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Method for identifying meassage source address real or not

A technology of message source and source address, applied in the field of network communication, can solve the problems of unable to support high-speed forwarding performance requirements, consume interface bandwidth processor processing time, etc., achieve the effect of simplifying comparison and query, reducing consumption, and improving identification efficiency

Inactive Publication Date: 2007-10-10
广东高鑫信息股份有限公司
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  • Summary
  • Abstract
  • Description
  • Claims
  • Application Information

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0012] In the prior art, the operation of confirming uRPF failure consumes a lot of interface bandwidth and processor processing time, and cannot support the performance requirements of high-speed forwarding.

Method used

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  • Method for identifying meassage source address real or not
  • Method for identifying meassage source address real or not
  • Method for identifying meassage source address real or not

Examples

Experimental program
Comparison scheme
Effect test

Embodiment 1

[0062] In Embodiment 1, the single board 2 has 8 ports, wherein port 0 and port 1 are connected to the destination address 204.69.207.0 / 24.

[0063] When a message with a destination address of 204.69.207.0 / 24 enters the router from port 1, according to the content of the routing table entry, the logical operation is performed on the port where the message enters the router, the bit of the port on the local board, and the bit mask of the port on the local board. The obtained result judges whether the source address of the packet is 204.69.207.0 / 24. If it is not a real address, the address is considered to be forged, the message is an attack message, and the message is not forwarded; if it is a real address, the message is considered to be a valid message, and it is normally forwarded.

[0064] The 8 ports in the board 2 are port 0-port 7, and when a message is received from port 1, port 1 is represented as 01000000;

[0065] Perform an AND operation on port 1 with the bit fie...

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PUM

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Abstract

The method comprises: the router adds the information for identifying the reality of route address into load-balanced routing table; after receiving a message, according to the modified routing table, the router makes unicast backward path enquiry for the source address carried by said message in order to confirm the reality of the source address.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the technical field of network communication, in particular to a method for distinguishing the authenticity of message source addresses. Background technique [0002] In the current network, it is common to use a large number of packets with forged source addresses to attack the target. In order to deal with packet attacks, it is necessary to determine whether the real address of the attack packet matches the source address it carries. In the prior art, when a router receives a message, it generally uses a unicast reverse path forwarding (uRPF) technology to detect the authenticity of the source address of the message. [0003] However, there is no effective algorithm for how to implement uRPF in the case of load sharing routing. [0004] As shown in Figure 1, when the address of the attack point itself is 204.69.207.0 / 24, but when launching an attack, it uses a randomly generated pseudo-address to initiate a packet flow to I...

Claims

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Application Information

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IPC IPC(8): H04L12/56H04L9/00H04L12/24H04L29/06H04L45/74
Inventor 李政肖斌
Owner 广东高鑫信息股份有限公司
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