Shared bicycle operation method and device based on zero-knowledge range proof

Abstract

The present application relates to a method and device for operating a shared bicycle based on zero-knowledge range proof, wherein the method includes: constructing an anonymous set of parking points corresponding to the full set of parking point information based on preset parking point information and anonymity processing strategy; obtaining the riding time and parking location of the target shared bicycle, and generating a zero-knowledge range proof of the target shared bicycle based on the parking location, the full set of parking point information, the anonymous set of parking points and the preset zero-knowledge range proof protocol; verifying the zero-knowledge range proof and obtaining the verification result, so as to calculate the riding fee of the target shared bicycle according to the verification result. Thus, the problem that the existing technology cannot protect the privacy of the precise geographical location of the user's riding starting point, on the way and at the end point without increasing the operating and maintenance costs of shared bicycles is solved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of network security technology, and in particular to a shared bicycle operation method and device based on zero-knowledge range proof. Background Art

[0002] In the existing shared bicycle operation model, the geographical location of the user throughout the ride is completely transparent to the shared bicycle operator's server. Criminals can intercept a large amount of user riding routes and location information by attacking the server, and then analyze the activity trajectory, behavior habits and other private information of specific targets, which poses a great security risk. For example, shared bicycle riding intensive areas are large residential areas, core business districts, employment dense areas, subway station areas, etc. Criminals can infer the user's home address, work place, frequently used subway travel routes and other private information through the location privacy leaked during the ride.

[0003] The security issues of the existing shared bicycle operation model can be attributed to the problem of location privacy protection. The existing location privacy protection technologies mainly include K-anonymity technology and location differential privacy technology. The main principle of both is to convert the user's precise location into a fuzzy location range through relevant mathematical principles, thereby protecting the user's geographic location privacy.

[0004] Among them, K-anonymity technology relies on a P2P distributed network. A user node searches for a set of K random nodes in the neighboring network and hides its own location in this node set, thereby blurring the precise location. This solution has the problem of high communication overhead. In contrast, location differential privacy technology blurs the user's precise location into a set of random locations by applying disturbances, thereby blurring the precise location.

[0005] However, for the sake of management, operators need to confirm that bicycles are parked in designated areas. Although the above-mentioned technology that simply blurs the precise location can better protect the user's location privacy, it makes it difficult for operators to confirm whether bicycles are parked in designated areas, thereby increasing the difficulty and cost of operation, making it difficult to apply the above-mentioned two types of location privacy protection technologies to the shared bicycle operation model.

[0006] In summary, the existing location privacy protection technology has high communication volume, low efficiency, and is difficult to expand and apply. When applied to shared bicycle operations, it is easy to cause a conflict between user privacy and security needs and the low cost and convenience of the company's operation and management, which needs to be solved urgently. Summary of the invention

[0007] The present application provides a method and device for operating a shared bicycle based on zero-knowledge range proof, so as to solve the problem that the prior art cannot protect the privacy of the precise geographical location of the user's riding starting point, middle and end point without increasing the operating and maintenance costs of the shared bicycle.

[0008] The first aspect of the present application provides a shared bicycle operation method based on zero-knowledge range proof, comprising the following steps: based on preset parking point full set information and anonymity processing strategy, constructing an anonymous set of parking points corresponding to the preset parking point full set information; obtaining the riding time and parking position of the target shared bicycle, and generating a zero-knowledge range proof of the target shared bicycle based on the parking position, the parking point full set information, the parking point anonymous set and a preset zero-knowledge range proof protocol; verifying the zero-knowledge range proof and obtaining a verification result, so as to calculate the riding fee of the target shared bicycle according to the verification result.

[0009] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the method further includes: determining a low riding period of the target shared bicycle, and performing a preset maintenance operation on the target shared bicycle during the low riding period.

[0010] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, obtaining the riding time and parking location of the target shared bicycle includes: obtaining the location information of the target shared bicycle, and generating a bicycle service start instruction based on the location information; based on the bicycle service start instruction, generating a bicycle order for the target shared bicycle, and recording the riding time of the target shared bicycle according to the bicycle order.

[0011] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the zero-knowledge range proof of the target shared bicycle is generated based on the parking position, the full set of parking point information, the anonymous set of parking points and a preset zero-knowledge range proof protocol, including: based on the full set of parking point information, judging whether the parking position meets the preset parking conditions; if the target shared bicycle meets the preset parking conditions, inputting the parking position and the anonymous set of parking points into the zero-knowledge range proof protocol to obtain the zero-knowledge range proof corresponding to each parking point in the anonymous set of parking points; if the target shared bicycle does not meet the preset parking conditions, providing acoustic and / or optical reminders to the target user.

[0012] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, verifying the zero-knowledge range proof and obtaining a verification result to calculate the riding fee of the target shared bicycle based on the verification result includes: verifying the zero-knowledge range proof, and if the verification result meets the preset range proof requirements, stopping recording the riding time to obtain the final riding time of the target shared bicycle; calculating the riding fee based on the final riding time.

[0013] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, before calculating the riding fee of the target shared bicycle based on the verification result, it also includes: obtaining the current longitude component information and the current latitude component information of the target shared bicycle; based on the zero-knowledge range proof protocol, performing zero-knowledge range proof on the current longitude component information and the current latitude component information, and generating a location proof result of the target shared bicycle to protect the location privacy of the target user based on the location proof result.

[0014] The second aspect of the present application provides a shared bicycle operation device based on zero-knowledge range proof, including: a construction module, which is used to construct an anonymous set of parking points corresponding to the preset full set of parking point information and an anonymous processing strategy; a generation module, which is used to obtain the riding time and parking position of the target shared bicycle, and generate a zero-knowledge range proof of the target shared bicycle based on the parking position, the full set of parking point information, the anonymous set of parking points and a preset zero-knowledge range proof protocol; a verification module, which is used to verify the zero-knowledge range proof and obtain a verification result, so as to calculate the riding fee of the target shared bicycle according to the verification result.

[0015] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, it further includes: a maintenance module, used to determine the riding low period of the target shared bicycle, and perform preset maintenance operations on the target shared bicycle during the riding low period.

[0016] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the generation module includes: a location information acquisition unit, used to acquire the location information of the target shared bicycle, and generate a bicycle service start instruction based on the location information; a recording unit, used to generate a bicycle order for the target shared bicycle based on the bicycle service start instruction, and record the riding time of the target shared bicycle according to the bicycle order.

[0017] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the generation module further includes: a judgment unit, for judging whether the parking position meets the preset parking condition based on the full set of parking point information; an input unit, for inputting the parking position and the anonymous set of parking points into the zero-knowledge range proof protocol if the target shared bicycle meets the preset parking condition, so as to obtain the zero-knowledge range proof corresponding to each parking point in the anonymous set of parking points; and a reminder unit, for providing acoustic and / or optical reminders to the target user if the target shared bicycle does not meet the preset parking condition.

[0018] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the verification module includes: an analysis unit, used to verify the zero-knowledge range proof, and when the verification result meets the preset range proof requirements, stop recording the riding time to obtain the final riding time of the target shared bicycle; a calculation unit, used to calculate the riding fee based on the final riding time.

[0019] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, it also includes: a longitude and latitude information acquisition module, used to obtain the current longitude component information and the current latitude component information of the target shared bicycle before calculating the riding fee of the target shared bicycle according to the verification result; a privacy protection module, used to perform zero-knowledge range proof on the current longitude component information and the current latitude component information based on the zero-knowledge range proof protocol, and generate a location proof result of the target shared bicycle to protect the location privacy of the target user based on the location proof result.

[0020] The third aspect of the present application provides an electronic device, comprising: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the program to implement the shared bicycle operation method based on zero-knowledge range proof as described in the above embodiment.

[0021] The fourth aspect embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the above-mentioned shared bicycle operation method based on zero-knowledge range proof.

[0022] Therefore, the embodiments of the present application have the following beneficial effects:

[0023] The embodiments of the present application can construct an anonymous set of parking points corresponding to the full set of parking point information based on the preset parking point information and anonymous processing strategy; obtain the riding time and parking location of the target shared bicycle, and generate a zero-knowledge range proof of the target shared bicycle based on the parking location, the full set of parking point information, the anonymous set of parking points and the preset zero-knowledge range proof protocol; verify the zero-knowledge range proof and obtain the verification result to calculate the riding fee of the target shared bicycle according to the verification result, thereby improving the scalability in the shared bicycle scenario, enhancing the protection of the privacy of user location information, and better balancing the interests and maintainability of commercial companies. Therefore, the existing technology solves the problem that it is impossible to protect the privacy of the precise geographical location of the user's riding starting point, middle and end point without increasing the operating and maintenance costs of shared bicycles.

[0024] Additional aspects and advantages of the present application will be given in part in the description below, and in part will become apparent from the description below, or will be learned through the practice of the present application. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0025] The above and / or additional aspects and advantages of the present application will become apparent and easily understood from the following description of the embodiments in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0026] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a simplified model of entities involved in a shared bicycle operation process provided according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0027] Figure 2 A flowchart of a shared bicycle operation method based on zero-knowledge range proof provided for one embodiment of the present application;

[0028] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the logical architecture of a shared bicycle operation method based on zero-knowledge range proof provided for one embodiment of the present application;

[0029] Figure 4 This is an example diagram of a shared bicycle operation device based on zero-knowledge range proof according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0030] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0031] Among them, 10-shared bicycle operation device based on zero-knowledge range proof, 100-construction module, 200-generation module, 300-verification module, 501-memory, 502-processor, 503-communication interface. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0032] Embodiments of the present application are described in detail below, and examples of the embodiments are shown in the accompanying drawings, wherein the same or similar reference numerals throughout represent the same or similar elements or elements having the same or similar functions. The embodiments described below with reference to the accompanying drawings are exemplary and are intended to be used to explain the present application, and should not be construed as limiting the present application.

[0033] The following describes the shared bicycle operation method and device based on zero-knowledge range proof of the embodiment of the present application with reference to the accompanying drawings. In view of the problems that the existing location privacy protection technology mentioned in the above background technology has high communication volume, low efficiency, and is difficult to expand and apply, and when applied to shared bicycle operation, it is easy to cause the user's privacy and security requirements to conflict with the low cost and convenience of the company's operation management. The present application provides a shared bicycle operation method based on zero-knowledge range proof. In the method, an anonymous set of parking points corresponding to the full set of parking point information is constructed based on preset parking point information and anonymity processing strategy; the riding time and parking location of the target shared bicycle are obtained, and based on the parking location, the full set of parking point information, the anonymous set of parking points and the preset zero-knowledge range proof protocol, a zero-knowledge range proof of the target shared bicycle is generated; the zero-knowledge range proof is verified, and a verification result is obtained, so as to calculate the riding fee of the target shared bicycle according to the verification result, thereby improving the scalability in the shared bicycle scenario, enhancing the protection of the user's location information privacy, and better balancing the interests and maintainability of the commercial company. This solves the problem that the existing technology cannot protect the privacy of the user's precise geographical location at the starting point, along the way and at the end point of the ride without increasing the operating and maintenance costs of shared bicycles.

[0034] In order to facilitate those skilled in the art to understand the shared bicycle operation method based on zero-knowledge range proof of the present application, the entities involved in the present application and the shared bicycle management and operation cycle are explained below.

[0035] 1. Entities involved:

[0036] Figure 1 This is a simplified model diagram of the entities involved in the shared bicycle operation process. Figure 1 As shown, users, bicycles, parking spots, and anonymous parking spot collections can all be identified by a unified identifier ID. Specifically, this application mainly involves the following entities:

[0037] 1. Shared bicycles, which only have Bluetooth communication function for connecting to mobile phones, but not network communication function;

[0038] 2. Parking point, which represents a rectangular geographical area that does not change over time, i.e., the designated locking area after the user finishes riding the bicycle;

[0039] 3. Anonymous set of parking spots. Each parking spot corresponds to an anonymous set of parking spots. This entity has the function of generalizing specific parking spots.

[0040] 4. User (client, prover), this entity can communicate with the shared bicycle through a Bluetooth device to complete the lock and unlock operation, thereby generating a zero-knowledge range proof of location information and forwarding it to the operator;

[0041] 5. Operator (server, verifier), this entity can verify the zero-knowledge range proof provided by the user and perform service settlement.

[0042] 2. Management and operation cycle:

[0043] In this application, the shared bicycle management and operation cycle is mainly divided into the following four stages:

[0044] 1. Update anonymous collection phase

[0045] Initialize the full set of parking point information through the operator, and perform K-anonymization to obtain the anonymous set of parking points, and provide the full set of parking point information and anonymous set information to the user. If the parking points are subsequently added, deleted, or modified, the full set of parking points needs to be K-anonymized again;

[0046] 2. User riding stage

[0047] Users use Bluetooth to stage the bicycle and start the bicycle riding service, during which the real-time location information will not be provided to the operator;

[0048] 3. Cycling settlement stage

[0049] The user obtains the bicycle parking location through Bluetooth, and inputs it into the zero-knowledge range proof protocol together with the full set of parking point information and the anonymous set of parking points to generate a zero-knowledge range proof and forward it to the operator, who then verifies the proof and settles the service fee based on the riding time;

[0050] 4. Bicycle maintenance stage

[0051] Operators will recycle, repair, and replace shared bicycles at parking spots during periods of low bicycle usage.

[0052] Specifically, Figure 2 A flowchart of a shared bicycle operation method based on zero-knowledge range proof provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0053] like Figure 2 As shown, the shared bicycle operation method based on zero-knowledge range proof includes the following steps:

[0054] In step S201, based on the preset parking point full set information and anonymity processing strategy, an anonymous set of parking points corresponding to the parking point full set information is constructed.

[0055] In the anonymous set updating stage, the embodiment of the present application may initialize the parking point full set information, perform K-anonymity processing, and update the parking point anonymous set. The specific process is as follows:

[0056] 1. Initialize the complete set of parking point information

[0057] The server initializes the regional location information of each parking spot. After registering a shared bicycle service account, the client selects a permanent city or region to obtain the complete set of parking spot information in that region;

[0058] 2. Perform K-anonymization

[0059] The server performs K-anonymization on the entire set of parking spots according to cities or regions, divides them into several anonymous sets of parking spots, the size of which ranges from K to 2K, and updates them to the client synchronously;

[0060] 3. Update the anonymous set of parking spots

[0061] If the server adds, deletes, or modifies the existing parking point set, the server first synchronizes the updated parking point set to the client, and then performs the K-anonymization operation again.

[0062] It should be noted that, in the embodiments of the present application, the parking spot can be approximately abstracted as a non-tilted rectangular area, and two sets of longitude and latitude ranges are used to represent the rectangular area, namely, {(x, y)|Latitude1≤x≤Latitude2, Longitude1≤y≤Longitude2}; in addition, there is a many-to-one relationship between the parking spot and the anonymous set of parking spots, and each anonymous set of parking spots stores the parameter K of the current K-anonymous partitioning round and the actual capacity of the anonymous set of parking spots.

[0063] In the actual implementation process, the embodiment of the present application can use the K-anonymity algorithm to generalize the parking point set PS; after generalization, different parking points will be divided into multiple parking point sets based on geographical proximity, namely "parking point anonymous sets".

[0064] As an achievable method, the embodiment of the present application can use a K-anonymity algorithm based on the Mondrian algorithm to generalize the parking point set. The process can be divided into two steps: partitioning and partition aggregation, as described below:

[0065] Partitioning: The embodiment of the present application can divide the original set into multiple partitions with a number of elements not less than k. All parking points in the partitions will be generalized into the same element or range in the subsequent aggregation process. When partitioning, each element of the parking point set PS has the attribute lo l ,lo r ,la t ,la u, represents a parking point P; the initial partition is selected as the PS set, and then the K-anonymity algorithm can continuously refine the K-anonymity partitions according to the median value of the elements in a certain attribute column partition until the partition cannot be divided into smaller k-anonymity partitions. The multiple K-anonymity partitions obtained in this step can be used for subsequent partition aggregation, and the partition is recorded as ρ i , where 1≤i≤m,|ρ i |≥k, The algorithm logic of the partitioning part is as follows:

[0066]

[0067] It should be noted that, in the above n=|PS|, [1,2,…,n] represents the set including the 1st to the nth parking spots; P result The elements in are the partition set ρ containing the parking points i .

[0068] Partition aggregation: The embodiment of the present application can aggregate each partition i The attributes of the parking spots in the dataset are aggregated to obtain a range of attribute values, thereby achieving generalization.

[0069] In the specific implementation process, partition ρ i The attributes of the parking spots in are generalized as follows: l ,lo r ,la t ,la u )={(lo lP ,lo rP ,la tP ,la uP )|P∈ρ i The attribute of each parking spot is modified into the attribute value set of all parking spots in the partition. At this time, the number of occurrences of the same attribute value in the new data set is not less than K, and the original parking spots can no longer be distinguished based on the attributes.

[0070] It can be understood that the embodiments of the present application generalize the parking point set by utilizing the K-anonymity algorithm during the anonymous set updating stage; and when generating proofs and order records during the subsequent riding settlement stage, only the parking point anonymous set is involved, rather than specific parking points. Therefore, for each transaction, the operator verifying the transaction cannot distinguish between different parking points in the same parking point anonymous set, thereby effectively ensuring the realization of goals such as blurring the destination and protecting the user's location privacy.

[0071] In step S202, the riding time and parking location of the target shared bicycle are obtained, and a zero-knowledge range proof of the target shared bicycle is generated based on the parking location, the full set of parking point information, the anonymous set of parking points and the preset zero-knowledge range proof protocol.

[0072] After obtaining the anonymous set of parking spots through the K-anonymity algorithm, further, the embodiments of the present application can also enable users to turn on the shared bicycle riding service and record the riding time of the shared bicycle through Bluetooth, during which no real-time location information is provided to the operator; in addition, users can also obtain the parking location of the shared bicycle through Bluetooth, and input it into the zero-knowledge range proof protocol together with the full set of parking spot information and the anonymous set of parking spots, thereby generating a zero-knowledge range proof and forwarding it to the operator.

[0073] Therefore, in the embodiments of the present application, the user only needs to provide the operator with a zero-knowledge range proof after the ride, rather than directly sharing the entire, plaintext, and detailed geographic location information with the operator in real time, which greatly improves the security of the user's riding privacy data.

[0074] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, obtaining the riding time and parking location of the target shared bicycle includes: obtaining the location information of the target shared bicycle, and generating a bicycle service start instruction based on the location information; based on the bicycle service start instruction, generating a bicycle order for the target shared bicycle, and recording the riding time of the target shared bicycle according to the bicycle order.

[0075] It should be noted that, during the user riding stage, the embodiment of the present application can firstly obtain the location information of the surrounding shared bicycles through Bluetooth by the user using a lightweight device such as a mobile phone or a tablet computer, and generate and send a bicycle service activation instruction to perform the unlocking operation. At the same time, a bicycle service request can be generated based on the bicycle service activation instruction, and the user (client) can send a bicycle service request to the operator server, so that the server generates a bicycle order for the user and starts recording the riding time.

[0076] In an embodiment of the present application, users can use the shared bicycle riding service until they reach their destination without having to share their location information with the operator's server in real time, thereby achieving privacy data protection for the user's riding.

[0077] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, a zero-knowledge range proof of a target shared bicycle is generated based on the parking position, the full set of parking point information, the anonymous set of parking points and a preset zero-knowledge range proof protocol, including: judging whether the parking position meets the preset parking conditions based on the full set of parking point information; if the target shared bicycle meets the preset parking conditions, inputting the parking position and the anonymous set of parking points into the zero-knowledge range proof protocol to obtain the zero-knowledge range proof corresponding to each parking point in the anonymous set of parking points; if the target shared bicycle does not meet the preset parking conditions, providing an acoustic and / or optical reminder to the target user.

[0078] It should be noted that, in the riding settlement stage, the embodiments of the present application allow users to lock the shared bicycles through lightweight devices or manual operation, and send the parking location of the shared bicycles to the user's device via Bluetooth.

[0079] Furthermore, after the user (client) receives the parking location of a shared bicycle, the embodiment of the present application can first perform a local check. If the locking location is not at any parking spot in the local stored parking point set, a voice prompt can be given to the user, such as "locking failed, please park again", etc., or the corresponding prompt light of the shared bicycle can be continuously flashed to remind the user of the location error; if the locking location is at a parking spot in the local stored parking point set, the embodiment of the present application can input the anonymous set of parking points corresponding to the parking point and the locking location into a concise and non-interactive zero-knowledge range proof protocol, thereby generating a range proof for each parking point in the anonymous set of parking points.

[0080] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that this range proof allows the operator to verify that the user's parking location is in a parking spot in a specific anonymous set of parking spots, but cannot know which parking spot it is. After generating the range proof, the user (client) can forward the batch range proof to the operator server.

[0081] In the actual implementation process, the embodiments of the present application can construct a non-interactive zero-knowledge range proof protocol suitable for shared bicycle operation scenarios through Pederson commitment, vector inner product argument protocol and BulletProofs protocol. The following will discuss Pederson commitment, vector inner product argument protocol, BulletProofs protocol and the non-interactive zero-knowledge range proof protocol finally constructed for shared bicycle operation scenarios, that is, the zero-knowledge range proof protocol for discontinuous ranges.

[0082] 1. Pederson Commitment

[0083] The Pederson commitment consists of (Setup, Com), and the Setup algorithm generates the public parameter pp←Setup(1 λ ), Com algorithm is based on pp in the plaintext space M pp , random number space R pp and commitment space C pp A function M is defined on pp ×R pp →C pp . Furthermore, based on the prime number field and cyclic groups of order p Perform the following steps:

[0084] First, for

[0085]

[0086] Com(x;r)=(g x h r )

[0087] Secondly, we make a vector commitment. n defaults to an exponent of 2,

[0088]

[0089]

[0090] The bold letters represent vectors. Under the discrete logarithm assumption, the Pederson commitment is completely hidden and computationally bound, but r = 0 commitment is often used, in which case the commitment is only computationally bound, not completely hidden.

[0091] 2. Vector Inner Product Argument Protocol

[0092] The inputs to the inner product argument are independent generators A scalar Sum and vector Compute the bound vector commitment P. The argument enables the prover to prove to the verifier that:

[0093]

[0094] in,<a,b> represents the inner product of vectors a and b. When c is part of P, the relationship can be further transformed into:

[0095]

[0096] The rationality of this transformation can be proved by Protocol 1, as follows:

[0097]

[0098] For extracting non-trivial discrete logarithmic relations between g, h, u or extracting valid witnesses a, b, the argument about formula (1) in protocol 1 has perfect completeness and statistical witness extension simulation. Protocol 1 is the proof system of formula (1) and completes the transformation from formula (1) to formula (2). Among them, protocol 2 is the proof system of formula (2), which will be discussed later and will not be repeated here.

[0099] In order to prove formula (2), the embodiment of the present application can first define a hash function Let n′=n / 2, and generate and For input, output:

[0100]

[0101] Among them, [:n'] means taking the first n' bits of the vector, and [n':] means taking the bit after the n'th bit of the vector.

[0102] It should be noted that the hash function is additively homomorphic, that is:

[0103] H(a1,a′1,b1,b′1,c)·H(a2,a′2,b2,b′2,c)=H(a1+a2,a′1+a′2,b1+b2,b′1+b′2,c)

[0104] From this, the inner product proof protocol (proof system) of formula (2) can be constructed as follows:

[0105] (1) The prover calculates:

[0106]

[0107]

[0108] (2) Random selection of validators And send x to the prover;

[0109] (3) Prover calculation And send a′, b′ to the verifier;

[0110] (4) Based on the received (L, R, a′, b′), the verifier calculates And output 1 (accept) if the following conditions are met, otherwise output 0 (reject).

[0111] P′=H(x -1 a′,xa′,xb′,x -1 b′,<a′,b′> ) (3)

[0112] Where P = H (a [n′:] ,a [:n′] ,b [n′:] ,b [:n′] ,<A,b> ).

[0113] From the inner product argument protocol, we can see that if the proof is constructed by an honest prover, the protocol result will be acceptance. Through the protocol, we can obtain the legal witnesses a and b for formula (2).

[0114] In addition, the formula (3) verified by the inner product proof protocol above can be equivalent to:

[0115]

[0116] This means that instead of sending a′, b′ to the verifier for verification, both parties can use the new parameters Recursively perform the inner product argument for P′. And the new argument n' is only half of the original n. Using this property, a protocol 2 with log2n rounds of recursion and fewer communication elements can be constructed to complete the above inner product argument. This protocol is a public coin protocol and can be converted to non-interactive with the help of Fiat Shamir heuristic. The specific steps of protocol 2 are as follows:

[0117]

[0118]

[0119] in, By combining protocols 1 and 2, we can construct a vector inner product proof protocol that can verify equation (1).

[0120] 3. BulletProofs Protocol

[0121] Assuming a secret value The Pederson commitment bound to its computation is Then we need to build a proof system that allows the prover to prove to the verifier without revealing v:

[0122]

[0123] Let a L =(a1,a2,…,a n )∈{0,1} n represents the bit representation of v, then we have L ,2 n >=v(2 n represents (1,2,…,2 n-1 )).

[0124] The prover is a L Make a vector commitment, denoted as If the prover can prove that he knows that the following conditions can be met and V = g v h γ , then the verifier can believe that v∈[0,2 n -1].

[0125]

[0126] Thus, it is proved that a1,a2,…,a n ∈{0,1}, and a L Consists of the bits of v. ​

[0127] Furthermore, embodiments of the present application may also attempt to construct a protocol to convert these constraints into an inner product constraint, so that Protocol 1 can be used to effectively prove that the inner product relationship holds.

[0128] Therefore, embodiments of the present application may employ random linear combinations of constraints (selected by the verifier). If the original constraints are not satisfied, then it is unlikely that the combined constraints will hold in the challenge space. Specifically, in proving Satisfying k=0 n When the verifier first sends a random To the prover, who then proves <k,y n >=0 n Obviously, k = 0 n When the inner product relationship holds, and k≠0 n And the maximum probability that the inner product relationship holds is n / p, which is negligible.

[0129] Based on the above properties, the embodiments of the present application can be implemented by two challenges. Convert equation (5) into the following equation:

[0130]

[0131] is equivalent to:

[0132]

[0133] in,

[0134] Afterwards, the embodiment of the present application may further add two hidden items s L ,s R and commitment V to construct the inner product relation proof protocol of formula (6) to avoid sending a directly to the verifier L ,a R .

[0135] Based on the above principles, the BulletProofs protocol can be constructed as follows:

[0136]

[0137]

[0138] Based on the random oracle model, the embodiment of the present application can use the Fiat-Shamir transformation protocol to convert the

[0139] The random challenge is replaced by the hash of the transcript up to a certain point, including the statement itself, so that it can be proved that

[0140] The method is safe for multi-round protocols.

[0141] 4. Zero-knowledge range proof protocol for discontinuous ranges

[0142] In the shared bicycle operation scenario involved in the embodiment of the present application, the bicycle parking position (v, w) and the parking point P α is the hidden value, the anchor point belongs to the anonymous set ρ α is a public value. Without revealing (v,w), the user needs to prove to the operator that (u,w) belongs to the anonymous set ρ α One of the parking spots is:

[0143]

[0144] Formula (7) can be understood as proving that the hidden value is in the discontinuous range, and the discontinuous range can be expressed as a continuous range, that is, a sequence of intervals. Equivalently transform Formula (7) to make the proof range a fixed range [0,2 n -1]:

[0145] C=V-LO lP ,D=V-LO rP +2 n -1,E=W-LA tP ,F=LA uP -W+2 n -1

[0146] stC∈[0,2 n -1]∧D∈[0,2 n -1]∧E∈[0,2 n -1]∧F∈[0,2 n -1]

[0147] Among them, n is a public parameter.

[0148] Therefore, the user needs to prove to the operator that the above four range relationships hold. This can be achieved using the above non-interactive zero-knowledge range proof protocol.

[0149] In addition, users still need to prove to the operator that the following is true:

[0150]

[0151] The validity of formula (8) guarantees the correctness of calculating C and D from V. Otherwise, the user has cheated, that is, forged C′≠C,D′≠D, but V′-C′=VC∈[0,2 n -1],V′-D′=VD∈[0,2 n -1]. Similarly, there are similar requirements for E and F.

[0152] Therefore, the zero-knowledge range proof for the discontinuous range can be divided into two steps: declaring legal intermediate variables and zero-knowledge range proof for the intermediate variables.

[0153] Taking BulletProofs based on vector inner product proof as an example, for random challenges The user needs to prove to the operator that the following inner product relationship holds:

[0154]

[0155]

[0156]

[0157]

[0158]

[0159]

[0160] <C,(r m ) [:m-n] ||0 n >=0 (15)

[0161] <D,(r m ) [:m-n] ||0 n >=0 (16)

[0162] <E,(r m ) [:m-n] ||0 n >=0 (17)

[0163] <F,(r m ) [:m-n] ||0 n >=0 (18)

[0164]

[0165]

[0166]

[0167]

[0168] Where m is the maximum bit length of the operation, m>n; Formula (9)-Formula (14) means that variables V, W, C, D, E, F are all binary numbers; Formula (15)-Formula (18) means that C, D, E, F∈[0,2 n-1]; Formula (19)-Formula (22) indicate that there is a parking point P such that C = V-LO lP ,D=V-LO rP +2 n -1,E=W-LA tP ,F=LA uP -W+2 n -1.

[0169] The above-mentioned zero-knowledge range proof protocol can enable the prover to make the verifier believe that the value is within a certain public range without revealing the secret value. Based on this protocol, the embodiment of the present application breaks the traditional cryptography mindset of privacy protection through traffic encryption, and innovatively proposes a location privacy protection strategy. The location privacy protection strategy will be introduced in detail below and will not be elaborated here.

[0170] In step S203, the zero-knowledge range proof is verified and a verification result is obtained to calculate the riding fee of the target shared bicycle according to the verification result.

[0171] After generating the zero-knowledge range proof, the embodiment of the present application can forward it to the operator, who can verify the proof and settle the service fee based on the riding time.

[0172] Therefore, the embodiments of the present application can reduce the local computing cost of lightweight clients and the communication cost between clients and servers, improve the proof efficiency of clients, and enhance the scalability of the location privacy protection technology in shared bicycle scenarios by using a concise and non-interactive zero-knowledge range proof protocol.

[0173] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, before calculating the riding fee of the target shared bicycle based on the verification result, it also includes: obtaining the current longitude component information and the current latitude component information of the target shared bicycle; based on the zero-knowledge range proof protocol, performing zero-knowledge range proof on the current longitude component information and the current latitude component information, and generating a location proof result of the target shared bicycle to protect the location privacy of the target user based on the location proof result.

[0174] It is understood by those skilled in the art that in a two-dimensional map, a location is usually uniquely determined by two components, longitude and latitude. If the longitude and latitude can be guaranteed not to be leaked, then the location privacy can be guaranteed. Therefore, the embodiments of the present application can determine the location privacy protection strategy based on the two components of longitude and latitude, combined with the zero-knowledge range proof protocol.

[0175] Specifically, the embodiments of the present application can first perform zero-knowledge range proof on the longitude and latitude of the current location (i.e., the secret location) of the target shared bicycle to verify whether the longitude of the location is within a certain longitude range and whether the latitude is within a certain latitude range; then, it is determined whether the location is within a certain range of the two-dimensional map, thereby determining the location privacy protection strategy of the embodiments of the present application, so as to determine whether the secret location is within a certain location range without disclosing the specific coordinates of the secret location.

[0176] It should be noted that the location privacy protection strategy of the embodiment of the present application is not limited to two-dimensional maps. Those skilled in the art can use the location privacy protection strategy of the present application to decompose a location into several components in three-dimensional space or even higher-dimensional space, and then determine whether this location is within a certain location range; in addition, the algorithms and protocols used in the embodiments of the present application are the Mondrian algorithm and the BulletProofs protocol, respectively. During the specific implementation process, those skilled in the art can choose other algorithms to generate a zero-knowledge range proof protocol according to actual conditions.

[0177] In summary, the embodiments of the present application use the zero-knowledge range proof protocol to prove that the user's hidden longitude and latitude position is within a certain longitude and latitude range, and convert the two-dimensional longitude and latitude position range relationship into two sets of one-dimensional range relationships, thereby applying the zero-knowledge range proof protocol to the field of location privacy protection; in addition, in the zero-knowledge range proof protocol, the verifier, that is, the operator, cannot know the user's specific hidden location, and can only verify that it is within a specific area, thereby enhancing the protection of the user's location information privacy.

[0178] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the zero-knowledge range proof is verified and a verification result is obtained to calculate the riding fee of the target shared bicycle based on the verification result, including: verifying the zero-knowledge range proof, and when the verification result meets the preset range proof requirements, stopping recording the riding time to obtain the final riding time of the target shared bicycle; calculating the riding fee based on the final riding time.

[0179] After generating the zero-knowledge range proof, the embodiment of the present application can further verify the correctness of the received batch range proof through the operator server according to the non-interactive zero-knowledge range proof protocol. If the verification fails, the verification failure error message is returned to the user, and the user is prompted "locking failed, please park again"; if the verification succeeds, the service timer is terminated, and the final riding time of the shared bicycle is obtained to settle the corresponding riding fee, and the payment order is returned to the user.

[0180] After the user (client) obtains the verification success information returned by the operator's server, he can send a lock instruction to the shared bicycle via Bluetooth and pay the riding service fee within a certain period of time. At the time of settlement, the transaction order only records the unique identifiers of the user, bicycle, and anonymous set, as well as other necessary information, and does not record the specific parking spot identifier.

[0181] Therefore, the embodiments of the present application utilize a zero-knowledge range proof protocol to allow users to prove that their current location is within a certain K-anonymous parking spot range without exposing their specific longitude and latitude. For operators, they can only determine that the parking location of a bicycle is within at least one of K parking spots within a specific range, but cannot know the specific parking spot identifier. This effectively solves the problem of user location privacy leakage while enabling operators to verify whether the user's parking location is legal, which has good maintainability.

[0182] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, it also includes: determining a low-riding period of the target shared bicycle, and performing a preset maintenance operation on the target shared bicycle during the low-riding period.

[0183] It should be noted that in the bicycle maintenance stage, the embodiments of the present application include bicycle recovery and repair, bicycle transportation and bicycle loss processing, etc. Figure 3 As shown, the shared bicycle is maintained. The specific process is as follows:

[0184] 1. Bicycle recycling and repair

[0185] Operators regularly collect bicycles that need to be repaired or charged during off-peak hours of shared bicycle service and perform unified repairs;

[0186] 2. Bicycle transfer

[0187] Operators regularly rearrange and transfer shared bicycles in anonymous collection areas at parking spots with higher settlement rates to achieve a balance between supply and demand of bicycles, and control the number of shared bicycles distributed in each anonymous collection area based on the distribution of settlement success rates in the anonymous collection areas of each parking spot;

[0188] 3. Handling of lost bicycles

[0189] Operators regularly inspect the anonymous collection areas at parking spots for lost bicycles in order of settlement failure rate from high to low.

[0190] Therefore, the embodiments of the present application integrate the K-anonymity algorithm and the zero-knowledge range proof protocol to perform shared bicycle operation management, so as to redesign the processes of unlocking, riding, returning, and maintaining shared bicycles, thereby eliminating unnecessary costs in traditional shared bicycle management techniques, while protecting the user's location privacy, and better balancing the interests and maintainability of commercial companies.

[0191] It is understandable to those skilled in the art that in the existing shared bicycle operation model, the user's location information is shared with the shared bicycle operator's server throughout the entire process. However, in actual services, the operator only requires the user to provide the final parking location to verify whether it is within the specified parking spot. Therefore, the full location privacy provided by the user is redundant, which brings unnecessary risks of location privacy leakage.

[0192] Therefore, the embodiments of the present application design a new shared bicycle operation mode to ensure the maintainability and convenience of bicycle management by operators while meeting the user's location privacy protection needs; and the shared bicycle operation mode of the embodiments of the present application is not limited to the field of shared bicycles, but can also be applied to automobile smart parking systems, or work clocking in for staff of sensitive and confidential units, so as to protect the user's location privacy security.

[0193] To sum up, in the new operation model, users do not need to share their location information with the server during the process of finding a bike, unlocking the bike, and riding the bike. When returning a shared bike, the user first aggregates the precise parking spot and at least K-1 nearby parking spots to form an anonymous set of parking spots. For this anonymous set of parking spots, the aforementioned location privacy protection scheme is used to provide the operator with a zero-knowledge range proof so that the operator can determine whether the user's parking spot is within the parking area, and then terminate the riding service for the user, so that the user will not disclose his or her location privacy during riding the shared bike, and the shared bike operator can also conveniently maintain and dispatch the shared bikes in the parking spots.

[0194] According to the shared bicycle operation method based on zero-knowledge range proof proposed in the embodiment of the present application, an anonymous set of parking points corresponding to the full set of parking point information is constructed based on the preset parking point information and anonymity processing strategy; the riding time and parking location of the target shared bicycle are obtained, and based on the parking location, the full set of parking point information, the anonymous set of parking points and the preset zero-knowledge range proof protocol, a zero-knowledge range proof of the target shared bicycle is generated; the zero-knowledge range proof is verified, and a verification result is obtained, so as to calculate the riding fee of the target shared bicycle according to the verification result, thereby improving the scalability in the shared bicycle scenario, enhancing the protection of the privacy of user location information, and at the same time better taking into account the interests and maintainability of commercial companies.

[0195] Secondly, the shared bicycle operation device based on zero-knowledge range proof proposed in accordance with the embodiment of the present application is described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0196] Figure 4 It is a block diagram of a shared bicycle operation device based on zero-knowledge range proof according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0197] like Figure 4 As shown, the shared bicycle operation device 10 based on zero-knowledge range proof includes: a construction module 100, a generation module 200 and a verification module 300.

[0198] The construction module 100 is used to construct an anonymous set of parking spots corresponding to the complete set of parking spot information based on the preset complete set of parking spot information and anonymity processing strategy.

[0199] The generation module 200 is used to obtain the riding time and parking location of the target shared bicycle, and generate a zero-knowledge range proof of the target shared bicycle based on the parking location, the full set of parking point information, the anonymous set of parking points and a preset zero-knowledge range proof protocol.

[0200] The verification module 300 is used to verify the zero-knowledge range proof and obtain the verification result so as to calculate the riding fee of the target shared bicycle according to the verification result.

[0201] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the shared bicycle operation device 10 based on zero-knowledge range proof of the embodiment of the present application also includes: a maintenance module, which is used to determine the low-riding period of the target shared bicycle and perform preset maintenance operations on the target shared bicycle during the low-riding period.

[0202] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the generating module 200 includes: a location information acquiring unit and a recording unit.

[0203] Among them, the location information acquisition unit is used to obtain the location information of the target shared bicycle and generate a bicycle service activation instruction based on the location information.

[0204] The recording unit is used to generate a bicycle order for a target shared bicycle based on a bicycle service start instruction, and to record the riding time of the target shared bicycle according to the bicycle order.

[0205] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the generation module 200 further includes: a judgment unit, an input unit and a reminder unit.

[0206] The judgment unit is used to judge whether the parking position meets the preset parking conditions based on the full set of parking point information.

[0207] The input unit is used to input the parking position and the anonymous set of parking points into the zero-knowledge range proof protocol if the target shared bicycle meets the preset parking conditions, so as to obtain the zero-knowledge range proof corresponding to each parking point in the anonymous set of parking points.

[0208] The reminder unit is used to provide acoustic and / or optical reminders to the target user if the target shared bicycle does not meet the preset parking conditions.

[0209] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the verification module 300 includes: an analysis unit and a calculation unit.

[0210] Among them, the analysis unit is used to verify the zero-knowledge range proof, and when the verification result meets the preset range proof requirements, stop recording the riding time to obtain the final riding time of the target shared bicycle.

[0211] A calculation unit is used to calculate the riding fee according to the final riding time.

[0212] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the shared bicycle operation device 10 based on zero-knowledge range proof of the embodiment of the present application further includes: a latitude and longitude information acquisition module and a privacy protection module.

[0213] Among them, the longitude and latitude information acquisition module is used to obtain the current longitude component information and the current latitude component information of the target shared bicycle before calculating the riding fee of the target shared bicycle according to the verification result.

[0214] The privacy protection module is used to perform zero-knowledge range proof on the current longitude component information and the current latitude component information based on the zero-knowledge range proof protocol, generate a location proof result of the target shared bicycle, and protect the location privacy of the target user according to the location proof result.

[0215] It should be noted that the aforementioned explanation of the embodiment of the shared bicycle operation method based on zero-knowledge range proof is also applicable to the shared bicycle operation device based on zero-knowledge range proof of this embodiment, and will not be repeated here.

[0216] According to the shared bicycle operation device based on zero-knowledge range proof proposed in the embodiment of the present application, it includes a construction module, which is used to construct an anonymous set of parking points corresponding to the full set of parking point information based on preset parking point information and anonymity processing strategy; a generation module, which is used to obtain the riding time and parking position of the target shared bicycle, and generate the zero-knowledge range proof of the target shared bicycle based on the parking position, the full set of parking point information, the anonymous set of parking points and the preset zero-knowledge range proof protocol; a verification module, which is used to verify the zero-knowledge range proof and obtain the verification result, so as to calculate the riding fee of the target shared bicycle according to the verification result, thereby improving the scalability in the shared bicycle scenario, enhancing the protection of the privacy of user location information, and at the same time better taking into account the interests and maintainability of commercial companies.

[0217] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application. The electronic device may include:

[0218] A memory 501 , a processor 502 , and a computer program stored in the memory 501 and executable on the processor 502 .

[0219] When the processor 502 executes the program, the shared bicycle operation method based on zero-knowledge range proof provided in the above embodiment is implemented.

[0220] Furthermore, the electronic device further comprises:

[0221] The communication interface 503 is used for communication between the memory 501 and the processor 502 .

[0222] The memory 501 is used to store computer programs that can be executed on the processor 502 .

[0223] The memory 501 may include a high-speed RAM memory, and may also include a non-volatile memory (non-volatile memory), such as at least one disk memory.

[0224] If the memory 501, the processor 502 and the communication interface 503 are implemented independently, the communication interface 503, the memory 501 and the processor 502 can be connected to each other through a bus and communicate with each other. The bus can be an Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, a Peripheral Component (PCI) bus or an Extended Industry Standard Architecture (EISA) bus. The bus can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. For ease of representation, Figure 5Only one thick line is used in the diagram, but this does not mean that there is only one bus or only one type of bus.

[0225] Optionally, in a specific implementation, if the memory 501, the processor 502 and the communication interface 503 are integrated on a chip, the memory 501, the processor 502 and the communication interface 503 can communicate with each other through an internal interface.

[0226] The processor 502 may be a central processing unit (CPU), or an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits configured to implement the embodiments of the present application.

[0227] An embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored. When the program is executed by a processor, the shared bicycle operation method based on zero-knowledge range proof as described above is implemented.

[0228] In the description of this specification, the description with reference to the terms "one embodiment", "some embodiments", "example", "specific example", or "some examples" etc. means that the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present application. In this specification, the schematic representations of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described may be combined in any one or N embodiments or examples in a suitable manner. In addition, those skilled in the art may combine and combine the different embodiments or examples described in this specification and the features of the different embodiments or examples, without contradiction.

[0229] In addition, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. Therefore, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include at least one of the features. In the description of this application, "N" means at least two, such as two, three, etc., unless otherwise clearly and specifically defined.

[0230] Any process or method description in a flowchart or otherwise described herein may be understood to represent a module, fragment or portion of code comprising one or N executable instructions for implementing the steps of a custom logical function or process, and the scope of the preferred embodiments of the present application includes alternative implementations in which functions may not be performed in the order shown or discussed, including performing functions in a substantially simultaneous manner or in reverse order depending on the functions involved, which should be understood by technicians in the technical field to which the embodiments of the present application belong.

[0231] The logic and / or steps represented in the flowchart or otherwise described herein, for example, can be considered as an ordered list of executable instructions for implementing logical functions, and can be embodied in any computer-readable medium for use by an instruction execution system, device or apparatus (such as a computer-based system, a system including a processor, or other system that can fetch instructions from an instruction execution system, device or apparatus and execute instructions), or in combination with these instruction execution systems, devices or apparatuses. For the purpose of this specification, "computer-readable medium" can be any device that can contain, store, communicate, propagate or transmit a program for use by an instruction execution system, device or apparatus, or in combination with these instruction execution systems, devices or apparatuses. More specific examples of computer-readable media (a non-exhaustive list) include the following: an electrical connection with one or N wirings (electronic devices), a portable computer disk box (magnetic device), a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable and programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), a fiber optic device, and a portable compact disk read-only memory (CDROM). In addition, the computer-readable medium may even be paper or other suitable medium on which the program is printed, since the program may be obtained electronically by optically scanning the paper or other medium and then editing, interpreting or processing in other suitable ways as necessary and then storing it in a computer memory.

[0232] It should be understood that the various parts of the present application can be implemented by hardware, software, firmware or a combination thereof. In the above embodiment, the N steps or methods can be implemented by software or firmware stored in a memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. If implemented by hardware, as in another embodiment, it can be implemented by any one of the following technologies known in the art or their combination: a discrete logic circuit having a logic gate circuit for implementing a logic function for a data signal, a dedicated integrated circuit having a suitable combination of logic gate circuits, a programmable gate array (PGA), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), etc.

[0233] A person skilled in the art may understand that all or part of the steps in the method for implementing the above-mentioned embodiment may be completed by instructing related hardware through a program, and the program may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, which, when executed, includes one or a combination of the steps of the method embodiment.

[0234] In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into a processing module, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one module. The above-mentioned integrated module may be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of a software functional module. If the integrated module is implemented in the form of a software functional module and sold or used as an independent product, it may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium.

[0235] The storage medium mentioned above may be a read-only memory, a magnetic disk or an optical disk, etc. Although the embodiments of the present application have been shown and described above, it can be understood that the above embodiments are exemplary and cannot be understood as limiting the present application. A person of ordinary skill in the art may change, modify, replace and modify the above embodiments within the scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A shared bicycle operation method based on zero-knowledge range proof, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Based on the preset parking point full set information and anonymity processing strategy, construct an anonymous set of parking points corresponding to the parking point full set information; Obtain the riding time and parking location of the target shared bicycle, and determine the longitude and latitude position range corresponding to the target shared bicycle based on the parking location, the full set of parking point information, the anonymous set of parking points and a preset zero-knowledge range proof protocol, so as to generate a zero-knowledge range proof of the target shared bicycle according to the longitude and latitude position range; The target shared bicycle is verified in the anonymous set of parking spots through the zero-knowledge range proof to obtain a verification result, and the riding fee of the target shared bicycle is calculated according to the verification result.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Also includes: Determine a low riding period of the target shared bicycle, and perform a preset maintenance operation on the target shared bicycle during the low riding period.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The step of obtaining the riding time and parking location of the target shared bicycle includes: Acquire the location information of the target shared bicycle, and generate a bicycle service activation instruction according to the location information; Based on the bicycle service start instruction, a bicycle order for the target shared bicycle is generated, and the riding time of the target shared bicycle is recorded according to the bicycle order.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The determining of the longitude and latitude position range corresponding to the target shared bicycle based on the parking position, the full set of parking point information, the anonymous set of parking points and a preset zero-knowledge range proof protocol, so as to generate a zero-knowledge range proof of the target shared bicycle according to the longitude and latitude position range, includes: Based on the parking point full set information, determining whether the parking position meets the preset parking condition; If the target shared bicycle meets the preset parking condition, the parking position and the anonymous set of parking points are input into the zero-knowledge range proof protocol to obtain the zero-knowledge range proof corresponding to each parking point in the anonymous set of parking points; If the target shared bicycle does not meet the preset parking condition, an acoustic and / or optical reminder is given to the target user.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The step of verifying that the target shared bicycle is in the anonymous set of parking spots by using the zero-knowledge range proof to obtain a verification result, and calculating the riding fee of the target shared bicycle according to the verification result, includes: Verify the zero-knowledge range proof, and if the verification result meets the preset range proof requirement, stop recording the riding time to obtain the final riding time of the target shared bicycle; The riding fee is calculated according to the final riding time.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Before calculating the riding fee of the target shared bicycle according to the verification result, the method further includes: Obtaining the current longitude component information and the current latitude component information of the target shared bicycle; Based on the zero-knowledge range proof protocol, a zero-knowledge range proof is performed on the current longitude component information and the current latitude component information to generate a location proof result of the target shared bicycle, so as to protect the location privacy of the target user according to the location proof result.

7. A shared bicycle operation device based on zero-knowledge range proof, characterized in that: include: A construction module, configured to construct an anonymous set of parking spots corresponding to the parking spot full set information based on the preset parking spot full set information and anonymity processing strategy; A generation module is used to obtain the riding time and parking location of the target shared bicycle, and determine the longitude and latitude position range corresponding to the target shared bicycle based on the parking location, the full set of parking point information, the anonymous set of parking points and a preset zero-knowledge range proof protocol, so as to generate a zero-knowledge range proof of the target shared bicycle according to the longitude and latitude position range; A verification module is used to verify that the target shared bicycle is in the anonymous set of parking spots through the zero-knowledge range proof to obtain a verification result, and calculate the riding fee of the target shared bicycle according to the verification result.

8. The device according to claim 7, characterized in that Also includes: The maintenance module is used to determine the low riding period of the target shared bicycle and perform a preset maintenance operation on the target shared bicycle during the low riding period.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: A memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the program to implement the shared bicycle operation method based on zero-knowledge range proof as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: The program is executed by a processor to implement a shared bicycle operation method based on zero-knowledge range proof as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

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