Quantum key distribution system for resisting blinding attack

A technology of quantum key distribution and blinding attack, which is applied in key distribution, can solve problems such as pseudo-state attack and time-shift attack, and achieve the effect of resisting blinding attack

Active Publication Date: 2012-10-17
SOUTH CHINA NORMAL UNIVERSITY
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  • Summary
  • Abstract
  • Description
  • Claims
  • Application Information

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Problems solved by technology

[0002] Quantum key distribution has theoretical unconditional security, but due to the actual implementation process, the technical loopholes brought about by the non-ideality of the actual device can be exploited by eavesdroppers, for example, the pulse sent by the quasi-single photon source contains multiple The photon beam splitting attack implemented by the vulnerability of 1 photon, the attack of accurately knowing the intensity and Poisson distribution of the light source

Method used

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  • Quantum key distribution system for resisting blinding attack
  • Quantum key distribution system for resisting blinding attack
  • Quantum key distribution system for resisting blinding attack

Examples

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Embodiment 1

[0023] Such as figure 2 As shown, a quantum key distribution system against blinding attacks includes an Alice sending end and a Bob receiving end. The Alice sending end includes a single photon source SPS and an encoding module that generates photons, and the photon information sent by the single photon source is passed through Coding module encoding; the Bob receiving end includes a unequal arm coupler C1, a first receiving end Bob1 and a second receiving end Bob2, and the encoded photons in the Alice sending end are respectively sent to the second receiving end through an unequal arm coupler C1 A receiving end Bob1 and a second receiving end Bob2. That is, the output end of the single photon source SPS is connected to the input end of the encoding module; the output end of the encoding module is connected to the input end of the unequal arm coupler C1, and an output end of the unequal arm coupler C1 is connected to the first receiving end Bob1 The input end is connected, ...

Embodiment 2

[0049] Such as image 3 As shown, a quantum key distribution system against blinding attacks includes a sending end and a receiving end, the sending end includes a single photon source and an encoding module that generates photons, and the photons emitted by the single photon source are encoded by the encoding module; The receiving end includes a decoding module, an equal ratio coupler C2, a first unequal arm coupler C21, a second unequal arm coupler C22, detectors D01, D11, D02, D12; the output end of the decoding module is coupled with an equal ratio The input end of the proportional coupler C2 is connected, and an output end of the proportional coupler C2 is connected with the input end of the first unequal arm coupler C21, and the other output end of the proportional coupler C2 is connected with the second unequal arm coupler C22. The input ends are connected, the first unequal arm coupler C21 is connected to the detectors D01 and D11 respectively; the second unequal arm c...

Embodiment 3

[0052] Such as Figure 4 As shown, a quantum key distribution system against blinding attacks includes a sending end and a receiving end. The sending end includes a single photon source that generates photons and an encoding module. The photons emitted by the single photon source are encoded by the encoding module; the receiving end includes The unequal arm coupler C3, the first decoding module, the second decoding module, the first delay line DL1, the second delay line DL2, the detector D0 and the detector D1, and the sending end uses the unequal arm coupler C3 to separate the photon information Send to the first decoding module and the second decoding module; the output end of the first decoding module is connected to the first delay line DL1 through the equi-arm coupler, and then connected to the detector D1; the output end of the second decoding module is connected through the equi-arm coupler The coupler is connected to the second delay line DL2, which in turn is connecte...

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Abstract

The invention discloses a quantum key distribution system for resisting a blinding attack. The quantum key distribution system comprises a transmitting end and a receiving end, wherein the transmitting end comprises a single photon source for generating photons and an encoding module; the single photon source and the encoding module are successively connected; the receiving end comprises an unequal-arm coupler, a first receiving end and a second receiving end; and the encoded photon information is respectively transmitted to the first receiving end and the second receiving end by the transmitting end through the unequal-arm coupler. According to the quantum key distribution system, the blinding attack is resisted by changing the structure of an optical decoding unit of the receiving end; the blinding attack can be effectively resisted; and meanwhile, the influence on an original communication system is small.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention belongs to the field of quantum key distribution, in particular to a quantum key distribution system against blinding attacks. Background technique [0002] Quantum key distribution has theoretically unconditional security, but due to the actual implementation process, the technical loopholes brought about by the non-ideality of actual devices can be exploited by eavesdroppers, for example, the pulses sent by quasi-single photon sources contain multiple The photon number beam splitting attack implemented by the vulnerability of 1 photon, the attack of accurately knowing the intensity and Poisson distribution of the light source of the sender (Alice) and making Alice's light source an untrusted light source, and the false state implemented by using the detector efficiency mismatch Attacks and time-shift attacks, large pulse attacks that use reflected light from optical devices to analyze the encoded information of the source, blinding atta...

Claims

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Application Information

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IPC IPC(8): H04L9/08
Inventor 王虹王金东李华锃魏正军张智明刘颂豪
Owner SOUTH CHINA NORMAL UNIVERSITY
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