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Method of defending equipment calibration attacks in quantum key distribution system

A quantum key distribution and equipment technology, applied in key distribution, can solve problems such as adverse attack effects, inability to intuitively monitor equipment calibration attacks, demonstrations, etc.

Active Publication Date: 2020-10-09
QUANTUMCTEK +1
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  • Summary
  • Abstract
  • Description
  • Claims
  • Application Information

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0012] The above methods of defending against equipment calibration attacks are only applicable to phase-encoded QKD systems based on active vector selection schemes, especially relying on devices that can modulate signals randomly, such as phase modulators and their modulation circuits, while for other QKD systems, For example, in the QKD system based on the passive base vector selection scheme, the above defense method cannot be used, because Bob at the receiving end has no device that can apply a random phase to randomly replace the detection results of multiple detectors
[0013] Secondly, this scheme can make the detection efficiency consistent regardless of whether it has been attacked; but this scheme cannot intuitively monitor whether it has been attacked by device calibration, which is not conducive to the demonstration of the attack effect

Method used

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  • Method of defending equipment calibration attacks in quantum key distribution system
  • Method of defending equipment calibration attacks in quantum key distribution system
  • Method of defending equipment calibration attacks in quantum key distribution system

Examples

Experimental program
Comparison scheme
Effect test

Embodiment 1

[0075] 1) First complete the construction of the parameter calibration system, such as Figure 4 shown.

[0076] The components of the parameter calibration system include: a standard light source in the sender, a quantum channel and a detection system to be calibrated at the receiver. There is also a built-in calibration light source in the receiving side, which is connected to the detection system of the receiving side to be calibrated through the coupling of optical switches or BS and other coupling elements.

[0077] Parameter calibration needs to be done in a safe area. There are two specific situations and methods for selecting a safe area.

[0078] ① One is that the sender, receiver and the quantum channel between them are all placed in a safe area that cannot be touched by the attacker Eve. Then the process of parameter calibration of the detection system in this area is safe. This safe area can be guaranteed during factory calibration, because it has not been depl...

example 1

[0172] Such as Figure 5 As shown, for example, for a certain QKD device, the delay scanning results before leaving the factory, the HVPN delay positions are 100ps, 200ps, 300ps, and 400ps respectively, and the delay difference between HVPNs is:

[0173] V-H=100ps, P-H=200ps, N-H=300ps;

[0174] H-V=-100ps, P-V=100ps, N-V=200ps;

[0175] H-P=-200ps, V-P=-100ps, N-P=100ps;

[0176] H-N=-300ps, V-N=-200ps, P-N=-100ps;

[0177] Adding the commonly used floating value ±20ps obtained from data statistics, the credible range of the delay difference is:

[0178] V-H=[80ps, 120ps], P-H=[180ps, 220ps], N-H=[280ps, 320ps];

[0179] H-V=[-120ps,-80ps], P-V=[80ps, 120ps], N-V=[180ps, 220ps];

[0180] H-P=[-220ps,-180ps], V-P=[-120ps,-80ps], N-P=[80ps, 120ps];

[0181] H-N=[-320ps,-280ps], V-N=[-220ps,-180ps], P-N=[-120ps,-80ps];

[0182] Store the range in this QKD device.

[0183] After the device is deployed at the factory and goes online, start it up and run it, and perform a d...

example 2

[0190] The same factory equipment parameters as Example 1, if a delayed scan result is as follows Figure 7 As shown, then:

[0191] V-H=120ps, P-H=230ps, N-H=330ps;

[0192] H-V=-120ps, P-V=110ps, N-V=210ps;

[0193] H-P=-230ps, V-P=-110ps, N-P=100ps;

[0194] H-N=-330ps, V-N=-210ps, P-N=-100ps;

[0195] Compare the delay difference result with the trusted delay difference range set by the factory above, and find that "P-H", "N-H", "H-P" and "H-N" exceed the credible range, and the device calibration process of the delay scan is abnormal , it is determined that there is a device calibration attack and an alarm is issued, and the delay scanning process is restarted until the delay difference of each HVPN channel returns to the credible range, and the device is determined to return to the normal working state, and the device calibration attack stops.

[0196] The present invention is applicable to all QKD systems, and is suitable for active (such as phase modulator) or pass...

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Abstract

The invention discloses a method for defending equipment calibration attacks in a quantum key distribution system. The method comprises the following steps: 1) completing establishment of a parametercalibration system; 2) generating parameter calibration light in a safe area; 3) in the safe area, completing key parameter measurement by a receiver detection system to be subjected to parameter calibration ; 4) calculating safety parameters of the receiver detection system; (5) setting a safety threshold DeltaAllowRange; 6) generating parameter calibration light in an external field area; and 7)in the external field area, completing measurement and judgment or calibration of the key parameters of the detector by the receiver. The method has the advantages that the function of resisting equipment calibration attacks can be realized only through necessary equipment parameter calibration and system online detection modes, and influence caused by instability of an actual system can be eliminated more comprehensively by adding a built-in calibration light source and a coupling element in the safe area in the receiver and considering calibration standards under specific different conditions.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to a method for defending against device calibration attacks in the field of actual quantum key distribution technology, in particular to a method for resisting device calibration attacks in a quantum key distribution (QKD) system. Background technique [0002] The QKD quantum key distribution device based on single-photon quantum state for information-theoretic security, because the receiver’s optical signal is very weak, in order to reduce noise interference and post-pulse interference caused by semiconductor detector response delay, a gated single-photon detector is usually used. When there is a gate control signal, the response of the semiconductor detector is valid, and when the gate control signal is not present, the response of the semiconductor detector is invalid. [0003] For example, if figure 1 As shown, taking the light-emitting pulse frequency of 100 MHz as an example, the gating signal at the detection end is also ...

Claims

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Application Information

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Patent Type & Authority Applications(China)
IPC IPC(8): H04L9/08H04L9/00H04B10/70
CPCH04L9/0852H04L9/002H04B10/70
Inventor 唐世彪程节汤艳琳孙剑
Owner QUANTUMCTEK