GPS deception jamming detection method based on magnetic heading of unmanned aerial vehicle

Abstract

The invention relates to a GPS deception jamming detection method based on the magnetic heading of an unmanned aerial vehicle. An AB segment, a BC segment, a CD segment and a DA segment of a virtual route are built by using a current position of an unmanned aerial vehicle as a starting point A and a current heading as the direction; the unmanned aerial vehicle is guided to fly along the AB segmentand consumed flight time Tf is recorded; if a distance Dd of deviation of the unmanned aerial vehicle to the virtual route is less than or equal to a threshold Kd, a difference between the current magnetic heading and the angle of the unmanned aerial vehicle is calculated every one second and the difference is marked as gamma; after the unmanned aerial vehicle arrives at a B point, average filtering is performed on the angle difference within the period of time to obtain an average deviation and the unmanned aerial vehicle is guided to enter the BC segment; if the Dd is larger than Kd, counting is started; if the lasting time exceeds five seconds, the GPS of the unmanned aerial vehicle is determined to be affected and detection is stopped; and if the consumed flight time Tf is larger than2t and the unmanned aerial vehicle is determined not to arrive at the B point, the GPS of the unmanned aerial vehicle is determined to be affected and detection is stopped; and determination of the BC segment, the CD segment and the DA segment is performed successively.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the field of unmanned aerial vehicle navigation, more specifically, a method for detecting GPS spoofing interference based on the magnetic heading of an unmanned aerial vehicle. Background technique [0002] At present, the navigation of most drones is based on the GPS receiver. The ground operator determines the position, speed and track angle of the drone according to the position information output by the GPS receiver, and controls the drone to fly to the designated area. When the ground operator loses the monitoring link to the UAV, the autonomous return process of the UAV also depends on the position information output by the GPS receiver to navigate to the predetermined area. Therefore, the correctness of the output data of the GPS receiver has no effect on Human-machine navigation is critical. [0003] GPS jamming is divided into suppressive jamming and deceptive jamming. Deceived interference will cause the GPS receiv...

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