Safety control device based on double 2-vote-2 safety redundant system, and system

Abstract

The invention provides a safety control device based on a double 2-vote-2 safety redundant system, and a system. The safety control device is connected between two CPUs of the double 2-vote-2 safety redundant system and a piece of actuating equipment. The safety control device comprises two comparison modules, a safety dynamic driver module, and a double relay output module. The comparison modules are used to obtain data output by the two CPUs, and through comparing, if the comparison modules learn that the data output by the two CPUs are consistent, the comparison modules generate a drive pulse signal and a control pulse signal. The safety dynamic driver module connected with the comparison modules is used to generate a drive signal according to the drive pulse signal obtained from the comparison modules. The double relay output module connected with the comparison modules and the safety dynamic driver module is used to generate an execution index signal according to the control pulse signal obtained from the comparison modules and the drive signal obtained from the safety dynamic driver module, and the execution index signal is used to support the actuating equipment to operate. The safety control device and the double 2-vote-2 safety redundant system realize high security of the system.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to railway signal control technology, in particular to a safety control device and system based on a two-by-two safety redundant system. Background technique [0002] The two-by-two safety redundant system is a common system used to implement railway signal control. The railway signal control system is composed of two identical safety control systems. The two-by-two safety redundant system requires the CPUs in the two systems to work synchronously to ensure normal operation. At present, when the two-by-two safety redundancy system of the Chinese Train Control System (hereinafter referred to as CTCS) level 2 and CTCS level 3 train control centers realizes the safety redundancy function of two-by-two safety, both The two CPUs independently compare the calculation results of the CPU with the calculation results of the other CPU's software data. If a CPU finds that the data is inconsistent, the CPU stops external output. The device ...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0003] Although the existing two-by-two safety redundancy technology has greatly improved the safety of the judgment of the CPU output results, and can largely avoid the wrong output caused by a single CPU operation failure, but because the comparison is only between two A CPU is implemented by software. As long as the software comparison passes, the output command will be issued. Once the command is issued, the command output will be executed. If a problem is found at this time, it is impossible for the software of the CPU to restore the issued command. Wrong output command, if the wrong output command is executed, it may cause serious unsafe consequences

In addition, if a software uncontrollable failure occurs on the CPU output command circuit or the execution device, it may also cause the wrong execution of the command issued by the non-CPU, which will bring serious safety hazards, making the two-by-two safety redundancy system Provides reduced security, i.e. the system is less reliable

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