A hardware module encryption method and encryption device
By using encryption algorithms and secure memory in hardware modules to dynamically transmit random numbers and generate and compare authentication codes, the problem of hardware modules being easily piracy and imitation is solved, and the security and cracking of hardware modules are improved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202010988974.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2020-09-18
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-29
- Estimated Expiration
- 2040-09-18
AI Technical Summary
Existing hardware modules lack effective protection mechanisms, are prone to pirated and imitated, and calibration data stored through external memory is easily obtained by third parties, resulting in limited security.
The random number generated by the hardware module is obtained through the secure memory, and the encryption algorithm is calculated using the random number, key and security code, and the first and second authentication codes are generated, and the authentication codes are compared in the hardware module to determine whether to enter the user program. Transfer random numbers to increase cracking difficulty.
It effectively reduces the possibility of hardware modules being cracked, ensures that imitation hardware without the manufacturer's authorization cannot work normally. Only authorized hardware can work normally through software authentication, thereby improving the security and difficulty of hardware modules to prevent imitation.
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Figure CN112100692B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present disclosure relates to the field of encryption technology, and in particular to an encryption method and an encryption device for a hardware module. Background Art
[0002] In the process of hardware device or board development, in order to reduce development costs, a large number of general processor hardware modules are adopted, resulting in the appearance, device selection and layout of hardware modules with good market sales becoming the object of imitation. Most of the current hardware modules have no protection mechanism or only simple and easy-to-crack protection due to cost considerations. For experienced plagiarists, a little external detection equipment can obtain the internal configuration and program data of the hardware module, making the design of the hardware module extremely easy to be pirated.
[0003] In order to solve the above problems, the calibration data of the corresponding hardware module can be stored in the external memory, and the corresponding hardware module can be judged as a genuine module or a non-original genuine module through the calibration of the data. However, because the data to be calibrated is stored in the external memory, during the configuration phase, all the data is exposed to the outside and can be easily detected by a third party through instruments to obtain an illegal copy. The processor cannot distinguish whether the bit stream is real data or copied data. Illegal data can obtain the permission for the program to run further. Therefore, the cost of cracking this model is not high, and the security is limited. Summary of the invention
[0004] In order to solve the above technical problems or at least partially solve the above technical problems, the present disclosure provides an encryption method and an encryption device for a hardware module, which utilize random numbers to greatly reduce the possibility of the hardware module being cracked, increase the difficulty of the hardware module being cracked, and effectively prevent the hardware module from being imitated by a third party.
[0005] In a first aspect, the present disclosure provides an encryption method for a hardware module, comprising:
[0006] The secure memory obtains the random number generated by the hardware module and sets an encryption algorithm according to the random number, the key and the security code to obtain a first authentication code;
[0007] The hardware module performs the set encryption algorithm according to the random number, the key and the security code to obtain a second authentication code;
[0008] The hardware module obtains the first authentication code, compares the first authentication code with the second authentication code, and determines whether to enter the setting user program according to the comparison result.
[0009] Optionally, the hardware module compares the first authentication code with the second authentication code and determines whether to enter a setting user program according to the comparison result, including:
[0010] If the first authentication code is consistent with the second authentication code, the hardware module enters the user program.
[0011] Optionally, the hardware module compares the first authentication code with the second authentication code and determines whether to enter a setting user program according to the comparison result, including:
[0012] If the first authentication code is inconsistent with the second authentication code, the hardware module exits the program.
[0013] Optionally, before the hardware module performs the setting encryption algorithm according to the random number, the key and the security code to obtain the second authentication code, the method further includes:
[0014] The hardware module obtains the key and the security code stored in the secure memory.
[0015] Optionally, the set encryption algorithm includes an information digest algorithm or a secure hash algorithm.
[0016] In a second aspect, the present disclosure provides an encryption device for a hardware module, comprising:
[0017] A secure memory, wherein the secure memory is connected to the hardware module via a bus;
[0018] The secure memory is used to obtain a random number generated by the hardware module through the bus and set an encryption algorithm according to the random number, the key and the security code to obtain a first authentication code;
[0019] The hardware module is used to perform the setting encryption algorithm according to the random number, the key and the security code to obtain a second authentication code, and to obtain the first authentication code through the bus, compare the first authentication code with the second authentication code and determine whether to enter the setting user program according to the comparison result.
[0020] Optionally, the bus is a single bus.
[0021] Optionally, the signal transmission node on the bus is connected to the set power supply signal through an impedance element.
[0022] Optionally, the hardware module includes a field programmable logic gate array or a power supply hardware module.
[0023] Optionally, the secure memory includes a DS28E01 model chip.
[0024] Compared with the prior art, the technical solution provided by the embodiments of the present disclosure has the following advantages:
[0025] The encryption method and encryption device of the hardware module provided by the embodiment of the present disclosure set a secure memory to obtain the random number generated by the hardware module and set the encryption algorithm according to the random number, key and security code to obtain the first authentication code, the hardware module sets the encryption algorithm according to the random number, key and security code to obtain the second authentication code, the hardware module obtains the first authentication code, compares the first authentication code and the second authentication code and judges whether to enter the setting user program according to the comparison result. The key lies in the random number. In this way, the embodiment of the present disclosure dynamically transmits random numbers between the secure memory and the hardware module, and the use of random numbers greatly reduces the possibility of the hardware module being cracked, which can effectively ensure that the simulated hardware module cannot work properly without the authorization of the manufacturer. Only after the authorization of the manufacturer and the authentication of the software algorithm between the hardware module and the carrier board, the hardware module can work normally, thereby increasing the difficulty of the hardware module being cracked and effectively preventing the hardware module from being copied by a third party. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0026] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with the present disclosure and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of the present disclosure.
[0027] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, for ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative labor.
[0028] Figure 1 A flowchart of an encryption method for a hardware module provided in an embodiment of the present disclosure;
[0029] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of data transmission between a secure memory and a hardware module provided in an embodiment of the present disclosure;
[0030] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the structure of an encryption device for a hardware module provided in an embodiment of the present disclosure. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0031] In order to more clearly understand the above-mentioned objectives, features and advantages of the present disclosure, the scheme of the present disclosure will be further described below. It should be noted that the embodiments of the present disclosure and the features in the embodiments can be combined with each other without conflict.
[0032] In the following description, many specific details are set forth to facilitate a full understanding of the present disclosure, but the present disclosure may also be implemented in other ways different from those described herein; it is obvious that the embodiments in the specification are only part of the embodiments of the present disclosure, rather than all of the embodiments.
[0033] Figure 1 The flowchart of a method for encrypting a hardware module provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown. The method for encrypting a hardware module can be applied to application scenarios where encryption of the hardware module is required, and can be executed by the encryption device for the hardware module provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure. Figure 1 As shown, the encryption method of the hardware module includes:
[0034] S110. The secure memory obtains a random number generated by the hardware module and sets an encryption algorithm according to the random number, the key and the security code to obtain a first authentication code.
[0035] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of data transmission between a secure memory and a hardware module provided in an embodiment of the present disclosure. Figure 2 As shown, the hardware module 1 generates a random number. The hardware module 1 may include a random number generator for generating random numbers. The hardware module 1 is electrically connected to the secure memory 2. The hardware module 1 transmits the generated random number to the secure memory 2.
[0036] The security code refers to the ROM (Read Only Memory) ID of the security memory, also known as the identification code. The security code of the security memory is set at the factory. The length of the ROM ID of each security memory is 64 bits and unique. The key refers to the parameter input in the algorithm for converting plain text to cipher text or cipher text to plain text, that is, the secret information used to complete cryptographic applications such as encryption, decryption or integrity verification. The security memory 2 stores a unique security code. The key can be obtained using the master key and the unique security code stored in the security memory 2, that is, using a non-specific algorithm, or combining the ROM ID of the security memory to generate an 8-byte key.
[0037] After obtaining the random number generated by the hardware module 1, the secure memory 2 sets the encryption algorithm according to the random number, the key and the security code to obtain the first authentication code C1. Exemplarily, the encryption algorithm can be a message digest algorithm, i.e., the MD5 (Message Digest Algorithm 5) algorithm. The message digest algorithm is one of the hash algorithms widely used by computers. The basic principle of the hash algorithm is to calculate the data into another fixed-length value. It is often used for file verification. No matter how large the file is, a unique message digest value can be generated after the message digest algorithm. The message digest algorithm allows large-capacity information to be compressed into a confidential format before signing the private key with a digital signature software, that is, to transform a byte string of arbitrary length into a hexadecimal digit string of a certain length. The message digest algorithm has the characteristics of fixed length of the message digest value, easy calculation and strong anti-modification.
[0038] Exemplarily, the encryption algorithm may also be a secure hash algorithm, namely the SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) algorithm, also known as a secure hash algorithm, which is mainly applicable to the digital signature algorithm (DSA) defined in the Digital Signature Standard (DSS). The secure hash algorithm receives a plain text and converts it into a cipher text in an irreversible way. It can be understood as taking a string of input codes, namely pre-mapping or information, and converting them into a shorter length, fixed-bit output sequence, namely a hash value, namely a message digest or information authentication code.
[0039] The secure memory 2 can obtain a unique first authentication code C1 by performing an information digest algorithm based on the random number, the key and the security code. The secure memory 2 can also obtain a unique first authentication code C1 by performing a secure hash algorithm based on the random number, the key and the security code. The process of obtaining the first authentication code C1 from the random number, the key and the security code via an information digest algorithm or a secure hash algorithm is well known to those skilled in the art and will not be discussed in detail here.
[0040] S120: The hardware module sets an encryption algorithm according to the random number, the key and the security code to obtain a second authentication code.
[0041] Alternatively, if Figure 2 As shown, before the hardware module 1 sets an encryption algorithm according to the random number, the key and the security code to obtain the second authentication code C2, the hardware module 1 can be configured to obtain the key and the security code stored in the secure memory 2.
[0042] Specifically, the security memory 2 stores keys and security codes internally, and there is an electrical connection between the security memory 2 and the hardware module 1. The security memory 2 sends the keys and security codes stored internally to the hardware module 1. After the hardware module 1 obtains the keys and security codes stored internally in the security memory 2, it uses the random numbers generated by itself to set an encryption algorithm according to the random numbers, keys and security codes to obtain the second authentication code C2.
[0043] Exemplarily, the encryption algorithm can also be an information digest algorithm or a secure hash algorithm. Similarly, the hardware module 1 can obtain a unique second authentication code C2 by performing an information digest algorithm based on the random number, key and security code. The hardware module 1 can also obtain a unique second authentication code C2 by performing a secure hash algorithm based on the random number, key and security code. The process of obtaining the second authentication code C2 from the random number, key and security code via an information digest algorithm or a secure hash algorithm is well known to those skilled in the art and will not be discussed in detail here.
[0044] It should be noted that the setting encryption algorithm used by the secure memory 2 is the same as the setting encryption algorithm used by the hardware module 1 , and both may use the information digest algorithm or the secure hash algorithm.
[0045] S130: The hardware module obtains a first authentication code, compares the first authentication code with a second authentication code, and determines whether to enter a setting user program according to the comparison result.
[0046] Specifically, Figure 2 As shown, there is an electrical connection between the hardware module 1 and the security memory 2. The hardware module 1 can obtain the first authentication code C1 generated by the security memory 2, and compare the first authentication code C1 generated by the security memory 2 with the second authentication code C2 generated by the hardware module 1 itself, and determine whether to enter the set user program based on the comparison result.
[0047] Optionally, the hardware module 1 compares the first authentication code C1 and the second authentication code C2 and determines whether to enter the set user program according to the comparison result. It can be set that if the first authentication code C1 is consistent with the second authentication code C2, the hardware module 1 enters the user program. If the first authentication code C1 is inconsistent with the second authentication code C2, the hardware module 1 exits the program.
[0048] Specifically, since the hardware module 1 can transmit the generated random number to the secure memory 2, if the hardware module 1 is in a normal state, since the first authentication code C1 obtained by the secure memory 2 is obtained by the random number, the key and the security code through the set encryption algorithm, the second authentication code C2 obtained by the hardware module 1 is obtained by the same random number, the same key and the same security code through the same set encryption algorithm, so the first authentication code C1 and the second authentication code C2 are consistent. Therefore, if the first authentication code C1 is consistent with the second authentication code C2, it means that the hardware module 1 is in a normal state. At this time, the hardware module 1 enters the user program, that is, the hardware module 1 passes the authentication.
[0049] If there is a third party maliciously detecting hardware module 1, and the third party cannot obtain the random number generated by hardware module 1, then the authentication code it obtains based on different random numbers is likely to be inconsistent with the first authentication code C1. Therefore, if the first authentication code C1 is inconsistent with the second authentication code C2, it means that there is a third party maliciously detecting hardware module 1. At this time, hardware module 1 exits the user program, and hardware module 1 can also perform other operations instead of normal work. At this time, hardware module 1 fails the authentication.
[0050] At present, hardware modules either have no protection mechanism, or simply verify by calculating and comparing preset values. The hardware module generally has a unique serial number, namely the device ID, which is built into the hardware module when it leaves the factory. According to the unique ID serial number, combined with the relevant encryption algorithm and the external storage chip, the encryption protection of the hardware module can be realized. After the hardware module is powered on, it first enters the encryption program through the boot program. The encryption program reads the unique ID preset in the hardware module by the manufacturer, calculates a comparison value through a specific algorithm, and then reads the external memory, such as the preset comparison value stored in a specific location in the external FLASH (flash memory), and compares the two to see if they are consistent. If they are consistent, it means that the hardware module is a genuine module shipped by the manufacturer; if they are inconsistent, it means that the hardware module is damaged or not produced by the original manufacturer, and the module will perform system power-off processing.
[0051] However, because the data to be calibrated is stored in an external memory, during the configuration phase, the data is exposed to the outside and can be easily detected by a third party through an instrument to obtain an illegal copy. The processor cannot distinguish whether the bit stream is real data or copied data, so illegal data can obtain the permission to further run the program. Therefore, the cost of cracking this mode is not high, and the security is limited. In other words, an obvious disadvantage of the existing technology is that once the ID of the hardware module is read externally, the external device can disguise itself as the processor and communicate with the FLASH to gain the trust of the system.
[0052] In the disclosed embodiment, after the hardware module 1 is powered on, the hardware module 1 starts from the default external configuration and enters the authentication program. The hardware module 1 authentication program generates a random number and sends it to the secure memory 2. The secure memory 2 sets an encryption algorithm based on the random number, the built-in key and the unique security code to obtain a first authentication code C1. The hardware module 1 authentication program obtains a second authentication code C2 through the same input and the same set encryption algorithm. The hardware module 1 authentication program compares the first authentication code C1 with the second authentication code C2.
[0053] If the first authentication code C1 is consistent with the second authentication code C2, it means that the hardware module 1 is in a normal state, and the hardware module 1 enters the user program at this time, that is, the hardware module 1 passes the authentication. If there is a third party maliciously detecting the hardware module 1, and the third party cannot obtain the random number generated by the hardware module 1, then the authentication code obtained by it according to different random numbers is likely to be inconsistent with the first authentication code C1. Therefore, if the first authentication code C1 is inconsistent with the second authentication code C2, it means that there is a third party maliciously detecting the hardware module 1. At this time, the hardware module 1 exits the user program, and the hardware module 1 can also perform other operations instead of normal operation. At this time, the hardware module 1 fails to pass the authentication. In this way, the embodiment of the present disclosure dynamically transmits random numbers between the secure memory 2 and the hardware module 1, and the use of random numbers greatly reduces the possibility of the hardware module 1 being cracked, and can effectively ensure that the imitated hardware module 1 cannot work properly without the authorization of the manufacturer. Only after the authorization of the manufacturer, the hardware module 1 and the carrier board pass the authentication of the software algorithm, the hardware module 1 can work normally, thereby increasing the difficulty of the hardware module 1 being cracked, and effectively preventing the hardware module 1 from being copied by a third party.
[0054] The present disclosure also provides an encryption device for a hardware module. Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the structure of an encryption device of a hardware module provided in an embodiment of the present disclosure. Figure 2 and Figure 3 The encryption device of the hardware module includes a secure memory 2, and the secure memory 2 is connected to the hardware module 1 via a bus 3. Exemplarily, the bus 3 may be a single bus, which is a peripheral serial expansion bus technology that uses a single signal line to transmit both clock and data, and the data is transmitted bidirectionally. The single bus is used to realize the connection between the secure memory 2 and the hardware module 1. On the basis of realizing the data transmission between the secure memory 2 and the hardware module 1, the hardware connection relationship between the hardware module 1 and the secure memory 2 is effectively simplified.
[0055] The security memory 2 is used to obtain the random number generated by the hardware module 1 through the bus 3 and set the encryption algorithm according to the random number, the key and the security code to obtain the first authentication code C1. The hardware module 1 is used to set the encryption algorithm according to the random number, the key and the security code to obtain the second authentication code C2, and to obtain the first authentication code C1 through the bus 3, compare the first authentication code C1 with the second authentication code C2 and determine whether to enter the set user program according to the comparison result.
[0056] Specifically, after the hardware module 1 is powered on, the hardware module 1 starts from the default external configuration and enters the authentication program. The hardware module 1 authentication program generates a random number and sends the random number to the secure memory 2 through the bus. The secure memory 2 sets an encryption algorithm based on the random number, the built-in key and the unique security code to obtain a first authentication code C1. The hardware module 1 also obtains the key and security code stored in the secure memory 2 and the first authentication code C1 generated by the secure memory 2 through the bus. The hardware module 1 authentication program obtains the second authentication code C2 through the same input and the same set encryption algorithm. The hardware module 1 authentication program compares the first authentication code C1 and the second authentication code C2.
[0057] If the first authentication code C1 is consistent with the second authentication code C2, it means that the hardware module 1 is in a normal state, and the hardware module 1 enters the user program at this time, that is, the hardware module 1 passes the authentication. If there is a third party maliciously detecting the hardware module 1, the third party cannot obtain the random number generated by the hardware module 1, and the authentication code obtained by the third party based on the different random numbers is likely to be inconsistent with the first authentication code C1. Therefore, if the first authentication code C1 is inconsistent with the second authentication code C2, it means that there is a third party maliciously detecting the hardware module 1, and the hardware module 1 exits the user program at this time. The hardware module 1 can also perform other operations instead of normal work, and the hardware module 1 fails the authentication at this time.
[0058] In this way, the embodiment of the present disclosure utilizes a single bus with a relatively simple connection relationship to dynamically transmit random numbers between the secure memory 2 and the hardware module 1. The use of random numbers greatly reduces the possibility of the hardware module 1 being cracked, and can effectively ensure that the simulated hardware module 1 cannot work normally without the manufacturer's authorization. Only after the manufacturer's authorization and the authentication of the software algorithm between the hardware module 1 and the carrier board can the hardware module 1 work normally, thereby increasing the difficulty of the hardware module 1 being cracked and effectively preventing the hardware module 1 from being imitated by a third party.
[0059] Alternatively, if Figure 3 As shown, the signal transmission node N on the bus 3 can be connected to the set power signal through the impedance element R1. Specifically, the signal transmission node N on the bus 3 is a node at any position on the bus 3 connecting the secure memory 2 and the hardware module 1. The set power signal can be, for example, a positive power signal VDD. The signal transmission node N on the bus 3 is connected to the set power signal VDD through the impedance element R1 to form an open-drain configuration. The impedance element R1 forms a pull-up element, so that the operating voltage of the secure memory 2 is consistent with that of the hardware module 1, and the operating voltage of the secure memory 2 and the hardware module 1 is balanced to ensure that the secure memory 2 and the hardware module 1 can communicate normally.
[0060] Exemplarily, the hardware module 1 may include a field programmable gate array, that is, the hardware module 1 may include an FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array), such as an FPGA produced by Xilinx. Exemplarily, the hardware module 1 may also include a power supply hardware module, and the power supply hardware module is encrypted using random numbers to reduce the possibility of the power supply hardware module being cracked, and effectively prevent the power supply hardware module from being copied by a third party.
[0061] Exemplarily, the secure memory 2 may include a DS28E01 chip. The DS28E01 chip is a 128-byte user memory that can be used for keys that are operated internally but cannot be read externally, as well as a unique and unchangeable security code. Using the DS28E01 chip as the secure memory 2 can further reduce the possibility of the hardware module 1 being cracked, while reducing the encryption cost of the hardware module 1, and effectively prevent the hardware module 1 from being copied by a third party.
[0062] The disclosed embodiment utilizes a single bus with a relatively simple connection relationship to dynamically transmit random numbers between the secure memory 2 and the hardware module 1. The use of random numbers greatly reduces the possibility of the hardware module 1 being cracked, and can effectively ensure that the simulated hardware module 1 cannot work normally without the manufacturer's authorization. Only after the manufacturer's authorization and the authentication of the software algorithm between the hardware module 1 and the carrier board can the hardware module 1 work normally, thereby increasing the difficulty of the hardware module 1 being cracked and effectively preventing the hardware module 1 from being imitated by a third party.
[0063] It should be noted that, in this article, relational terms such as "first" and "second" are only used to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "include", "comprise" or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or device. In the absence of further restrictions, the elements defined by the sentence "comprise a ..." do not exclude the existence of other identical elements in the process, method, article or device including the elements.
[0064] The above are only specific embodiments of the present disclosure, so that those skilled in the art can understand or implement the present disclosure. Various modifications to these embodiments will be apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein can be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the present disclosure. Therefore, the present disclosure will not be limited to these embodiments herein, but will conform to the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.
Claims
1. A method for encrypting a hardware module, characterized in that: include: The secure memory obtains the random number generated by the hardware module and sets an encryption algorithm according to the random number, the key and the security code to obtain a first authentication code; The hardware module performs the set encryption algorithm according to the random number, the key and the security code to obtain a second authentication code; The hardware module obtains the first authentication code, compares the first authentication code with the second authentication code, and determines whether to enter the setting user program according to the comparison result; The security code and the key are stored in the secure memory, and the secure memory cannot be read from the outside; the security code is unique and cannot be changed, and the key is obtained based on the security code; Before the hardware module performs the setting encryption algorithm according to the random number, the key and the security code to obtain the second authentication code, it also includes: the hardware module obtains the key and the security code stored in the secure memory.
2. The encryption method of the hardware module according to claim 1, characterized in that: The hardware module compares the first authentication code with the second authentication code and determines whether to enter the setting user program according to the comparison result, including: If the first authentication code is consistent with the second authentication code, the hardware module enters the user program.
3. The encryption method of the hardware module according to claim 1, characterized in that: The hardware module compares the first authentication code with the second authentication code and determines whether to enter the setting user program according to the comparison result, including: If the first authentication code is inconsistent with the second authentication code, the hardware module exits the program.
4. The encryption method of the hardware module according to claim 1, characterized in that: The set encryption algorithm includes an information digest algorithm or a secure hash algorithm.
5. An encryption device for a hardware module, characterized in that: include: A secure memory, wherein the secure memory is connected to the hardware module via a bus; The secure memory is used to obtain a random number generated by the hardware module through the bus and set an encryption algorithm according to the random number, the key and the security code to obtain a first authentication code; The hardware module is used to perform the setting encryption algorithm according to the random number, the key and the security code to obtain a second authentication code, and to obtain the first authentication code through the bus, compare the first authentication code with the second authentication code and determine whether to enter the setting user program according to the comparison result; The security code and the key are stored in the secure memory, and the secure memory cannot be read from the outside; the security code is unique and cannot be changed, and the key is obtained based on the security code; The hardware module is also used to obtain the key and the security code stored in the secure memory.
6. The encryption device of the hardware module according to claim 5, characterized in that: The bus is a single bus.
7. The encryption device of the hardware module according to claim 6, characterized in that: The signal transmission node on the bus is connected to the set power supply signal through an impedance element.
8. The encryption device of the hardware module according to claim 5, characterized in that: The hardware module includes a field programmable logic gate array or a power supply hardware module.
9. The encryption device of the hardware module according to claim 5, characterized in that: The secure memory includes a DS28E01 chip.
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