A method to defend against device calibration attacks in quantum key distribution systems
A quantum key distribution and equipment technology, applied in key distribution, can solve problems such as inability to intuitively monitor equipment calibration attacks, unfavorable attack effects, and inability to use, so as to facilitate the demonstration of attack effects, ensure security, and avoid attack errors. Judgment effect
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Embodiment 1
[0075] 1) First complete the construction of the parameter calibration system, such as Figure 4 shown.
[0076] The components of the parameter calibration system include: a standard light source in the sender, a quantum channel and a detection system to be parameterized at the receiver. There is also a built-in calibration light source in the receiver, which is connected to the receiver detection system to be calibrated through the coupling of optical switches or BS and other coupling elements.
[0077] Parameter calibration needs to be done in a safe area. There are two specific situations and methods for the selection of the safe area.
[0078] ① One is that the sender, the receiver, and the quantum channel between them are placed in a safe area that cannot be touched by the attacker Eve. Then the process of parameter calibration of the detection system in this area is safe. This safe area can be guaranteed at the factory calibration, because it has not been deployed i...
example 1
[0172] like Figure 5 As shown, for example, for a certain QKD device, the HVPN delay positions are 100ps, 200ps, 300ps, and 400ps in the pre-delivery delay scan results, then the delay difference between HVPNs is:
[0173] V-H=100ps, P-H=200ps, N-H=300ps;
[0174] H-V=-100ps, P-V=100ps, N-V=200ps;
[0175] H-P=-200ps, V-P=-100ps, N-P=100ps;
[0176] H-N=-300ps, V-N=-200ps, P-N=-100ps;
[0177] Adding the commonly used floating value ±20ps obtained from data statistics, the credible range of the delay difference is:
[0178] V-H=[80ps, 120ps], P-H=[180ps, 220ps], N-H=[280ps, 320ps];
[0179] H-V=[-120ps,-80ps], P-V=[80ps,120ps], N-V=[180ps,220ps];
[0180] H-P=[-220ps,-180ps], V-P=[-120ps,-80ps], N-P=[80ps,120ps];
[0181] H-N=[-320ps,-280ps], V-N=[-220ps,-180ps], P-N=[-120ps,-80ps];
[0182] Store the range in this QKD device.
[0183] After the device is deployed from the factory and goes online, start up and run, and perform the delay scan device calibration process...
example 2
[0190] The same factory parameters as in Example 1, if the result of a delay scan is as follows Figure 7 shown, then:
[0191] V-H=120ps, P-H=230ps, N-H=330ps;
[0192] H-V=-120ps, P-V=110ps, N-V=210ps;
[0193] H-P=-230ps, V-P=-110ps, N-P=100ps;
[0194] H-N=-330ps, V-N=-210ps, P-N=-100ps;
[0195] Compare the delay difference result with the above factory-set credible delay difference range, and find that "P-H", "N-H", "H-P", and "H-N" are out of the credible range, then the device calibration process of the delay scan is abnormal. , judge that there is a device calibration attack and alarm, restart the delay scanning process, until the delay difference of each HVPN channel returns to the trusted range, determine that the device returns to the normal working state, and the device calibration attack stops.
[0196] The present invention is applicable to all QKD systems, suitable for active (such as phase modulator) or passive (such as beam splitter BS) quantum state deco...
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