Data transmission method, electronic equipment and computer readable storage medium

By using pseudo-identity information and target session key encryption in the data transmission between electric vehicles and the power grid, the problem of insufficient data transmission security is solved, and higher data transmission security and identity verification is achieved to prevent data leakage.

CN119232473APending Publication Date: 2024-12-31SHENZHEN POWER SUPPLY BUREAU
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411410079.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-10-10
Publication Date
2024-12-31

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The data transmission security of electric vehicles and the power grid is insufficient, and there is a potential risk of attack, leading to data breaches and identity tracking problems.

Method used

By using pseudo-identity information and target session key encryption during data transmission, two-way authentication and data encryption are implemented to ensure the security of data transmission.

Benefits of technology

It effectively reduces the possibility of attackers tracking data transmission, improves the security of data transmission, prevents data leakage, and enhances the security of data transmission between electric vehicles and the power grid.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention relates to a data transmission method, electronic equipment and a computer readable storage medium. The method comprises the following steps: under the condition that target data is generated each time, sending predetermined verification information and a pseudo identity identifier of energy storage equipment to a service node; receiving target verification information of the service node sent by the service node; the target verification information is determined by the service node according to the predetermined verification information and the pseudo identity; determining a target session key according to the target verification information under the condition that the target verification information is adopted and verification of the service node is passed; and encrypting the target data by using the target session key to obtain target encrypted data, and sending the target encrypted data to the service node. By adopting the method, the security of data transmission can be improved.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of data encryption, and in particular to a data transmission method, an electronic device and a computer-readable storage medium. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid growth of electric vehicles, the energy demand for the power grid has become a challenge that cannot be ignored. Although renewable energy such as wind and solar energy is developing rapidly, the instability of energy supply, such as the intermittent nature of wind and the day-night difference of solar energy, indicates the potential risk of energy shortage.

[0003] As an effective way to alleviate the above problems, vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology is gaining widespread attention from academia and industry. V2G technology enables two-way communication and energy exchange between electric vehicles and smart grids, that is, electric vehicles draw power from the grid and store it in batteries when the battery is low, and can also supply power to the grid when the grid demand is peak. This process promotes the two-way flow of data and power, optimizes the efficiency of energy production and distribution, and encourages users to charge during off-peak hours and discharge during peak hours through incentive mechanisms, thus achieving a win-win situation for smart grids and electric vehicles.

[0004] However, given the openness of the communication environment, potential attackers may intercept, tamper with or forge transmitted data, seriously affecting the security of data transmission between electric vehicles and the power grid. Therefore, how to improve the security of data transmission between electric vehicles and the power grid has always been a concern in this field. Summary of the invention

[0005] Based on this, it is necessary to provide a data transmission method, an electronic device and a computer-readable storage medium that can improve the security of data transmission in response to the above technical problems.

[0006] In a first aspect, the present application provides a data transmission method, which is applied to an energy storage device, and the method includes: sending predetermined verification information and a pseudo-identity of the energy storage device to a service node each time target data is generated; receiving target verification information of the service node sent by the service node; the target verification information is determined by the service node based on the predetermined verification information and the pseudo-identity; when the service node is verified by using the target verification information, determining a target session key based on the target verification information; encrypting the target data using the target session key to obtain target encrypted data, and sending the target encrypted data to the service node.

[0007] In one of the embodiments, each time the target data is generated, the method further includes: determining predetermined verification information based on the target verification value stored in the energy storage device; when the target verification information is used and the service node is verified, the method further includes: updating the target verification value and the pseudo-identity according to the target verification information.

[0008] In one of the embodiments, each time target data is generated, before sending predetermined verification information and a pseudo-identity to a service node, the method further includes: sending a real identity of an energy storage device to the service node; receiving a designated verification value and a pseudo-identity sent by the service node; the designated verification value is determined based on the real identity of the energy storage device, and the pseudo-identity is generated by the service node; a target verification value is determined based on the designated verification value; wherein the target verification value is used to determine the predetermined verification information.

[0009] In one of the embodiments, the method further includes: sending a pseudo-identity to a service node in response to a password modification request; receiving designated verification information of the service node sent by the service node; wherein the designated verification information is determined based on the pseudo-identity; in the case where the service node is verified according to the designated verification information, obtaining updated password information; and updating the pseudo-identity and a target verification value for determining predetermined verification information based on the designated verification information and the updated password information.

[0010] In a second aspect, the present application also provides a data transmission method, which is applied to a service node, and the method includes: receiving predetermined verification information and a pseudo-identity sent by an energy storage device; when the energy storage device is verified by using the predetermined verification information, determining the target verification information of the service node according to the predetermined verification information and the pseudo-identity; sending the target verification information to the energy storage device; wherein the target verification information is used by the energy storage device to encrypt the generated target data to obtain target encrypted data; determining the target session key according to the target verification information; receiving the target encrypted data sent by the energy storage device, and decrypting the target encrypted data according to the target session key.

[0011] In one of the embodiments, before receiving the predetermined verification information and pseudo-identity sent by the energy storage device, the method also includes: receiving the real identity of the energy storage device sent by the energy storage device; determining a designated verification value based on the real identity of the energy storage device; sending the designated verification value and the generated pseudo-identity to the energy storage device; wherein the designated verification value is used by the energy storage device to determine the predetermined verification information.

[0012] In one of the embodiments, the method also includes: receiving a pseudo-identity of the energy storage device sent by the energy storage device; determining designated verification information of the service node based on the pseudo-identity of the energy storage device; sending the designated verification information to the energy storage device; using the designated verification information for the energy storage device to verify the service node, and updating the pseudo-identity and a target verification value for determining the predetermined verification information.

[0013] In a third aspect, the present application also provides a data transmission method, which is applied to a charging station, and the method includes: receiving predetermined verification information and a pseudo-identity identifier of an energy storage device sent by the energy storage device, and sending the predetermined verification information, the pseudo-identity identifier and the preset verification information of the charging station to the service node; receiving specific verification information of the service node sent by the service node; wherein the specific verification information is determined based on the predetermined verification information, the pseudo-identity identifier and the preset verification information; when the service node is verified according to a part of the verification information in the specific verification information, determining a designated session key based on a part of the verification information; sending target verification information to the energy storage device; wherein the target verification information is another part of the verification information in the specific verification information, and the target verification information is used by the energy storage device to encrypt the generated target data to obtain target encrypted data; using the designated session key to encrypt the designated data obtained by the charging station, or to encrypt the target encrypted data sent by the energy storage device to obtain designated encrypted data, and send the designated encrypted data to the service node.

[0014] In a fourth aspect, the present application further provides an electronic device, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor implements the steps of any of the above methods when executing the computer program.

[0015] In a fifth aspect, the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of any of the above methods are implemented.

[0016] In the above-mentioned data transmission method, electronic device and computer-readable storage medium, since the energy storage device sends pseudo-identity information to the service node, the energy storage device can hide the real identity information, and the attacker cannot associate the pseudo-identity information with the actual energy storage device, thereby reducing the possibility of being tracked by the attacker and improving the security of data transmission; the energy storage device and the service node will send their own verification information when communicating, so that the energy storage device and the service node will perform two-way identity authentication before communication, and data transmission can be performed only after two-way identity authentication, thereby further improving the security of data transmission; in addition, the energy storage device uses the target session key to encrypt the target data, so that even if the target data is intercepted by the attacker during the transmission process, the attacker cannot directly obtain the original target data, thereby effectively preventing data leakage and further improving the security of data transmission. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0017] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application or related technologies, the drawings required for use in the embodiments of the present application or related technical descriptions will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other related drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0018] FIG1 is an application environment diagram of a data transmission method according to an embodiment;

[0019] FIG2 is a schematic flow chart of a data transmission method provided by the first embodiment;

[0020] FIG3 is a schematic flow chart of a data transmission method provided by the second embodiment;

[0021] FIG4 is a schematic diagram of a flow chart of a method for registering an energy storage device provided by an embodiment;

[0022] FIG5 is a schematic flow chart of a method for modifying a password of an energy storage device provided by an embodiment;

[0023] FIG6 is a schematic diagram showing a comparison of time overheads provided by an embodiment;

[0024] FIG7 is a schematic diagram showing a comparison of communication overheads provided by an embodiment;

[0025] FIG8 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device provided in the first embodiment;

[0026] FIG9 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device provided in the second embodiment;

[0027] FIG10 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device provided in the third embodiment;

[0028] FIG. 11 is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided by an embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0029] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present application more clearly understood, the present application is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present application and are not used to limit the present application.

[0030] The data transmission method provided in the embodiment of the present application can be applied in the application environment shown in Figure 1. Among them, the energy storage device can communicate directly with the service node, or the energy storage device can communicate with the service node through the charging station. Among them, when the energy storage device communicates with the service node through the charging station, the energy storage device needs to be connected to the charging station through a charging gun.

[0031] Energy storage devices may include, but are not limited to, a combination of one or more of the following: vehicles, ships, aircraft, mobile phones, tablets, laptops, electric toys, electric tools, battery cars, electric cars, ships, spacecraft, etc. In some embodiments, vehicles may include fuel vehicles, gas vehicles, or new energy vehicles, and new energy vehicles may be pure electric vehicles, hybrid vehicles, or extended-range vehicles, etc. In some embodiments, electric toys may include fixed or mobile electric toys, such as game consoles, electric car toys, electric ship toys, and electric airplane toys, etc. In some embodiments, spacecraft may include airplanes, rockets, space shuttles, and spacecraft, etc.

[0032] In some embodiments, the charging station may be replaced by a charging pile. In some embodiments, the service node may include an Energy Service Provider (ESP) node.

[0033] FIG. 2 is a flow chart of a data transmission method provided by the first embodiment. As shown in FIG. 2 , the method includes:

[0034] S201. Each time the energy storage device generates target data, the energy storage device sends predetermined verification information and a pseudo identity identifier of the energy storage device to the service node. Correspondingly, the service node receives the predetermined verification information and the pseudo identity identifier sent by the energy storage device.

[0035] The target data is information that the energy storage device needs to transmit to the service node. In some embodiments, the target data may include payment data or parameter information of the energy storage device. Exemplarily, the parameter information of the energy storage device may include at least one of the remaining power, charged power, consumed power, battery temperature information, and battery voltage information of the energy storage device.

[0036] The predetermined verification information and pseudo-identity are the predetermined verification information and pseudo-identity currently maintained by the energy storage device. In some embodiments, the energy storage device generates target data for the i-th time and sends the predetermined verification information and pseudo-identity currently maintained by the energy storage device to the service node. The currently maintained predetermined verification information and pseudo-identity are updated as i changes, that is, for different i, the corresponding predetermined verification information and pseudo-identity are different. Wherein, i is an integer greater than or equal to 1.

[0037] In some embodiments, the pseudo identity may be maintained by the energy storage device. In some embodiments, the predetermined verification information may be determined based on a target verification value maintained by the energy storage device. In other embodiments, the predetermined verification information may be maintained by the energy storage device.

[0038] S202: When the service node uses the predetermined verification information and verifies the energy storage device successfully, the service node determines the target verification information of the service node according to the predetermined verification information and the pseudo identity.

[0039] The energy storage device may be verified by using predetermined verification information in a variety of ways, which are not limited in the embodiments of the present application. Exemplarily, the predetermined verification information includes a first value and a second value, and the real identity of the energy storage device is determined based on the first value, and a third value is determined based on the real identity. If the third value is the same as the second value, the energy storage device is verified. Another exemplary method is that the predetermined verification information includes a first value, and the real identity of the energy storage device is determined based on the first value. If the determined real identity of the energy storage device is the same as the real identity of the energy storage device pre-stored by the service node, the energy storage device is verified.

[0040] Determining the target verification information of the service node based on the predetermined verification information and the pseudo-identity can be achieved in a variety of ways, and the embodiments of the present application are not limited to this. Exemplarily, the predetermined verification information includes a first value, and the real identity of the energy storage device is determined based on the first value. According to the real identity and the pseudo-identity of the energy storage device, the target verification information of the service node is determined. Another exemplary method is to generate a new pseudo-identity for the energy storage device, and determine the target verification information of the service node based on the pseudo-identity and the new pseudo-identity.

[0041] S203. The service node sends target verification information to the energy storage device; correspondingly, the energy storage device receives the target verification information of the service node sent by the service node.

[0042] The target verification information is determined by the service node according to the predetermined verification information and the pseudo-identity identifier. The target verification information is used by the energy storage device to encrypt the generated target data to obtain the target encrypted data.

[0043] S204: The service node determines a target session key according to the target verification information.

[0044] S205: When the energy storage device uses the target verification information and verifies the service node successfully, the energy storage device determines the target session key according to the target verification information.

[0045] Using the target verification information to verify the service node can be achieved in a variety of ways, and the embodiments of the present application are not limited to this. Exemplarily, the target verification information includes a fourth value and a fifth value, the target session key is determined according to the fourth value, the sixth value is determined according to the target session key, and when the sixth value is consistent with the fourth value, the service node is verified. Another exemplary method is that the target verification information includes a fourth value and a fifth value, a new pseudo-identity is determined according to the fourth value, the sixth value is determined according to the new pseudo-identity, and when the sixth value is consistent with the fourth value, the service node is verified.

[0046] The service node may determine the target session key in the same manner as the energy storage device determines the target session key. Determining the target session key based on the target verification information may be implemented in a variety of ways, and the embodiments of the present application are not limited thereto. Exemplarily, the target verification information includes a fourth value, and the target session key is determined based on the fourth value. Also exemplarily, the target verification information includes a fourth value, and a new pseudo-identity is determined based on the fourth value, and the target session key is determined based on the new pseudo-identity.

[0047] S206. The energy storage device uses the target session key to encrypt the target data to obtain target encrypted data.

[0048] Exemplarily, the encryption method may be a symmetric encryption method. In other embodiments, the encryption method may be a key hash encryption method, an asymmetric encryption method, or a digital signature encryption method.

[0049] S207: The energy storage device sends the target encrypted data to the service node, and correspondingly, the service node receives the target encrypted data sent by the energy storage device.

[0050] S208: The service node decrypts the target encrypted data according to the target session key.

[0051] In the embodiment of the present application, since the energy storage device sends pseudo-identity information to the service node, the energy storage device can hide the real identity information, and the attacker cannot associate the pseudo-identity information with the actual energy storage device, thereby reducing the possibility of being tracked by the attacker and improving the security of data transmission; the energy storage device and the service node will send their own verification information when communicating, so that the energy storage device and the service node will perform two-way identity authentication before communication, and data transmission can be performed only after two-way identity authentication, thereby further improving the security of data transmission; in addition, the energy storage device uses the target session key to encrypt the target data, so that even if the target data is intercepted by the attacker during the transmission process, the attacker cannot directly obtain the original target data, thereby effectively preventing data leakage and further improving the security of data transmission.

[0052] The communication between the energy storage device and the service node in FIG2 may be performed through the charging station, or may be performed directly through the network without passing through the charging station. When the energy storage device and the service node communicate through the charging station, the service node may also perform a verification operation on the charging station and the charging station may also perform a verification operation on the service node. FIG3 is a flow chart of a data transmission method provided in the second embodiment. As shown in FIG3, the method includes:

[0053] S301. Each time the energy storage device generates target data, the energy storage device sends predetermined verification information and a pseudo identity identifier of the energy storage device to the charging station. Correspondingly, the charging station receives the predetermined verification information and the pseudo identity identifier of the energy storage device sent by the energy storage device.

[0054] S302: The charging station sends predetermined verification information, a pseudo identity, and preset verification information of the charging station to the service node.

[0055] In some possible embodiments, the preset verification information of the charging station may be determined by the charging station according to the real identity of the charging station. In other embodiments, the preset verification information of the charging station may be information maintained by the charging station.

[0056] S303: The service node determines specific verification information of the service node according to the predetermined verification information, the pseudo identity identifier and the preset verification information.

[0057] Determining the specific verification information of the service node based on the predetermined verification information, the pseudo-identity and the preset verification information can be implemented in a variety of ways, and the embodiments of the present application are not limited to this. Exemplarily, the real identity of the energy storage device is determined according to the predetermined verification information, and the specific verification information of the service node is determined according to the real identity of the energy storage device, the pseudo-identity and the preset verification information. Another exemplary method is to determine the key of the charging station according to the preset verification information, and determine the specific verification information of the service node according to the predetermined verification information, the pseudo-identity and the key of the charging station.

[0058] S304. The service node sends specific verification information of the service node to the charging station. Correspondingly, the charging station receives the specific verification information of the service node sent by the service node.

[0059] S305: When the charging station successfully authenticates the service node based on a portion of the authentication information in the specific authentication information, the charging station determines a designated session key based on the portion of the authentication information.

[0060] Verifying the service node based on a portion of the verification information in the specific verification information can be achieved in a variety of ways, and the embodiments of the present application are not limited to this. Exemplarily, a portion of the verification information includes a seventh value and an eighth value, a designated session key is determined based on the seventh value, a ninth value is determined based on the designated session key, and when the ninth value is the same as the eighth value, the energy storage device is verified.

[0061] Determining the designated session key based on a portion of the verification information can be implemented in a variety of ways, and the embodiments of the present application are not limited to this. Exemplarily, a portion of the verification information includes a seventh value, and the designated session key is determined based on the seventh value. Another exemplary embodiment is that a portion of the verification information includes the seventh value, and the designated session key is determined based on the seventh value and the key of the charging station.

[0062] S306. The charging station sends target verification information to the energy storage device; the target verification information is another part of the verification information in the specific verification information; correspondingly, the energy storage device receives the target verification information sent by the charging station.

[0063] The target verification information is used by the energy storage device to encrypt the generated target data to obtain target encrypted data.

[0064] S307: When the energy storage device uses the target verification information and verifies the service node successfully, it determines the target session key according to the target verification information.

[0065] In some possible embodiments, after S307 , S308 - S313 may be executed.

[0066] S308. The energy storage device uses the target session key to encrypt the target data to obtain target encrypted data.

[0067] S309: The energy storage device sends the target encrypted data to the charging station, and correspondingly, the charging station receives the target encrypted data sent by the energy storage device.

[0068] S310. The charging station uses a designated session key to encrypt target encrypted data sent by the energy storage device to obtain designated encrypted data.

[0069] S311. The charging station sends designated encrypted data to the service node. Correspondingly, the service node receives the designated encrypted data sent by the charging station.

[0070] S312: The service node determines a designated session key based on a portion of the verification information, and determines a target session key based on the target verification information.

[0071] S313: The service node uses the specified session key and the target session key to decrypt the specified encrypted data.

[0072] In some other possible embodiments, after S307, S308-S313 may not be executed, but the following steps are executed: the charging station obtains specified data; the charging station uses a specified session key to encrypt the specified data obtained by the charging station to obtain specified encrypted data; the charging station sends the specified encrypted data to the service node, and correspondingly, the service node receives the specified encrypted data sent by the charging station; the service node determines the specified session key based on a part of the verification information; the service node uses the specified session key to decrypt the specified encrypted data.

[0073] In some possible embodiments, the designated data is data generated by the charging station. For example, the charging station generates data based on the user scanning identification information (such as a QR code, etc.) through a mobile device. In other possible embodiments, the designated data is target data. For example, the charging station determines the target session key based on the target verification information, receives the target encrypted data sent by the energy storage device, and uses the target session key to decrypt the target encrypted data to obtain the target data.

[0074] In an embodiment of the present application, when the energy storage device communicates with the service node through the charging station, the service node can also perform verification operations on the charging station and the charging station can also perform verification operations on the service node, thereby further improving the security of data transmission.

[0075] In some embodiments, each time the target data is generated, the method further includes: determining predetermined verification information according to the target verification value stored in the energy storage device.

[0076] In some embodiments, when the service node is authenticated by using the target authentication information, the method further includes: updating the target authentication value and the pseudo identity identifier according to the target authentication information.

[0077] In an embodiment of the present application, each time the target data is generated, the target verification value and the pseudo-identity are updated once, so that the target data generated by the energy storage device at different times have different predetermined verification information and pseudo-identity sent to the service node, and thus before the target data is transmitted at different times, the verification information provided is different, and the determined session key is also different, which increases the difficulty of data cracking and improves the security of data transmission. In addition, even if a session key is leaked, it will not affect the security of the next data transmission, further improving the security of data transmission.

[0078] FIG4 is a flow chart of a method for registering an energy storage device provided by an embodiment. As shown in FIG4 , the steps of the method for registering an energy storage device are steps before S201 or S301. In the method for registering an energy storage device, the energy storage device and the service node do not need to communicate through a charging station. Exemplarily, the energy storage device can communicate with the service node through a wireless communication network (such as a cellular network), or the energy storage device can communicate with the service node through a registration center (such as a device in an ESP center connected to an ESP node). The method includes:

[0079] S401. The energy storage device sends a real identity identifier of the energy storage device to a service node. Correspondingly, the service node receives the real identity identifier of the energy storage device sent by the energy storage device.

[0080] S402: The service node determines a designated verification value according to the real identity identifier of the energy storage device.

[0081] S403. The service node sends a designated verification value and a generated pseudo identity to the energy storage device. Correspondingly, the energy storage device receives the designated verification value and pseudo identity sent by the service node.

[0082] The designated verification value is used by the energy storage device to determine predetermined verification information.

[0083] The designated verification value is determined according to the real identity of the energy storage device, and the pseudo identity is generated by the service node.

[0084] S404. The energy storage device determines a target verification value according to the specified verification value; wherein the target verification value is used to determine predetermined verification information.

[0085] FIG5 is a flowchart of a method for modifying the password of an energy storage device provided by an embodiment. As shown in FIG5 , the method for modifying the password of an energy storage device may be performed before the steps of the embodiment corresponding to FIG2 or FIG3 , or may be performed after the steps of the embodiment corresponding to FIG2 or FIG3 , or may be performed after S403. In the method for modifying the password of an energy storage device, the energy storage device and the service node do not need to communicate through a charging station. Exemplarily, the energy storage device may communicate with the service node through a wireless communication network (such as a cellular network), or the energy storage device may communicate with the service node through a registration center (such as a device in an ESP center connected to an ESP node). The method includes:

[0086] S501. In response to a password modification request, the energy storage device sends a pseudo identity to a service node. Correspondingly, the service node receives the pseudo identity of the energy storage device sent by the energy storage device.

[0087] Exemplarily, the energy storage device may include a display module, and the user may trigger an application in the display module to generate a password modification request. Also exemplary, the energy storage device may receive a password modification request sent by other devices.

[0088] S502: The service node determines designated verification information of the service node according to the pseudo-identity identifier of the energy storage device.

[0089] S503. The service node sends designated verification information to the energy storage device; correspondingly, the energy storage device receives the designated verification information of the service node sent by the service node.

[0090] The specified verification information is determined based on the pseudo identity identifier.

[0091] The specified verification information is used for the energy storage device verification service node, and the pseudo identity is updated and the target verification value is used to determine the predetermined verification information.

[0092] S504: When the energy storage device successfully verifies the service node according to the specified verification information, the energy storage device obtains updated password information.

[0093] S505: The energy storage device updates the pseudo identity and the target verification value used to determine the predetermined verification information according to the designated verification information and the updated password information.

[0094] The following takes the energy storage device as an electric vehicle (EV) and the service node as an ESP node (ESP node may be referred to as ESP for short) as an example to illustrate the embodiment of the present application:

[0095] Researchers have conducted extensive explorations in the security of data transmission between electric vehicles and the grid (V2G). However, despite the proposal of a variety of protection schemes, there are still risks of data privacy leakage and identity tracking. For example, the temporary data of EV is transmitted in plain text, and a pseudo-identity is used but lacks dynamicity, allowing attackers to easily track EVs and obtain their data. Later, it was proposed to use the Diffie-Hellman construction to hide some data, but the plaintext transmission of EV identities and public keys still leaves security risks. In other words, the current V2G data transmission still needs to be further improved and optimized in terms of protecting data privacy, identity anonymity, and resisting various attacks. In particular, strengthening the dynamic nature of session keys and the reliability of identity authentication are issues that need to be addressed urgently.

[0096] The flow of data and power between electric vehicles (EVs) and smart grids can be bidirectional, and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology plays a key role in this scenario. In response to security issues in V2G networks, the present application embodiment proposes a secure authentication and key agreement (AKA) scheme for V2G networks, which combines electric vehicle anonymity and physical unclonable functions (PUF).

[0097] For example, a V2G network security anonymous authentication key negotiation method based on a physical unclonable function PUF can be provided, and the scheme involves three key participants: an electric vehicle, a charging station, and an electric service provider (ESP). Including step 3, or including steps 1-3, or including steps 1-4:

[0098] Step 1: System initialization. Before forming a V2G security network, the power service provider (ESP) needs to select a random number S ESP as its private key, and set its identity to ID ESP , a hash function H(.) needs to be selected and a PUF mechanism is installed on all CS and EV. In some possible embodiments, the random number S ESP The selection methods include: generation by hardware random number generators based on thermodynamic noise or photoelectric effect, or generation by nonlinear data generation methods in pure computer systems, such as hashing pseudo-random numbers.

[0099] Step 2: Registration. During the registration process, the electric vehicle and / or charging station needs to be registered with the Electricity Service Provider (ESP). To ensure the secure transmission of information, all parties communicate through a secure channel.

[0100] The registration method of charging station is as follows: Charging station CS j First confirm your ID j (i.e. the real identity of the charging station) and generates a challenge-response pair (chl j ,res j ), this response is through the PUF function according to chl j Generate.CS j Its ID j and the response res j After receiving this information, ESP will use the ID j , ESP's own identity and private key, and the response res j Calculate and generate a key K j ESP will CSj The identity and response res j Stored in the database, with the key K j Return to CS j CS j After receiving the key, it will be combined with its own identity and chl j In some possible embodiments, chl j The generation methods include: generation by hardware random number generators based on thermodynamic noise or photoelectric effect, or generation by nonlinear data generation methods in pure computer systems, such as hashing pseudo-random numbers.

[0101] The method of electric vehicle registration is as follows: Electric Vehicle EV i First, choose a random number r0 and set your own identity ID i (i.e. the real identity of the energy storage device) and password PW i The user uses the random number r0 and the password PW i Generate a hash value HPW i At the same time, EV i A challenge-response pair (chl i ,res i ).EV i Its ID i 、Response res i and hash value HPW i Send to ESP. ESP is EV i Assign a pseudo identity PID i , and through EV i The identity, response, ESP private key and other information generate two values ​​​​V a and V2 (V a and V2 are designated verification values). ESP will i The identity and response res i ) is stored in the database, and V a and V2 returns to EV i EV i After receiving these two values, it will use its own password and random number r0 to perform further calculations to obtain a value V1, and then r0, chl i , V1, V2 and pseudo identity PID i Save them together. In this way, EV i The registration on ESP is completed. V1 and V2 are the target verification values, PID iIn some possible embodiments, the random number (e.g., any one or more of r0 to r5) is generated by a hardware random number generator based on thermodynamic noise or photoelectric effect, or by a nonlinear data generation method in a pure computer system, such as obtaining a hash value for a pseudo-random number.

[0102] Step 3: Identity verification. i When charging or discharging is needed, the user will drive it to the nearest charging station CS j , only after completing identity authentication can subsequent encrypted communication be carried out. The specific steps are B1-B5:

[0103] Step B1: Get an identity ID i and password PW i Electric Vehicles (EV) i Generate a random number r1 and a timestamp t1. EV i Using its internal PUF function and a specific challenge chl i Generate a response res i Since then, EV i The above target verification values ​​(V1, V2), password, random number and timestamp are used to calculate and generate a set of values ​​(A1, A2, A3, A4) for identity authentication, where A1, A2, A3, A4 are the predetermined verification information of the energy storage device. i will contain these values, the pseudo-identity PID i The message M1 with the timestamp is sent to the charging station CS j In some possible embodiments, chl i The generation methods include: generation by hardware random number generators based on thermodynamic noise or photoelectric effect, or generation by nonlinear data generation methods in pure computer systems, such as hashing pseudo-random numbers.

[0104] Step B2: Charging Station CS j After receiving the message M1, the validity of the timestamp t1 is checked first. If the timestamp is valid, CS j It will generate its own random number r2 and use its own private key K j The response res2 is used to calculate and generate B1 and B2 for identity authentication. B1 and B2 are preset authentication information of the charging station. j Send the original message M1 together with your own identity ID j , B1, B2 and timestamp t1 are encapsulated into a new message M2 and sent to ESP.

[0105] Step B3: After receiving the message M2, ESP first checks the validity of the timestamp t1. ESP uses its private key sESP The ESP will then generate a new pseudo-identity PID. new_i , random number r3 and timestamp t2, and calculates and generates multiple values ​​C1, C2, ..., C8 for session keys and identity authentication. C1, C2, ..., C8 are specific authentication information of the service node. ESP sends a message M3 containing these values ​​to the charging station CS j In some possible embodiments, PID new_i The generation methods include: generation by hardware random number generators based on thermodynamic noise or photoelectric effect, or generation by nonlinear data generation methods in pure computer systems, such as hashing pseudo-random numbers.

[0106] Step B4: Charging Station CS j After receiving the message M3, check the validity of the timestamp t2. Use part of the received information to verify the message and its own private key K j , C.S. j Calculate a session key sk CSj , and verify its correctness. If the session key verification succeeds, CS j The session key is confirmed, and the other part of the verification information (excluding the session key itself, that is, the target verification information of the service node) is encapsulated into a new message M4 and sent to the electric vehicle EV. i .

[0107] Step B5: Electric Vehicle EV i After receiving message M4, check the validity of timestamp t2. Using the received information and the previously stored information, EV i Calculate the session key sk EVi ,sk EVi The target session key is used and its correctness is verified. If the session key verification succeeds (i.e., the ESP verification succeeds), EV i It will accept the session key as the key for subsequent communications and update its pseudo-identity and target verification values.

[0108] In summary, electric vehicles EV i 、Charging Station CS j A secure session is established between the battery and the edge server ESP, which enables encrypted communication during subsequent charging or discharging processes.

[0109] Step 4: User changes password. If a user needs to change the password, the user first needs to enter the ID i and PW i , through EV iCommunicate with ESP and authenticate to generate a new security identifier. The specific steps are as follows:

[0110] Step C1: Equipment EV i First generate a random number r4 and a new challenge chl new_i , and records the current timestamp t3. After that, EV i It needs to be based on the physical unclonable function (PUF) and the original challenge chl i Generate response res i , using PUF and new challenge chl new_i Generate a new response res new_i Through a series of encryption and hash operations, combined with EV i The private key PW i , random number r4, device identifier PID i , timestamp t3, etc., to generate multiple encrypted data blocks D1, D2, D3, D4, D5. Finally, the encrypted data blocks D2, D3, D4, D5, and the device identifier PID i The message M5 with the timestamp t3 is sent to ESP. In some possible embodiments, chl new_i The generation methods include: generation by hardware random number generators based on thermodynamic noise or photoelectric effect, or generation by nonlinear data generation methods in pure computer systems, such as hashing pseudo-random numbers.

[0111] Step C2: When ESP receives the signal from V i When sending message M5, ESP needs to first check the validity of timestamp t3 to ensure that the message is not outdated. After that, ESP will use its own private key s SEP and the encrypted data block in the message to decrypt and verify the information. It does this by calculating the original random number r4 and the device identifier ID i . Use r4 and ID i , ESP finds the corresponding response res i , and verify the new response res new_i ESP checks the encrypted verification data D5 to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the message. If all verifications pass, ESP selects a new device identifier PID new_i And a new timestamp t4. ESP generates a series of new encrypted data blocks D7, D8, D9, D 10 ,D 11 ,D 12 These blocks contain the new identifier, response, and other necessary authentication information. Finally, ESP will update its internal records and will include the new encrypted data block D9,D 10 ,D 11 ,D12 ,PID new_i Message M6 with timestamp t4 is sent to EV i Among them, D9,D 10 ,D 11 ,D 12 Specifies the authentication information for the service node.

[0112] Step C3: When EV i When receiving the response message M6 from ESP, EV i First, check the validity of timestamp t4 to prevent replay attacks. i Calculation is required to verify the authenticity of the received message. i Use the previously generated random number r4 and other known information to decrypt and verify the encrypted data block D9 in the message M6. 10 ,D 11 ,D 12 By calculation, EV i Verify PID new_i Is it valid (i.e., the ESP verification is passed) and check the encrypted verification data D 12 To ensure the integrity and authenticity of the message. If all verifications are successful, EV i Will accept new password PW new_i , and perform corresponding updates on internal records.

[0113] The following is a further description of the embodiments of the present application:

[0114] In the embodiment of the present application, in order to ensure that the communication is simple and representative, the system involves three key participants: electric vehicles, charging stations, and power service providers (ESP). Initially, EV and CS register on the ESP platform before starting regular operations. For example, Figure 1 is an application environment diagram of the data transmission method in one embodiment. As shown in Figure 1, the dotted arrows represent data transmission in the registration phase, while the solid arrows represent the identity authentication and password change phase. After registration, when the electric vehicle needs to be charged or discharged, the user drives it to the nearest charging station. The identity authentication request is then sent from the EV to the ESP through the CS. After both the EV and the CS are successfully authenticated, the EV and the CS will also authenticate the ESP to establish a shared session. In addition, if the EV user wants to change the password, they must contact the ESP, authenticate the EV through the ESP, and update the relevant information stored on the EV. The registration phase is carried out through a secure channel, while the subsequent phases are carried out through a public channel. The key links such as initialization, registration, authentication, and password change involved in the embodiment of the present application are described below, as follows:

[0115] Step 1: Initialization. When the system starts running, ESP selects a random number S ESPas its key, and set its identity to ID ESP . Install PUF mechanism on all CS and EV.

[0116] Step 2: Charging station registration and electric vehicle registration.

[0117] Charging Station CS j Select its ID j and the challenge-response pair constructed by PUF (chl j ,res j =PUF(chl j )). Then CS j Send(ID j ,res j ) to ESP. ESP calculates K j =H(ID j ||ID ESP ||s ESP ||res j ), (ID j ,res j ) is stored in its database and K j Return to CS j CS j Storage (ID j , chl j , K j ).

[0118] In any embodiment of the present application, || represents a logical operator (or). In other embodiments of the present application, the logical or operator in any place of the present application is replaced by other operators, for example, a logical and operator (&&) or a logical negation operator (!).

[0119] EV i The user selects a random number r0, his identity and password pair (ID i ,PW i ), where HPW i =H(r0||PW i ) and the challenge response pair (chl i ,res i =PUF(chl i )). Then EV i (ID i ,res i ,HPW i ) is sent to ESP. ESP selects a pseudo identity PID i , calculate V a =H(ID i ||res i ||s ESP) and V2=H(PID i ||s ESP )⊕HPW i , (ID i ,res i ) into the database and (V a ,V2) returns to EV i EV i After receiving the information, calculate V1=V a ⊕H(PW i ||r0) and store (r0,chl i ,V1,V2,PID i ).

[0120] In any embodiment of the present application, the ⊕ symbol represents an exclusive-OR operation.

[0121] Step 3: Authentication. When EV i When charging or discharging is needed, the user drives the vehicle to the nearest charging station CS j The following steps need to be completed:

[0122] 1. The user enters the corresponding identity and password information (ID i , PW i ). Select random number r1 and timestamp t1, calculate A1=V1⊕H(PW i ||r0), res1=PUF(chl i ), A2=V2⊕r1⊕H(r0||PW i ), A3=H(r1)⊕ID i And A4=H(ID i ||A1||r1||t1) then send message M1={A2,A3,A4,PID i ,t1} to CS j .

[0123] 2. CS j After receiving M1, the validity of t1 is checked first. If the message is valid, CS j Select a random number r2. Then calculate res2=PUF(chl j )、B1=H(K j )⊕r2 and B2=H(ID j ||K j ||res2||r2||t1). Finally CS j Send message M2={M1,ID j ,B1,B2,t1}.

[0124] In some possible embodiments, the method for verifying the validity of the verification timestamp t (e.g., at least one of t1 to t4) includes: determining whether the time difference between the current moment t’ and the timestamp t in the received message is lower than a preset threshold Δt, that is, whether |t’ - t| < Δt is satisfied. If it is satisfied, the timestamp is valid; if not, the timestamp is invalid.

[0125] 3. ESP first checks whether t1 is valid. If it is valid, then calculate C1 = H(PID i ||s ESP ), r1 = A2 ⊕ C1 and ID i = A3 ⊕ H(r1). ESP finds (res i , ID j ) according to (ID i , ID j ) and checks whether the equation A4 = H(ID i ||H(ID i ||res i ||s ESP )||r1||t1) holds. Then ESP calculates K j = H(ID j ||ID ESP ||s ESP ||res j ), r2 = B1 ⊕ H(K j ) and checks whether the equation B2 = H(ID j ||K j ||res j ||r2||t1) holds. If the above checks pass, ESP selects PID new_i , a random number r3 and a timestamp t2. Then calculate C2 = H(PID new_i ||s ESP ), C3 = C1 ⊕ H(r1||ID i ) ⊕ C2, sk ESP = H(r1||r2||ID i ||ID j ||res i ||res j ), C4 = C2 ⊕ H(ID i ||r1) ⊕ PID new_i , C5 = H(r1||ID i ||PID new_i ||PID i ) ⊕ sk ESP , C6 = H(PID new_i ||C2||sk ESP ||Id i||r1||t2), C7=H(K j ||res2)⊕sk ESP ,C8=H(sk ESP ||ID j ||r2||t2). Finally, ESP sends a j Send message M3={C3,C4,C5,C6,C7,C8,t2}.

[0126] 4. CS j Check the validity of timestamp t2 and calculate sk CSj =C7⊕H(K j ), and check whether C8=H(sk CSj ||ID j ||r2||t2). If the verification succeeds, CS j Accept sk CSj As the session key, M4={C3,C4,C5,C6,t2} is sent to EV i .

[0127] 5. EV i Check the validity of timestamp t2 and calculate A5=C3⊕V2⊕H(r1||ID i ), PID new_i =C4⊕A5⊕H(ID i ||r1),sk EVi =C5⊕H(r1||ID i )||PID new_i ||PID i ) and check C6=H(PID new_i ||A5||sk EVi ||ID i ||r1||t2). If yes, EV i Accept sk EVi As the session key, and (A5, PID new_i )Update(V2,PID i ).

[0128] Step 4: Password Change. If the user wants to change the password, they can do so through EV i Communicate with ESP. First, the user should enter the ID i and PW i , the following steps will be completed:

[0129] 1. EV i Select random number r4, challenge chl new_i and timestamp t3. Then calculate D1=V1⊕H(PW i ||r0),resi =PUF(chl i ),res new_i =PUF(chl new_i ),D2 = V2 ⊕ r4,D3 = H(r4||PID i ) ⊕ ID i ,D4 = H(r4||res i ||ID i ) ⊕ res new_i , and D5 = H(ID i ||D2||r4||res new_i ||t3). EV i Send the message M5 = {D2, D3, D4, D5, PID i , t3} to ESP.

[0130] 2. After ESP receives M5, check the validity of t3. Then calculate D6 = H(PID i ||s SEP ), r4 = D2 ⊕ D6, and ID i = D3 ⊕ H(r4||PID i ). ESP finds res i according to ID i , and calculate res new_i = D4 ⊕ H(r4||res i ||ID i ), and check whether the equation D5 = H(ID i ||D6||r4||res new_i ||t3) holds. If the check passes, ESP selects PID new_i and t4, calculate D7 = H(ID i ||res new_i ||s ESP ), D8 = H(PID new_i ||s ESP ), D9 = H(PIDi||r4||resi)||res new_i ) ⊕ D7, D 10 = H(r4||PID i ||res i ||res new_i ) ⊕ D8, D 11 = H(r4||res i |res new_i ||PID i ) ⊕ PID new_i and D 12 = H(r4||D7||D8||PID new_i ||PIDi ||res i ||res new_i ||t4). Finally, ESP uses (ID i ,res new_i )Update(ID i ,res i ) and set the message M6={D9,D 10 ,D 11 ,D 12 ,PID new_i ,t4} sent to EV i .

[0131] 3. EV i Check the validity of t4 and calculate D 13 =D9⊕H(PID i ||r4||res i ||res new_i )、D 14 =D 10 ⊕H(r4||PID i ||res i ||res new_i ), PID new_i =D 11 ⊕H(r4||res i ||res new_i ||PID i ) and check equation D 12 =H(r4||D 13 ||D 14 ||PID new_i ||PID i ||res i ||res new_i ||t4) is true. If the verification is successful, EV i The user is required to enter a new password PW new_i , generate a new random number r5, calculate V1 new =D 14 ⊕H(r5||PW i new ),V2 new =D 13 ⊕H(PW i new ||r5), and use (r5,chl new_i ,V1 new ,V2 new ,PW i new , PID i new )Update(r0,chli ,V1,V2,PW i ,PID i ).

[0132] The following eight common security attributes satisfied by the embodiments of the present application are described below:

[0133] 1. User anonymity: Message M1 contains a pseudo-identity PID i , which can facilitate authentication on the ESP side. In addition, the real identity ID i It is covered by H(r1) in A3 and used for auditing on ESP. Therefore, the embodiment of the present application ensures the anonymity of the user.

[0134] 2. Unlinkability: In the embodiment of the present application, PID i It changes at the end of the authentication phase and the password change phase, so an attacker cannot find two identical identities in different sessions.

[0135] 3. Resist offline guessing attacks: Assume that the attacker has obtained the message of the last session and the challenge response pair of the last session. i / res i r0, V1, V2 and PID in i , he guessed (ID * ,PW * ), and calculate A1 * =V1⊕H(PW * ||r0). However, he cannot use the information he currently knows about A2 to get r1 old When the last session ends r2 old will fail, so the attacker cannot complete the attack on A4 old Since the attacker has no ESP , so he cannot directly convert A1 * With H(ID * ||res i ||s SEP ) for comparison. In other words, the embodiment of the present application can resist this offline guessing attack.

[0136] 4. Resist replay attacks: Since a timestamp is placed in each message of the embodiment of the present application, attackers cannot replay these messages.

[0137] 5. Resistance to forgery attacks: If an attacker wants to forge a message in the embodiment of the present application, he needs to know the ESP key. ESP It is long enough and well protected, making it difficult for an attacker to guess or forge the key. In other words, an attacker cannot perform a forgery attack.

[0138] 6. Resistance to desynchronization attacks: In the embodiment of the present application, the pseudo identity is only stored on the EV side, not in the ESP. Therefore, even if the message M3 or M4 is lost, it will not affect the next session. Therefore, the embodiment of the present application can resist desynchronization attacks.

[0139] 7. Mutual authentication: On the ESP side, ESP checks A4 and B2 to verify EV i and CS j Then CS j Check C8 to verify ESP, EV i Check C6 to verify ESP. This allows mutual authentication during the authentication process.

[0140] 8. Traceability: In the present application embodiment, each session ESP should obtain the real identity of the EV for auditing. In other words, each electric vehicle can be tracked in identity verification.

[0141] The embodiment of the present application uses SHA2-256 as a hash function (included in the above-mentioned hash function), AES as symmetric encryption, and a 160-bit elliptic curve cryptosystem. In the embodiment of the present application, each real identity / pseudo identity is 160 bits long, and the timestamp is 64 bits long.

[0142] In some possible embodiments, the embodiments of the present application can be analyzed and compared with the 5G-V2G system proposed by Hou et al., the robust anonymous authentication and key establishment scheme based on PUF proposed by Itoo et al., and the protocol based on the Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) authentication framework proposed by Yu et al. in terms of time and communication overhead.

[0143] FIG6 is a schematic diagram showing a comparison of time overheads provided by an embodiment. As shown in FIG6 , the embodiment of the present application has obvious advantages over Hou and Itoo in terms of the time overheads of electric vehicles, charging stations and ESPs, and has a slight advantage over Yu.

[0144] FIG7 is a comparative diagram of communication overhead provided by an embodiment. As shown in FIG7 , the embodiment of the present application has an obvious advantage in communication overhead compared with Yu, but is higher than Hou and Itoo.

[0145] It can be seen that the authentication scheme provided in the embodiment of the present application can improve security while also meeting the requirements in terms of time overhead and communication overhead.

[0146] This application proposes a novel identity authentication and key agreement scheme designed for V2G networks, combining user anonymity with the help of PUF mechanism to protect the privacy of all entities. The embodiment of this application can fully meet the eight common security attributes of user anonymity, unlinkability, resistance to offline guessing attacks, resistance to replay attacks, resistance to forgery attacks, resistance to desynchronization attacks, mutual authentication, and traceability.

[0147] Based on the same inventive concept, the embodiment of the present application also provides an electronic device for implementing the data transmission method involved above. The implementation scheme for solving the problem provided by the device is similar to the implementation scheme recorded in the above method, so the specific limitations in one or more electronic device embodiments provided below can refer to the limitations on the data transmission method above, and will not be repeated here.

[0148] In an exemplary embodiment, FIG8 is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in the first embodiment, and the electronic device 800 includes:

[0149] The communication module 801 is used to send predetermined verification information and a pseudo identity of the energy storage device to the service node each time the target data is generated;

[0150] The communication module 801 is further used to receive target verification information of the service node sent by the service node; the target verification information is determined by the service node according to the predetermined verification information and the pseudo identity identifier;

[0151] A determination module 802 is used to determine a target session key according to the target verification information when the service node is verified successfully using the target verification information;

[0152] The determination module 802 is further used to encrypt the target data using the target session key to obtain target encrypted data;

[0153] The communication module 801 is also used to send target encrypted data to the service node.

[0154] In some possible embodiments, the determination module 802 is further configured to determine predetermined verification information according to a target verification value stored in the energy storage device each time the target data is generated;

[0155] The determination module 802 is further configured to update the target verification value and the pseudo identity according to the target verification information when the service node is verified successfully using the target verification information.

[0156] In some possible embodiments, the communication module 801 is further used to send the real identity of the energy storage device to the service node;

[0157] The communication module 801 is also used to receive a specified verification value and a pseudo identity sent by the service node; the specified verification value is determined according to the real identity of the energy storage device, and the pseudo identity is generated by the service node;

[0158] The determination module 802 is further used to determine a target verification value according to a specified verification value; wherein the target verification value is used to determine predetermined verification information.

[0159] In some possible embodiments, the communication module 801 is further configured to send a pseudo identity to the service node in response to the password modification request;

[0160] The communication module 801 is further used to receive the designated verification information of the service node sent by the service node; wherein the designated verification information is determined according to the pseudo identity identifier;

[0161] The determination module 802 is further configured to obtain updated password information when the service node is authenticated according to the specified authentication information;

[0162] The determination module 802 is further used to update the pseudo identity identifier and the target verification value used to determine the predetermined verification information according to the specified verification information and the updated password information.

[0163] In an exemplary embodiment, FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in the second embodiment, and the electronic device 900 includes:

[0164] The communication module 901 is used to receive the predetermined verification information and pseudo identity sent by the energy storage device;

[0165] A determination module 902 is used to determine target verification information of the service node according to the predetermined verification information and the pseudo identity when the energy storage device is verified by using the predetermined verification information;

[0166] The communication module 901 is also used to send target verification information to the energy storage device; wherein the target verification information is used by the energy storage device to encrypt the generated target data to obtain target encrypted data;

[0167] The determination module 902 is further used to determine the target session key according to the target verification information;

[0168] The communication module 901 is also used to receive the target encrypted data sent by the energy storage device;

[0169] The determination module 902 is further configured to decrypt the target encrypted data according to the target session key.

[0170] In some possible embodiments, the communication module 901 is further used to receive a real identity of the energy storage device sent by the energy storage device;

[0171] The determination module 902 is further used to determine a specified verification value according to the real identity of the energy storage device;

[0172] The communication module 901 is further used to send a specified verification value and a generated pseudo identity to the energy storage device; wherein the specified verification value is used by the energy storage device to determine predetermined verification information.

[0173] In some possible embodiments, the communication module 901 is further used to receive a pseudo identity of the energy storage device sent by the energy storage device;

[0174] The determination module 902 is further used to determine the designated verification information of the service node according to the pseudo identity of the energy storage device;

[0175] The communication module 901 is also used to send designated verification information to the energy storage device; the designated verification information is used for the energy storage device to verify the service node, and to update the pseudo identity and the target verification value used to determine the predetermined verification information.

[0176] In an exemplary embodiment, FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in the third embodiment. The electronic device 1000 includes:

[0177] The communication module 1001 is used to receive the predetermined verification information and pseudo identity of the energy storage device sent by the energy storage device, and send the predetermined verification information, pseudo identity and preset verification information of the charging station to the service node;

[0178] The communication module 1001 is further used to receive specific verification information of the service node sent by the service node; wherein the specific verification information is determined according to the predetermined verification information, the pseudo identity identifier and the preset verification information;

[0179] A determination module 1002, configured to determine a designated session key according to a portion of the verification information when the service node is verified successfully according to a portion of the verification information in the specific verification information;

[0180] The communication module 1001 is also used to send target verification information to the energy storage device; wherein the target verification information is another part of the verification information in the specific verification information, and the target verification information is used by the energy storage device to encrypt the generated target data to obtain the target encrypted data;

[0181] The determination module 1002 is further configured to use a specified session key to encrypt the specified data acquired by the charging station, or to encrypt the target encrypted data sent by the energy storage device, to obtain the specified encrypted data;

[0182] The communication module 1001 is also used to send designated encrypted data to the service node.

[0183] Each module in the above electronic device can be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware or a combination thereof. Each module can be embedded in or independent of a processor in an electronic device in the form of hardware, or can be stored in a memory in an electronic device in the form of software, so that the processor can call and execute operations corresponding to each module.

[0184] In an exemplary embodiment, the electronic device may be an energy storage device, a charging station or a service node. FIG11 is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided by an embodiment. As shown in FIG11, the electronic device includes at least one of a processor, a memory, an input / output interface, a communication interface, a display unit, and an input device. Among them, the processor, the memory and the input / output interface are connected through a system bus, and the communication interface, the display unit and the input device are connected to the system bus through the input / output interface. Among them, the processor of the electronic device is used to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the electronic device includes a non-volatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system and a computer program. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and the computer program in the non-volatile storage medium. The input / output interface of the electronic device is used to exchange information between the processor and an external device. The communication interface of the electronic device is used to communicate with an external terminal in a wired or wireless manner, and the wireless manner can be implemented through WIFI, a mobile cellular network, a near field communication (Near Field Communication, NFC) or other technologies. When the computer program is executed by the processor, a data transmission method is implemented. The display unit of the electronic device is used to form a visually visible picture, and can be a display screen, a projection device, or a virtual reality imaging device. The display screen can be a liquid crystal display screen or an electronic ink display screen, and the input device of the electronic device can be a touch layer covered on the display screen, or a key, trackball, or touchpad provided on the housing of the electronic device, or an external keyboard, touchpad, or mouse, etc.

[0185] Those skilled in the art can understand that the structure shown in FIG. 11 is only a block diagram of a part of the structure related to the solution of the present application, and does not constitute a limitation on the electronic device to which the solution of the present application is applied. The specific electronic device may include more or fewer components than those shown in the figure, or combine certain components, or have different component arrangements. For example, the electronic device includes a memory and a processor, the memory stores a computer program, and the processor implements the steps of the method in any of the above embodiments when executing the computer program.

[0186] In an exemplary embodiment, an electronic device is provided, including a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and when the processor executes the computer program, the following steps are implemented:

[0187] Sending predetermined verification information and a pseudo-identity of the energy storage device to the service node each time the target data is generated;

[0188] receiving target verification information of the service node sent by the service node; the target verification information is determined by the service node according to the predetermined verification information and the pseudo-identity identifier;

[0189] When the service node is authenticated by using the target authentication information, a target session key is determined according to the target authentication information;

[0190] The target data is encrypted using the target session key to obtain target encrypted data, and the target encrypted data is sent to the service node.

[0191] In one embodiment, when the processor executes the computer program, the following steps are also implemented: each time the target data is generated, the predetermined verification information is determined according to the target verification value stored in the energy storage device; when the service node is verified by using the target verification information, the target verification value and the pseudo-identity are updated according to the target verification information.

[0192] In one embodiment, when the processor executes the computer program, the following steps are also implemented: sending the real identity of the energy storage device to the service node; receiving the specified verification value and the pseudo identity sent by the service node; the specified verification value is determined based on the real identity of the energy storage device, and the pseudo identity is generated by the service node; based on the specified verification value, determining the target verification value; wherein the target verification value is used to determine the predetermined verification information.

[0193] In one embodiment, when the processor executes the computer program, the following steps are also implemented: in response to a password modification request, sending a pseudo identity to a service node; receiving designated verification information of the service node sent by the service node; wherein the designated verification information is determined based on the pseudo identity; when the service node is verified according to the designated verification information, obtaining updated password information; and updating the pseudo identity and a target verification value for determining predetermined verification information based on the designated verification information and the updated password information.

[0194] In an exemplary embodiment, an electronic device is provided, including a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and the processor implements the following steps when executing the computer program: receiving predetermined verification information and a pseudo-identity sent by an energy storage device; when the energy storage device is verified by using the predetermined verification information, determining target verification information of a service node according to the predetermined verification information and the pseudo-identity; sending the target verification information to the energy storage device; wherein the target verification information is used by the energy storage device to encrypt generated target data to obtain target encrypted data; determining a target session key according to the target verification information; receiving the target encrypted data sent by the energy storage device, and decrypting the target encrypted data according to the target session key.

[0195] In one embodiment, receiving a real identity identifier of the energy storage device sent by the energy storage device;

[0196] Determine a designated verification value according to a real identity identifier of the energy storage device; send the designated verification value and the generated pseudo identity identifier to the energy storage device; wherein the designated verification value is used by the energy storage device to determine predetermined verification information.

[0197] In one embodiment, a pseudo-identity of an energy storage device sent by an energy storage device is received; designated verification information of a service node is determined based on the pseudo-identity of the energy storage device; the designated verification information is sent to the energy storage device; the designated verification information is used for the energy storage device to verify the service node, and the pseudo-identity and a target verification value for determining predetermined verification information are updated.

[0198] In an exemplary embodiment, an electronic device is provided, including a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and the processor implements the following steps when executing the computer program: receiving predetermined verification information and a pseudo identity identifier of an energy storage device sent by the energy storage device, and sending the predetermined verification information, the pseudo identity identifier and the preset verification information of the charging station to a service node; receiving specific verification information of the service node sent by the service node; wherein the specific verification information is determined based on the predetermined verification information, the pseudo identity identifier and the preset verification information; in the case where the service node is verified according to a part of the verification information in the specific verification information, determining a designated session key based on a part of the verification information; sending target verification information to the energy storage device; wherein the target verification information is another part of the verification information in the specific verification information, and the target verification information is used by the energy storage device to encrypt the generated target data to obtain target encrypted data; using the designated session key to encrypt the designated data obtained by the charging station, or to encrypt the target encrypted data sent by the energy storage device to obtain designated encrypted data, and sending the designated encrypted data to the service node.

[0199] In one embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method in any of the above embodiments are implemented.

[0200] A person of ordinary skill in the art can understand that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment method can be completed by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program, and the computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above-mentioned methods. Among them, any reference to the memory, database or other medium used in the embodiments provided in the present application can include at least one of non-volatile memory and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash memory, optical memory, high-density embedded non-volatile memory, resistive random access memory (ReRAM), magnetic random access memory (MRAM), ferroelectric random access memory (FRAM), phase change memory (PCM), graphene memory, etc. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory, etc. As an illustration and not limitation, RAM can be in various forms, such as static random access memory (SRAM) or dynamic random access memory (DRAM). The database involved in each embodiment provided in this application may include at least one of a relational database and a non-relational database. Non-relational databases may include distributed databases based on blockchains, etc., but are not limited to this. The processor involved in each embodiment provided in this application may be a general-purpose processor, a central processing unit, a graphics processor, a digital signal processor, a programmable logic device, a data processing logic device based on quantum computing, an artificial intelligence (AI) processor, etc., but are not limited to this.

[0201] The technical features of the above embodiments may be combined arbitrarily. To make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this application.

[0202] The above-described embodiments only express several implementation methods of the present application, and the descriptions thereof are relatively specific and detailed, but they cannot be understood as limiting the scope of the present application. It should be pointed out that, for a person of ordinary skill in the art, several variations and improvements can be made without departing from the concept of the present application, and these all belong to the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application shall be subject to the attached claims.

Claims

1. A data transmission method, characterized in that: Applied to energy storage equipment, the method comprises: Sending predetermined verification information and a pseudo-identity of the energy storage device to a service node each time target data is generated; receiving target verification information of the service node sent by the service node; the target verification information is determined by the service node according to the predetermined verification information and the pseudo identity identifier; When the service node is authenticated by using the target authentication information, determining a target session key according to the target authentication information; The target data is encrypted using the target session key to obtain target encrypted data, and the target encrypted data is sent to the service node.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that In the case where the target data is generated each time, the method further comprises: determining the predetermined verification information according to the target verification value stored in the energy storage device; In the case where the service node is authenticated by using the target authentication information, the method further includes: updating the target authentication value and the pseudo identity according to the target authentication information.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that In each case of generating target data, before sending the predetermined verification information and the pseudo identity to the service node, the method further includes: Sending the real identity of the energy storage device to the service node; receiving a designated verification value and the pseudo identity sent by the service node; the designated verification value is determined according to the real identity of the energy storage device, and the pseudo identity is generated by the service node; According to the designated verification value, a target verification value is determined; wherein the target verification value is used to determine the predetermined verification information.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that: The method further comprises: In response to the password modification request, sending the pseudo identity to the service node; receiving designated verification information of the service node sent by the service node; wherein the designated verification information is determined according to the pseudo identity identifier; When the service node is authenticated according to the specified authentication information, obtaining updated password information; The pseudo-identity identifier and a target verification value used to determine the predetermined verification information are updated according to the designated verification information and the updated password information.

5. A data transmission method, characterized in that: Applied to a service node, the method comprises: Receiving predetermined verification information and pseudo-identity sent by the energy storage device; When the energy storage device is authenticated by using the predetermined authentication information, determining the target authentication information of the service node according to the predetermined authentication information and the pseudo identity; Sending the target verification information to the energy storage device; wherein the target verification information is used by the energy storage device to encrypt the generated target data to obtain target encrypted data; determining a target session key according to the target authentication information; The target encrypted data sent by the energy storage device is received, and the target encrypted data is decrypted according to the target session key.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that Before receiving the predetermined verification information and the pseudo identity sent by the energy storage device, the method further includes: Receiving a real identity identifier of the energy storage device sent by the energy storage device; Determining a specified verification value according to the real identity identifier of the energy storage device; The designated verification value and the generated pseudo identity are sent to the energy storage device; wherein the designated verification value is used by the energy storage device to determine the predetermined verification information.

7. The method according to claim 5 or 6, characterized in that: The method further comprises: Receiving a pseudo identity of the energy storage device sent by the energy storage device; Determining the designated verification information of the service node according to the pseudo identity of the energy storage device; The designated verification information is sent to the energy storage device; the designated verification information is used by the energy storage device to verify the service node, and to update the pseudo identity and a target verification value for determining the predetermined verification information.

8. A data transmission method, characterized in that: Applied to a charging station, the method comprises: Receiving predetermined verification information and a pseudo identity identifier of the energy storage device sent by the energy storage device, and sending the predetermined verification information, the pseudo identity identifier and the preset verification information of the charging station to the service node; Receiving specific verification information of the service node sent by the service node; wherein the specific verification information is determined according to the predetermined verification information, the pseudo identity identifier and the preset verification information; In a case where the service node is authenticated according to a portion of the authentication information in the specific authentication information, determining a designated session key according to the portion of the authentication information; Sending target verification information to the energy storage device; wherein the target verification information is another part of the verification information in the specific verification information, and the target verification information is used by the energy storage device to encrypt the generated target data to obtain target encrypted data; The designated session key is used to encrypt the designated data acquired by the charging station, or to encrypt the target encrypted data sent by the energy storage device, to obtain designated encrypted data, and the designated encrypted data is sent to the service node.

9. An electronic device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, wherein: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the method described in any one of claims 1 to 4 or any one of claims 4 to 7 or 8 are implemented.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method described in any one of claims 1 to 4 or any one of claims 4 to 7 or 8 are implemented.