Sensitive element device for bypass signal of sensing circuit and detection method of sensitive element device

Abstract

The invention relates to a sensitive element device for a bypass signal of a sensing circuit and a detection method of the sensitive element device. The sensitive element device mainly comprises a shell, a counting module which is arranged in the shell, a sensing module which is connected with the counting module, an input port and an output module, which are connected with the counting module, and an interaction control port which is connected with the sensing module, wherein the counting module is mainly used for converting an output waveform of a sensing part into a characteristic value and outputting the characteristic value; the interaction control port is a connection device of a sensitive element for circuit reaction characteristic; a port comprises input and output external ports; the input external port controls the working state of the sensitive element; the output external port outputs the characteristic value which is acquired by the sensitive element; and the sensing module is a core part, employs a ring oscillator and a delayer and is mainly embodied in the output waveform of a certain point of the circuit. The electrical characteristic of the circuit can be conveniently obtained without an additional test tool, the obtained characteristic value is stable and non-fluctuant, and a great number of labor resources and material resources are saved.

Description

technical field

[0001] The invention relates to a sensitive element device and a detection method thereof, in particular to a sensitive element device and a detection method thereof for sensing circuit board signals. Background technique

[0002] In order to reduce costs, an IC industry chain may spread across various countries, and a large number of open source IP cores (Intellectual Property cores) are used during development, making it possible to implant hardware Trojans. So far, hardware Trojans can be classified according to physical characteristics, activation characteristics, and behavioral characteristics. The variety of hardware Trojans makes their detection a hot and difficult point in IC circuit security. Currently, there are four detection methods: physical inspection, functional testing, built-in self-test and bypass analysis techniques.

[0003] Among them, the principle of the bypass analysis technology is: since the insertion of a hardware Trojan will affec...

Examples

Embodiment

[0034] The technical solution of the present invention will be further specifically described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0035] figure 1 The overall design framework is given, the right side is a brief description of the port, and the design diagram on the left mainly includes four parts: counting part, interactive control part, port part and sensing part.

[0036] figure 1 Among them, ①Enabling the control terminal can stop the entire HTD-PUF from working and isolate it from the original circuit. ②Data output, this port is a vector port, the number of bits is determined according to the characteristics of the sensor. ③Probe port, the port for interacting with the original circuit.

[0037] figure 2 TIMER (timer) and COUNT (counter) are controlled by the same RST (reset signal). Point is the counting basis port of COUNT, that is, the number of signal transitions at the Point port is calculated. The operation process is as follows:

[0038] 1...

technical field

[0001] The invention relates to a sensitive element device and a detection method thereof, in particular to a sensitive element device and a detection method thereof for sensing circuit board signals. Background technique

[0002] In order to reduce costs, an IC industry chain may spread across various countries, and a large number of open source IP cores (Intellectual Property cores) are used during development, making it possible to implant hardware Trojans. So far, hardware Trojans can be classified according to physical characteristics, activation characteristics, and behavioral characteristics. The variety of hardware Trojans makes their detection a hot and difficult point in IC circuit security. Currently, there are four detection methods: physical inspection, functional testing, built-in self-test and bypass analysis techniques.

[0003] Among them, the principle of the bypass analysis technology is: since the insertion of a hardware Trojan will affec...

Examples

Embodiment

[0034] The technical solution of the present invention will be further specifically described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0035] figure 1 The overall design framework is given, the right side is a brief description of the port, and the design diagram on the left mainly includes four parts: counting part, interactive control part, port part and sensing part.

[0036] figure 1 Among them, ①Enabling the control terminal can stop the entire HTD-PUF from working and isolate it from the original circuit. ②Data output, this port is a vector port, the number of bits is determined according to the characteristics of the sensor. ③Probe port, the port for interacting with the original circuit.

[0037] figure 2 TIMER (timer) and COUNT (counter) are controlled by the same RST (reset signal). Point is the counting basis port of COUNT, that is, the number of signal transitions at the Point port is calculated. The operation process is as follows:

[0038] 1...

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