Invisible address implementation method capable of being supervised by third party

Abstract

The invention discloses an invisible address implementation method capable of being supervised by a third party. The method comprises the following steps: when a sender initiates a transaction with a receiver, the sender computes a final public key of the receiver by selecting a random value and using the public key of a supervisor and the public key of the receiver; when the receiver receives the transaction initiated by the sender, the receiver computes a private key corresponding to a transaction address including the random value by using the received random value in the transaction, the own private key and the public key of the supervisor; and when the supervisor audits whether the transaction received by the receiver is legal, the supervisor compute the public key corresponding the transaction address including the random value by using the own private key, the random value in the audited transaction and the public key of the audited party. The method provided by the invention has the advantages that the different transaction addresses received by the same user have unconditional unlinkability; and the supervisor can audit and supervise all transactions by only needing to store one main private key, and protection on user privacy is indirectly achieved.

Description

Technical field [0001] The invention relates to a method for realizing a third-party supervisable stealth address. Background technique [0002] Existing applications based on blockchain technology have the characteristics of collective maintenance, openness and transparency, so the privacy of users based on the application cannot be guaranteed. The core of user privacy on the blockchain is the privacy of user addresses. Because as long as an address can be associated with a user, all users who have access to blockchain data can know the privacy of the user's data. The existing methods to protect user privacy are mostly achieved through random addresses and zero-knowledge proofs, but random addresses are essentially pseudo-anonymous, and zero-knowledge proofs are not practical because of their cumbersome proofs. Although the one-time address generation technology adopted by CryptoNote solves the problem of pseudo-anonymity, it has a certain degree of security risks, because when...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0002] Existing applications based on blockchain technology, due to the characteristics of collective maintenance, openness and transparency, etc., the privacy of users based on this application will not be guaranteed. The core of user privacy on the blockchain is the privacy of user addresses. Because as long as an address can be associated with a user, all users who have access to blockchain data can know the privacy of the user data

Most of the existing methods of protecting user privacy are realized through random addresses and zero-knowledge proofs, but random addresses are pseudo-anonymous in nature, and zero-knowledge proofs are not practical due to their cumbersome proofs

Although the one-time address generation technology adopted by CryptoNote solves the problem of pseudo-anonymity, there is a certain degree of security risk, because when the private key of a user's transaction is leaked, by combining the tracking key of the user, the adversary may obtain the user The complete private key of the user, and then the adversary obtains the knowledge authority of all transactions involving the user

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