A security protection system for industrial control equipment based on virtualization

By deploying a virtualization-based security protection system for industrial control equipment in the industrial control system, using simulation systems and virtual controllers to simulate the real industrial control environment, dynamically collect data and update models, the shortcomings of honeypots and honeynets in defending against unknown threats are solved. , realizes higher simulation simulation and stronger defense capabilities, avoiding damage in the production environment.

CN115549950BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-08GUANGZHOU UNIVERSITY
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202210969614.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-08-12
Publication Date
2024-11-08
Estimated Expiration
2042-08-12

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing honeypots and honeynets have limited capabilities in defending against unknown threats, are difficult to simulate business logic, and are deployed independently of real systems, lack linkage with other security mechanisms, and are difficult to effectively resist highly concealed APT attacks, and are in production environments. There are fewer applications, low simulation degree, few open source tools, and static simulation is difficult to adapt to complex industrial control scenarios.

Method used

Adopt a virtualization-based security protection system for industrial control equipment, including data acquisition module, trap module and result analysis module, run Windows/Linux operating system and real-time operating system through the hypervisor, and dynamically collect data and update models using the simulation system. Spoof attackers and predict potential attack behaviors, build virtual industrial control systems through multiple virtual controllers, listen and analyze control instructions, and warn and filter malicious instructions in advance.

Benefits of technology

Effectively defend against attacks carried out by attackers after stealing legal identities, avoid causing damage to industrial production, provide higher simulation of industrial control system simulation, enhance defense capabilities against APT attacks, integrate virtualization and real-time operating systems, and improve system adaptability and linkage.

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Abstract

The present invention discloses a security protection system for industrial control equipment based on virtualization, which includes: a data acquisition module, a trap module, a control instruction module, and a result analysis module; the data acquisition module dynamically collects the status and data of field equipment and provides the data to the trap module; the trap module lures attackers to access and attack by running a simulation system of the industrial control system; the control instruction module monitors the control instructions from the host computer in the industrial control system at the edge gateway and forwards the instructions to the trap module; the result analysis module analyzes the operation results of the simulation system to determine whether the results are safe. The security protection system provided by the present invention can effectively resist attacks on the industrial control system and ensure the production order of the factory.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of industrial control safety technology, and in particular to a safety protection system for industrial control equipment based on virtualization. Background Art

[0002] With the continuous development of emerging technologies such as the Internet of Things and cloud computing, as well as the continuous advancement of the integration of automation and informatization, the original lack of security considerations in the design of equipment in industrial control systems (ICS) has caused more and more industrial control systems to expose serious shortcomings of structural vulnerability. This includes the use of insecure industrial control protocols (such as the Modbus protocol without encryption and authentication) and product lifecycle management that does not comply with security regulations. Industrial equipment firmware, operating systems, and other software vulnerabilities are frequent, and devices with such vulnerabilities will attract attackers and become vulnerable targets. As more and more industrial environments are connected to corporate intranets or the Internet, attacks on industrial control system networks are emerging in an endless stream.

[0003] In order to protect the ICS environment from attacks by malicious entities, traditional security mechanisms such as cryptography, firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDS, IPS) and other solutions can be used. However, these solutions are more targeted at known attacks. For unknown attacks such as highly concealed APT attacks, these passive defense methods cannot help security researchers observe and analyze how attackers execute attacks and predict the harm caused by attacks in advance. At present, more and more researchers are focusing on the research of honeypots for active defense. Honeypot is an application that is used as bait to lure hackers to launch attacks. A simulated network composed of multiple honeypots implemented on a system is called a honeynet. Industrial control honeypots can be used to simulate a variety of industrial control protocols and industrial control equipment, and fully capture the attacker's access traffic. The honeypot host can record various types of attack information accessing the host. Moreover, the honeypot is deployed in the bypass to monitor network data. By collecting the network communication data mirrored by the switch, the attacker's communication data packets are analyzed to discover the attacker's network attack behavior and its data packets.

[0004] Existing honeypots and honeynets have limited defense capabilities against unknown threats to real ICS. At the same time, they cannot simulate business logic and are difficult to resist APT attacks with strong concealment. At present, most industrial control honeypots and honeynets are deployed in ICS in a bypass manner. They are independent of the actual production system. Industrial control honeypots are often very different from real ICS when deployed, and are easily identified by attackers. Moreover, due to their isolation in deployment, they lack linkage with existing security mechanisms. High-interaction honeypot systems can detect attacks against unknown vulnerabilities, but only when the vulnerabilities exploited by attackers exist in the application used when building the honeypot, which limits the capture range of the honeypot. Honeypots also have the function of springboards. If the honeypot is compromised, there is a risk that the honeypot will be used as a springboard to attack other industrial control devices, affecting the normal operation of the ICS. Therefore, it is urgent to readjust the security strategy of industrial control systems to resist unknown APT attacks as the focus of industrial control system security research.

[0005] The existing attack identification and defense architecture and system based on ICS honeypots and honeynets have four main shortcomings:

[0006] (1) Mostly theoretical research, rarely used in production systems

[0007] Since the devices in ICS try their best to avoid interruptions or downtime and ensure real-time constraints on response time, most honeypots and honeynets remain for research purposes and are not used in real production environments.

[0008] (2) Low degree of simulation and insufficient deception

[0009] Honeypots and honeynets proposed for ICS can play a role in scanning, target protocols, attack sources and brute force cracking, but low-interaction honeypots are not enough to build a highly simulated industrial control system network to deceive smart attackers.

[0010] (3) Few open source honeypots limit research progress

[0011] Currently, there are relatively few open source ICS honeypots and honeynets, and the lack of available honeypot tools has limited the development of using honeypot technology to defend against ICS.

[0012] (4) Static simulation, lack of adaptability

[0013] For industrial control honeypots and honeynets based on static specifications, even if the implementation is completely consistent with the protocol specification, it may still be different from the actual implementation of the real system. For example, a system with a proprietary implementation in a real utility environment.

[0014] The main reasons for the above shortcomings include two aspects: (1) The industrial control scenarios are complex and diverse, resulting in a variety of industrial control attack types. The existing honeypot-based defense strategies are mainly set for simple attack types such as scanning, which makes it difficult to effectively defend against APT attacks on industrial control networks. (2) With the development of anti-honeypot technology, industrial control honeypots are difficult to deceive hackers, thus putting forward new requirements for the virtualization-based industrial control system security architecture. Summary of the invention

[0015] In view of the existing problems, an object of the present invention is to provide a security protection system for industrial control equipment based on virtualization to solve the above problems.

[0016] The present invention provides the following technical solution:

[0017] A security protection system for industrial control equipment based on virtualization, characterized in that it includes: a data acquisition module, a trap module, a control instruction module, and a result analysis module; the data acquisition module dynamically collects the status and data of field equipment and provides the data to the trap module; the trap module lures attackers to access and attack by running a simulation system of the industrial control system; the control instruction module monitors the control instructions from the host computer in the industrial control system at the edge gateway and forwards the instructions to the trap module; the result analysis module analyzes the running results of the simulation system to determine whether the results are safe.

[0018] The system is deployed on an industrial server and runs the general Windows / Linux operating system and the real-time operating system in parallel through a virtual machine hypervisor. The simulation system of the industrial control system runs in the real-time operating system, and the simulation system consists of multiple virtual controllers.

[0019] The data acquisition module defines a universal sensor interface on the operating system of the industrial control system, so that the data acquisition module can access the sensors mounted in the operating system through the same interface to collect real-time data. The universal sensor interface is not bound to a specific hardware device.

[0020] The trap module dynamically updates the model and parameters of the simulation system through real-time data acquisition by the data acquisition module, so that the simulation system can perform calculations based on the real industrial control system status and discover and predict potential attack behaviors.

[0021] The trap module runs the set parameters and functions to obtain the running result of the control instruction module forwarding instruction.

[0022] The trap module connects the simulation system used for cheating to the real industrial control system through technical methods such as data modeling, parameter estimation, control application deduction, and anomaly detection algorithm, so that the simulation system and the real industrial control system are executed in parallel, and the threat of abnormal instructions is deduced in advance and a warning is issued.

[0023] The control instruction module monitors the control instructions from the host computer in the real industrial control system at the edge gateway, and forwards both normal instructions and malicious instructions to the simulation system in the trap module, driving multiple virtual controllers to run collaboratively and form a virtual industrial control system.

[0024] The result analysis module analyzes the running results of the simulation system, issues threat warnings for results that do not comply with security rules, and records the behavior process of malicious instructions.

[0025] The beneficial technical effects of the present invention are:

[0026] The security protection system for industrial control equipment based on virtualization provided by the present invention can lure attackers to attack the trap module, analyze the received malicious instructions, and deduce the threat of malicious instructions in advance, thereby filtering instructions carrying APT attacks. The present invention can effectively defend against attacks carried out by attackers after stealing legitimate identities, and avoid substantial damage to industrial production. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0027] Figure 1 It is a structural diagram of the security protection system of industrial control equipment based on virtualization provided by the present invention;

[0028] Figure 2 It is a layout principle diagram of the security protection system of the virtualized industrial control equipment provided by the present invention in a real industrial control system;

[0029] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the interaction between a virtual industrial control system and a real industrial control system in an embodiment of a security protection system for virtualized industrial control equipment provided by the present invention.

[0030] Figure 4 It is a schematic diagram of the principle of deploying a virtualized industrial control equipment security protection system in an embodiment of the present invention to display a production scene. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0031] The embodiments of the present invention are described in detail below. The following embodiments are implemented on the premise of the technical solution of the present invention, and detailed implementation methods and specific operation processes are given, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited to the following embodiments. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0032] Reference to "embodiments" herein means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in conjunction with the embodiments may be included in at least one embodiment of the present application. The appearance of the phrase in various locations in the specification does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, nor is it an independent or alternative embodiment that is mutually exclusive with other embodiments. It is explicitly and implicitly understood by those skilled in the art that the embodiments described herein may be combined with other embodiments without conflict.

[0033] Example 1

[0034] like Figure 1 As shown, in a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the security protection system for industrial control equipment based on virtualization includes: a data acquisition module, a trap module, a control instruction module, and a result analysis module; the data acquisition module dynamically collects the status and data of the field equipment and provides the data to the trap module; the trap module lures attackers to access and attack by running a simulation system of the industrial control system; the control instruction module monitors the control instructions from the host computer in the industrial control system at the edge gateway and forwards the instructions to the trap module; the result analysis module analyzes the running results of the simulation system to determine whether the results are safe.

[0035] The system is deployed on an industrial server and runs the general Windows / Linux operating system and the real-time operating system in parallel through a virtual machine hypervisor. The simulation system of the industrial control system runs in the real-time operating system, and the simulation system consists of multiple virtual controllers.

[0036] like Figure 3 As shown, the data acquisition module defines a universal sensor interface on the operating system of the industrial control system, so that the data acquisition module accesses the sensor mounted in the operating system through the same interface to collect real-time data. The universal sensor interface is not bound to a specific hardware device.

[0037] like Figure 2 As shown, the trap module dynamically updates the model and parameters of the simulation system through real-time data acquisition by the data acquisition module, so that the simulation system can perform calculations based on the real industrial control system status and discover and predict potential attack behaviors.

[0038] The trap module runs the set parameters and functions to obtain the running result of the control instruction module forwarding instruction.

[0039] The trap module connects the simulation system used for cheating to the real industrial control system through technical methods such as data modeling, parameter estimation, control application deduction, and anomaly detection algorithm, so that the simulation system and the real industrial control system are executed in parallel, and the threat of abnormal instructions is deduced in advance and a warning is issued.

[0040] The control instruction module monitors the control instructions from the host computer in the real industrial control system at the edge gateway, and forwards normal instructions and malicious instructions to the simulation system in the trap module, driving multiple virtual controllers to run collaboratively and form a virtual industrial control system.

[0041] The result analysis module analyzes the running results of the simulation system, issues threat warnings for results that do not comply with security rules, and records the behavior process of malicious instructions.

[0042] Example 2

[0043] like Figure 4 As shown, in a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the security protection system for industrial control equipment based on virtualization specifically introduces the security protection system for industrial control equipment based on virtualization into the pumping control system of an automated water plant.

[0044] Water tank 1 and water tank 2 are provided with sensors, which identify the water level in the water tanks and maintain the water level in a safe state through an industrial control system.

[0045] The status and data of water tank 1 and water tank 2 are sent to the simulation system through the data acquisition module. A security protection system based on virtualized industrial control equipment is deployed on the virtualized industrial server. The server is connected to the real industrial control system through the trap module to realize dynamic deception simulation. Attackers can easily think that the simulation system is a real industrial control system.

[0046] The security protection system of industrial control equipment based on virtualization collects the data and status of field equipment in real time through the control instruction module and transmits them as input values ​​to the virtual controller. Through the result analysis module, the simulation system obtains the operation results of the control instructions earlier than the real industrial control system to make safety judgments.

[0047] The security protection system provided by the above-mentioned embodiment of the present invention can effectively resist attacks on the industrial control system and ensure the production order of the factory.

[0048] The preferred specific embodiments of the present invention are described in detail above. It should be understood that ordinary technicians in the field can make many modifications and changes based on the concept of the present invention without creative work. Therefore, all technical solutions that can be obtained by technicians in the technical field based on the concept of the present invention through logical analysis, reasoning or limited experiments on the basis of the prior art should be within the scope of protection determined by the claims.

Claims

1. A security protection system for industrial control equipment based on virtualization, characterized in that: It includes: Data acquisition module, trap module, control instruction module, result analysis module; the data acquisition module dynamically collects the status and data of the field equipment and provides the data to the trap module; The trap module runs the simulation system of the industrial control system to lure attackers to access and attack; the control instruction module monitors the control instructions from the host computer in the industrial control system at the edge gateway and forwards the instructions to the trap module; the result analysis module analyzes the operation results of the simulation system to determine whether the results are safe; The system is deployed on an industrial server and runs a general Windows / Linux operating system and a real-time operating system in parallel through a virtual machine hypervisor; A simulation system of an industrial control system is run in the real-time operating system, wherein the simulation system is composed of a plurality of virtual controllers; The data acquisition module defines a universal sensor interface on the operating system of the industrial control system, so that the data acquisition module accesses the sensor mounted in the operating system through the same interface to collect real-time data; The universal sensor interface is not bound to a specific hardware device; The trap module dynamically updates the model and parameters of the simulation system through real-time collection by the data acquisition module, so that the simulation system can perform calculations based on the real industrial control system status to discover and predict potential attack behaviors; The trap module connects the simulation system used for deceivers to the real industrial control system through technical methods such as data modeling, parameter estimation, control application deduction, and anomaly detection algorithm, so that the simulation system and the real industrial control system are executed in parallel, and the threat of abnormal instructions is deduced in advance and a warning is issued.

2. The security protection system for virtualized industrial control equipment according to claim 1, characterized in that: The trap module obtains the operation result of the forwarding instruction of the control instruction module through the set parameters and function operation.

3. The security protection system for industrial control equipment based on virtualization according to claim 1, characterized in that: The control instruction module monitors the control instructions from the host computer in the real industrial control system at the edge gateway, forwards normal instructions and malicious instructions to the simulation system in the trap module, drives multiple virtual controllers to run in coordination and form a virtual industrial control system.

4. The security protection system for industrial control equipment based on virtualization according to claim 1, characterized in that: The result analysis module analyzes the operation results of the simulation system, issues threat warnings for results that do not comply with security rules, and records the behavior process of malicious instructions.