Quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key
By adopting quantum signature and identity authentication methods based on quantum public keys in digital signatures and identity authentication, and using quantum gate transformation and unitary arithmetic, we solve the problems of low security and inability to withstand the threat of quantum computing in the existing technology, and achieve high efficiency. Quantum signatures and identity authentication.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411463779.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-10-21
- Publication Date
- 2025-01-24
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-10-21
AI Technical Summary
Existing digital signature and identity authentication methods are low in security, cannot detect eavesdropping, and face potential quantum computing threats.
The quantum signature and identity authentication method based on the quantum key, which includes the registration phase, initialization stage, the signature stage, the identity certification stage, and the signature verification stage. Essence
This method effectively resist quantum intermediate people attack, counterfeit attacks, retransmit attacks, and laser intermediate attacks to ensure the inseparable and uniformity of signature and identity authentication, and have better quantum bit efficiency.
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Figure CN119363354A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of quantum signature and quantum identity authentication, and in particular to a quantum signature and identity authentication method based on a quantum public key. Background Art
[0002] In recent years, with the rapid advancement of global informatization, we are in an era of information explosion, constantly processing huge data streams from all parties. Although technological progress has greatly facilitated daily life, it has also led to the intensification of information security issues, including the risk of private information leakage and data damage. With the development of science and technology and quantum computers, there are many security risks in the process of digital signatures. In particular, the emergence of Shor's algorithm has made public key cryptography systems based on large integer decomposition and discrete logarithm problems, such as asymmetric encryption algorithms (RSA) and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), face the risk of being cracked. The security of digital signatures depends on mathematical formulas, computational complexity and other characteristics. During the authentication and transmission process, it is more vulnerable to security threats from quantum adversaries with strong computing power. It is particularly important to ensure the security of these sensitive information. The security of digital signatures has become an important research topic. For ordinary classical authentication and classical digital signature schemes, the security is low, eavesdropping and potential quantum computing threats cannot be detected. Traditional digital signature methods are difficult to meet the requirements of security and real-time processing.
[0003] Currently, quantum signatures use the properties of quantum bits, such as the quantum no-cloning theorem, to ensure that signatures are unforgeable and non-repudiable. These methods aim to build a communication and authentication system that remains secure even in the presence of quantum computers. At the same time, in identity authentication, the indivisibility and unpredictability of quantum information greatly improve the security of the system and effectively resist man-in-the-middle attacks and other potential threats. Summary of the invention
[0004] The present invention provides a quantum signature and identity authentication method based on a quantum public key to solve the problems of low security of existing digital signatures and identity authentication, inability to detect eavesdropping and potential quantum computing threats.
[0005] Based on the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key, the method is implemented by registration stage, initialization stage, signature stage, identity authentication stage and signature verification stage; the specific steps of the method are:
[0006] Step 1: During the registration phase, user A registers his identity information with user C;
[0007] Step 2: Initialization phase, including key distribution initialization phase and quantum public key initialization phase;
[0008] The key distribution initialization phase obtains a sequence c of length 2n for quantum public key encryption;
[0009] The quantum public key initialization phase is specifically as follows:
[0010] Step B1: The encrypted identity information ID′ obtained by user A through hash function calculation A Perform a one-way function operation to change the length to n+1 and the state to |0 > or |1>, the quantum bit sequence is the quantum public key
[0011] Step B2: User A selects the corresponding quantum gate encryption operation based on the random combination value of sequence c to perform the quantum public key encryption. Encrypt and obtain the particle sequence ψ;
[0012] Step B3, user A randomly selects q decoy particles from the decoy particle sequence {|0>,|1>,|+>,|->}, and inserts them into the particle sequence ψ respectively, obtains the particle sequence ψ′, and records the position and original state of the decoy particles, q>>n+1, and sends the particle sequence ψ′ and the quantum gate encryption operation set C to user C;
[0013] Step 3: Signature phase;
[0014] User A converts the encrypted sequence of the original message M, the original message M and the particle sequence Sent to user B; the particle sequence The particle sequence obtained by inserting q decoy particles into the quantum signature of user A
[0015] Step 4: Identity authentication stage; the specific process is:
[0016] Step 41: User C receives the particle sequence ψ′ sent by user A. User A publishes the position and original state of the decoy particle in step B3. Based on the information published by user A, user C selects a corresponding measurement basis for measuring the decoy particle and compares the measurement result with the original state of the decoy particle. If the error rate in the measurement result is higher than the established threshold, user C terminates the protocol, otherwise, the protocol continues.
[0017] Step 42: After removing the decoy particles, user C obtains the particle sequence ψ. The received quantum gate encryption operation set C is used to perform the inverse operation of quantum gate encryption on the particle sequence ψ and measure the corresponding quantum state. The measurement result is recorded as and with ID′ in the database A For comparison, if It means that the identity authentication is passed and the identity authentication result K is recorded v=1, otherwise record K v =0, authentication will be terminated;
[0018] Step 43: After identity authentication, user C uses the key K shared with user B bc To K v Encrypt to get the encrypted identity authentication result K′ v , and send it to user B;
[0019] Step 5: Signature verification phase;
[0020] Identity authentication is ultimately achieved through signature verification.
[0021] Beneficial effects of the present invention: In order to ensure the anti-eavesdropping and anti-quantum attack security of traditional digital signatures and identity authentication, the method described in the present invention designs a public key encryption algorithm based on quantum gate transformation, which is applied to the quantum public key identity authentication stage. On the one hand, it is used for encryption processing of the public key, thereby reducing the threat of information leakage, and on the other hand, it is used in the identity authentication process to ensure the security of the signature identity. At the same time, a quantum signature method based on unitary operation is used to ensure the security and anti-quantum attack capability of the signature stage. Finally, the security analysis shows that the security of this method depends on the indistinguishability of unknown quantum sequences and the quantum man-in-the-middle attack threat model. Therefore, its security can be supported by formal proofs, and meets the requirements of unforgeability, non-repudiation and better quantum bit efficiency. At the same time, it can resist counterfeiting attacks, retransmission attacks and laser man-in-the-middle attacks.
[0022] The method described in the present invention is used for experimental analysis, which can effectively resist quantum man-in-the-middle attacks, counterfeit attacks, retransmission attacks and laser man-in-the-middle attacks. The correctness, unforgeability, non-repudiation and confidentiality of the private key of the method are proved in formal analysis, and it has better quantum bit efficiency. The method can give full play to the role of the physical properties of quantum mechanics in protecting information and effectively improve the security of signature and identity authentication. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0023] Figure 1 A flowchart of the registration phase in the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key according to the present invention;
[0024] Figure 2 Flow chart of the initialization phase in the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key described in the present invention;
[0025] Figure 3 Flow chart of the quantum public key encryption algorithm in the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key described in the present invention;
[0026] Figure 4Flow chart of the signature phase in the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key described in the present invention;
[0027] Figure 5 Flow chart of the identity authentication phase in the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key described in the present invention;
[0028] Figure 6 Flow chart of the signature verification phase in the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key described in the present invention;
[0029] Figure 7 Flow chart of an example phase of quantum public key encryption in the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key according to the present invention;
[0030] Figure 8 Flow chart of an example phase of quantum public key identity authentication in the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key described in the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0031] Specific implementation method 1. Combination Figures 1 to 8 This embodiment describes a quantum signature and identity authentication method based on a quantum public key. The method consists of the following registration phase, initialization phase, signature phase, identity authentication phase, and signature verification phase, which are specifically implemented by the following steps:
[0032] Step 1: Registration stage;
[0033] In order to avoid the threat of identity fraud caused by man-in-the-middle attacks during the transmission process, user A needs to register her identity with user C first; Figure 1 As shown, the specific process is:
[0034] Step 11: User A provides his public identity information ID A Send to user C;
[0035] Step 12: User C uses a hash function to identify the ID A Calculation is performed to protect the security of information, and the encrypted identity information is recorded as ID′ A :
[0036] ID′ A =hash(ID A ) (1)
[0037] Step 13: User C sends ID′ A Sent to user A and saved to the database, and finally the registration is successful.
[0038] Step 2: Initialization phase;
[0039] like Figure 2As shown, this stage is divided into two parts, namely the key distribution and quantum public key initialization stages.
[0040] Key distribution initialization;
[0041] Step A21: User B and user C establish a shared key K according to the quantum key generation protocol (QKDP) bc ,User A generates two key sequences A and B of length n.
[0042] A={a1,a2,a3…a n}∈{0,1} n
[0043] B={b1,b2,b3…b n}∈{0,1} n (2)
[0044] Step A22: Use the hash function to calculate the key sequences A and B respectively to ensure the irreversibility of the key. The encrypted key sequences are recorded as A′ and B′:
[0045] A′=hash(A)={a′1,a′2,a′3…a′n}
[0046] B′=hash(B)={b′1,b′2,b′3…b′ n} (3)
[0047] Step A23: Randomly combine sequences A′ and B′ to generate a sequence c={c1, c2, c3…c 2n}, used for quantum public key cryptographic operations.
[0048] Quantum public key initialization; such as Figure 3 shown.
[0049] Step B21: User A obtains ID′ through the hash function A After the "classical-quantum" one-way function F() operation, it becomes a quantum bit sequence with a length of n+1 and a state of |0> or |1>, which serves as the quantum public key.
[0050] Recorded as
[0051]
[0052] Step B22: User A selects the corresponding quantum gate encryption operation to encrypt the quantum public key according to the random combination value of sequence c. The following quantum X gate is used to implement the flipping of quantum bits, quantum Z gate is used to implement the rotation of quantum bits, quantum CNOT gate is a two-qubit controlled NOT gate, and quantum SWAP gate is used to exchange the states of two quantum bits. Among them:
[0053] X→00, CNOT→01, SWAP→10, Z→11 (5)
[0054] Will Apply the corresponding quantum gate encryption operation to obtain the particle sequence ψ. For the relevant quantum gate operation, there are the following matrices:
[0055]
[0056] Among them, O(C n ) represents the corresponding quantum gate operation, and the set C = {O(C1), O(C2), …, O(C n )} represents a set of encryption operations, such as Figure 3 and as shown in formula (7).
[0057]
[0058] Finally, after quantum gate encryption operation, the particle sequence ψ is obtained.
[0059] Step B23: User A randomly selects q decoy particles from the sequence {|0>,|1>,|+>,|->} and inserts them into the particle sequence ψ to obtain the particle sequence ψ′, and records the position and original state of the decoy particles. To ensure the security of these sequences, the number of decoy particles q in any of these sequences should satisfy q>>n+1. Finally, the particle sequence ψ′ and the encryption operation set C are sent to user C.
[0060] Step 3: Signature phase; Figure 4 shown.
[0061] Step 31: Assume that user A has an original message M of length n = {m1,m2,…,m i ,…,m n}∈{0,1} n At the same time, user A connects the message M with the key sequences A and B, and then uses the hash function to calculate the encrypted sequence of the original message, which is recorded as α and β:
[0062] α=hash(M||A)=(α1,α2,α3,…,α n )
[0063] β=hash(M||B)=(β1,β2,β3,…,β n ) (8)
[0064] Step 32: User A converts the original message M into quantum bits by performing a "classical-quantum" one-way function F() operation on the original message M to form a quantum summary, denoted as |M>:
[0065] |M>=F(M)=(|m1>,|m2>,…,|m i >,…,|m n >) (9)
[0066] Step 33: User A uses Table 1 and encryption sequence α, β in |m i > performs a unitary operator on and in H 0 =Y 0 =I, and obtain the quantum signature. Table 1 shows the unitary operation.
[0067]
[0068] Afterwards, is the tensor product notation, and |S> is the quantum signature on the original message N.
[0069] Table 1
[0070]
[0071] Step 34: User A inserts q decoy particles into the quantum signature |S> to obtain the particle sequence And record the position and original state of the decoy particle. Then the encrypted sequence α, β of the original message, the original message M and the particle sequence Sent to user B.
[0072] Step 4: Identity authentication stage; Figure 5 shown.
[0073] Step 41: Once user C receives the particle sequence ψ′ from user A, user A publishes the position and original state of the decoy particles recorded in step B23. Based on the information published by user A, user C selects the corresponding measurement basis for measuring those decoy particles. The measurement results are compared with the original state of the decoy particles. If the error rate in the measurement results is higher than the established threshold, user C terminates the protocol, otherwise the protocol continues.
[0074] Step 42: User C first removes the decoy particles to obtain the particle sequence ψ, and then uses the received encryption operation set C to perform the inverse operation of quantum gate encryption and measure the corresponding quantum state. The measured result is recorded as
[0075]
[0076] and the encrypted identity information ID′ A Compare, if ID A * =ID′ A , it means the identity authentication is passed, K v Indicates the authentication result and records K v =1, otherwise record K v =0 will terminate the authentication;
[0077] Step 43: After identity authentication, user C uses the key K previously shared with user B bc ID card recognition result K v Encrypt to get the encrypted identity authentication result K′ v , and sent to user B.
[0078]
[0079] Where ID A is the identity information of user A, and ts is the timestamp.
[0080] Step 5: Signature verification phase; Figure 6 shown.
[0081] Step 51: User B receives the particle sequence Encrypted sequence α, β, original message M and encrypted identity authentication result K′ v .
[0082] Step 52: User B uses the shared key K bc For K′ v Decrypt and obtain the identity information ID A , Identity authentication result K v and timestamp ts. If K v The value is 1, and the identity information ID A If it is the identity information of user A, it means that the identity of the sender of the verification message is user A, otherwise the agreement is terminated;
[0083] At the same time, user A announces the original state and position of the decoy particle in step 34 to user B. After receiving it, user B selects the corresponding measurement basis to measure the decoy particle according to the information announced by user A, and obtains the quantum signature |S>. Then, the inverse operation of the unitary operation is performed on the signature information through the encryption sequence α, β sent by user A:
[0084]
[0085] Afterwards,
[0086] Step 53: User B measures the quantum signature |S′> after the operation and records the measurement result as
[0087]
[0088] If M * =M, it means that the message has not been tampered with or attacked during transmission, and user B declares that he accepts the quantum signature, otherwise he will refuse to sign.
[0089] Specific implementation method 2: Combination Figures 7 and 8 This embodiment is described as an example of the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key described in the first embodiment. In this embodiment, the output of the selected SHA-3 hash function is 256 bits, and it is assumed that the length of the generated key and the original message M are both 7 bits. For ease of understanding, the SHA-3 hash function implementation process of this method only selects 8 bits for method example analysis. The method is implemented by the following steps:
[0090] Suppose the original message M to be signed by user A is {1,1,1,0,1,0,0}, and execute the following process.
[0091] 1. Registration stage;
[0092] In order to avoid the threat of identity fraud by man-in-the-middle attacks during the transmission process, user A needs to register her identity with user C first. The main steps are as follows:
[0093] Step 1: Assume user A’s public identity information ID A ={1,0,1,1,0,1,0}, put your public identity information ID A Sent to user C.
[0094] Step 2: User C receives the public identity information ID of user A A Then use the SHA-3 hash function to parse the identity information ID A Calculate and record it as ID′ A :
[0095] ID′ A =hash(ID A ) = {0,1,0,1,1,0,0,1} (15)
[0096] After the calculation is completed, user C will A It is sent to user A and saved to the database at the same time. Finally, the registration is successful at this stage.
[0097] 2. Initialization phase;
[0098] This phase is divided into two parts: key distribution and quantum public key initialization. The following is a detailed introduction. Figure 2 shown.
[0099] 1. Key distribution initialization;
[0100] Step 1: Through the quantum key distribution protocol (QKDP), user A generates key sequences A and B, and user B and user C establish a shared key Kbc.
[0101] A={1,0,1,1,0,1,1}
[0102] B={1,1,0,1,0,0,1} (16)
[0103] Step 2: Use the SHA-3 hash function to calculate the key sequences A and B to improve the confidentiality and irreversibility of the key, denoted as A′ and B′:
[0104] A′=hash(A)={0,1,1,1,0,1,0}
[0105] B′=hash(B)={1,1,1,0,0,0,0} (17)
[0106] Step 3: For sequences A′ and B′, the sequence c = {01, 11, 11, 10, 00, 10, 00} is generated by pairwise combination for the selection of quantum gates in the process of quantum public key encryption operation.
[0107] 2. Quantum public key initialization;
[0108] Step 1: When user A receives the ID' sent by user C A ={0,1,0,1,1,0,0,1}, the quantum sequence is obtained by quantizing the "classical-quantum" one-way function As the initial quantum public key, it is used in the next step of quantum public key encryption process.
[0109] Step 2: User A selects the corresponding quantum gate operation based on the value of the combined sequence c. Apply CNOT, Z, Z, SWAP, X, SWAP, X quantum gate encryption in sequence to obtain the particle sequence ψ = {|0>, -|1>, |0>, |1>, -|0>, |0>, |0>, |0>}, and the obtained particle sequence ψ is used as the encrypted quantum public key. An example of quantum public key encryption is as follows Figure 7 shown.
[0110] Step 3: User A randomly selects 8 decoy particles from {|0>,|1>,|+>,|->} and inserts them into the particle sequence ψ to obtain ψ′, and records the position and original state of the decoy particles. Finally, the particle sequence ψ′, the quantum gate encryption operation set C and ID′ A Sent to user C.
[0111] 3. Signature stage;
[0112] Step 1: Assume that user A uses the SHA-3 hash function to calculate the original message M = {1,1,1,0,1,0,0}:
[0113] α=h(M||A)=(1,0,0,1,0,1,1)
[0114] β=h(M||B)=(0,0,1,0,1,1,1) (18)
[0115] Step 2: The message M is converted into quantum bits through the "classical-quantum" one-way function F() to form a quantum summary:
[0116] |M>=F(M)=(|1>,|1>,|1>,|0>,|1>,|0>,|0>) (19)
[0117] Step 3: User A, according to Table 1 and (α, β), selects |m i > performs a unitary operator on and And get:
[0118]
[0119] make |S> is the signature on the original message M;
[0120] Step 4: User A inserts 8 decoy particles into the signature to obtain a particle sequence And record the position and original state of the decoy particle. Then the sequence α, β, message M and particle sequence Sent to user B.
[0121] 4. Identity verification stage;
[0122] Step 1: User C receives the particle sequence ψ′, and User A publishes the position and original state of the decoy quantum. Based on the information published by User A, User C selects the corresponding measurement basis to measure those decoy particles. The measurement results are compared with the original state of the decoy particles. If the error rate in the measurement results is higher than the established threshold, User C terminates the protocol, otherwise the protocol continues.
[0123] Step 2: Use the received encryption operation set C to perform the inverse operation of the quantum gate encryption operation on the particle sequence ψ after removing the decoy particles and measure it, and record the measured result as With ID' in the database A Compare the result ID A * =ID′ A , indicating that the identity authentication is passed and K is recorded v =1. An example of quantum public key authentication is Figure 8 shown.
[0124] Step 3: After identity authentication, user C uses the key K previously shared with user B bc ID A , K v Encrypt to get K′ v , and sent to user B.
[0125]
[0126] Where ID A is the identity information of user A, and ts is the timestamp.
[0127] 5. Signature verification phase;
[0128] Step 1: User B receives the particle sequence sent Sequence α, β, messages M and K′ v .
[0129] Step 2: User B uses K bc For K′ v Decrypt and get the result ID A , K v and ts. Results K v The value is 1, ID A It is the identity information of user A, indicating that the sender of the verification message is user A.
[0130] Step 3: After user B knows the original state and position of the decoy particle through user A, he selects the corresponding measurement basis and measures the decoy particle. He obtains the quantum signature |S> and then performs the inverse operation of the unitary operation on the signature information through the sequence α, β.
[0131]
[0132] make
[0133] Step 4: User B measures the particle sequence |S′> after the operation, denoted as M *=(1,1,1,0,1,0,0).
[0134]
[0135] And M * =M, user B declares that he accepts this signature, otherwise he will refuse to sign.
[0136] The quantum signature and identity authentication process in this embodiment are both quantized. In the identity authentication process, the security of the public key is increased by encrypting the quantum gate of the quantum state. On the one hand, it is used for encrypting the public key, thereby reducing the threat of information leakage. On the other hand, it is used in the identity authentication process to ensure the security of the signer's identity. In the quantum signature process, a quantum signature method based on unitary operation is used to ensure the security of the signature stage and the ability to resist quantum attacks.
[0137] The method described in the present invention is used for formal experimental testing. The method has third-party participants, information-theoretic security, unforgeability and non-repudiation. In terms of anti-attack capability, it can resist quantum man-in-the-middle attacks, counterfeit attacks, retransmission attacks and laser man-in-the-middle attacks. The security performance of the method is shown in Table 2 and Table 3.
[0138] Table 2
[0139] Third participant Information Theoretical Security Unforgeability Non-repudiation Method of the present invention Yes (credible) Yes Yes Yes
[0140] Table 3
[0141]
[0142] This method uses quantum technology to implement both the signature and identity authentication process, and the signer and the receiver do not need to share the key in advance, which improves the efficiency of the signature. Finally, we analyze the quantum bit efficiency of this method. The concept of quantum bit efficiency is defined as where b s The number of bits representing the message M, q m represents the number of quantum bits transmitted on the quantum channel, b m represents the number of classical bits exchanged to decode the message (ignoring the decoy particles used to check for eavesdropping). In this scheme, the quantum system sequence (public key) and signature are transmitted in the quantum channel. Therefore, in the proposed scheme, b s =n,q m =2n,b m =n, so the quantum bit efficiency of the proposed scheme is And recorded in Table 4, which is the performance analysis of this method.
[0143] Table 4
[0144]
[0145] The technical features of the above-described embodiments may be arbitrarily combined. To make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above-described embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.
[0146] The above-mentioned embodiments only express the implementation methods of the present invention, and the descriptions thereof are relatively specific and detailed, but they cannot be understood as limiting the scope of the invention patent. It should be pointed out that, for ordinary technicians in this field, several variations and improvements can be made without departing from the concept of the present invention, which all belong to the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the patent of the present invention shall be subject to the attached claims.
Claims
1. The quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key is characterized by: The method is implemented by a registration phase, an initialization phase, a signature phase, an identity authentication phase, and a signature verification phase; the specific steps of the method are: Step 1: During the registration phase, user A registers his identity information with user C; Step 2: Initialization phase, including key distribution initialization phase and quantum public key initialization phase; The key distribution initialization phase obtains a sequence c of length 2n for quantum public key encryption; The quantum public key initialization phase is specifically as follows: Step B1: The encrypted identity information ID′ obtained by user A through hash function calculation A Perform a one-way function operation to convert it into a quantum bit sequence of length n+1 and state |0> or |1>, which is the quantum public key Step B2: User A selects the corresponding quantum gate encryption operation based on the random combination value of sequence c to perform the quantum public key encryption. Encrypt and obtain the particle sequence ψ; Step B3, user A randomly selects q decoy particles from the decoy particle sequence {|0>, |1>, |+>, |->}, and inserts them into the particle sequence ψ respectively to obtain the particle sequence ψ′, and records the position and original state of the decoy particles, q>>n+1, and sends the particle sequence ψ′ and the quantum gate encryption operation set C to user C; Step 3: Signature phase; User A converts the encrypted sequence of the original message M, the original message M and the particle sequence Sent to user B; the particle sequence The particle sequence obtained by inserting q decoy particles into the quantum signature of user A Step 4: Identity authentication stage; the specific process is: Step 41: User C receives the particle sequence ψ′ sent by user A. User A publishes the position and original state of the decoy particle in step B3. Based on the information published by user A, user C selects a corresponding measurement basis for measuring the decoy particle and compares the measurement result with the original state of the decoy particle. If the error rate in the measurement result is higher than the established threshold, user C terminates the protocol, otherwise, the protocol continues. Step 42: After removing the decoy particles, user C obtains the particle sequence ψ. The received quantum gate encryption operation set C is used to perform the inverse operation of quantum gate encryption on the particle sequence ψ and measure the corresponding quantum state. The measurement result is recorded as and with ID′ in the database A For comparison, if It means that the identity authentication is passed and the identity authentication result K is recorded v =1, otherwise record K v =0, authentication will be terminated; Step 43: After identity authentication, user C uses the key K shared with user B bc To K v Encrypt to get the encrypted identity authentication result K′ v , and send it to user B; Step 5: Signature verification phase; Identity authentication is ultimately achieved through signature verification.
2. The quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The specific process of step one is: Step 1: User A will provide his / her public identity information ID A Send to user C; Step 1 and 2: User C uses a hash function to identify the ID A Perform calculations and obtain the encrypted identity information, recorded as ID′ A ; Step 13: User C sends the encrypted identity information ID′ A Sent to user A and saved to the database, and finally the registration is successful.
3. The quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step 2, the key distribution initialization phase is specifically as follows: Step A1: According to the quantum key generation protocol QKDP, user B and user C establish a shared key K bc , user A generates two key sequences A and B, both of length n; Step A2: Use a hash function to calculate the key sequences A and B respectively to obtain encrypted key sequences A′ and B′; Step A3: Randomly combine the encrypted key sequences A′ and B′ to generate a sequence c={c1, c2, c3...c 2n }, for quantum public key encryption.
4. The quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step B2, the specific process of obtaining the particle sequence ψ is: Set quantum gate X to flip the quantum bit, quantum gate Z to rotate the quantum bit, quantum gate CNOT as a two-qubit controlled NOT gate, and quantum gate SWAP to exchange the states of two quantum bits; where: X→00,CNOT→01,SWAP→10,Z→11 It is expressed in matrix form as: Quantum gate encryption operation O(C n )The formula is as follows: Quantum gate encryption operation set C = {O(C1), O(C2), ..., O(C n )), and finally after quantum gate encryption operation, we get the particle sequence ψ.
5. The quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The specific process of step three is: Step 31: Assume that user A has an original message M with a length of n. At the same time, user A connects the original message M with key sequences A and B, and uses a hash function to calculate, and obtains the encrypted sequences of the original message, which are recorded as α and β; Step 32: User A converts the original message M into quantum bits by performing a one-way function F() on the original message M to form a quantum summary |M>, which can be expressed as follows: |M>=F(M)=(|m1>,|m2>,...,|m i ),...,|m n >) Step 3: User A performs unitary operations and encrypts the sequences denoted as α and β, and in quantum bit |m i >Perform unitary operation on it to obtain quantum signature |s i >: The quantum signature on the original message M is |S>; Step 3 and 4: User A inserts q decoy particles into the quantum signature |S> to obtain the particle sequence And record the position and original state of the decoy particle, then convert the encrypted sequence α, β, the original message M and the particle sequence Sent to user B.
6. The quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key according to claim 5, characterized in that: The specific process of the signature verification phase in step 5 is as follows: Step 51: User B receives the particle sequence Encrypted sequence α, β, original message M and encrypted identity authentication result K′ v ; Step 52: User B uses the shared key K bc The encrypted identity authentication result K′ v Decrypt and obtain identity information ID A , Identity authentication result K v and timestamp ts; if the authentication result K v The value is 1, and the identity information ID A If it is the identity information of user A, it means that the identity of the sender of the verification message is user A, otherwise the agreement is terminated; At the same time, user A announces the original state and position of the decoy particles described in steps three and four to user B. After receiving the information, user B selects the corresponding measurement basis to measure the decoy particles according to the information announced by user A, obtains the quantum signature |S>, and then performs the inverse operation of the unitary operation on the signature information through the encryption sequence α, β sent by user A to obtain the particle sequence |S′>; Step 53: User B measures the particle sequence |S′> and records the measurement result as M * , if M * =M, it means that the message has not been tampered with or attacked during transmission, and user B declares that he accepts the signature, otherwise he will refuse to sign.
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