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57 results about "Adversary" patented technology

In cryptography, an adversary (rarely opponent, enemy) is a malicious entity whose aim is to prevent the users of the cryptosystem from achieving their goal (primarily privacy, integrity, and availability of data). An adversary's efforts might take the form of attempting to discover secret data, corrupting some of the data in the system, spoofing the identity of a message sender or receiver, or forcing system downtime.

The One-Qubit Pad (OQP) for entanglement encryption of quantum information

The One-Qubit Pad (OQP) protocol and its generic implementing device constitute a novel, maximally efficient scheme for encryption of quantum information with a quantum key of just a single qubit in an arbitrary unknown quantum state. The OQP enables encryption of the quantum information of n qubits register with a single qubit key upon provision of a multi-qubit entanglement between the single qubit key and the n qubits of the quantum message by the iterative application of the CNOT gate on the same key qubit (control input) and subsequent qubits of the message (target input). This results in an entanglement of all n+1 qubits, which locks original quantum information qubits and the single qubit of the key in a jointly entangled state that cannot be disentangled without the single qubit key. In order to decrypt the quantum message (by its disentanglement) one needs to have the qubit key and either reverse the protocol (applying CNOT operations in the reversed order) or simply measure the entangled key qubit and then depending on the outcome either straightforwardly obtain the decrypted quantum message or its quantum negation (dealt with by again applying quantum negation on all of the message qubits thus restoring their original states). The OQP protocol and its implementing device is proposed one hundred years after the classical One-Time Pad (Vernam cipher) was invented in 1917. The main differences between two schemes show how much quantum and clasical information differ. It is of course impossible to unconditionally securely encrypt classical sequence of n bits with just 1 bit of a key or guarantee that the random key that can be used for this purpose of n bits length (same as of the message) could not be copied. In contrast both these features are possible for the quantum information as described upon the proposed invention. The main characteristic of the OQP protocol to use only a single qubit as the key to enable information-theoretic security of n qubits quantum information encryption follows from the introduction in the invention of the multi-qubit entanglement, which is a non-local, topological and non-classical phenomenon giving quantum information significant edge over its classical counterpart. The main application of the OQP protocol and its implementing generic device is to lock quantum information with the single key qubit in order to prevent any unauthorized access to it (not only a classical access upon a measurement, but more importantly a quantum access by a quantum information processing device). This application can be also extended to communication scenario jointly with the Quantum Teleportation, which without OQP requires pre-sharing of n pairs of Bell states between Alice and Bob to securely communicate n qubits long quantum message, whereas in contrast with the OQP protocol just one pair of Bell state is required to securely teleport only the single qubit key for the OQP encrypted quantum message sent through an insecure quantum channel and still be access-protected from Eve (an adversary).
Owner:COMPSECUR SP ZOO

Technique for producing through watermarking highly tamper-resistant executable code and resulting "watermarked" code so formed

InactiveUS20050144458A1Improvement in tamper-resistanceSecurely watermarkDigital data processing detailsUser identity/authority verificationThird partyTamper resistance
Apparatus and an accompanying method, for forming and embedding a highly tamper-resistant cryptographic identifier, i.e., a watermark, within non-marked executable code, e.g., an application program, to generate a “watermarked” version of that code. Specifically, the watermark, containing, e.g., a relatively large number of separate executable routines, is tightly integrated into a flow pattern of non-marked executable code, e.g., an application program, through randomly establishing additional control flows in the executable code and inserting a selected one of the routines along each such flow. Since the flow pattern of the watermark is highly intertwined with the flow pattern of the non-marked code, the watermark is effectively impossible to either remove from the code and / or circumvent. The routines are added in such a manner that the flow pattern of resulting watermarked code is not substantially different from that of the non-marked code, thus frustrating third party detection of the watermark using, e.g., standard flow analysis tools. To enhance tamper-resistance of the watermarked code, each such routine can provide a pre-defined function such that if that routine were to be removed from the marked code by, e.g., a third party adversary, then the marked code will prematurely terminate its execution.
Owner:MICROSOFT TECH LICENSING LLC

Authenticable asymmetrical group secret key negotiation method in mobile unbalanced network

The invention relates to an authenticable asymmetrical group secret key negotiation scheme in a mobile unbalanced network. The scheme comprises the steps that signature and authentication of group members are carried out, group members negotiate an asymmetrical shared secret key, and consistency verification of the shared secret key is carried out. According to the signature and authentication, a short signature mechanism of mobile equipment in a network is achieved by adopting a bilinear mapping technology, and members of mobile groups provide identify authentication by using the signature before the group secret key is negotiated to defense active attack of adversaries. According to step that the group members negotiate the asymmetrical shared secret key, all mobile equipment in the mobile unbalanced network negotiates a pair of asymmetrical group communication encryption/decryption secret keys, and members outside the group can send secret messages to members inside the group by encrypting the secret messages through a public key without the necessary of joining the group. According to the consistency verification of the shared secret key, after the group members negotiate the group secret key, the accuracy and the consistency of the calculated group secret key can be guaranteed. According to the authenticable asymmetrical group secret key negotiation scheme in the mobile unbalanced network, when secret communication is carried out among mobile group equipment in the mobile network environment, safe communication among the group equipment can be guaranteed, energy consumption of calculation and communication is quite low, and good flexibility, safety and practicability are achieved.
Owner:ZHENGZHOU UNIVERSITY OF LIGHT INDUSTRY

Trust negotiation building method and system based on history roles

The invention discloses a trust negotiation building method based on history roles, which comprises the following steps that: (1) when a request party submits requests on a certain resource to a resource party, firstly, a chinchin stage of the trust negotiation is triggered, and the identities of the two parties and whether the historical negotiation success record information exists or not are verified; (2) after the chinchin stage is completed, the two parties enter a trust development period, a safe certificate disclosing sequence is found out to visit the requested resources through mutually disclosing visit control tactics and certificates; and (3) the two parties enter the trust maintenance stage after the trust negotiation is successful, relevant information of the other negotiation party in the current negotiation is stored for accelerating the subsequent negotiation process of the two parties. The method provided by the invention has the advantages that the successfully negotiated two parties update the roles for the other parties in self history information databases and record and obtain the certificate disclosing sequences of the two parties of the role. When the two parties negotiate again, the negotiation does not need to be carried out again, the disclosing can be directly carried out according to the certificate disclosing sequences of the role, the subsequent negotiation of the two parties is shortened, and the certificate collection activities of venomous negotiation adversaries is avoided.
Owner:HUAZHONG UNIV OF SCI & TECH

Detection of Test-Time Evasion Attacks

Embodiments of the present invention concern detecting Test-Time Evasion (TTE) attacks on neural network, particularly deep neural network (DNN), classifiers. The manner of detection is similar to that used to detect backdoors of a classifier whose training dataset was poisoned. Given knowledge of the classifier itself, the adversary subtly (even imperceptibly) perturbs their input to the classifier at test time in order to cause the class decision to change from a source class to a target class. For example, an image of a person who is unauthorized to access a resource can be modified slightly so that the classifier decides the image is that of an authorized person. The detector is based on employing a method (similar to that used to detect backdoors in DNNs) to discover different such minimal perturbations for each in a set of clean (correctly classified) samples, to change the sample's ground-truth (source) class to every other (target) class. For each (source, target) class pair, null distributions of the sizes of these perturbations are modeled. A test sample is similarly minimally perturbed by the detector from its decided-upon (target) class to every other (potential source) class. The p-values according to the corresponding null distributions of these test-sample perturbations are assessed using the corresponding nulls to decide whether the test sample is a TTE attack.
Owner:ANOMALEE INC

Revocation of cryptographic digital certificates

Different targets (c0, N1) of a digital certificate are mapped into a “super-target” using methods allowing a certificate validity verifier (110) to compute the super-target. The certificate includes the super-target instead of the targets. Also, a certificate with multiple targets can be signed with a redactable signature by the certification authority (CA 120). When the certificate's owner provides the certificate to a verifier together with a validity proof, the owner redacts the certificate to delete unnecessary targets. A single validity proof (ci(F)) may be provided to certificate owners for a set (F) of the certificates via a multicast transmission if a multicasting group (2010) is formed to correspond to the set. A verifier (110) may decide to cache the validity proof for a set provide the cached proof to other parties. The caching decision is based on the caching priority of the set F. The priority may depend on the number of certificates in the set F, the sum of the remaining validity periods for the certificates in the set, and other factors. In the setup phase, the CA generates validation proof data structures for greater time than the maximum validity period of any certificate. Therefore, new certificates can be added to the existing data structures after the setup phase. A distributed certificate authority includes a CA and a number of Sub-CAs (2610). The Sub-CAs have secret certificate validation data, but different data are provided to different Sub-CAs for each certificate. If a Sub-CA is compromised, the Sub-CA validity proof will be withheld by the CA to alert the verifiers not to use the data from this Sub-CA. Also, the secret data are encrypted when distributed to the Sub-CAs. A decryption key (DK.j.k) for each “partition” of time is distributed to each Sub-CA at or shortly before the start of the partition. A compromised Sub-CA can be reactivated at the end of the partition because the adversary does not get the decryption keys for the future partitions.
Owner:NTT DOCOMO INC

Certificate-free signature method based on national secret SM2

The invention discloses a certificate-free signature method based on a national secret algorithm. At the time of signature generation, B calculates the parameters participate in signature generation according to the secret parameters randomly selected to participate in signature generation, and send the parameters to A. A randomly selects the secret parameters involved in signature verification, and generates a message combining the secret parameters to send to B. During signature verification, B verifies whether A's signature public key is valid according to the secret parameters generated byparticipating signatures. If it is invalid, the verification fails, otherwise, the verification continues. B calculates a parameter and send it to A. A verifies whether B completes the signature verification according to the correct steps through this parameter, and sends a parameter containing the secret value if B conforms to the correct execution step, otherwise, terminates the signature. B receives the verification parameters of A and participates in the subsequent signature verification, and finally produces the result. The invention can prevent an adversary from controlling one of the parties to seek personal gain in the process of signature and verification in which the server cooperates with the mobile terminal.
Owner:ZHEJIANG GONGSHANG UNIVERSITY

A target detection method based on generative adversarial network

ActiveCN109543740BCombining real samples can enrich training dataEnrich training dataCharacter and pattern recognitionNeural architecturesTraining phaseAdversary
The invention provides a target detection method based on a generative confrontation network, which includes designing a generator, generating various samples according to category labels, designing an agent, detecting the data of the generator, providing false true values, and applying the data generated by the agent to Training of target detectors, designing target detectors, judging whether the generated data is conducive to improving the accuracy of target detection, designing adversaries, in the training phase, judging whether the data comes from real data or generated data, the generator and the discriminator are trained alternately, In the testing phase, the data to be detected is directly input into the target detector to obtain the detection result. The combination of the samples generated by the generation network of the invention and the real samples can enrich the training data, improve the detection accuracy, the target detection network provides feedback to the generation network, so that the generated samples are more realistic, and the data generated by the agent is directly applied to the training of the target detector. There is no need to spend a lot of manpower and material resources for labeling, and the present invention has a simple structure and is easy to deploy.
Owner:HARBIN ENG UNIV
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