Secure time functionality for a wireless device

Abstract

The present invention is related to a wireless transmit/receive unit (WTRU) for providing advanced security functions. The WTRU includes trusted platform module (TPM) for performing trusted computing operations; and a secure time component (STC) for providing a secure measurement of a current time. The STC and the TPM are integrated to provide accurate trusted time information to internal and external to the WTRU. The STC may be located on an expanded a subscriber identity module (SIM), on the WTRU platform, or two STCs may be used, one in each location. Similarly, the TPM may be located on an expanded SIM, on the WTRU platform, or two TPMs may be used, one in each location. Preferably, the STC will include a real time clock (RTC); a tamper detection and power failure unit; and a time report and sync controller.

Description

technical field [0001] The present invention relates to wireless communication systems. More specifically, the present invention relates to secure time functionality for use on wireless devices. Background technique [0002] As the wireless industry spreads and grows, it is desired to develop wireless communication devices that can provide various functions. The smartphone market is in its early stages of adoption and offers many features such as access to corporate information systems (email and intranet access) and connectivity to Internet-based services, among others. Many of these features require confidential corporate and personal information to be stored on the device itself. Additionally, the growth of content-based services such as digital rights management (DRM) has created additional requirements for these devices to ensure that content stored on the device is only accessed by authorized users and is accessed on the content provider's terms. Typically, content ...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

Another problem is that the current OMA DRM protocol leaves room for improvement in the processing of time information for DRM applications

[0017] Another problem: DRM devices are connected devices, they have the ability to re-sync their local clocks, and they will use the resulting DRM time as the base time provided by the RI, even though it may have originated from an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) service responder

[0018] Another problem is: the clock inside the DRM device can also be synchronized separately from the DRM process

However, although there are secure network timing protocols such as the IETF Secure NTP protocol, the timing information thus obtained following the Secure NTP protocol may subsequently be compromised once it is stored in a DRM device

This is likely to lead to unauthorized use and redistribution of DRM content

[0019] Another problem is: even if the DRM SW (DRM UA on the device, DRM SW of the RI) is safe and not compromised, other malicious or compromised SW applications may access these time-dependent resources or their output and erroneously use them

[0021] However, a direct application of existing TCG technology does not address a method to explicitly and systematically improve the confidence and integrity of DRM time on a device with a TPM, nor any method of ensuring time information on an RI with a TPM

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