Secure bootstrapping for wireless communications

Abstract

A mutual authentication method is provided for securely agreeing application-security keys with mobile terminals supporting legacy Subscriber Identity Modules (e.g., GSM SIM and CDMA2000 R-UIM, which do not support 3G AKA mechanisms). A challenge-response key exchange is implemented between a bootstrapping server function (BSF) and mobile terminal (MT). The BSF generates an authentication challenge and sends it to the MT under a server-authenticated public key mechanism. The MT receives the challenge and determines whether it originates from the BSF based on a bootstrapping server certificate. The MT formulates a response to the authentication challenge based on keys derived from the authentication challenge and a pre-shared secret key. The BSF receives the authentication response and verifies whether it originates from the MT. Once verified, the BSF and MT independently calculate an application security key that the BSF sends to a requesting network application function to establish secure communications with the MT.

Description

[0001] Claiming priority under 35 U.S.C. §119 [0002] This patent application asserts U.S. Provisional Application No. 60 / 650,358, filed Feb. 4, 2005, entitled "Secure Bootstrapped Keys in GSM," and U.S. Provisional Application No. 60 / 650,358, filed Feb. 18, 2005, entitled "Secure Bootstrapping with CAVE." 60 / 654,133, both of which are assigned to the assignee of the present case and are expressly incorporated herein by reference. technical field [0003] The present invention generally relates to systems and methods for securing wireless communications. More specifically, one feature of the present invention provides a novel authentication and key agreement mechanism for devices supporting legacy network authentication mechanisms to provide application security keys by utilizing legacy wireless authentication and key agreement mechanisms. Background technique [0004] One type of cellular technology for wireless communication is defined by the Global System for Mobile (G...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0008] However, these mutual authentication techniques (e.g., GAA and GBA) are not available for earlier developed (e.g., 2G) communication systems, such as the GSM Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol

These GSM protocols are vulnerable to replay attacks whereby an attacker can force the reuse of keys and may in some circumstances exploit the weakness to reveal keys and thus compromise security

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