is convenient for storage and storage, and at the same time protects the interface end plate 2 to prevent the interface from being damaged or dusty, which affects the service life of the vehicle power plug 1.

[0015] Among them, the connection confirmation interface includes two connection confirmation CC1 interfaces and connection confirmation CC2 interfaces with the same structure. The connection confirmation CC2 interface is located in the middle of the upper end of the interface end plate 2, the connection confirmation CC1 interface is located below the connection confirmation CC2 interface, and the protective grounding interface PE is located directly below the connection confirmation CC1 interface. A 1KΩ resistor is connected in series between the connection confirmation CC2 interface and the protective grounding interface PE, and the vehicle confirms the connection through the resistor. The internal structure of the charging system requires the detection of a 1KΩ resistance value, and the charging system will default to connecting to the charging pile and start communication. Therefore, by setting a 1KΩ resistor, the signal is ensured to be accurate.

[0016] A wake-up voltage is connected to the low-voltage auxiliary power interface. In this embodiment, the low-voltage auxiliary power interface includes a low-voltage auxiliary power positive A+ interface and a low-voltage auxiliary power negative A- interface. The low-voltage auxiliary power positive A+ interface and the low-voltage auxiliary power negative A- interface are respectively located on both sides of the protective grounding interface PE, and are both smaller than the protective grounding interface PE. The wake-up voltage is connected in series between the low-voltage auxiliary power positive A+ interface and the low-voltage auxiliary power negative A- interface. In this embodiment, the voltage value of the wake-up voltage is 12V to wake up the vehicle communication. By adopting a 12V voltage to meet the voltage requirements of the small battery of the whole vehicle, the stability of the charging port wake-up process is guaranteed, and the smooth progress of the wake-up process is guaranteed. At the same time, it can meet the use of various electronic devices, lights and starting systems in the car, ensure compatibility and versatility with existing vehicle systems, and reduce additional design and adaptation costs. At the same time, the 12V voltage belongs to the low-voltage range, which can also ensure the safety of operators when operating the charging port or performing related maintenance, and help reduce fires or other safety risks caused by electrical failures.

[0017] A test tool 3 is connected to the charging signal interface, and the test tool 3 is communicatively connected to the operating terminal 4. In this embodiment, the charging signal interface includes a charging signal S+ interface and a charging signal S- interface. Among them, the charging signal S+ interface and the charging signal S- interface are respectively arranged on both sides of the connection confirmation CC2 interface, and are the same size as the connection confirmation CC2 interface. The test tool is connected in series between the charging signal S+ interface and the charging signal S- interface. In this embodiment, the test tool 3 is CANoe, which sends an attack test message to the charging signal interface through CANoe. The operating terminal 4 is a test computer for monitoring the test results.

[0018] A DC power interface is also provided on the interface end plate 2, and the DC power interface is provided in the middle of the interface end plate 2, and is located between the connection confirmation CC1 interface and the protective grounding interface PE. In this embodiment, the DC power interface includes a DC power positive electrode DC+ interface and a DC power negative electrode DC- interface provided in parallel, the DC power positive electrode DC+ interface is located on the left side of the DC power negative electrode DC- interface, and the connection confirmation CC1 interface is located between the DC power positive electrode DC+ interface and the DC power negative electrode DC- interface.

[0019] In this embodiment, the vehicle power plug 1 is connected to the vehicle charging port, and the attack test message is sent between the charging signal S+ interface and the charging signal S- interface through the test tool CANoe to simulate various attack behaviors of hackers and obtain monitoring test results. The specific test cases are as follows.

[0020] Set the test items to communication connection security and communication transmission security, and set test sub-items under the communication connection security item and the communication transmission item respectively. Perform tests according to the designed test steps, obtain monitoring test results, and compare the test results with the expected results to obtain security monitoring results.

[0021] 1. Test item: Communication connection security.

[0022] Test sub-item: Communication connection without identity authentication.

[0023] Test steps:

[0024] Method 1)

[0025] Step 1: Open the DC charging socket of the vehicle and identify the pin definitions of each socket;

[0026] Step 2: Input a 12V wake-up voltage between the positive A+ interface of the low-voltage auxiliary power supply and the negative A- interface of the low-voltage auxiliary power supply.

[0027] Step 3: Use CANoe to simulate sending the charging pile handshake message between the charging signal S+ interface and the charging signal S- interface at a cycle of 250ms.

[0028] Expected result: CANoe does not detect the vehicle's handshake message.

[0029] A 12V voltage is used to wake up the vehicle communication system, ensure the communication connection between the vehicle system and the monitoring system, and ensure communication stability and security.

[0030] Method 2)

[0031] Step 1: Open the DC charging socket of the vehicle and identify the pin definitions of each socket;

[0032] Step 2: Connect a 1KΩ resistor in series between the vehicle connection confirmation CC2 interface and the protective ground interface PE;

[0033] Step 3: Use CANoe to simulate sending the charging pile handshake message between the charging signal S+ interface and the charging signal S- interface at a cycle of 250ms.

[0034] Expected result: CANoe does not detect the vehicle's handshake message.

[0035] By connecting a 1KΩ resistor in series, the internal structure of the charging system can be detected, thereby meeting the communication requirements, establishing a communication connection, and ensuring an effective communication process.

[0036] Method 3)

[0037] Step 1: Open the DC charging socket of the vehicle and identify the pin definitions of each socket;

[0038] Step 2: Use CANoe to simulate sending the charging pile handshake message between the charging signal S+ interface and the charging signal S- interface at a cycle of 250ms.

[0039] Expected result: CANoe does not detect the vehicle's handshake message.

[0040] By sending the charging pile handshake message, the information exchange status between the vehicle and the charging pile between the charging signal S+ interface and the charging signal S- interface is simulated to confirm each other's identity and status, laying the foundation for the subsequent charging process. By monitoring, the information security of the charging signal S+ interface and the charging signal S- interface is ensured, thereby achieving an efficient, safe and reliable charging process, thereby monitoring the security of the communication connection.

[0041] 2. Test item: Communication transmission security.

[0042] Test sub-item: Tampering of important data.

[0043] Test steps:

[0044] Method 1)

[0045] Step 1: Connect the test computer to the external communication network of the charging system;

[0046] Step 2: Use CANoe to intercept and tamper with important data sent by the charging pile to the charging system, and send an error message (handshake message / identification message) with inconsistent DLC length (long / short);

[0047] Step 3: monitor the response of the charging system to the important data and determine whether the charger responds.

[0048] Expected Result: No positive response from the charging system.

[0049] By intercepting and tampering with important data and sending corresponding error messages, the state of hacker intrusion is simulated, thereby monitoring the security of error message transmission.

[0050] Method 2)

[0051] Step 1: Connect the test computer to the external communication network of the charging system;

[0052] Step 2: Use CANoe to intercept and tamper with important data sent by the charging pile to the charging system, and send messages with inconsistent periods (100ms / 500ms);

[0053] Step 3: monitor the response of the charging system to the important data and determine whether the charger gives a positive response.

[0054] Expected Result: No positive response from the charging system.

[0055] By intercepting and tampering with important data and sending messages with inconsistent cycles, the test items for hacker intrusion are changed, thereby monitoring the security of message transmission with inconsistent cycles.

[0056] Method 3)

[0057] Step 1: Connect the test computer to the external communication network of the charging system;

[0058] Step 2: Use CANoe to intercept and tamper with important data sent by the charging pile to the charging system, and send data transmission (TP.DT) timeout / discontinuity / incorrect data length message;

[0059] Step 3: monitor the response of the charging system to the important data and determine whether the charger gives a positive response.

[0060] Expected Result: No positive response from the charging system.

[0061] By intercepting and tampering with important data and changing the error message type, the security of error message transmission in this case is monitored.

[0062] Method 4)

[0063] Step 1: Connect the test computer to the external communication network of the charging system;

[0064] Step 2: Use CANoe to tamper with important data sent by the charging pile to the charging system and send a message with an incorrect ID;

[0065] Step 3: monitor the response of the charging system to the important data and determine whether the charger responds.

[0066] Expected result: The charging system discards the error message and does not affect normal operation.

[0067] By tampering with important data, identifying erroneous messages, and changing the simulated test items, the security of erroneous message transmission in this situation can be monitored to achieve diversified testing.

[0068] Method 5)

[0069] Step 1: Connect the test computer to the external communication network of the charging system;

[0070] Step 2: Use CANoe to intercept and tamper with important data sent by the charging pile to the charging system, and send a data error message (charging ready content);

[0071] Step 3: monitor the charging system's response to the important data and determine whether the charger continues to work.

[0072] Expected Result: Charging system stops working.

[0073] By intercepting and tampering with important data and changing the simulated test items, the security of erroneous message transmission in this situation can be monitored to achieve diversified testing.

[0074] In this embodiment, a 1KΩ resistor is connected in series between the connection confirmation CC2 interface and the protective grounding interface PE, so that it can meet the monitoring requirements for establishing communication, thereby starting communication and ensuring the effectiveness and accuracy of communication. A 12V wake-up voltage is connected in series between the low-voltage auxiliary power supply positive A+ interface and the low-voltage auxiliary power supply negative A- interface, so that it can be adapted to the vehicle battery, ensuring the stability and safety of the communication process, ensuring compatibility and versatility with existing vehicle systems, reducing additional design and adaptation costs, and at the same time meeting the energy requirements of the charging port wake-up process, ensuring the smooth progress of the wake-up process. And it can be simulated through the test tool CANoe according to the above test steps to simulate various hacker attack behaviors, so as to comprehensively detect the information security of the electric vehicle charging system, thereby improving the overall safety of the vehicle and ensuring the safety of people and property.

[0075] The above is only an embodiment of the utility model, and the common knowledge such as the known specific technical solutions and / or characteristics in the solution is not described in detail here. It should be pointed out that for those skilled in the art, without departing from the technical solution of the utility model, several deformations and improvements can be made, which should also be regarded as the protection scope of the utility model, and these will not affect the effect of the implementation of the utility model and the practicality of the patent. The scope of protection required by this application shall be based on the content of its claims, and the specific implementation methods and other records in the specification can be used to interpret the content of the claims.

Claims

1. An information security testing device for electric vehicle charging system, Features: It includes a vehicle power supply plug, which is connected to the vehicle charging port; the vehicle power supply plug includes an interface end plate, a connection confirmation interface and a charging signal interface are provided at the upper end of the interface end plate, and a protective grounding interface and a low-voltage auxiliary power supply interface are provided at the lower end of the interface end plate; a 1KΩ resistor is connected in series between the connection confirmation interface and the protective grounding interface; a wake-up voltage is connected to the low-voltage auxiliary power supply interface; a test tool is connected to the charging signal interface, and the test tool is communicatively connected to the operating end.

2. An electric vehicle charging system information security testing device according to claim 1, Features: The connection confirmation interface includes a connection confirmation CC1 interface and a connection confirmation CC2 interface; the connection confirmation CC2 interface is arranged in the middle of the upper end of the interface end plate, and the connection confirmation CC1 interface is arranged below the connection confirmation CC2 interface; the resistor is connected to the connection confirmation CC2 interface.

3. An electric vehicle charging system information security testing device according to claim 1, Features: The low-voltage auxiliary power supply interface includes a low-voltage auxiliary power supply positive A+ interface and a low-voltage auxiliary power supply negative A- interface; the low-voltage auxiliary power supply positive A+ interface and the low-voltage auxiliary power supply negative A- interface are respectively arranged on both sides of the protective grounding interface; the wake-up voltage is connected in series between the low-voltage auxiliary power supply positive A+ interface and the low-voltage auxiliary power supply negative A- interface.

4. An electric vehicle charging system information security testing device according to claim 2, Features: The charging signal interface includes a charging signal S+ interface and a charging signal S- interface; the charging signal S+ interface and the charging signal S- interface are respectively arranged on both sides of the connection confirmation CC2 interface; the testing tool is connected in series between the charging signal S+ interface and the charging signal S- interface.

5. An electric vehicle charging system information security testing device according to claim 1, Features: The voltage value of the wake-up voltage is 12V.

6. An electric vehicle charging system information security testing device according to claim 1, Features: The test tool is CANoe, which sends attack test messages to the charging signal interface.

7. An electric vehicle charging system information security testing device according to claim 1, Features: The operating end is a test computer used to monitor the test results.

8. An electric vehicle charging system information security testing device according to claim 1, Features: The interface end plate is also provided with a DC power interface, and the DC power interface is arranged in the middle of the interface end plate.

9. An electric vehicle charging system information security testing device according to claim 8, Features: The DC power interface includes a DC power positive electrode DC+ interface and a DC power negative electrode DC- interface arranged in parallel; the DC power positive electrode DC+ interface is located on the left side of the DC power negative electrode DC- interface.

10. An electric vehicle charging system information security testing device according to claim 1, Features: It also includes a shell, which is arranged on the interface end plate by snap-fitting.

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