Environmental protection treatment method and system based on tripartite evolutionary game model

Abstract

The invention provides an environmental protection treatment method and system based on a three-party evolutionary game model, and relates to the technical field of environmental protection treatment, and the method comprises the following steps: S1, under an environmental protection treatment rule formed based on the interaction between a third service provider and a pollution unit, carrying out the environmental protection treatment; establishing a three-party evolutionary game model taking the third-party service provider, the pollution unit and the management mechanism as a main body through three-party benefits and decision selection of the third-party service provider, the pollution unit and the management mechanism; s2, calculating an expectation function of a pollution unit and a management mechanism according to a three-party evolutionary game model; s3, establishing a replicated dynamic equation according to expected functions of the pollution unit and the management mechanism; and S4, obtaining an evolution equilibrium point of the tripartite evolution game model according to the copied dynamic equation, and performing stability analysis on an evolution stationary point to obtain a stable condition for environmental protection treatment.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of environmental protection management, and in particular to an environmental protection management method and system based on a three-party evolutionary game model. Background Art

[0002] At present, the management agency usually entrusts a third-party service provider to closely monitor the polluting units and punish the polluting units that violate environmental regulations. The specific model is: the third-party service provider supervises and monitors the activities of the polluting units and reports the violations to the management agency, and the management agency then punishes the polluting units in the form of monetary or credit fines. In this way, although the existence of third-party service providers has alleviated some of the pressure on the management agency, several key shortcomings have become apparent: (1) There is a certain lag in supervision, including the verification and reporting of violations and the arrival of law enforcement officers at the scene. The production process that causes environmental pollution has already ended, which also increases the workload of the management agency; (2) In real-world scenarios, violations occur frequently, and the reporting of a large number of violators will cause huge economic and credit losses to the polluting units, which is detrimental to the development of enterprises; (3) There is a confrontation between the two regulatory parties. Polluting units that focus mainly on economic benefits are prone to a vicious cycle in which the management agency’s law enforcement personnel cooperate well with on-site supervision, but immediately continue to discharge pollutants in violation of regulations after the personnel leave. Summary of the invention

[0003] The purpose of the present invention is to provide an environmental protection management method and system based on a three-party evolutionary game model. The environmental protection management method mainly proposes an environmental protection steward management model based on the three-party evolutionary game model. Through this environmental protection steward management model, not only can digital monitoring and supervision services be provided to management agencies, but also violation warnings can be provided to polluting units, and on-site consulting services can be provided to help polluting units regulate pollution discharge.

[0004] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention adopts the following solutions: An environmental protection management method based on a three-party evolutionary game model, the method comprising the following steps: S1. Based on the environmental governance rules formed by the interaction between the third-party service providers and the polluting units, a three-party evolutionary game model with the third-party service providers, polluting units and management agencies as the main bodies is established through the interests and decision-making choices of the three parties; S2. Calculate the expected function of the polluting unit and the management agency based on the three-party evolutionary game model; S3, establish a replication dynamic equation based on the expected functions of the pollution units and management agencies; S4. Based on the replication dynamic equation, the evolutionary equilibrium point of the three-party evolutionary game model is obtained, and the stability analysis of the evolutionary stable point is carried out to obtain stable conditions for environmental protection management.

[0005] Furthermore, the environmental protection management rules provide for real-time monitoring of polluting units by third-party service providers. When it is detected that the number of violations by a polluting unit exceeds a threshold, the third-party service provider reports the violations to the management agency. At the same time, the polluting unit chooses to subscribe to the third-party service provider to provide relevant services.

[0006] Furthermore, the establishment process of the three-party evolutionary game model is as follows: Under the environmental governance rules formed by the interaction between the third-party service providers and the polluting units, objective functions with the third-party service providers, polluting units and management agencies as the main bodies are established according to the interests of the three parties; Then, the corresponding evolutionary game payoff matrix is ​​established according to the decision choices of the polluting unit and the management agency, wherein the polluting unit chooses to subscribe to a third-party service provider or not to subscribe to a third-party service provider, and the management agency chooses a high recall rate or a low recall rate. The recall rate refers to the probability of detecting violations by the polluting unit based on the current service level of the third-party service provider.

[0007] Furthermore, the objective function of the management agency is: ; in, To protect the environmental disutility of the management agency, the management agency can choose the service level from the third-party service providers , used to reduce environmental negative effects; Indicates the different categories of polluting units; p k is the probability of violation of the pollution unit of category k; R i is the probability that a third-party service provider with service level i detects a violation by a polluting unit; N is the maximum number of times a third-party service provider provides warning and consulting assistance services to a polluting unit during the service period; A k is the environmental negative utility caused by the illegal discharge of pollutants by the polluting unit of category k; The degree to which environmental impact is reduced after a third-party service provider intervenes in the illegal behavior of a polluting unit; M k is the number of polluting units of category k; Indicates that the category is k and the probability of violation is p within a certain period of time k The pollution unit has a probability of R i The number of violations that occurred but were not detected by the third-party service provider, with a limit of N; Indicates that the category is k and the probability of violation is p within a certain period of time k The pollution unit has a probability of R i The number of violations that occur and are detected by the third-party service provider is N.

[0008] Furthermore, the objective function of the third-party service provider is: ; Among them, U i For the fees charged by the management agency, V k is the charge of the pollution unit; when the pollution unit of category k chooses to subscribe to the third-party service, ; It is an increasing function of the total number of subscriptions of polluting units and the cost incurred by the third-party service provider for serving the polluting units.

[0009] Furthermore, the objective function of the polluting unit is: ; Among them, when the polluting unit chooses to subscribe to third-party services, ;on the contrary, ; V k the price of subscribing to third-party services on behalf of the pollution unit; Represents the expected number of economic and credit penalties imposed on the polluting unit during the service period.

[0010] Furthermore, in S2, the expected functions of the polluting unit and the management agency are calculated according to the three-party evolutionary game model, and the expected function of the management agency is obtained as follows: , where x represents the probability that the management agency chooses a high recall rate, and vice versa 1-x represents the probability of choosing a low recall rate, U G1 The expected function for selecting a high recall rate for the management agency, U G2 Select an expected function with low recall for the administration; At the same time, the expected function of the pollution unit is obtained as: , y represents the probability of a pollutant choosing to subscribe to the service, whereas 1-y represents the probability of not subscribing, U E1 is the expected function for the pollution unit to choose to subscribe to a third-party service provider, U E2 The expected function for a polluting unit to choose not to subscribe to a third-party service provider.

[0011] Furthermore, in S3, the replication dynamic equation is: ; ; in, The dynamic equation representing the selection of high-recall replicators by the management agency, Equation representing the replication dynamics of the pollution unit subscription service.

[0012] An environmental protection management system based on a three-party evolutionary game model, using an environmental protection management method based on a three-party evolutionary game model as described above, comprising: Three-party evolutionary game model establishment module: Based on the environmental protection governance rules formed by the interaction between the third-party service provider and the polluting unit, a three-party evolutionary game model with the third-party service provider, the polluting unit and the management agency as the main body is established through the interests and decision-making choices of the three parties; Expected function building module: Calculate the expected function of the pollution unit and the management agency based on the three-party evolutionary game model; Replication dynamic equation building module: build replication dynamic equations based on the expected functions of pollution units and management agencies; Stability analysis module: The evolutionary equilibrium point of the three-party evolutionary game model is obtained based on the replication dynamic equation, and the stability analysis is performed on the evolutionary stable point to obtain stable conditions for environmental protection management.

[0013] Beneficial effects of the present invention: The present invention provides an environmental management method and system based on a three-party evolutionary game model. The environmental management method mainly proposes an environmental steward management model based on the three-party evolutionary game model. Through the environmental steward management model, the role of the third-party service provider is cleverly changed from the existing regulator to a service provider between two opposing roles. This can not only reduce the workload of the management agency in dealing with a large number of violations, but also, combined with its own professionalism, minimize the economic and credit losses of polluting units in illegal pollution discharge. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0014] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the conventional mode in Embodiment 1 of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the environmental steward management mode in Example 1 of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the process of the environmental protection method in Example 1 of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0015] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, rather than all the embodiments. The following description of at least one exemplary embodiment is actually only illustrative and is by no means intended to limit the present invention and its application or use. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0016] The relative arrangement of components and steps, the numerical expressions and numerical values ​​set forth in these embodiments do not limit the scope of the present invention unless specifically stated otherwise.

[0017] At the same time, it should be understood that for the convenience of description, the sizes of the various parts shown in the drawings are not drawn according to the actual proportional relationship.

[0018] Additionally, descriptions of well-known structures, functions, and configurations may be omitted for clarity and conciseness.One of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that various changes and modifications may be made to the examples described herein without departing from the spirit and scope of the present disclosure.

[0019] Technologies, methods, and apparatus known to ordinary technicians in the relevant field may not be discussed in detail, but where appropriate, such technologies, methods, and apparatus should be considered part of the authorization specification.

[0020] In all examples shown and discussed herein, any specific values ​​should be interpreted as merely exemplary and not as limiting. Therefore, other examples of the exemplary embodiments may have different values.

[0021] The present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and in conjunction with embodiments: Example 1 Because, in the traditional model, the management agency usually entrusts a third-party service provider to closely monitor the polluting units and punish the polluting units that violate environmental regulations, such as Figure 1 As shown in the figure, specifically: the third-party service provider monitors the activities of the polluting unit and reports violations to the management agency, which then punishes the polluting unit in the form of monetary or credit fines. It can be seen that in the traditional model, although the third-party service is located between the management agency and the polluting unit, it has not been substantially involved, but only plays a monitoring and regulatory role on the polluting unit. In other words, the third-party service provider plays a unilateral role on the polluting unit.

[0022] In this traditional model, although the existence of third-party service providers can reduce some of the pressure on the management agency, there are still many problems that are inevitable. Therefore, in order to solve the above problems, the present invention provides an environmental steward governance model, under which the following rules are formulated: Under the "environmental steward" governance model, Figure 2 As shown, third-party service providers use digital technology to help management agencies monitor polluting units in real time. At the same time, polluting units choose to subscribe to third-party service providers and enable them to provide relevant services, namely, providing warnings and consulting assistance services with a limit of N times to polluting units.

[0023] The specific measures of this rule are as follows: If a polluting unit violates regulations during the service period of a third-party service provider and is successfully monitored by the third-party service provider, the third-party service provider will immediately send personnel to the site to issue warnings and provide guidance, and assist the polluting unit in reducing the level of illegal pollution discharge to within the standard; if the polluting unit violates regulations more than N times during the service period, the third-party service provider will directly report the violations to the management agency, and the management agency will impose economic and credit penalties on the polluting unit.

[0024] It can be seen that under the environmental steward governance model, third-party service providers do not simply join in the relationship between management agencies and polluting units to play a unilateral role, but focus on how to change the governance model between management agencies and polluting units through services. Based on the interaction between third-party service providers and polluting units, it can not only help management agencies reduce work pressure, so that management agencies do not need to spend energy on supervision as usual, but only wait for third-party service providers to upload supervision data, and provide better services to management agencies. At the same time, within a limited number of times, it can help polluting units reduce their ability to reduce pollution levels, and solve the problem itself for management agencies within their capabilities. At the same time, it also reduces the possibility of polluting units being punished, thereby reducing the number of times they violate pollution regulations.

[0025] Among them, the reputation and economic losses of polluting units caused by penalties imposed by management agencies can be referred to existing policies and regulations or experimental data in literature. Data such as the probability of violation penalties, service pricing, and algorithm recall rate under different decisions of different types of polluting units can be obtained by third-party service providers themselves.

[0026] Based on the above principles, in this embodiment, an environmental protection management method based on a three-party evolutionary game model is proposed. The environmental protection management method mainly proposes an environmental steward management model based on the three-party evolutionary game model. Through this environmental steward management model, not only can digital monitoring and supervision services be provided to management agencies, but also violation warnings can be provided to polluting units, and on-site consulting services can be provided to help polluting units regulate pollution discharge.

[0027] The environmental protection treatment method mainly includes the following steps: Figure 3 As shown, specifically: S1. Based on the environmental governance rules formed by the interaction between the third-party service providers and the polluting units, a three-party evolutionary game model with the third-party service providers, polluting units and management agencies as the main bodies is established through the interests and decision-making choices of the three parties; S2. Calculate the expected function of the polluting unit and the management agency based on the three-party evolutionary game model; S3, establish a replication dynamic equation based on the expected functions of the pollution units and management agencies; S4. Based on the replication dynamic equation, the evolutionary equilibrium point of the three-party evolutionary game model is obtained, and the stability analysis of the evolutionary stable point is carried out to obtain stable conditions for environmental protection management.

[0028] In one embodiment, the process of establishing the three-party evolutionary game model is as follows: Under the environmental governance rules formed by the interaction between the third-party service providers and the polluting units, objective functions with the third-party service providers, polluting units and management agencies as the main bodies are established according to the interests of the three parties; Then, the corresponding evolutionary game payoff matrix is ​​established according to the decision choices of the polluting unit and the management agency, wherein the polluting unit chooses to subscribe to a third-party service provider or not to subscribe to a third-party service provider, and the management agency chooses a high recall rate or a low recall rate. The recall rate refers to the probability of detecting violations by the polluting unit based on the current service level of the third-party service provider.

[0029] In one embodiment, the objective function of the management agency in establishing the environmental steward governance model is: ; in, If the environmental disutility of the management agency is , in order to minimize the overall negative environmental impact; Indicates the different categories of polluting units; p k is the probability of violation of the pollution unit of category k; R i is the probability that a third-party service provider with service level i detects a violation by a polluting unit, i.e., the algorithm recall rate; N is the maximum number of times a third-party service provider provides warning and consulting assistance services to a polluting unit during the service period; A kis the environmental negative utility caused by the illegal discharge of pollutants by the polluting unit of category k; The degree to which environmental impact is reduced after a third-party service provider intervenes in the illegal behavior of a polluting unit; M k is the number of polluting units of category k; Indicates that the category is k and the probability of violation is p within a certain period of time k The pollution unit has a probability of R i The number of violations that occurred but were not detected by the third-party service provider, with a limit of N; Indicates that the category is k and the probability of violation is p within a certain period of time k The pollution unit has a probability of R i The number of violations that occur and are detected by the third-party service provider is N.

[0030] In one embodiment, the objective function of the third-party service provider in establishing the environmental steward governance model is: ; Among them, U i For the fees charged by the management agency, V k is the charge of the pollution unit; when the pollution unit of category k chooses to subscribe to the third-party service, ; is an increasing function of the total number of subscriptions of polluting units, and the costs incurred by third-party service providers for serving polluting units, such as labor costs, etc. It can be seen that the third-party service providers have a high i and V k Make pricing decisions to maximize your objective function.

[0031] In one embodiment, the objective function of the polluting unit under the environmental steward governance mode is established as follows: ; Among them, when the polluting unit chooses to subscribe to third-party services, ;on the contrary, ; V k the price of subscribing to third-party services on behalf of the pollution unit; Represents the expected number of economic and credit penalties imposed on the polluting unit during the service period. It can be seen that the polluting unit needs to decide whether to subscribe to the services of a third-party service provider to minimize its financial costs.

[0032] In the process of environmental governance, for management agencies, the following two types of supervision services are considered: high recall rate (R2) and low recall rate (R1); for polluting units, the following two service models are considered: subscribing to a third-party service provider and not subscribing to a third-party service provider. Among them, when the polluting unit does not subscribe to a third-party service provider, the third-party service provider should supervise the polluting unit in accordance with the above traditional model, and the third-party service provider will report the illegal behavior of the polluting unit in real time and impose penalties on the polluting unit.

[0033] Therefore, under the environmental protection governance rules formed by the interaction between the third-party service providers and the polluting units, four game strategy combinations can be obtained according to the objective functions of the third-party service providers, polluting units, and management agencies, as shown in Table 1 below: Table 1 in, ; .

[0034] In the process of establishing the three-party evolutionary game model, it can be seen that the present invention combines the three-party evolutionary game model with the specific number of violations, in which there are cases where violations are detected and there are cases where violations are not detected, which is closer to reality. Moreover, for the management agency, it mainly chooses to establish the objective function based on environmental benefits, and the purpose of whether the environment is well managed is greater than whether the economy has considerable income itself.

[0035] In addition, the three-party evolutionary game model in the present invention is essentially a two-party evolutionary game between the polluting unit and the management agency. The service provider only plays the role of providing services and does not participate in the game process. Based on the above three-party evolutionary game model, the following solution process is performed: The first step is to calculate the expected function U of the management agency and the pollution unit G and U E ; The expected function of the management agency is: ; Among them, x represents the probability that the management agency chooses a high recall rate, and conversely 1-x represents the probability of choosing a low recall rate.

[0036] U G1 Select an expected function with high recall for the administration, as follows: ; U G2 Select an expected function with low recall for the administration as follows: ; The expected function of the pollution unit is: ; Among them, y represents the probability that the polluting unit chooses to subscribe to the service, and conversely 1-y represents the probability of not subscribing.

[0037] The expected function for the pollution unit to choose to subscribe to a third-party service provider is as follows: ; The expected function for the polluting unit to choose not to subscribe to the third-party service provider is as follows: ; The second step is to establish the replication dynamic equation. The specific process is as follows: ; ; The third step is to solve it through the Jacobian matrix calculation formula: ; ; ; ; .

[0038] Based on the above, the determinant and trace of the Jacobian matrix can be calculated: ; ; In summary, for the equilibrium point of the three-party evolutionary game model, the Jacob matrix satisfies ,and At this time, this point is the evolutionary stable point.

[0039] The evolution stability conditions of the four points (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), and (1,1) are as follows: (1) For the point (0,0), the evolutionary stability condition is as follows: ; ; (2) For the point (0,1), the evolutionary stability condition is as follows: ; ; (3) For point (1,0), the evolutionary stability condition is as follows: ; ; (4) For point (1,1), the evolutionary stability condition is as follows: ; ; It can be seen that in this embodiment, a necessary condition for the polluting unit to choose to subscribe to a third-party service provider is , that is, the subscription fee is less than the saved penalty, indicating that the pollutant unit will bring positive economic benefits by subscribing to the services of the third-party service provider. In this case, the pollutant will tend to subscribe .

[0040] Similarly, a necessary condition for regulatory agencies to select high recall rate regulatory services is Below a certain critical value, this is because successful detection of illegal discharge of pollutants by pollutants will lead to environmental utility, so low enough This means that each detection of illegal discharge by a polluting unit will bring higher environmental benefits, thus prompting the authorities to adopt a high recall rate. .

[0041] In this embodiment, based on the results of the stability analysis of the evolutionary equilibrium point of the three-party evolutionary game model, the game results and the driving factors of the ideal results can be obtained as follows: According to the results of solving the three-party evolutionary game model, the stability conditions of the most ideal state (1,1) are extracted: ; ; It can be seen that under the environmental stewardship governance model provided by the third-party service provider, the final game state between the management agency and the polluting unit is determined by the service pricing and penalty ratio of the third-party service provider and the initial allocation of the degree of reduction in environmental impact after the third-party service provider intervenes in the illegal behavior of the polluting unit. In addition, the third-party service provider has the ability to adjust the parameters. and , making the outcome of the evolutionary game favorable to it.

[0042] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and does not limit the present invention in any form. According to the technical essence of the present invention, within the spirit and principles of the present invention, any simple modification, equivalent replacement and improvement made to the above embodiment still falls within the protection scope of the technical solution of the present invention.

Claims

1. An environmental protection management method based on a three-party evolutionary game model, characterized in that: The method comprises the following steps: S1. Based on the environmental governance rules formed by the interaction between the third-party service providers and the polluting units, a three-party evolutionary game model with the third-party service providers, polluting units and management agencies as the main bodies is established through the interests and decision-making choices of the three parties; S2. Calculate the expected function of the polluting unit and the management agency based on the three-party evolutionary game model; S3, establish a replication dynamic equation based on the expected functions of the pollution units and management agencies; S4. Based on the replication dynamic equation, the evolutionary equilibrium point of the three-party evolutionary game model is obtained, and the stability analysis of the evolutionary stable point is carried out to obtain stable conditions for environmental protection management.

2. The environmental protection management method based on the three-party evolutionary game model according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The environmental protection management rules are that a third-party service provider conducts real-time monitoring of polluting units. When it is detected that the number of violations of a polluting unit exceeds a threshold, the third-party service provider reports the violation to the management agency. At the same time, the polluting unit chooses to subscribe to the third-party service provider to enable the third-party service provider to provide relevant services.

3. The environmental protection management method based on the three-party evolutionary game model according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The establishment process of the three-party evolutionary game model is as follows: Under the environmental governance rules formed by the interaction between the third-party service providers and the polluting units, objective functions with the third-party service providers, polluting units and management agencies as the main bodies are established according to the interests of the three parties; Then, the corresponding evolutionary game payoff matrix is ​​established according to the decision choices of the polluting unit and the management agency, wherein the polluting unit chooses to subscribe to a third-party service provider or not to subscribe to a third-party service provider, and the management agency chooses a high recall rate or a low recall rate. The recall rate refers to the probability of detecting violations by the polluting unit based on the current service level of the third-party service provider.

4. The environmental protection management method based on the three-party evolutionary game model according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The objective function of the management agency is: ； in, To protect the environmental disutility of the management agency, the management agency can choose the service level from the third-party service providers , used to reduce environmental negative effects; Indicates different categories of polluting units; p k is the probability of violation of the pollution unit of category k; R i is the probability that a third-party service provider with service level i detects a violation by a polluting unit; N is the maximum number of times a third-party service provider provides warning and consulting assistance services to a polluting unit during the service period; A k is the environmental negative utility caused by the illegal discharge of pollutants by the polluting unit of category k; The degree to which environmental impact is reduced after a third-party service provider intervenes in the illegal behavior of a polluting unit; M k is the number of pollution units of category k; Indicates that the category is k and the probability of violation in a specific period is p k The pollution unit has a probability of R i The number of violations that occurred but were not detected by the third-party service provider, with a limit of N; Indicates that the category is k and the probability of violation is p within a certain period of time k The pollution unit has a probability of R i The number of violations that occur and are detected by the third-party service provider is N.

5. The environmental protection management method based on the three-party evolutionary game model according to claim 4 is characterized in that: The objective function of the third-party service provider is: ； Among them, U i For the fees charged by the management agency, V k is the charge of the pollution unit; when the pollution unit of category k chooses to subscribe to the third-party service, ; It is an increasing function of the total number of subscriptions of polluting units and the cost incurred by the third-party service provider for serving the polluting units.

6. The environmental protection management method based on the three-party evolutionary game model according to claim 4 is characterized in that: The objective function of the pollution unit is: ； Among them, when the polluting unit chooses to subscribe to third-party services, ;on the contrary, ; V k the price of subscribing to third-party services on behalf of the pollution unit; represents the expected number of financial and credit penalties imposed on the polluting unit during the service period; The amount of penalty received by a polluting unit after being found to have violated the regulations.

7. The environmental protection management method based on the three-party evolutionary game model according to claim 3 is characterized in that: In S2, the expected functions of the polluting unit and the management agency are calculated according to the three-party evolutionary game model, and the expected function of the management agency is obtained as follows: , where x represents the probability that the management agency chooses a high recall rate, and vice versa 1-x represents the probability of choosing a low recall rate, U G1 The expected function for selecting a high recall rate for the management agency, U G2 Select an expected function with low recall for the administration; At the same time, the expected function of the pollution unit is obtained as: , y represents the probability of a pollutant choosing to subscribe to the service, whereas 1-y represents the probability of not subscribing, U E1 is the expected function for the pollution unit to choose to subscribe to a third-party service provider, U E2 The expected function for a polluting unit to choose not to subscribe to a third-party service provider.

8. The environmental protection management method based on the three-party evolutionary game model according to claim 7 is characterized in that: In S3, the replication dynamic equation is: ； ； in, The dynamic equation representing the selection of high-recall replicators by the management agency, Equation representing the replication dynamics of the pollution unit subscription service.

9. An environmental protection management system based on a three-party evolutionary game model, characterized in that: An environmental protection management method based on a three-party evolutionary game model as described in any one of claims 1 to 8 is applied, comprising: Three-party evolutionary game model establishment module: Based on the environmental protection governance rules formed by the interaction between the third-party service provider and the polluting unit, a three-party evolutionary game model with the third-party service provider, the polluting unit and the management agency as the main body is established through the interests and decision-making choices of the three parties; Expected function building module: Calculate the expected function of the pollution unit and the management agency based on the three-party evolutionary game model; Replication dynamic equation building module: build replication dynamic equations based on the expected functions of pollution units and management agencies; Stability analysis module: The evolutionary equilibrium point of the three-party evolutionary game model is obtained based on the replication dynamic equation, and the stability analysis is performed on the evolutionary stable point to obtain stable conditions for environmental protection management.

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